STUDIES IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Prof. R. D. Ranade

Edited and Annotated

By

B. R. Kulkarni

Part I

1996

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(Annotated)

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FOREWORD

(First Edition)

It has always been my earnest desire to preserve every word of Shri Gurudev and to offer it to the world of scholarship. I am exceedingly happy that the present work is being published under the auspices of the Sahitya Samskriti Mandal, Maharashtra State. My thanks are due to them.

The work, though partly in the form of Notes, will be found highly useful by students of philosophy and research scholars.

It is with great satisfaction that I place this scholarly treatise in the hands of all those interested in Philosophy and Religion.

Bombay
20th March 1986.

(Mrs.) VIJAYA V. APTE

PREFACE

(First Edition)

It is our great privilege to publish 'Studies in Indian Philosophy', by late Prof. R. D. Ranade, a doyen of Indian Philosophy.

The history of philosophy is its own critique. The historical process involves development, evaluation, attempt at cancellation and rehabilitation of doctrines. Different Darsanas of Indian philosophy have their own basic assumptions which they sometimes share with others. Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga or Dvaita Vedanta all share the doctrine of the reality of the world. Similarly, Buddhism and Jainism, though very different in approach from Advaita Vedanta, share with the latter several epistemological doctrines. The Advaita system itself, to which Shri Ranade belongs, has developed on account of the intellectual warfare with other philosophical systems and the conflicts arising within the system itself. Comparisons and criticisms have always helped development of philosophical thought. This is borne out by the present work also, though briefly. We wish we had a fuller exposition of such comparison from this great master.

We are happy that we are able to publish this yet unpublished work during Professor Ranade's Birth Centenary Year. The Board deems it an honour that Shri Gurudev R. D. Ranade Samadhi Trust, Nimbal (R. S.), has asked the Board to undertake the publication of this Volume. What more befitting tribute can be paid to late Professor R. D. Ranade, than bringing to light his hitherto unpublished works?

Bombay :
Gudi Padava
Chaitra Shuddha Pratipada
Shake 1908
10th April 1986.

S. S. BARLINGAY
Chairman,
Maharashtra State Board for
Literature and Culture, Bombay

EDITORIAL NOTE
(First Edition)

The preservation of the thought of the Master throws on the disciple a special responsibility of propagating his philosophy in all its pristine purity. What a disciple or an Editor can do is to add a foot-note here or a foot-note there.

The Notes left by Gurudev R. D. Ranade are valuable and constitute a rich heritage. They contain original suggestions and judgments and thus make a contribution to world-scholarship in general and to Indian Philosophy in particular. They are highly critical in value; though succinct, they are very lucid couched that they are in a simple style. The logical and developmental manner of arrangement of topics reflects his method of study and presentation. It is our confidence that many a research scholar would be benefited by a study of these Notes as they give a new vision to look at Indian Philosophy. Particular mention may be made of two sections of Mīmāṃsā System, namely the Doctrine of Śabda and the Doctrine of Sphoṭa. The topic "Contribution to the Science of Interpretation", will be very valuable for those who are interested in the study of Linguistics, and by those who want to specialise in the interpretation of the Hindu Law. In fact, the science of interpretation is a basic discipline. These days there are very few who study and appreciate the value of Mīmāṃsā Philosophy. Unfortunately, it is dubbed as meaningless ritualism. The two sections treated in the present brochure are an epitome of the fundamental Mīmāṃsā teachings. In our opinion, students of Linguistics cannot afford to disregard Mīmāṃsā doctrines.

The Notes are unbiased and do not advocate any particular 'ism' of philosophy. Both the orthodox and heterodox schools are subjected to a severe criticism whenever their theory is not in conformity with logical reasoning. Neither the thrill of poetry nor an emotional out-burst is allowed to have an edge over cool philosophical reasoning.

Under Six Systems (Ṣaḍ-darśanas), Gurudev has included: (i) Sāṅkhya, (ii) Yoga, (iii) Buddhism, (iv) Jainism, (v) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and (vi) Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. This classification is different from the traditional one which (a) does not include Buddhism and Jainism, (b) treats Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as separate systems and (c) includes Vedānta or Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. His new classification seems to be oriented towards grouping non-Vedāntic Schools together and treating them as Pūrva-pakṣas, and as such Vedānta, constituting Uttara-pakṣa, is taken out of the traditional fold. By the by the stand-point of the Uttara-pakṣa, namely Vedānta, has already been elucidated in his volume, 'Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought' published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay in 1970. A few of the Notes with some exposition appear in the above-mentioned volume.

Gurudev Ranade's interpretation of any doctrine is most natural. While scholars – both eastern and western – have laboured hard to understand correctly the import of the Buddhistic doctrine of Pratītya-samutpāda, Gurudev takes the term in its most natural sense. He splits the word into two parts – Pratīti + Asamutpāda which means that in Pratīti or intuition, there is Asamutpāda i.e. non-creation of the world (P. 20). Only a God-realiser can give such an interpretation.

It is really wonderful how he would translate a technical term from Indian Philosophy into a technical term from Western Philosophy instead of just explaining its meaning. Thus the technical term Nayābhāsa (opposing standpoint) found in Jaina epistemology is rendered into the Kantian term Antinomy.

His mathematical brain would always incline towards graphic presentation of the data wherever possible. Thus he would divide a page into two sections to present side by side the views of Prabhākara and Kumārila on all topics so that the similarities and differences between the two philosophical heavy weights (Pp. 68 ff) become at once obvious. The symbolic

representation of systems expressing varying views on validity of knowledge (P. 53) makes the whole discussion precise and clear.

The salient features of his writings– systematisation, comparative approach, clarity of thought and lucidity of exposition, chaste language, employment of apt western terminology and doctrines to display ancient Indian thought in the modern out-fit to make it more appealing – are all present in these Notes though many of which are just jottings.

Mostly Gurudev Ranade has not – barring one or two places (e.g. P. 46) – specifically mentioned his own judgments regarding a topic dealt with. But the brief outline of a topic is interspersed with his own comments which can be easily noted by a discerning reader. At times there are brief summaries of standard works on a particular philosopher or a topic kept ready for critical exposition.

Sometimes two drafts of a section are given – one rough and one fair. If there is a specific instruction to omit the rough draft, it is omitted. If, however, there is no such specific instruction, the rough draft too is retained. In the latter case a comparative study of both the drafts shows how the topics were rearranged, the rearrangement showing that Prof. Ranade was always thinking of the subject in order to put it in a still more systematic way. In this connection, we may refer to two drafts of the subject-headings of his Vedanta and Western Thought one of which was prepared as early as 1927.

Sometimes the sub-sections are indicated as 1, 2, 3...; sometimes as i, ii, iii....; or A, B, C....; or even a, b, c....; bracketed or unbracketed. As every system was prepared independently and as these are but Notes, his usual rigour of maintaining uniformity is not found here. Again, we do not know whether he wanted to develop each system into a separate book or prepare one single volume comprising all the Six Systems.

Notes on one section 'Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla' place for which is indicated in Chapter III as well as Chapter V, are not available. It is mentioned that this section is typed separately, but nowhere could it be found. So too "Analysis" of the Yoga Sūtras referred to on Pp. 13 and 16 could not be traced.

We have also included here his plan of the Pathway to God bearing the sub-title: A Study in the Philosophy of Beatificism. He wanted to write a volume on the Pathway to God (see P. 109) for which his works on the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad-gītā, Vedānta or the Three Pathways (Pathway to God in Marathi Literature, Pathway to God in Hindi Literature and Pathway to God in Kannada Literature) would constitute the basis.

Some of these Notes were taught by Shri Gurudev to his M. A. students.

Gurudev's Bibliography given at the end of each of the Six Systems would be found useful by those who want to undertake an intensive study of a system. The bibliography is not just a list of books; it gives an analysis of the important contents thereof. There are also thought-provoking comments which would help a student to think independently and form his own judgment. In a couple of places, Gurudev's Bibliography refers to the Call Number of a book of the Allahabad University Library.

I must express my gratitude to Mrs. Vijayatai V. Apte (daughter of Shri Gurudev) for having made available the material for publication. It is very kind of her to have written a Foreword to this volume.

My heartfelt thanks ar due to Dr. S. S. Barlingay, Chairman, Shri S. D. Deshmukh, Secretary, of Sahitya Sanskriti Mandal, Maharashtra State, as well as Members of the Mandal for the keen interest they took in the publication of this work. But for their kind gesture the work would not have seen the light of day. The indefatiguable efforts which Shri Vidyadhar Gokhale

made in the furtherance of this sacred cause are beyond all praise. Shri R. B. Alva, Director; Shri G. D. Dhond, Dy. Director; Shri P. S. More, Manager, Shri A. C. Sayyed, Dy. Manager and the concerned staff of Government Central Press, Bombay have laid us under great obligation by their valuable help in the printing of the volume.

The MS was very old and in some places difficult to decipher. It goes to the credit of Shri S. D. Shintre who took the trouble of making a clean typed copy ready for the Press. Shri V. G. Nitsure typed the Bibliography appended to the Six Systems. Shri Vyankatesh Apte and Dr. P. M. Upadhye rendered whatever help was sought from them. To all these earnest devotees who have done the job in a spirit of sacrifice our gratitude is due.

Bombay — B. R. Kulkarni
Tukarambij
Falgun Vadya Dvitiya, Sake 1907
27th March 1986.

EDITORIAL NOTE

(Second Edition)

History of Philosophy has recorded creative souls whose strength lies in illuminating flashes – like the Vedic Ṛṣis. Similarly, William James. Time the destroyer, says T. S. Eliot, is the Time preserver. It has also obliged us by producing systematic thinkers like Pāṇini or Kant who collected manifold data and arranged them in a magnificent super-structure. Nature has not been chary, but has gifted to the world, giants like Patañjali or Aristotle who combined both inspiration and system-building. Professor R. D. Ranade belongs to this illustrious syncretic group.

Professor Ranade's Birth Centenary was celebrated in July 1986. There was a plan to bring to light his unpublished writings. As part of the celebration programme, his Notes on Indian Philosophy were published under the title 'Studies in Indian Philosophy'. The Notes were published as they were. They show Professor Ranade's characteristic power of concentrating his meaning in pithy sentences winged with mystical vision and profound philosophic reflection which 'strike the mark like a cannon ball'. The cryptic statements, however, needed a detailed elucidation, and hence the present attempt.

An annotated edition of the entire text of 'Studies in Indian Philosophy' is contemplated. What is being published today is Part I of the project and covers the first six chapters of the first edition. The remaining chapters (Seven to Fourteen) would be covered in Part II.

Professor Ranade refers in his Notes to very many authors – Eastern and Western. His vast studies covered the ancient Vedic period as well as the early Greek period and took note of the works of his contemporaries as well. Dr. P. V. Kane's History of Dharma-śāstras or E. B. Holt's articles dealing with physiologism did not escape his attention. We have tried to locate

as many books as we could. Not that all books scrutinised by Professor Ranade were available, much less the editions he had used. We are keenly aware of these limitations.

In the haste to pubish the notes during the Birth Centenary celebrations, some glaring errors remained uncorrected in the first edition. They have now been rectified.

Sometimes the criticism in the notes appears to be a bit too severe. After all, the notes or jottings were lecture-points for teaching Post-graduate students of the Allahabad University. To drive home a point, over-emphasis might have been laid on a lacuna in a particular philosophic doctrine. Again, suggestions from any quarter were welcomed, and these were added to the Notes as marginalia for consideration. Some of them contained sarcastic remarks. Perhaps Professor Ranade might have deleted them in the final draft. It might also be mentioned here that the marginalia in the original notes have been fitted in the text without omitting any point. Occasionally, their exact place was not indicated in the text of the Notes leaving room for conjecture.

We are grateful to the Maharashtra State Board for Literature and Culture for granting permission to bring out the annotated edition. We record our heart-felt thanks to many scholars without whose esteemed help the annotation-work would not have been completed. Dr. (Mrs.) Shailaja Karandikar whole-heartedly supplied all information asked for. It is unfortunate that she could not see the publication of the book as death snatched her away in 1994. Dr. P. G. Lalye, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, made available translation of many an abstruse Sanskrit passage. Sanskrit grammar created stumbling blocks in our way. Dr. G. B. Palsule, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, cleared many doubts in our mind and provided detailed clarification of technical terms, especially grammatical, in addition to running to our rescue whenever we faced difficulties. Dr. P. D. Nawathe, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, explained many a terse

Mīmāṃsā doctrine. Dr. R. L. Joshi, Solapur, obliged us by explaining original Sanskrit passages and supplying documentation of Sanskrit quotations. Shri M. N. Deshpande, New Delhi, sent valuable information about Asoka Edicts as also about some topics in Jainism. Shri V. K. Wagadarikar, Bombay, threw light on some scientific concepts like Atomism. We were always welcome to Prof. H. L. Auluck's house, which itself is a veritable library. Shri G. G. Devan Dixit, Dharwad, and Dr. K.B. Dabade, Udupi, were ever ready to help us. Dr. S. G. Kulkarni, Hyderabad, supplied documentation of many philosophical classics. We could make profuse use of the Fergusson College library, Pune, and we have great pleasure in recording our indebtedness to Principal S. V. Bokil, Dr. S. M. Paralikar and Principal V. M. Bachal, who extended all help in this behalf. Special mention must be made of the authorities of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University Library Aurangabad, and of D.A.V. College Library, Solapur, where we could see valuable texts. Our profound gratitude to them. The whole credit of preparing a neat and clean Press Copy goes to Shri S. D. Shintre, Solapur. Shri N. S. Kulkarni, Solapur and Shri S. K. Joshi, Solapur helped us in checking the text. The credit for preparing the front cover goes to Shri N. S. Kulkarni, Solapur and to Sou. Sushama Agnihotri, Pune. The disciples of Gurudev R. D. Ranade who assisted us would like to remain anonymous. We express our gratitude to Navadurga Lasertech, Udupi, for accurate type-setting and to Vinand off-set Printers, Solapur for elegant printing.

There is no end to annotations. They can never be fully exhaustive. There always remains enough scope for a student to study fresh books and for the teacher to give a new orientation to a topic. Hence sufficient unto the day.....

Solapur
Ganesh Chaturthi
19th August 1995

B. R. Kulkarni

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CHAPTER I

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SĀṄKHYA

I. Introduction[1]

1. A Scientific World-view: Sāṅkhya is very old, going back to the days of the Upaniṣads, and tries to give a scientific[2]

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1 Sections I to X of this chapter cover the entire Sāṅkhya thought and are mostly evaluative. Professor Ranade had also an alternative scheme of presenting Sāṅkhya Philosophy under three heads, namely,
(i) Cosmology (Categories and Causality)
(ii) Psychology (Buddhi, Liṅga, Guṇas)
(iii) Ontology (Prakṛti and Puruṣa)
Perhaps the ten Sections treated in the present text would have been re-arranged under these three major heads in his final exposition. Section I (Introduction), Section II (Criticism of Sāṅkhya Categories) and Section IV (Sāṅkhya Doctrine of Causality) would have gone under Cosmology. Section V (The Schematic Function of Buddhi), Section VI (Doctrine of Liṅga-śarīra) and Section VII (Relation of the Guṇas to Prakṛti) would have been covered by Psychology. Finally, Ontology would have included Section III (Evaluation of Arguments for the Existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣa), Section VIII (Criticism of the Nature of Prakṛti), Section IX (Criticism of the Nature of Puruṣa) and Section X (The Sāṅkhya Ideal).
The Kārikās referred to in the subsequent pages are from Īśvarakṛṣṇa's 'Sāṅkhyakārikā'.

2 Science depends upon observation and experiment. Sāṅkhya world-view is naturalistic and based on observation. Sāṅkhya does not put forward any non-observable or non-inferable cause of the world like God. The Sāṅkhya Prakṛti which is the ultimate cause of the world, though not observable, is inferable.

explanation of Reality; cf. Homer[3] and Thales[4]. Evolutionism[5]. Realistic[6] atheistic[7] spiritualism[8].

The proofs for the existence of Prakṛti depend on inference i.e., from the actual to the potential or from effect to cause. Sāṅkhya is thus scientific.

3 Homer, the great epic poet of Greece and author of 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'. For him, all events are governed by natural laws; he does not allow any groundless beliefs or superstitions. An intellectual approach to nature is also traceable in him. As E. Zeller points out, 'Beneath the surface of the heroic poetry and its myths the Logos begins to stir, soon to grow bold and raise its head'. (Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Co. Ltd., London, 1931, P. 10).

4 Thales (about 7th century B.C.), a thinker from Greece, was a philosopher of the physical school. He sought to find within Nature an explanation of everything. "The Principle of all things is water", he says, "all comes from water and to water all returns". Eslewhere Prof. Ranade calls Thales the inaugurator of a philosophy of nature in Greece. (See Philosophical and Other Essays, Part I, Shri Gurudev Ranade Satkar Samiti, Jamkhandi, District Bijapur, Karnatak, 1956, P. 79).

5 Evolution means actualisation of the potential. From Avyakta (non-manifest) Prakṛti, the Vyakta (manifest) world evolves or comes out.

6 Sāṅkhya is realistic because according to it, the world is real and not illusory. Again, the existence of Prakṛti or matter is not dependent on any cognising spirit (is independent of any cognitive relation).

7 Sāṅkhya does not believe in the existence of God.

8 Sāṅkhya Puruṣa is spiritual – a conscious entity, and the aim of Sāṅkhya is liberation of Puruṣa from Prakṛti. Liberation consists in recognition by Puruṣa (the spiritual principle), that

2. The Criteria of Truth: Recognition of Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda. As scientists[9], the Sāṅkhya philosophers attach great value to Pratyakṣa. As rationalists, they credit Anumāna with the power of proving even the super-sensuous[10] (अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् Kārikā 6). Āpta-vākya recognised (Kārikās 4 and 5), but misinterpreted. This means that the Sāṅkhya philosophers want to interpret the Upaniṣads as supporting Sāṅkhya philosophy only, that is to say, a pluralistic.[11] spiritualistic atheism. They take Upaniṣadic passages and foist a philosophy of their own thereon.[12] प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हण.[13]

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he is different from Prakṛti (the non-spiritual entity). Liberation is reiteration of the spiritual principle or to put it in other words, liberation is the soul's abiding in its own nature.

9 See Foot Note 2 above.

10 The super-sensuous here means the Avyakta Prakṛti.

11 Sāṅkhya advocates that there are many Puruṣas or souls and not one Puruṣa, and hence it is pluralistic.

12 See Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra II.2.1 : सांख्यादयः स्वपक्षस्थापनाय वेदान्तवाक्यान्यपि उदाहृत्य स्वपक्षानुगुण्येन एव योजयन्तः व्याचक्षते। (As the Sāṅkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedānta-passages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems....). (The Vedānta-sūtras with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya, Tr. George Thibaut, Part I, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1890, P. 364)

13 प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हण न्याय is a maxim of defeating a formidable foe. It means that by conquering the most powerful enemy, you have conquered all the lesser ones. It refers to the game of wrestling where, by defeating the mightiest wrestler (प्रधानमल्ल), one automatically gains a victory over the minor ones. Sāṅkhya is referred to as the mightiest adversary because (a) it comes very

3. Heterodox System: Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā should all be excluded from the 'orthodox' systems;[14] Sāṅkhya, because Nirīśvara; Vaiśeṣika because no Āptavākya and Mīmāṃsā, because no necessity of God. It is curious that in the three doublets – Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta, the first is heterodox and the second orthodox; probably a movement of thought.

II. Criticism of Sāṅkhya Categories



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near to the Vedāntic doctrine of non-difference of cause and effect; (b) it is supported by somewhat weighty arguments; and (c) it is also accepted by some authorities like Devala and so on who follow the Veda.

14 There are two Schools of Indian Philosophy – orthodox (Āstika) and heterodox (Nāstika). Traditionally the term Āstika refers to those who believe in the authority of the Vedas. Nāstikas are those who do not accept Vedic authority (नास्तिको वेदनिंदकः). On this count, Vaiśeṣika is excluded from the orthodox systems. The terms Āstika and Nāstika also mean those who believe in the existence of God and those who deny the existence of God respectively. Hence Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā have no claim to be orthodox systems. Professor Ranade's standpoint seems to combine both the meanings. So Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā are characterised as heterodox or Nāstika.



1. Four logical combinations, because two co-present and co-eternal entities: Prakṛti, Prakṛti-Vikṛti, Vikṛti and

15 The category '5 Prāṇas' is mentioned in Prof. Ranade's notes. The Pañca-prāṇas do not form part of the Sāṅkhya categories. Perhaps Prof. Ranade would have given his comments regarding their place in the Sāṅkhya scheme. However, while commenting on Kārikā 29 which deals with the three internal organs, namely, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra and Manas, he observes : ".... also the five Prāṇas are here specified" (See analytical survey of Kārikas below). Professor Ranade had his own reservations about the Pañca-prāṇas not being included in the Sāṅkhya scheme. He says : "we have a famous passage in Īśwara-kṛṣṇa which describes the twenty five Tattvas :
मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिः न विकृतिः पुरुषः ।।
If we just think of the lacuna in this enunciation of Kapila, we shall see that he has not made any mention of five Prāṇas. The five Jñānendriyas are there; the five Karmendriyas are there; the five Mahābhūtas are there; the five Tanmātras are there; and five other entities are there, but there is no mention of the Pañca-prāṇas" (Pathway to God in Hindi Literature, Second Edition, Shri Gurudev Ranade Samadhi Trust, Nimbal, R.S. Dist., Bijapur, Karnatak, 1986, P. 263). See also Lokamanya Tilak's गीतारहस्य, Tilak Mandir, 568 Narayan Peth, Pune 411030, 7th edition, 1956, P. 169.

Na-prakṛti-na-vikṛti; cf. Aristotle, Moved, Mover, Neither, Both;[16] also cf. Yoga : Śukla, Kṛṣṇa, Śukla-kṛṣṇa and Aśuklākṛṣṇa.[17]

2. Mahat, the cosmic principle, cannot be identified with Buddhi, the psychic principle. (a) Implicit parallelism in the equation of Mahat and Buddhi, the cosmic and the psychic as in the attributes of Spinoza. (b) Not even parallelism but an identitat philosophy in the huddling up of mind and matter.[18]

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16 In Aristotle, form and matter are two principles. Form is always the mover and matter always the moved. God is pure form and is the mover. Pure matter is the moved (though pure matter does not exist). All things in the world are combinations of form and matter, and as such are both mover and moved. Corresponding to the category of 'neither mover nor moved', there is nothing in Aristotle. So in Aristotle, the class, 'both mover and moved' is the widest because all things except pure form and pure matter are included therein; 'mover' is a unimember class with God as the only member; while 'moved' as well as 'neither mover nor moved' are null-classes as they have no members.

17 For explanation, see below, Chapter II Section IV 8 (d).

18 In Spinoza's philosophy, thought and extension are attributes of the Substance and are parallel. The same thought and extension when referred to the individual, become mind and body. In Sāṅkhyan parlance, thought is cosmic (Mahat) and mind is individual (Buddhi). In Spinoza, thought is spiritual while extension is material. But in Sāṅkhya, Mahat and Buddhi, being evolutes of Prakṛti, are identical as they are material (Jaḍa). So the Spinozistic distinction between thought and extension does not hold in Sāṅkhya. The parallelism is true as regards the cosmic and the psychic, but not as regards thought

3. Violation of the law of Satkāryavāda, the vaunted Sāṅkhya doctrine of causality. There must not be more in the effect than in the cause. It is wonderful how from the unintelligent Prakṛti, the intelligent Buddhi could spring. This means that non-intelligence is superior to intelligence.

4. (a) Ahaṅkāra, a superfluous category, sometimes dropped even by the Sāṅkhya philosophers in the concept of Liṅga-śarīra (सप्तदशैकं लिंगम् 17 or 18); 17 + 1, महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् (Kārikā 40), dropping Ahaṅkāra it is 17.[19] (b) The ego, according to the scheme, becomes a product of nature. Contrast, however, the Puruṣa.[20]

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and extension, for both mind and matter are covered by what Spinoza calls extension.

19 Śaṅkara in his Pañcīkaraṇa speaks of Liṅga-śarīra as comprising of 17 elements : 5 Prāṇas + 10 Indriyas + Manas + Buddhi. Here Ahaṅkāra is excluded. It is surprising how there can be a Liṅga-śarīra without Ahaṅkāra. Apart from metaphysical quibblings, it sounds unconvincing both psychologically and ethically that there can be Liṅga-śarīra without Ahaṅkāra. In fact, Ahaṅkāra seems to be both necessary and sufficient to compel a man to take re-birth; traces of past actions (Saṃskāras) and unfulfilled desires lead to the cycles of birth and death. With the destruction of Ahaṅkāra, the very root of transmigration is destroyed. Egolessness is the ethical characteristic of a Jīvan-mukta. For a Jīvan-mukta, there is Anāvṛtti (no return to mundane life) mainly because he is free from Ahaṅkāra.

20 In Sāṅkhya metaphysics Puruṣa is independent of Ahaṅkāra, though in ordinary parlance, Puruṣa is invariably associated with the principle of 'self'-assertion (Ahaṅkāra). Ahaṅkāra is an evolute of Prakṛti.

5. Tanmātras and Mahābhūtas: (a) The priority of functions to structures.[21] (b) Also qualities (Śabda, Sparśa, Rūpa, Rasa and Gandha) as (c) essences of substances or elements (Ākāśa, Vāyu, Tejas, Ap, Pṛthvī) (Kārikā 38). The Tanmātras are the first to exist, but the last to be known[22] cf. Aristotle.[23] Idealism vs. Naturalism.[24]

6. The unsatisfactory position assigned to Manas. (a) Doctrine of Inner Sense, (2, 3, 4, 5).[25] The triple internal organ; not treated

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21 Biologically, Functionalism explains the process of adaptation of the organism to the environment. It is a basic operative principle of evolutionism. From the practical and utilitarian point of view, priority of functions is a more acceptable principle. Function is primary and for that purpose, structure is evolved, e.g. the function of seeing is fundamental, and for its realisation, the eye is evolved.

22 The Tanmātras or subtle elements are the essences of the gross elements and as such precede the latter in existence. They are not directly known, but are inferred through the gross elements which are first known.

23 Form is the fundamental reality, and hence, is first to exist. Matter without form is mere potentiality and does not exist in itself. It realises form and becomes actual. And through this process, form is known (See E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, Pp. 174 ff.).

24 In idealism there is priority of ideas or thought as against naturalism where structure or matter is prior. As the Tanmātra-Mahābhūta relation is functionalistic, it is idealism and not naturalism (See Foot Note 21 above).

25 Which are the constituents of inner sense – that seems to be the question mooted here. Various views held as regards the exact number of the constituents can be mentioned :

accurately from the psychological point of view. If Manas is an internal organ like Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra, it must be on a par with them, and cannot be their off-spring. While Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra are products as well as productive, the Manas is only a product. (b) Moreover, Manas partakes both of intelligence and activity, from the Jñānendriyas and Karmendriyas respectively. Hence, in a way, it is superior both to Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Intelligence and activity made compatible in Manas.

III. Evaluation of Arguments for the Existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣa

1. Arguments[26] for the existence of Prakṛti : Three main proofs for the existence of Prakṛti :

Two constituents: When sometimes the Sāṅkhyas say that the Liṅga-śarīra consists of 17 principles (eliminating Ahaṅkāra), the inner sense or Antaḥkaraṇa would consist of only 2 elements, namely, Manas and Buddhi.

Three constituents: The usual sense of Antaḥkaraṇa is Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra.

Four constituents: Sometimes there is mention of Antaḥkaraṇa catuṣṭaya, i.e. Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra and Citta. Cf. Śaṅkara's निर्वाणषट्क - मनोबुद्ध्यहंकारचित्तानि नाहम् ।

Five constituents: Rāmadāsa, the great saint of Maharashtra, speaks of Antaḥkaraṇa-pañcaka (Dāsabodha XVII. 8. 3–10) i.e., (i) Antaḥkaraṇa (it means that stage of awareness without any mental modifications. This can be compared to Asmitā of the Yoga system. (See below, Chapter II, Foot Note 25). (ii) Manas (iii) Buddhi (iv) Ahaṅkāra, and (v) Citta.

26 While teaching the topic in the class, Prof. Ranade summarised the arguments as follows: (a) The limit implies the unlimited, the manifested the unmanifested (Kārikās 7, 8, 9); (b) the parts imply the whole, the many the one; the heterogenous the

भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् कार्यतः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
कारणकार्यविभागाद् अविभागाद् वैश्वरूप्यस्य ।। (Kārikā 15)

From Finite to Infinite: From *Peras* to *Apeiron*, from Effect to Cause (if there is identity of cause and effect in Sāṅkhya, why should it argue from effect to cause?) and from Plurality to Unity (Avibhāga or indivisibility of cosmic substance). Prakṛti or the Avyakta, which according to Sāṅkhya is super-sensuous, is in the system proved not by intuition, but by Anumāna (Kārikā 6 अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात्). Such a great importance the Sāṅkhya philosophers attribute to the method of inference. Inference from the Vyaktas must lead not to Avyakta, as in the system, but to Jña or Spirit. Interposition of Avyakta between Vyakta and Jña, gratuitous. There must, again, be a 'Sacetana' cause for Prakṛti, as Śaṅkara contends.[27] The arguments for Prakṛti only prove the Spirit.

2. Arguments for the Existence of Puruṣa : Three main proofs for the existence of Puruṣa.[28]

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homogenous; (c) the effect implies the cause.

27 Inference from the Vyaktas should lead to a conscious subject and not to the unconscious Avyakta; therefore, the inference should lead to Jña, the knower, and no intermediate stage of Avyakta is necessary; because, Avyakta or unconscious Prakṛti cannot be an architect (See Śaṅkara's commentary on Vedānta-sūtra II. 2.1). Creation can take place only under the supervision of a conscious agent. We can directly infer Jña or Puruṣa from the Vyaktas or Mahābhūtas. Incidentally, we notice here Professor Ranade's usual tendency to reduce plurality of categories to one category.

28 The three proofs are: (i) Immanent Teleology (ii) Contraries and (iii) Substratum. Professor Ranade's lecture-points explain

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ।। (Kārikā 17)

Saṅghāta = Bond. Proofs from Immanent Teleology[29] (or *Vinculum Substantiale* – there must be a *Vinculum* for all complexes), Contraries and Substratum. (No proofs for Puruṣa should have been given; only for Puruṣas).

3. Plurality of Puruṣas : (a) Differentiation of organs, (b) Unsimultaneity of actions and (c) Variety of enjoyments:

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत् प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ।। (Kārikā 18)

Pluralism (McTaggart).[30] The Vedāntin Ānandabodha in his

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these arguments as under:
(a) All complexes are for an ulterior end : Teleological argument.
(b) The enjoyed implies the enjoyer (But the done does not imply the doer).
(c) The eternal quest for release seen in sages and others, which implies the existence of their selves. The Will to absolution. Cf. Will to Live in Schopenhauer.
(d) The Triguṇas indicate Nistraiguṇya; argument from opposites like Plato's "life" and "death" in Phaedo.
(e) There must be an eternal ground (why not Prakṛti alone?)
Of these (a), (b), (c) are from Immanent Teleology, (d) is from Contraries and (e) is from Substratum.

29 Things are created to serve the purpose of Puruṣa. That purpose is self-realisation or separateness from Prakṛti. This realisation is not external to man, it is in-built. There is an inner bond (*vinculum*) between all things and Puruṣa, in as much as things serve his purpose. This is immanent teleology.

30 "....we find a great resemblance between the plural souls of the

Nyāya-makaranda criticises these Sāṅkhya arguments for the plurality of selves. See Das Gupta Vol. II.[31]

4. Evaluation. Intimations of the great philosophical proofs of Reality. Recognition of the cosmological or causal argument, of the teleogical or design argument, of the logical argument from contraries, and of the ontological argument from the substratum, substance or background.[32]

IV. Sāṅkhya Doctrine of Causality

1. The Sāṅkhya philosopher speaks not merely about Pariṇāma but even about Sarga (Kārikā 21) and Prasava (Kārikā 11), which is creation. The mere presence of Puruṣa (Puruṣa-sannidhi) is the cause of creation. Pariṇāma vs. Sarga. Transformism vs. Creationism. Loose terminology.[33] "Puruṣa-sannidhi" reminds

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Sāṅkhya without a ruling God, and the "system of selves or spirits, uncreated and eternal, forming together a unity but not a conscious unity" of the non-theistic Idealist McTaggart....And, it is curious to find that while McTaggart's philosophy is non-theistic, Sāṅkhya is also nirīśvara (God-less)" (R.D. Ranade, Essays and Reflections, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Chowpatty Road, Bombay–400 007, 1964, P. 10).

31 S.N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Cambridge, At the University Press, Cambridge, 1922, P. 116.

32 The cosmological argument, the ontological argument and the teleological argument for proving the existence of God are famous in the history of Western Philosophy. Rene Descartes and St. Anselm are fore-runners of these arguments. However, the arguments have been ruthlessly criticised by Immanuel Kant. The point to be noted is that so ancient a system like Sāṅkhya could put forward these arguments. This itself is admirable.

33 In परिणामवाद (Transformism) the cause itself becomes effect

one of the world's desire for God in Aristotle.[34] God, a magnet.[35]

2. Causation is referred to the sphere of Nature and has no application to Puruṣa; cf. Kant.[36]

3. Two different conceptions of causality in Sāṅkhya : Separateness of Cause and Effect (Kārikā 15), and Identity (cf. Bradley and Vedānta) of cause and effect (कार्यं सत् कारणभावात् Kārikā 9, or अविभागाद् वैश्वरूप्यस्य). Tādātmya or Ananyatva, on a lower level than Gauḍapāda's Ajāti,[37] cf. Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on

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and does not remain a separate entity. When milk is transformed into curds milk ceases to exist. In सर्ग or प्रसव (creation) there are two entities, one giving rise to another, the creator and the created. And after creation, the duo would still remain. The Tanmātras after giving rise to Mahābhūtas still remain Tanmātras. Hence the terms परिणाम and सर्ग cannot be used inter-changeably.

34 According to Aristotle matter as potentiality has a desire for actuality (form) that is good and divine. The absolutely perfect being is the end to which all things in the world move and strive (See E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, Pp. 176–177).

35 This may be termed Theo-tropism. God acts on the world not by moving it but by attracting it towards Him. All beings desire the realisation of their essence and God constitutes this essence.

36 "The principle of Causality has no meaning and no criterion for its application save only in the sensible world". (Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, N.K. Smith (Translator), Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London, Reprinted 1970, P. 511).

37 On the hypothesis of cause and effect being identical, there is a tacit admission that cause and effect as two different entities exist. Gauḍapāda's Ajāti cuts at the very root of the controversy

Vedānta-sūtra II. 1.18. Probably, the Sāṅkhya philosophers borrowed the identity doctrine from the Vedānta.

4. (a) Śaṅkara sides with the Sāṅkhya doctrine of Satkārya-vāda, as against the Naiyāyika doctrine of Asatkārya-vāda, or Ārambha-vāda; only by Sat he means Brahman while the Sāṅkhyas mean Prakṛti. (b) Satkārya-vāda or Pariṇāma-vāda, Evolutionism or Transformism. Satkārya-vāda in Sāṅkhya (pre-formation or equilibration) and Asatkārya-vāda in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (epigenesis or new formation), both inaccurate expressions; they stand only for Satkāraṇa-vāda. Why not equate Kāraṇa with God? In Sāṅkhya, Kāraṇa is Prakṛti; in Vaiśeṣika, atoms; in Vedānta, God. All these schools join hands in Satkāraṇa-vāda. Asatkārya-vāda in Vaiśeṣika, generation from अणुs. Asatkārya-vāda in Nyāya, generation of पट from तंतुs which are already destroyed (?)[38] Asatkārya-vāda is a contradiction in terms[39], Kārya must exist previously in some shape. The Naiyāyikas are also called अर्धवैनाशिकs.[40] Vaiśeṣikas are पीलुपाकवादिन्s (generation in 7, 9, 10, 11 moments). The Naiyāyikas are पिठरपाकवादिन्s –not cumulative transformation but total transformation.[41]

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by saying that neither the cause nor the effect exists.

38 In fact, the तंतुs take different formation in पट. They are not destroyed. Were they destroyed the पट would be like the invisible dress of the King in Hans Anderson.

39 Both in Satkārya-vāda and Asatkārya-vāda, Kārya exists. When Asatkārya-vāda says that Kārya (effect) is a new thing, what is denied is Kāraṇa and not Kārya. So Kārya does exist, either in the Kāraṇa (Sāṅkhya) or as a new product (Nyāya). When Kārya is very much a reality, why say that it does not exist (असत्कार्य)?

40 See Foot Note 138, in Chapter III.

41 See Section IV. 3 (iii) in Chapter V.

5. Violation of the law of Satkārya-vāda in the evolution of the intelligent Buddhi from the non-intelligent Pradhāna. The generation of the conscious Buddhi from the unconscious Prakṛti is a violation of Sāṅkhya Satkārya-vāda.

(Three points in Sāṅkhya Psychology: (a) The Nature of Buddhi, (b) The Doctrine of Liṅga-śarīra, and (c) The Nature of Qualities).[42]

V. The Schematic Function of Buddhi

1. Nature of Buddhi: Buddhi is the unifier, the mediator, the Janus-faced[43] interpreter (Kārikās 36, 37); Time in Kant.[44] A new schematism required for any pair of schematiser and schematised.

2. Infinite regress involved in all schematism.[45]

3. Fictitious function. Why then, take exception to Semblance? Through Buddhi, Prakṛti becomes intelligent or sentient as it

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42 See Foot Note 1 above.

43 Janus is an ancient Roman deity who presided over different epochs of time. He had two faces one of which looked behind into the past and the other before into the future. He is thus Trikāla-darśī, i.e. knower of past, present and future. This power was given to Janus by Saturn for being given a shelter when the latter was driven out of heaven.

44 According to Kant, time brings together categories and sensations. This mediation is possible because time is homogeneous with both categories and sensations. Similarly Buddhi brings together Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

45 A schema brings together two things, say, A and B. But we must have another schema, namely, A1 to bring together the schema itself and A, and then again a third one, namely, A2 to bring together A and A1 and so on *ad infinitum.*

were, as Puruṣa becomes active as it were. But only, 'as it were', and not really[46] (Kārikā 20).

तस्मात् तत् संयोगादचेतनं चेतनवदिव लिंगम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ।।

VI. The Doctrine of Liṅga-śarīra

1. The Liṅga-śarīra, a good hypothesis, but incapable of proof (Kārikās 40, 41, 42).

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिंगम् ।। 40 ।।
चित्रं यथाऽश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो यथा विना छाया ।
तद्वद्विनाऽविशेषैः[47] न तिष्ठति विनाश्रयं लिंगम् ।। 41 ।।
पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसंगेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद् व्यवतिष्ठते लिंगम् ।। 42 ।।

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46 Read on this head Prof. Ranade's article: "Yājñavalkya and the Philosophy of Fictions" included in his book – Philosophical and Other Essays, Part I.

47 Professor Ranade takes the reading अविशेषैः instead of विशेषैः in Kārikā 41. The expression महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् in Kārikā 40 definitely states that the Liṅga-śarīra consists of 18 elements (Mahat (Buddhi), Ahaṅkāra, Manas, 5 sense-organs, 5 motor organs and 5 Tanmātras). Viśeṣa means the five gross elements. To say that the Liṅga-śarīra can not live without five gross elements or Sthūla-śarīra, is to assert that the Liṅga-śarīra after leaving the body on death, has to take, at that very moment, another gross body. This contradicts the Brhadāraṇyaka view (VI. 2. 14–15) that the Liṅga-śarīra passes on from one region to another. Hence the support which the Liṅga-śarīra has, is not that of Sthūla-śarīra (Viśeṣa) but that of Tanmātras (Aviśeṣa). Read: Lokamanya Tilak's गीतारहस्य, Pp. 176–179.

Compare upward, downward, absolution and bondage (Kārikās 44 and 54).[48]

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बंधः ।। 44 ।।
ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमो विशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये रजो विशाले ब्रह्मादिस्तंबपर्यन्तः ।। 54 ।।

The Bhagavad-gītā (XV. 10) says we can see it, उत्क्रामन्तम् etc.

2. The only concept in the whole History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western for the *modus operandi* of Transmigration.[49] (The horrible interpretation of Aṅguṣṭhamātra by Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious Pp. 130–132).[50]

3. A new concept of Bhāva (traces or disposition), additional to the concept of Liṅga. Also reciprocal causation of Bhāva and Liṅga.[51]

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48 Compare the Bhagavad-gītā verse: XIV. 18
ऊर्ध्वं गच्छन्ति सत्त्वस्थाः मध्ये तिष्ठन्ति राजसाः ।
जघन्यगुणवृत्तिस्था अधो गच्छन्ति तामसाः ।।

49 It is difficult to explain how the soul transmigrates or takes on another body. There must be some determining factor behind this process. The Vāsanās (desires) and Saṃskāras (traces) contribute this determining factor. As Vāsanās and Saṃskāras need some carrier, the hypothesis of Liṅga-śarīra is brought in. The Liṅga-śarīra is a connecting link between the previous birth and the subsequent birth. In the absence of the hypothesis of Liṅga-śarīra, the process of transmigration falls apart.

50 "Who this Tom-thumb is can easily be divined - the phallic symbol of the Libido. The phallus is this hero dwarf, who performs great deeds..." (Kegan Paul, London, Pp. 70, 72. We have referred to Fifth impression (1946) of Jung's book).

51 The Liṅga-śarīra exists as the carrier of Bhāvas or dispositions.

न विनाभावैर्लिंगं न विना लिंगेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।
लिंगाख्यो भावाख्यः तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।। 52 ।।

As of seed and sprout. Which is the root, and which is the fruit? Bhāvas or traces are deposited in Liṅga: cf. धर्मस्तमनुगच्छति.[52]

4. The Liṅga must retire (Vinivṛtti, Kārikā 55), or break before liberation can be attained.

5. The Liṅga must have a body (Kārikā 42). A mere encasement (Mahadādi-sūkṣma-paryantam) can not transmigrate; this would either make the Liṅga a substance, or, in the alternative, destroy the Udāsīnatva of Puruṣa,[53] and even then Transmigration would be inconsistent with the eternity of Puruṣa.[54]

6. Psychoplasm and Anlage[55]

It appears that the additional concept of Bhāvas is added, for it is they that cause the re-birth. It may be suggested that the relation between Liṅga and Bhāvas is like structure and function. Rebirth is the function of Bhāvas for which the Liṅga serves as the structure. See also Foot Note 21 above.

52 Mahābhārata, Vana Parva, Yakṣa Praśna. The verse runs as follows:
मृतम् शरीरमुत्सृत्य काष्ठलोष्टसमं क्षितौ ।
विमुखा बांधवा यान्ति धर्मस्तमनुगच्छति ।।

53 If Puruṣa transmigrates according to Vāsanās, he cannot be Udāsīna. Cf. Bhagavad-gītā verse VIII. 6 यं यं वापि स्मरन् भावम्..। Compare Kant's idea of immortal life which is posited to wipe out passions. The surd of sensibility is wiped out only after an infinite time.

54 Transmigration takes place in time. Eternity is beyond time. It is time-less-ness.

55 Anlage (German word) means foundation, the basis of a later development; it is the same as primordium. In his Lecture

VII. Relation of the Guṇas to Prakṛti. Examination of the Doctrine of Qualities

1. Is Prakṛti an aggregate or a whole? Are Guṇas components or only subsidiary? Members or parts? (strands of a rope). Are they dependent or independent, adjectival or substantival? If

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Points prepared in 1934–35 when he taught Contemporary Schools of Psychology, Prof. Ranade noted: "James Ward's Theory of Psycho-plasm corresponds to Vedāntic Liṅga-śarīra. (1) Proto-plasm, (ii) Bio-plasm, (iii) Neuro-plasm".

Plasm means fluid substance of an animal or vegetable cell. Hence psycho-plasm would imply fluid substance comprising of Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkāra.

These seem to be the psychological bases of Liṅga-śarīra.

According to James Ward the ultimate concept in biology (at the time when he wrote) is bio-plasm, i.e., life force and not a conglomeration of atoms. So too in psychology, psychical force, and not the manifold of sensations, is the explanatory concept. Psycho-plasm is the psychical force corresponding to bio-plasm or the biological force and is inheritable from parents. Psycho-plasm develops into a psychical organism. Law of heredity or inheriting characteristics from parents, implies a tendency to pass on or transmit though not actual transmission. What is inherited is the tendency to develop certain characteristics, or Anlage (See James Ward, Psychological Principles, Cambridge, at the Clarendon Press, 1933, Pp. 408 ff.).

Psycho-plasm or Anlage is then a foundation of further development and is the same as Liṅga-śarīra. It is the carrier of tendencies or Bhāvas or Saṃskāraś and, as Ward contends, though the individual is unaware of these tendencies, his life is determined by them. The modern theories of bio-plasm and psycho-plasm were anticipated by Sāṅkhya philosophers ages ago in their concept of Liṅga-śarīra.

adjectival, they are superfluous; if substantival, they are super-numerary.[56] The Guṇas have no substantival existence. Which of the two, viz., Guṇas or Prakṛti is prior, is left unsaid (Jha).

2. The condition of the Guṇas during the state of Pralaya: are they in equilibrium or are they yet dynamic?

3. The mutual relation of the Guṇas, their reciprocal generation, conquest and concert:

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्चगुणाः ॥ 12 ॥

Nistraiguṇya also; Puruṣa is beyond the reign of qualities.

4. Only three in earlier Sāṅkhya, an infinite number in later; this latter does away with the triplicity of the Guṇas. (Cf. सत्त्वादित्रयमपि व्यक्तिभेदादनन्तम् - सांख्यप्रवचन भाष्य on Sāṅkhya-sūtra I. 127). Cf. The Attributes of Spinoza.[57]

5. The Guṇas cooperate towards one purpose, viz. the satisfaction of Puruṣa (Kārikā 31), पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः. They are destroyed (nistraiguṇya), as liberation is attained. Lamp in action; wick, oil and flame: Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः Kārikā 13). In a different sense cf. प्रदीपवदावेशः तथाहि दर्शयति (वे. सू.

56 If Guṇas are adjectival, they are superfluous because a substance need not necessarily have qualities, Cf. Puruṣa who is beyond the pale of qualities. If Guṇas are substantival, they exceed the prescribed number, i.e. instead of one Prakṛti, there will be four substances, namely, Prakṛti, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

57 According to Spinoza, the Substance has infinite attributes; but human intellect knows only two, namely thought and extension.

IV. 4.15).[58] This has two meanings: either that the Atman remaining in himself illumines all existence or that the Atman enters into an infinite number of Jīvas.[59]

6. Analogy with the doctrine of Humours in Medieval Physiology;[60] or Tridoṣas in Indian Medicine.[61] Compare also the three types of modern psychology : intellectual type, feeling type, and conative type; also the eidetic types in Jaensch[62] or the types of men in Spranger[63]

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58 This Sūtra refers to the soul's entry into many bodies on the analogy of a flame of lamp multiplying itself into many flames.

59 The first alternative implies transcendence like the sun; and the second implies immanence like the vital principle or Prāṇa.

60 Cardinal Humours: Blood, phlegm, choler (yellow bile) and melancholy (black bile). Humour is any fluid of an animal considered responsible for one's health and disposition. The related types of personality are: Sanguine (hopeful), Phlegmatic (sluggish), choleric (angry) and melancholy (depressed).

61 Tridoṣas: Vitiation or derangement of the three humours of the body, namely, वात, पित्त, कफ.

62 This is based on eidetic imagery. Eidetic means unusually vivid mental images. It refers to memory images that are percept-like and are 'seen'. A child is reported to have counted buttons on the coat of a person whom he had seen and who was not before him at the moment. He was counting from the memory image, but that memory image was as vivid as actual perception. The name 'eidetic' has been used by Jaensch and his associates who related the phenomenon to personality traits (see Jaensch E.R., Eidetic Imagery and Typological Methods of Investigation, 1930). The types according to Jaensch are : Form-type, Light-type, Colour-type, Sound-type or Word-type.

63 Spranger mentions the following types: (i) Theoretic, Cognitive

or Carlyle.[64]

VIII. Criticism of the Nature of Prakṛti

1. Personality: The personality of Prakṛti is seen from the Andha-paṅgu-nyāya, (Kārikā 21). Buddhi lifts up the Paṅgu over the shoulders of the Andha (Andha-paṅgu-nyāya applied also to Karma and Jñāna).[65] The milk and the calf, no doubt (Kārikā 57); but the cow is neglected![66]

2. The actress or dancing girl or नर्तकी (नट्वद् व्यवतिष्ठते लिंगम्). Cf. U.P. and Bengal, where dancing is regarded as an art. Sexual imagery. She is also very tender सुकुमार. She is rainbow coloured.

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ।। (Kārikā 63)

The colours are the प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त. सप्तहस्तासोऽस्य.[67] White light = seven prismatic colours.

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or Scientific, (ii) Economic man, (iii) Aesthetic type, (iv) Social type, (v) Man of Power, (vi) Religious.

64 Types according to Carlyle are: (i) Hero as Divinity, (ii) Hero as Prophet, (iii) Hero as Poet, (iv) Hero as Priest, (v) Hero as Man of Letters, (vi) Hero as King.

65 There should be cooperation between कर्म and ज्ञान i.e. power and insight. A ज्ञानिन् should not leave कर्म. And a real activist should not be irrational or ignorant.

66 It is not un-intelligent milk which ministers to the development of the calf; but it is the intelligent cow. Similarly unintelligent Prakṛti by itself cannot work for the emancipation of Puruṣa. There must be some intelligent director behind Prakṛti and that is God.

67 The reference is to a Mantra is Ṛgveda.
चत्वारि शृंगा त्रयो अस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासो अस्य ।
त्रिधा बद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्त्यान् आविवेश ।। (IV. 58. 3)

3. Benefactress

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ।। 58 ।।

Prakṛti is generous (Guṇavatī) while Puruṣa ungrateful (Aguṇa). Guṇa = virtue or quality or also strand.

नानाविधैरुपायैः उपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकं चरति ।। 60 ।।

4. Modest

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किंचिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टाऽस्मीति पुनः न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ।। 61 ।।

and therefore evanescent, सुकुमार. Dalliance with a mental creation.[68] Two co-present and co-eternal entities,-one of which is likely to be evanescent, passes beyond philosophic comprehension. Retiring of the dancing girl (Kārikā 59). Mutual retirement : "I am seen". "I am the Seer".

दृष्टा मया इत्येको दृष्टाऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।
सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य ।। 66 ।।

5. Relativism. The Prakṛti retires for the released soul, but continues to exercise her function for the others. This makes Prakṛti subjective. She is, and is not. Why not Prakṛti a semblance or an Āvaraṇa? Why not equate with Māyā? Subjective and illusory. The vaunted Sāṅkhya realism does not hold much water.

(He has four horns, three feet, two heads, seven hands. The Bull sovereign God, showerer of all bounties, has settled Himself in human beings, where, being chained by the three, He bellows). This is a description of अग्नि the Fire-God.

68 Here too there is a mental creation of a beautiful woman in which form Prakṛti is presented.

Why not have a multiplicity of Prakṛtis for a multiplicity of Puruṣas? (Kārikā 18).

6. It is not the Puruṣa who is bound or emancipated, or transmigrates,

तस्मान्नबध्यते नापि मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ 62 ॥

but it is the Prakṛti, which is emancipated (कैवल्यार्थं प्रधानस्य, Kārikā 21).

IX. Criticism of the Nature of Puruṣa

1. The Puruṣa not entirely Udāsīna (Kārikā 65) or Upekṣaka (Kārikā 66). No doubt, he is described as looking at Prakṛti unconcerned. He has a purpose (Puruṣārtha), which is the motive to action. The Indriyas, the Guṇas, the Liṅga and the Prakṛti are all described as contributing to this Puruṣartha; cf.

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूत हेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ 31 ॥
(प्रतिपद्यन्ते, namely करणानि)

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्यबुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ 36 ॥
(एते गुणविशेषाः, namely गुणाः)

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसंगेन ।
प्रकृतेः विभुत्वयोगात् नटवद् व्यवतिष्ठते लिंगम् ॥ 42 ॥
रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नाति आत्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव पुरुषार्थं प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ 63 ॥
(लिंगम्, सैव च, namely प्रकृतिः)

2. The Puruṣa is described as Sākṣī, Kevala, Draṣṭā etc.

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ 19 ॥

But he cannot be a Sākṣī or Cetā, because this implies intelligence, and intelligence is Jaḍa (Prākṛtika);

cf. Bergson.[69]

Puruṣa is said to be neither Prakṛti, nor Vikṛti nor Prakṛti-vikṛti; and Buddhi is Prākṛtika. Sākṣitva might involve intuition and not intelligence.

3. Moral responsibility entirely shelved. The *vicarious* suffering of Puruṣa. Wife purchases articles and husband has to pay. The Prakṛti sows, and the Puruṣa reaps. Cf. The vicarious suffering of both the Puruṣa and Paramātman in the Bhagavad-gītā:

कार्यकारणकर्तृत्वे हेतुः प्रकृतिरुच्यते ।

पुरुषः सुखदुःखानाम् भोक्तृत्वे हेतुरुच्यते (XIII. 21)[70]

and भर्ता भोक्ता महेश्वरः परमात्मा (XIII. 23)[71]. Double fault in the Bhagavad-gītā.[72]

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69 According to Bergson, intellect analyses Reality into static stereo-types and arranges them. In this endeavour, the living Reality escapes from its grasp. Likewise the Sāṅkhya intellect can not be a characteristic of Puruṣa. Reality can not be grasped by mediate intellect, but by immediate experience or intuition. In this sense Sākṣitva may imply intuition. In his Lecture on Bergson's Creative Evolution, Professor Ranade notes: Life = Change = Intuition = Duration.

70 In some editions of the Bhagavad-gītā, one more verse is added at the beginning of XIII Adhyāya. It seems, Prof. Ranade's student who wrote the Sanskrit verse in the MS used such an edition. In most of the Bhagavad-gītā editions, these verses appear as 20 and 22 respectively. (For further explanation, see Lokamanya Tilak's Gitā-rahasya, 7th edition, P. 763).

71 See Foot Note 70, above.

72 In the first place, the Gītā toes the line of Sāṅkhya by saying that Prakṛti sows and Puruṣa reaps. This contradicts the ethical maxim that he who sows must reap. Secondly, in holding that

4. Puruṣa in the singular in Kārikā 1. Unconscious monism. The psycho-analytic back-ground of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's mind.[73]

X. The Sāṅkhya Ideal

1. Poetic and not philosophic presentation. The dancing girl retires. The Liṅga-śarīra breaks; the Guṇas commit suicide: their true intent is all for the delight or satisfaction of Puruṣa. Aristotle on Plato. A poetical fancy.[74]

2. The Sāṅkhya ideal, negative. Removal of suffering. No beatification, no joy. Cf. Painlessness in Nyāya. दुःखत्रयाभिघातात्..... तदवघातके हेतौ (Kārikā 1). Elimination of sorrow.[75]

God is the enjoyer, the Gītā sets at naught the transcendent nature of God. We have to note that in his ध्यानगीता, (Ranade Ashram, Nimbal, Dist. Bijapur, 1961, P. 14) Prof. Ranade takes the reading अभोक्ता instead of भोक्ता in the verse भर्ताभोक्ता महेश्वरः । God is not the enjoyer.

73 Freud divided the mind into conscious and unconscious; all unwanted ideas, desires, motives are stored in the unconscious. But the unconscious like the conscious is active and striving, and the ideas from the unconscious sometimes appear on the surface though the conscious disapproves of them. So has this monistic idea jumped out of the unconscious part of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's mind.

74 Aristotle severely criticised the Platonic theory of Ideas which he described as poetic fancy. "To say that the Universals are archetypes and that Particulars partake in them, is unmeaning and mere poetic fancy" (George Grote, Aristotle, John Murray, Albemarle Street, London, 1883, P. 560).

75 See Vācaspati's justification of reference to दुःख at the very beginning of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā. He states that the main point is not the existence of दुःख or sorrow but its removal.

3. Intellectualism: Isolation, an intellectual state.[76] The driest soul, the wisest and the best.[77] No place for emotion or feeling. A vast array of sad personalities. Flight of the alone to the Alone.[78] Contrast Kaivalya with the Mukti of Vedānta, and the Nirvāṇa of Buddhism.[79]

4. Separation of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, to be attained by a contemplation on their separateness, which is a circle.[80] भृंगीकीटन्याय.[81] Hypnotic hoax.[82] Cf. Rashdall's Criticism of

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76 The Sāṅkhya ideal, namely, Kaivalya seems to be intellectual understanding that the Puruṣa is different from Prakṛti. There is no intuitive realisation of the Self.

77 This is an aphorism of Herakleitos, an ancient Greek thinker. He extolled Reason.

78 This is the famous expression of Plotinus, an Alexandrian philosopher of the Neo-platonic school.

79 Unlike Kaivalya of Sāṅkhya, the Vedāntic Mukti and the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa are characterised by beatific joy.

80 Contemplation on separateness means that you have already known their separateness. On the other hand, separateness cannot be known unless you contemplate on it. Thus separateness and contemplation on it depend on each other.

81 It is a maxim which says that you become that on which you constantly contemplate. The larva becomes a butter-fly by constantly contemplating on it.

82 Merely being hypnotised by the idea of separateness or sheer intellectual imposition of the idea of separateness proves to be a hoax or deceit. Thus it is not by intellectual contemplation but by intuitive realisation that the goal is attained. Rāmadāsa, the great poet-saint of Maharashtra, also says that mere contemplation on the महावाक्य is of no use.

Bradley's Self-realisation; the Self is real already.[83]

5. Knowledge of not-ness: नास्मि, न मे, नाहम् (Kārikā 64). No subject, no predicate. Influence of Buddhism. Buddhistic element in Sāṅkhya.

एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासात् नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ।। 64 ।।

What then becomes of the eternity of Puruṣa? Two interpretations: Buddhistic and Vedāntic.[84]

6. The Vedānticised Sāṅkhya: The conceptions of Jīvat-kaivalya (Aikāntika, pertaining to an end. Implicit Vedāntism in Īśvara-kṛṣṇa) (Kārikā 67, potter's wheel) and Videha-kaivalya (Ātyantika, beyond all end, Kārikā 68).

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात् धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात् चक्रभ्रमवद् धृतशरीरः ।। 67 ।।

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83 Prof. Ranade refers to the same point in his essay 'Evolution of My Own Thought' incorporated in 'Contemporary Indian Philosophy', (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Museum street, London, Second Edition, 1952, P. 556): "When Canon Rashdall says that the self is realised already, he is speaking about a metaphysical fact. On the other hand, when it is said that the Self is to be realised, we are asked to take into account the whole ethical and mystical process by which the human being is gradually weaned from the allurements of the not-self, and the Self to be realised in its native purity and grandeur".

84 Not-ness is expressed in two ways (i) नाहम् = I am not or नास्मि = I do not exist. In these the subject is denied. (ii) न मे = nothing is mine, i.e. I exist but nothing belongs to me. Here the predicate is denied. Buddhistic interpretation means denial of the subject (नैरात्म्य). Vedāntic interpretation means denial of the predicate (the self is devoid of all qualities).

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ।। 68 ।।

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे might mean also catastrophic liberation. Prototypes of Jīvan-mukti and Videha-mukti. Īśvara-kṛṣṇa goes to the length of positing both Jīvan-mukti and Videha-mukti. Running with hare and hunting with hound.[85]

7. The ultimate aim, emancipation of every Puruṣa.

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतौ महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रति पुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ एव परार्थ आरम्भः ।। 56 ।।

Cf. the Vedāntic doctrine of Sarva-mukti. Doctrine of Universal salvation.[86]

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85 Jīvan-mukti means liberation while living and though living. Videha-mukti means liberation only at death and not during life. Hence the two can not go hand in hand. The Sāṅkhya philosopher advocating both Jīvan-mukti and Videha-mukti is inconsistent in his stand.

86 As liberation is destruction of ignorance of one's own nature, सर्वमुक्ति would require the destruction of everybody's ignorance. Towards the end of his treatise Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Dharmarājādhvarīndra discusses this point (Tr. Swāmī Mādhavānanda, The Ramakrishna Mission Saradapitha, Belur Math, Howrah, 1972, Pp. 226–229). It is no use objecting that Nescience (अविद्या) or ignorance is only one and its destruction in one single person's case is tantamount to its total destruction resulting in universal salvation. Nescience may be one but its covering power for different individuals (आवरणभेद) is different, depending on individual प्रारब्ध. Even he who has realised Brahman has to live on till he finishes the enjoyment of the past deeds that have begun fructifying. Final मुक्ति is deferred till then. As against this, it is claimed that God's grace destroys प्रारब्ध and a person in that case need not enjoy it. But does God's

An Analytical Survey of Sāṅkhya-kārikās[87]

1. The removal of three kinds of suffering: Ādhyātmika, Ādhidaivika, Ādhibhautika, like the Buddhistic ideal, a negative idea. Contrast the positive ideal of beatification.

2. Knowledge of Vyakta, Avyakta and Jña, the manifest, the

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grace lie at our doorstep? Have we not to resort to moral purity and one-pointed meditation? This itself is enjoying प्रारब्ध. This also explains why persons take longer or shorter time to reach the final goal. प्रारब्ध is an obstacle that does not allow complete destruction of ignorance. Dharmarājādhvarīndra calls it प्रारब्धकर्मरूप प्रतिबंधकदशा. God's grace, when it pours, may be far in excess of our desert (who knows?); but it is bonus and not stipulated interest. Our spiritual practice which takes us towards grace, goes on cutting out प्रारब्ध on the way. There is no contradiction in insisting that we have to square it up with our कर्म and in hoping that God's grace annihilates it. Both are the same phenomenon looked at from opposite ends. God evaluates man's work and then smiles on him. Prof. Ranade used to give grace marks to students – but that was after going through the whole of the answer-book, and after assessing the performance. Grace marks would differ from candidate to candidate – +1, +2.... upto +5, some not qualifying at all. Solely to depend on grace to wipe out प्रारब्ध, is an idler's philosophy. It has neither philosophic, nor ethical justification. Reap as you sow is the dictum. Dharmarājādhvarīndra quotes Vācaspati Miśra to state that only after finishing one's own work that has begun to yield fruit, can a man be liberated. Far less it is true that liberation of one individual can lead to liberation of all.

87 This is Professor Ranade's analytical survey of Kārikās mostly used in the preceding discussion.

unmanifest and the knower. For Jña, cf. Vedānta-sūtra ज्ञोऽत एव (II.3.18).

3. One + seven + sixteen + one; cf. mover, moved, neither mover nor moved, both mover and moved, in Aristotle. While the Aristotelean God is mover, the Sāṅkhya Puruṣa is na-prakṛtiḥ, na-vikṛtiḥ.

4. Āptavākya is recognized by Sāṅkhya.

5. This is the same as Śruti.

6. The supersensuous according to Sāṅkhya philosophy is established by inference. No intuition is recognized.

7. One of the causes of non-perception is subtlety.

8. We cannot perceive Nature because it is subtle. It is, however, to be inferred from its effects such as the great principle Buddhi and the rest.

9. The effect is in fact identical with the cause कार्यं सत् कारणभावात्। The effect cannot be greater than the cause nor less than it (शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्). There must be compatibility between cause and effect. Causation, in fact, is referred to the sphere of Nature. It cannot be ascribed to Puruṣa.

11. Prasavadharmī is a talk about creation and not simply evolution.

12. A fine description of the Guṇas or qualities. Pleasure, pain and gloom; illumination, activity and stupefaction; mutual conquest; mutual dependence; mutual generation; mutual concert.

13. They cooperate towards one purpose; they supplement and do not supplant one another प्रदीपवत् चार्थतोवृत्तिः, the wick, the oil and the flame give out light; wind, bile and phlegm maintain a constitution.

15. Arguments for the existence of Nature (a) From the limit to

the unlimited, (b) from a primary causal energy, (c) from effect implying a cause कारणकार्यविभाग. Contrast Kārikā 9 where identity of cause and effect is suggested. कारणविभाग and कारणभाव are antithetical.

17. Proofs for the existence of spirit:

(i) All aggregates imply an end. Teleology embedded in the nature of the composite.

(ii) Qualities imply the qualitiless.

(iii) Necessity of a substratum for all things. This incidentally does away with the necessity of postulating Nature.

(iv) The enjoyed implies the enjoyer (note that it is not doer but enjoyer).

(v) The will to absolution, abstraction of spirit from matter, is seen in all human beings.

18. Arguments for the plurality of spirits:

Differential incidence of births, deaths, actions, and mental equipment. (Types of character such as Sāttvika, Rājasa and Tāmasa). The Sāṅkhya believes in re-incarnation (Liṅga-śarīra).

19. Attributes of Puruṣa:

The spirit as Sākṣī, Kevala, Udāsīna, Madhyastha, Draṣṭā and Akartā. The Draṣṭā is the same as Sākṣī.

20. On account of mediation of Buddhi, the Pradhāna appears intelligent and the Puruṣa active.

21. Combination like that of the lame and the blind for the spirit's contemplation of Prakṛti as well as for Prakṛti's emancipation (कैवल्यार्थं प्रधानस्य). Sarga or creation is also referred to.

22. Evolution from Prakṛti successively of Mahat or Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, and then of Manas, Pañca-karmendriyas, Pañca-jñānendriyas and Pañca-tanmātras (Five primary elements from which last proceed the five gross elements or Pañca-bhūtas).

24. From Ahaṅkāra or self-consciousness proceed on the one hand the eleven organs and on the other the five Tanmātras.

27. Mind partakes of the nature of both Karmendriyas and Jñānendriays, i.e. it is both active and intellectual in its nature.

29. The three internal organs are here specified. Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, and Manas, i.e. determination, self-consciousness and imagination, also the five Prāṇas are here specified.

31. The spirit's purpose is the motive to action.

33. The difference between the three internal organs Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra and Manas and the ten external organs, viz. the Pañca-karmendriyas and the Pañca-jñānendriyas is that while the external organs refer only to the present, the internal organs may refer to the past, present or future. The element of time introduced. There must have been rain (past) because the river has risen; there must be fire in the mountain (present) because there is smoke; we shall have rain (future) because the ants are carrying eggs.

35. The ten external organs are gates (Dwārāṇi); the three internal organs are gate-keepers (Dwārins).

36. Manas and the ten Indriyas all of which are modifications of the three qualities resemble a lamp in action. Having manifested the purpose of the Puruṣa, they present it in its entirety to the Buddhi. After all, the Puruṣa has a purpose! Cf. the expression Puruṣārtha in Kārikā 31.

37. The Buddhi ministers to the entire satisfaction (Bhoga) of Puruṣa. The Puruṣa then enjoys!

38. From the five Tanmātras (primary elements, Śabda, Sparśa, Rūpa, Rasa, Gandha) proceed the Pañca-mahābhūtas. They are also subject to qualities and thus become Śānta, Ghora and Mūḍha (calm, turbulent and stupefying).

39. Difference between the subtle body and the physical body.

The physical body is derived from the parents and is perishable. The subtle body is underived and is imperishing.

40, 41, 42. A famous description of the Liṅga-śarīra.

40 Its origin untraceable, its nature imperishable, consisting of 18 elements (महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्) subject to transmigration, containing traces of actions, in the shape of motives or dispositions.

41 It must have a body because a picture cannot stand without a background, because there can be no shade without pillars. It cannot be supportless.

42 It fulfils the purpose of the Puruṣa by playing its part like a dramatic actor under the all-pervading influence of Prakṛti.

44. By merit the Liṅga goes upward, by demerit downward, by knowledge it reaches absolution (ज्ञानेन अपवर्गः), by the reverse it suffers bondage.

45. Dispassion leads to the destruction of Prakṛti, passion to transmigration.

52. The Liṅga cannot exist without Bhāvas or dispositions; the Bhāvas cannot exist without the Liṅga. The reciprocal causation among them can be compared to the seed and the sprout.

54. Cf. The Bhagavad-gītā–

ऊर्ध्वं गच्छन्ति सत्त्वस्थाः मध्ये तिष्ठन्ति राजसाः ।
.....अधो गच्छन्ति तामसाः ।।

Īśvara-kṛṣṇa later.

55. Pain is natural so long as the Liṅga is not dissolved, Avinivṛttiḥ; pain of old age and death is bound to occur.

56. The ultimate aim as the emancipation of (every) Puruṣa though it appears as if the Prakṛti itself is emancipated.

57. The unintelligent milk ministers to the development of the calf, similarly the unintelligent Prakṛti ministers to the

emancipation of Puruṣa. The cow, however, is neglected! Personality, cf. Kārikā 21.

59. As a dancing girl retires, so does Prakṛti retire after having shown herself to Puruṣa. The subtle sexuality in Īśvara-kṛṣṇa.

60. Prakṛti is Upakāriṇī, the Puruṣa is Ḱṛta-upakārin; the one is generous, the other is ungrateful. Nature is Guṇavatī, Puruṣa is Aguṇa.

61. Prakṛti is most delicate or modest; having but been seen, she vanishes forever.

62. It is not Puruṣa who is bound or is emancipated or transmigrates; it is Prakṛti, who is bound or is emancipated or transmigrates.

63. (प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त) Rainbow coloured Prakṛti binds herself. Seven coloured, she emancipates Puruṣa, cf. the natural love of women for colours.

64. Characteristics of Kevala-jñāna: Neither do I exist, nor does anything belong to me. Knowledge of 'not-ness', cf. Buddhism; see commentary for negative and positive interpretations. (In its negative aspect, the Sāṅkhya ideal corresponds with the Buddhistic, in its positive aspect, it corresponds with the Vedāntic). Three things: see Radhakrishnan नास्मि, न मे, नाहम्।

65. The Puruṣa is Prekṣaka or Sākṣī or Upekṣaka. He sees the Prakṛti unconcerned; Prakṛti whose seven-fold variegated creation has ceased. But can the Puruṣa be entirely without emotions? (He that hath not committed sin in his heart). The emotionless Puruṣa of the Sāṅkhya is like an abstract universal not a concrete universal; or much rather an abstract individual because there are many Puruṣas.

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A. B. Keith : Sāṅkhya System (Heritage of India Series) should be read. Chapter II discusses Sāṅkhya and Buddhism; Chap. III discusses Sāṅkhya and Mahābhārata; Chapter IV discusses developments which Yoga made beyond Sāṅkhya; Chap. VII discusses the classical Sāṅkhya philosophy in Kārikās; Chap. VIII is important, discussing the contents of the तत्त्वसमास as well as the सांख्यसूत्र. It gives a good account of Sāṅkhya philosophy as found in the सांख्यसूत्रs. Criticism by Sāṅkhya of all the other systems of philosophy in this work is important. (Cf. Vedāntic criticism of all the other systems in Vedānta-sūtras II.1 and II.2). Finally a very good account of विज्ञानभिक्षु occurs, Pp. 113 ff.

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CHAPTER II

YOGA

Introductory[1]

1. Two Patañjalis: Patañjali, the grammarian and Patañjali, the Yogin.[2] Keith on wrong grammar. We should read प्रातिभाद्वासर्वम्

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1 English translation of every Sūtra quoted in the Text is not given. Readers are requested to refer to the excellent book – Rājayoga by Swami Vivekananda (Advaita Ashram, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta–14).

2 The date of Patañjali, the Yogin (author of Yoga-sūtras) is fixed at 2nd century B.C. on the hypothesis that he is the same as Patañjali, the grammarian. "The view, however, cannot stand examination. It is clear that in his philosophic views as to the nature of substance and quality, the grammarian stands on a lower plane of development than the philosopher, and on the other hand, the philosopher violates one at least of the grammarian's laws of grammar." (A. B. Keith, The Sāṅkhya System, Heritage of India Series, Y.M.C.A. Publishing House, 1949, P. 69). The grammatical discrepancy may be explained in two ways – either as an archaic form or slip of hand.
The question whether there are two Patañjalis is considered from a very different angle by Dr. K.K. Kolhatkar. He has absolutely no doubt about the one-ness of Patañjali, the grammarian and Patañjali, the Yogin. He tackles the question of two Patañjalis by questioning a widely held assumption. He counters the supposition that the Vedānta-sūtras have criticised Aṣṭāṅga-yoga of Patañjali in II. 1.3. The fact is that Aṣṭāṅga-yoga is not different from Vedānta, much less hostile to it. He further argues that Vedānta is theoretical in the sense that, it propounds the ideal of self-realisation; Yoga is its practical aspect as it provides the means to achieve the Vedāntic goal of self-

(Yoga-sūtra III. 33) instead of प्रतिभाद्वा सर्वम् । आर्षप्रयोग

realisation. The Vedānta-sūtras, according to Dr. Kolhatkar, can not attack the application of their own theory. Their criticism is directed to an older Yoga-śāstra which is theistic Sāṅkhya (सेश्वर सांख्यशास्त्र). Seśvara Sāṅkhya is dualistic and is entirely different from Aṣṭāṅga-yoga-śāstra of Patañjali. However, continues Dr. Kolhatkar, if people want to maintain that the name of the founder of the older school also was Patañjali, they may do so. In that case, we may have two Patañjalis – the one of the older Yoga and the other of Aṣṭāṅga-yoga. While the former system has almost disappeared from the philosophic scene, the latter is very much in vogue. The conjecture of two Patañjalis is only a working hypothesis. There is no proof to say that the name of the founder of the older Yoga-śāstra is also Patañjali (See भारतीय मानसशास्त्र अथवा पातंजल-योग-दर्शन, Publishers, Shri D. B. Dhavale, Shri Samartha Sadan, First Bhat Wadi, Girgaum, Bombay 4, 1951, भूमिका, Pp. 111–112).

Professor J. H. Woods is of the opinion that Patañjali the grammarian and Patañjali the Yogin can not be identified as they hold divergent views about the nature of substance (Dravya). Prof. S. N. Das Gupta holds that this view is untenable. He argues that there is no internal evidence in पातंजल महाभाष्य (the celebrated commentary on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī), which would go against the identification of the two Patañjalis. Moreover, the महाभाष्य agrees with the योग view as regards स्फोटवाद. No other school of Indian Philosophy accepts स्फोटवाद. (See S. N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, Reprint 1957, Pp. 231–232). Prof. Das Gupta concludes, "Since there is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the grammarian Patañjali with the Yoga writer, I believe, we may take them as being identical." (Ibid. p. 238).

or हस्तदोष. Ahīśaḥ.[3]

पातंजल-महाभाष्य चरकप्रति संस्कृतैः ।
मनोवाक्कायदोषाणाम् हंत्रेऽहिपतये नमः ।।[4]

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3 The word Ahīśaḥ occurs in the following benedictory verse of Vyāsa-bhāṣya on the Yoga-sūtras. The verse is applicable both to Śeṣa, the serpent-God and to the sage Patañjali.
यस्त्यक्त्वा रूपमाद्यं प्रभवति जगतोऽनेकधानुग्रहाय ।
प्रक्षीणक्लेशराशिः विषमविषधरोऽनेकवक्त्रः सुभोगी ।।
सर्वज्ञानप्रसूतिर्भुजगपरिकरः प्रीतये यस्य नित्यम् ।
देवोऽहीशः स वोऽव्यात् सितविमलतनुः योगदो योगयुक्तः ।।
(May Ahīśa, the divine Lord of serpents (Patañjali) who appears on the world scene by discarding his original form and confers infinite benefactions on the world, who reduces to ashes heaps of affliction, who embodies in himself immortal nectar, who has many faces (who is a multifaceted author), who sports a beautiful hood (who enjoys ecstatic bliss of Brahman), who is the source of all knowledge and whose girdle of attendant snakes is ever ready for his pleasure (whose attendant disciples are ever willing for his service), who possesses a white, immaculate body and who, himself merged in contemplation, bestows concentration (the science of Yoga) on humanity, protect you).

4 The verse means: "Obeisance to Patañjali, the Lord of serpents, who authored immortal sacred texts on Yoga (Yoga-sūtras), grammar (Mahābhāṣya), and medicine (Caraka-saṃhitā), and thereby cleansed the impurities of mind, speech and body." The stanza occurs in the Introduction to the commentary on Caraka, composed by Cakrapāṇi (See J. H. Woods, The Yoga System of Patañjali, Harward Oriental Series, Vol. XVII, 1927). Similar is the import of the next verse – योगेन चित्तस्य... This verse is cited in Śivarāma's commentary on Vāsavadattā (Ibid. Introduction).

योगेन चित्तस्य पदेन वाचाम् मलं शरीरस्य तु वैद्यकेन ।
योऽपाकरोत्तं प्रवरं मुनीनाम् पतंजलिं प्रांजलिरानतोऽस्मि ।।

पतन् अंजलौ इति पतंजलिः ।[5] Yoga defined as stemming the tide of consciousness so as to make it stable and placid. Yoga derived from युज् to concentrate (समाधौ), and not from युज् to join, 7th conjugation (उभयपद). Contrast Yoke. See Woods.[6] Swarūpa (Y.S. I.3) and Sārūpya (Y.S. I.4).[7]

II Metaphysics

2. The conflict of Self and God in Yoga: which of them is the primary reality? तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् (Y.S. I. 3), ईश्वर प्रणिधानाद्वा

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5 "The form of the serpent fell into the folded hands of his father, *(Añjalau patan)* and hence the name Patañjali" (R. D. Ranade, Pathway to God in Kannada Literature, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Chowpatty Road, Bombay 7, 1960, p. 93).

6 The aim of Yoga is attainment of Kaivalya which implies freedom or emancipation. Thus it would not be proper to maintain that the word Yoga has its analogue in the English word 'Yoke' which is a symbol of bondage, the very anti-thesis of freedom. J. H. Woods says: "Yoga.... is etymologically derived from the stem Yuj-a (Dhātupāṭha IV. 68) in the sense of concentration and not from the stem Yuj-a (VII. 7) in the sense of conjunction". (The Yoga System of Patañjali, P. 5). In fact Yoga is religious concentration while its compeer system Sāṅkhya is theoretical investigation.

7 The word Swarūpa occuring in Y.S. I.3 means the unmodified state of Puruṣa or one's own original pure nature. The word Sārūpya, in Y.S. I.4 means identification with mental modifications, which leads to misery. In the one, there is sorrowlessness while the other is the very root-cause of all sorrow and suffering. सारूप्य corresponds to the Vedāntic Adhyāsa.

(Y.S. I.23). God from the back-door. Could be resolved only in Vedāntic fashion by identifying Self and God.[8] Yoga, a half-way house between Sāṅkhya and Vedānta.[9]

3. Transcendence of God; cf. the deistic God of Aristotle.[10] God

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8 In Y.S. I.23 which says that the state of Samādhi can be attained also by surrendering oneself to God, God becomes the primary reality in as much as the self has to surrender to God for the attainment of the highest ideal. The self here becomes a secondary reality. In Sūtra I.3 stating that at the time of one-pointed concentration the seer or Puruṣa abides in his own unmodified state, the self becomes the primary reality. This Sūtra dispenses with God. The Yoga-sūtras lay stress on the Yogic practice for the attainment of Samādhi. Sūtra I.23 states that one can attain to Samādhi, also (वा) by surrendering to God. The Avyaya (indeclinable) वा implies that devotion or surredering to God is relegated to a lower position while Yogic practice is assigned a higher position. The conflict between self and God disappears when they are regarded as identical. In that case Sūtra I.3 would mean that in the highest state the Self abides in God; the same would be the upshot of Sūtra I.23 as well.

9 In Sāṅkhya there is no God. In Vedānta, God is the only reality. In Yoga, God is recognised, but he is only the first among equals and is not assigned the highest position. Thus Yoga is a stepping-stone to Vedānta.

10 Deism is a doctrine that God creates the world, but takes no further interest in it. Zeller summarises the view of Aristotle as follows: "Aristotle did not assume the action of the divine will on the world or any creative activity or interference of the deity in the course of the world". (E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, Pp. 177–178). See also Foot Note 17 below.

as a mere epiphenomenon.[11] *Deus ex machina*[12]. Concession to Bhakti.[13] Pañcaśikha, the Sāṅkhya philosopher, said by Hopkins to have introduced the 26th principle, namely, God, under Bhāgavata influence (?)[14] क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैः (Y .S . I . 24). Puruṣa-viśeṣa = *Primus inter pares.*[15] Two meanings of "Self *of* selves".[16] Is Yogic God theistic or deistic?[17] No God-

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11 The term epiphenomenon means: a superfluous accessory without any determining influence.

12 Literally it means, God from a machine, a deity brought artificially to change the course of events.

13 God is brought in the system for purposes of devotion.

14 Pañcaśikha is a pupil of Āsuri, who is a pupil of Kapila. मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ (Sāṅkhya-kārikā 70). It is not known why a question mark has been put at the end of the sentence in the text above. It may indicate a case of anachronism if the Bhāgavata is a later composition.

15 The expression means: first among equals.

16 The first meaning of Self of selves is that God is the special Puruṣa, untouched by misery etc. He stands apart from other Puruṣas. The second meaning is that He is the immanent principle and all other Puruṣas become subservient.

17 'The general principles of deism may be compressed into a few theses. There is a natural religion, whose essential content is morality; this comprises not much more than the two maxims, "Believe in God and Do your duty." ' (R. Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, Tr. A.C. Armstrong Jr., Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1962, P. 185). Falckenberg here enumerates naturalism and free thinking as characteristics of deism. We may consider Yoga philosophy in the light of these tenets. Yoga which accepts Sāṅkhya metaphysics is naturalistic. It also adopts the scientific attitude of Sāṅkhya. Yama (negative virtues) and Niyama (positive virtues), the very first two steps

realization in Yoga, but Self-realization, but Self-realization of a kind, namely, idiological.[18] Remover of obstacles (Y.S. I.29). Teacher without time (Y.S. I.26). Omniscience (Y.S. I. 25). Eka-tattva, the only Reality (Y.S. I.32).

4. Avidyā, root cause of the world-experience. Approach to Vedānta. Definition of Avidyā, taking Anitya for Nitya : अनित्याशुचि-दुःखानात्मसु नित्य-शुचि-सुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या (Y.S. II.5). Breeding ground of all other Kleśas (Y.S. II.4).

5. (i) Definition of Viparyaya as: मिथ्याज्ञानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठम् (Y.S. I.8). Again, approach to Vedānta. वस्तुनि अवस्त्वारोपः अज्ञानम्. Cf. Vedāntic Adhyāsa. (Also अतद्वति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानम्).[19] (ii) This inconsistent

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in Aṣṭāṅga Yoga, lay down rigorous moral duties for an individual. Absence of blind faith (in as much as surrender to God is given a secondary place) and full faith in self-effort to reach the highest state, vouchsafe that the Yoga philosopher is a free thinker. It should be noted that Yoga is not atheistic. However, Yoga is not pure deism. Y.S. I.24 and I.26 talk of a personal God. In being the Teacher of teachers, God is very much related to the world. Hence, Yoga is theistic as well.

18 Idiological means one's own, personal or distinct. On such a hypothesis सर्वमुक्ति and परिवारमुक्ति become impossible; only एकमुक्ति (i.e. individual salvation alone) would be possible. For a discussion of the antinomy between एकमुक्ति and सर्वमुक्ति, see R. D. Ranade, Pathway to God in Hindi Literature, Second edition, Shri Gurudev Ranade Samadhi Trust, Nimbal. R.S., Dist: Bijapur, 1986, Pp. 264 - 265. (See also Foot Note 86 in Chapter I).

19 "...in a right apprehension that same characteristic which marks the object must also be the distinguishing property of its notion" (Y.V. Athalye and M.R. Bodas, Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhatta, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune 4,

with सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्याति (Y.S. III.49). अन्यता = separateness, which is so often mentioned in the Yoga-sūtras. The first is unrealistic while the second is realistic.[20] (iii) A third description yet under Sāṅkhya influence: unreal for the knower, real for the ignorant; कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् (Y.S. II. 22), (तत् = प्रधान).[21]

6. Also attack on the Vedāntic conception of Asmitā (Unity of

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Second edition, 1930, Pp. 180–181). This is Pramā or right knowledge. The opposite of this is Aprama or wrong knowledge, namely, "the cognition of a property (तत् प्रकारकः) in a thing which does not possess that property (अतद्वति)" (Ibid. P. 181).

20 Y.S. I.8 talks of मिथ्याज्ञान or false knowledge. This is nothing but Avidyā or nescience of Advaita Vedānta. Avidyā mistakes the unreal for the real. Swami Vivekananda, while explaining the Sūtra gives the traditional Vedāntic example of शुक्तिकारजत or mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl for a piece of silver. On this hypothesis the world or Prakṛti becomes unreal. Sūtra III. 49 specifically recommends that we should discriminate between Prakṛti (सत्त्व) and Puruṣa. This is realism because here both Puruṣa and Prakṛti are real. So while the former Sūtra regards Prakṛti as unreal, the latter holds that it is real, and hence the inconsistency.

21 Of the three explanations (i), (ii) and (iii) mentioned above, the first is unrealistic because, the world is unreal though विपर्यय or false knowledge makes it appear to be real; the second is realistic because, the world is real while the पुरुष is separate from it. Viveka consists in separateness (अन्यता). The third combines these two: for a Jñānin the world is unreal; for a common man, the world is real. This is again nearer Advaita Vedānta, namely, implicit recognition of two grades of Reality, i.e. Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika.

self and mind, दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतैव अस्मिता (Y.S. II. 6),[22] Aham Brahmāsmi); cf. अनलहक्.[23] Contrast the Yogic unification of ग्रहीतृ, ग्रहण and ग्राह्य.[24] Ānanda which constitutes संप्रज्ञातसमाधि

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22 In Yoga there is unity of self (दृक्शक्ति or पुरुष) and mind (दर्शनशक्ति or बुद्धि). This is called अस्मिता. The very fact that we have experience proves that there is such a unity, argues Vyāsa-bhāṣya on Y.S. II.6. In the Vedāntic expression अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, the Brahm'āsmitā' is unity of self and Brahman. This necessarily means that the self can not be identified with the senses, mind or intellect, in a word, with body. But, proceeds Vyāsa-bhāṣya, if there is realisation of the separateness between self and mind (or पुरुष and प्रकृति as Yoga would put it), Kaivalya would be the result and no experience whatsoever would be possible. Therefore Vyāsa-bhāṣya would insist that अस्मिता, which is a pre-condition of experience, is unity of self and mind and not unity of self and Brahman.

As a matter of fact, both Yoga and Vedānta agree that for the sake of empirical experience the identification of self and mind is necessary and that it has to be ultimately done away with. The only difference is that Yoga uses the word अस्मिता for the identification on the empirical level whereas Vedānta would reserve the term अस्मि for the transcendental level. Yoga itself comes very near such identification in the Sūtra I.41. See Foot Notes 24 and 87 below.

23 The famous utterance of Mansūr, the absolutistic mystic-philosopher of Sufism. The expression means, 'I am the Reality'. This is in consonance with the Advaita Vedāntic stand.

24 The Yogic unification of ग्रहीतृ, ग्रहण and ग्राह्य in Y.S. I.41 comes very near the Vedāntic idea of त्रिपुटिलय (unity of knower, known and knowledge) and therefore, can be contrasted with the Yogic conception of अस्मिता, namely, unity of Self and mind. See Foot Notes 22 above and 87 below.

(Y.S. I.17). अस्मिता is a क्लेश (Y.S. II.3) and also constitutes संप्रज्ञातसमाधि (Y.S. I.17). (मूळ अस्मितेचे सूक्ष्म शुद्ध स्फुरण म्हणजे समाधी).[25] Two meanings of Asmitā: one while going out of the door and one while returning through the door.[26]

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25 Shri K.K. Kolhatkar had been to Nimbal in May 1947 with his MS of भारतीय मानसशास्त्र अथवा पातंजल-योगदर्शन and requested Prof. R. D. Ranade to write a Foreword to it. He read out to Professor Ranade some portions of his work. There were discussions on Shri Kolhatkar's exposition of some crucial Sūtras. Shri Kolhatkar's book was published with Prof. Ranade's Foreword in 1951. Shri Kolhatkar was awarded in 1972 D. Litt. degree *honoris causa* by the University of Poona for his erudite scholarship. Readers may profitably go through this monumental Yoga classic. During one of the discussions, Prof. Ranade asked Shri Kolhatkar to clarify how Asmitā (ego-hood) which is a pain-bearing obstruction (क्लेश) can serve as an object of meditation. Shri Kolhatkar explained as under : 'There are two stages in अस्मिता - qualified and unqualified. At the first stage, passions or Vāsanās linger. The sense of 'I' and 'mine' is not yet eliminated. Hence, it is a source of pain. On the other hand, the अस्मिता which is an object of meditation in संप्रज्ञातसमाधि, is pure or unqualified'. It is to this stage that the Marathi sentence in the text refers. The Marathi sentence is in the handwriting of a student who hurriedly took down notes to the dictation of Prof. Ranade. The word समाधी in this sentence should have been संप्रज्ञात समाधीचे आलंबन. Such अस्मिता is bereft of all Vāsanās. It is bare consciousness of one's own existence without any qualifying predicate. So अस्मिता in its pure form can be an object of meditation; but when it becomes turbid with passions, it becomes a क्लेश (Read Pp. 155–156 of the book under reference, as also P. 74 of the भूमिका). See also Foot Note 26 below.

26 Citta or mind-stuff either goes out to the external objects (extra-

III. Epistemology

7. The epistemological argument for self and God (4th Adhyāya). Cf. Berkeley.[27] The proof of (a) mind (b) minds (c) Mind of minds – चित्तजाणय्यन.[28] (i) The mind is not self-illuminative, स्वाभास (Y.S. IV. 19), nor can one mind be cognised by another (Y.S. IV.21), hence self exists as the knower of mind: negative aspect.[29] Difference between self and mind.[30] (ii) The states of a mind are known to its Lord who never changes (Y.S. IV. 18): positive aspect.[31] (iii) The objective world exists for a self

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tropic) for enjoyment, or turns inward towards the self (intra-tropic) for release, as stated in Y.S. II.18. The two meanings of अस्मिता mentioned in Foot Note 25 above indicate these two purposes (Ibid: P. 58).

27 Berkeley gave proof for the existence of one's own self as perceiver of the external world. He proved the existence of other selves by analogy: I have a body and also mental life; hence, others who have bodies must have also mental lives. The existence of God was proved as the ultimate Knower.

28 Purandaradāsa, the great poet-saint of Karnataka, uses the expression चित्तजनय्यन (father of Kāma, the mind-born) for Kṛṣṇa, in his song केंडक्के गोरलि हत्तुवदुंटे. Prof. Ranade would rather change the expression to चित्तजाणय्यन to convey the meaning, 'knower of mind'. See परमार्थमंदिर, प्रकाशक, वामन त्र्यंबक आपटे, कार्याध्यक्ष, श्री गुरुदेव परमार्थ मंदिर, जमखंडि, जि. विजापुर, 1963, Pp. 104–105.

29 The negative aspect is displayed by mind because it is Jaḍa and hence can not know itself; while the positive aspect is displayed by the self which is self-illuminative.

30 If self is the knower, and mind the known, the two would be different. Contrast this with the assertion of unity of Self and mind in Yoga Sūtra II.6.

31 The point 7 (i) in the text above refers to negative aspect and 7 (ii) to the positive aspect. The conclusion, 'hence the self

(Y.S. II. 21). The being of the spectacle is for the seer. (*Esse est percipi*).[32] (iv) A thing uncognised by one mind still exists for another (Y.S. IV. 16), hence other selves and God exist. Thus there is no solipsism.[33] This kills two birds with one stone.[34] Cf. also Berkeley's proof of God.[35] (v) One Mind, the director of many (Y.S. IV.5). Hence corresponding to a supreme Mind, there must be a supreme Self. Conception of *primus inter pares*, namely God. Compare on the whole Yoga-vāsiṣṭha and its Idealistic Philosophy.[36]

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exists as the knower of the mind', is based on the negative aspect of the mind, i.e., the inability of the mind to know itself and other minds. Hence the difference between the mind and self is stressed, namely, the mind is not self-illuminative while the self is. The Lord or Self knowing the states of the mind, is said to be the positive aspect because it is based on the ability of the self to know the mind.

32 The phrase means : existence is perception. According to Berkeley's idealism, matter has no existence apart from the knowing self; and therefore, the existence of matter consists in being perceived by a perceiver.

33 Solipsism is an extreme form of subjective idealism which asserts that, 'I' alone exist.

34 The two things are (a) proving the existence of other selves and God, and (b) ruling out solipsism.

35 See Foot Note 27 above.

36 See, for instance, Vasiṣṭha's doctrine of Space and Time.
देशकालाभिधानेन राम संकल्प एव हि ।
कथ्यते तद्वशात् यस्मात् देशकालौ स्थितिं गतौ ।। (III. 110.59)
(Time and space, Oh Rama! are thoughts. It is upon thought that their existence depends). Here space and time are made dependent on the cognising subject. This is Idealism. Priority of cognitive consciousness is the cardinal principle of Idealism;

IV. Ethics

8. (a) Parallelism of the ten virtues included under Yama and Niyama with the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, Exodus and Deuteronomy,[37] the latter of which gives an older

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likewise in the above instance, space and time have no independent existence apart from the knowing subject. Again, दुःखितस्य निशाः कल्प सुखितस्यैव क्षणः (III. 60.22). (The same period of night is experienced as a small eternity by the miserable and as a single moment by the happy). William James expresses the point in his own inimitable style. Tracts of time "shorten *in passing* whenever we are so fully occupied with their content as not to note the actual time itself. A day full of excitement, with no pause, is said to pass 'ere we know it'. On the contrary, a day full of waiting, of unsatisfied desire for change, will seem a small eternity" (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Dover Publications, Inc. 920 Broadway, New York 10, N.Y. 1950, P. 626).

37 The Bible, a collection of sacred Writings, is divided into two parts – the Old Testament and the New Testament. The Old Testament is written in Hebrew and deals, among others, with the religion, history, institutes and manners of the Jews. The New Testament is written in Greek and comprises, among others, the Four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles. Exodus (i.e. going out), the book of Old Testament, refers to the departure of the people of Israel from Egypt where they had been slaves. It also deals with the institution of the moral and ceremonial laws. Deuteronomy (i.e. the second law) is the fifth book of Pentateuch (the first five books of the OldTestament). Deuteronomy is a series of addresses given by Moses to the people of Israel. One of the most important items in these addresses is Moses' review of the Ten Commandments. Moses emphasizes the meaning of the First Commandment

scheme and the former a newer one, which is the one now usually adopted. (1) Thou shalt have no other Gods beside me. (2) Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images. (3) Thou shalt not take the name of Thy God for a vain end. (4) Thou shalt work during the week and rest on the Sabbath. (5) Honour thy father and thy mother. (6) Thou shalt not kill. (7) Thou shalt not commit adultery. (8) Thou shalt not steal. (9) Thou shalt not bear false witness. (10) Thou shalt not covet. Yama and Niyama, a higher moral code. Negative and positive aspects or self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. This distinction not ultimately valid.[38]

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calling the people to have devotion to the Lord alone. The Ten Commandments are to be found in Exodus 20.3–17 and Deuteronomy 5.7–21.

A rough parallelism may be noted as under:

Ten Commandments	Yoga virtues
1. Thou shalt not kill	Ahimsā
2. Thou shalt not bear false witness	Satya
3. Thou shalt not steal	Asteya
4. Thou shalt not commit adultery	Brahmacarya
5. Thou shalt not covet	Aparigraha
6. Thou shalt work during the week and rest on the Sabbath	Tapas
7. Thou shalt not take the name of thy God for a vain end	Svādhyāya
8. Thou shalt have no other God beside me	Īśvara-praṇidhāna

38 The classification of virtues into positive and negative can not be exclusive. Satya can be understood both positively (truth) and negatively (non-falsehood) and can be included in either class. Similarly, the classification into self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. Santoṣa or contentment seems to be an individual virtue. But its implication is to rule out covetousness.

Virtues included under Yama (Y.S. II.30): (i) Non-killing (अहिंसा), (ii) Truth or not bearing false witness, (सत्य), (iii) Non-stealing (अस्तेय), (iv) Celibacy, (no adultery), (ब्रह्मचर्य), (v) Non-possession (अपरिग्रह). Virtues included under Niyama (Y.S. II.32): (i) Purity (शौच), (ii) Contentment (संतोष), (iii) Austerities, (work and rest), (तपस्), (iv) Uttering the name of God, प्रणव (स्वाध्याय), (v) Worship of God (ईश्वरप्रणिधान), offering of actions at the feet of God, a kind of Karma-yoga[39] (Y.S. II.1), सर्वक्रियाणाम् परमगुरावर्पणम् ।[40]. ईश्वरप्रणिधान = ईश्वरामध्ये क्रियांचे प्रणिधान करणे म्हणजे ईश्वरास क्रिया अर्पण करणे - कोल्हटकर.[41] प्रणिधान = ध्यान ?[42] तज्जपः तदर्थभावनम् (Y.S. I. 28): This is superior to Vedānta.[43] Eight of the Ten are almost identical (Hocking). Cf. also virtue in the Bhagavad- gītā.[44] (b) Other virtues: मैत्री, करुणा, मुदिता (Contrast

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Covetousness is necessarily social. 907230

39 Tapas, Svādhyāya and Īśvarapraṇidhāna constitute क्रियायोग. It can be said to be a kind of Karma-yoga, as all the three are observed in a spirit of disinterestedness.

40 The expression occurs in Vyāsabhāṣya on the Y.S. II.1

41 The Marathi sentence refers to Dr. K. K. Kolhatkar's clarification of the term ईश्वरप्रणिधान, see also Foot Note 25 above.

42 Will not क्रियायोग be achieved by remembering God at every moment? This seems to be the implication of the expression, ''प्रणिधान = ध्यान?'' in the above text.

43 Repetition of meditation (जप) is a stimulation to good संस्कारs (impressions) which lie potent in the mind. Yoga recognises the value of potency of संस्कारs, the good fruits of which can be harvested. Repeated meditation leaves its traces on the mind which can be exploited by meditation added unto meditation. In this psychological insight, Yoga steals a march over Vedānta.

44 See Professor R. D. Ranade's discussion of the topic in his

Ānanda),[45] उपेक्षा (Y.S. I.33). We must feel happy when we see other people happy. Cf. also virtues in Buddhism.[46] (c) Mystical virtues: तीव्रसंवेग (Y. S. I.21),[47] दीर्घकाल, नैरंतर्य and सत्कार (Y. S. I. 14) or आदर. Brown's Laws of Association.[48] Control of चित्त in

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book, The Bhagavad-gītā as a Philosophy of God-realisation, Nagpur University, Nagpur, 1959, Pp. 209 ff.

45 मुदिता is empirical or intellectual happiness while आनंद is spiritual bliss.

46 See Section IV of Chapter III; also Foot Notes 32 and 33 in Chapter III.

47 Professor Ranade stresses the same point of intensity of devotion: "....there is no use in calling upon God without Bhāva and Bhakti.... What is wanted is a devout heart for God...." (Pathway to God in Kannada Literature, P. 63). "....higher than anything else is Bhāva." (Ibid. P. 100). "....Bhāva or Bhakti, an unexplained and inexplicable love of God, is a fundamental requirement....." (The Bhagavad-gītā as a Philosophy of God-realisation, P. 254).

48 Dr. Thomas Brown (1778–1820) was a Scottish psychologist. He taught in the University of Edinburgh. His lectures were published in a book form under the title, 'Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind'. He says that human mind has a tendency to perceive the relations between objects that are perceived together. This he calls the feeling of relation. Without this feeling of relation, our consciousness would be limited to a single point. He further holds that consciousness does not consist of independent or disparate states, but is one continuous stream. The implication of these two laws is that our meditation will not be confined to one single moment, but will have a tendency to carry the process forward. Again, if the consciousness were limited to one single moment, no habit can be formed, because repetition or Abhyāsa of any act will

its intellectual and emotional aspects by अभ्यास and वैराग्य, enoughness of heard and seen (Y.S. I. 15). अभ्यास and वैराग्य intellectual and moral bridles (Y.S. I.12). Cf. Bhagavad-gītā (VI.35). वैराग्य is not different from उपेक्षा. (d) Four kinds of Karmas : शुक्ल, कृष्ण, शुक्ल-कृष्ण, अशुक्लाकृष्ण. कर्म अशुक्लाकृष्णं योगिनः त्रिविधमितरेषाम् (Y. S. IV. 7). This last for the Yogins. "Anticipation"[49] of Vedāntic प्रारब्ध, संचित and क्रियमाण. सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च (Y.S. III.22). We have to suffer संचित and प्रारब्ध; but we can control the क्रियमाण i.e., the future. एका जनार्दनी भोग प्रारब्धाचा। हरिकृपें त्याचा नाश आहे ।। (एकनाथ),[50] प्रारब्ध क्रियमाण। भक्तां संचित नाहीं जाण ।। (तुकाराम).[51] Sāṅkhya influence also traceable, लोहितशुक्लकृष्णाम्.[52]

terminate at the end of every moment and begin anew the next moment. The hypothesis of the stream of thought confirms the Yogic injunction that meditation must be continuous (Nairantarya). We must meditate continuously and for a long time in order to exploit the tendency of the mind to carry forward the effect of earlier meditation.

49 Professor Ranade mentions the word anticipation in quotes perhaps to indicate that the term anticipation, which is here used in the usual sense, yet bears a Kantian stamp.

50 Ekanātha in his अभंग, आवडीनें भावें हरिनाम घेसी...हरिकृपें त्याचा नाश आहे, says that our actions necessarily yield fruit, and we have to enjoy it. But God's grace can terminate the process. See Foot Note 86 in Chapter I.

51 The view of Tukaram is : In the case of a devotee the fruits of संचित, प्रारब्ध and क्रियमाण are annulled. See his अभंग, प्रारब्ध क्रियमाण....तुका म्हणे नाहीं भिन्न. See Foot Note 86 in Chapter I.

52 लोहित, शुक्ल, कृष्ण mean red, white and black respectively. Sāṅkhya Prakṛti is constituted of three qualities, namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Sattva is white (Śukla), Rajas is red (Lohita) and Tamas is black (Kṛṣṇa). The present expression लोहितशुक्लकृष्णाम् occurs in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (IV.5). This

9. (a) Knowledge of Puruṣa alone leads beyond Guṇas: पुरुषख्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्ण्यम् (Y. S. I. 16). (b) Thinking of the opposite, प्रतिपक्षभावनम् (Y. S. II. 33). Schiller.[53] Aristotle's Wand.[54]

Upaniṣadic description anticipates the conception of Sāṅkhya Prakṛti.

53 In the centre of J.C.F. Schiller's (1759–1805) aesthetics, ".....stand the Kantian antithesis of sensibility and reason and the reconciliation of the two sides of human nature brought about by its occupation with the beautiful". (R. Falckenburg, History of Modern Philosophy, P. 417). The aesthetical activity avoids the two extremes of reason and sensibility. Y.S. II.33 states that to combat the upsurge of an inimical emotion coming in the way of observance of a virtue, one has to think of an opposite emotion. For example, to contain anger, one has to think of love. This, however, is highly difficult. The practical way would suggest the dilution of the inimical emotion. Extreme vice is undesirable; extreme virtue is unattainable; therefore, in practice a golden mean should be struck.

54 Aristotle gives an example of a crooked stick (wand) when he suggests the way to arrive at virtuous life. If we suffer from a vice to which we are habitually inclined, we should try to practise the virtue that lies at the other extreme. This is painful, and the pain indicates how deeply the vice is rooted in us. Now we have to practise the opposite virtue with determination. The force of the vice and the determined effort to practise the opposite virtue will bring us to the mean. Aristotle says, "But it is necessary to drag ourselves away towards the opposite extreme; for by bringing ourselves far from the side of error, we shall arrive at the mean; as people do with crooked sticks to make them straight". (The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Tr. R.W. Browne, London, George Bell and Sons, 1889, Book II, Chapter IX, Section 4). Prof. Ranade has referred to the

Measure.[55] (c) Virtues of universal application (सार्वभौम), जातिदेशकालसमयानवच्छिन्नाः सार्वभौमा महाव्रतम्(Y.S. II. 31); birth, place,

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concept of Aristotle's wand in his work "A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Chowpatty Road, Bombay, 400 007, 1968, P.241.

55 How is it that, inspite of constant flux in the world, things appear relatively stable? The answer of Herakleitos is that it is owing to the observance of the "measures", in virtue of which the aggregate bulk of each form of matter in the long run remains the same, though its substance is constantly changing. Certain "measures" of the "ever-living fire" are always being kindled, while like "measures" are always going out (Fraction 20). All things are "exchanged" for fire and fire for all things (Fr. 22); and this implies that for every thing it takes, fire will give as much. "The sun will not exceed his measures" (Fr. 29). (J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, Adam and Charles Black, London, 4th edition, 1958, P. 150).

"It is clear at any rate that the great contribution of Pythagoras to science was his discovery that the concordant intervals could be expressed by simple numerical ratios. In principle at least, that suggests an entirely new view of the relation between the traditional "opposites". If a perfect attunement (*α'ρμονια*) of the high and the low can be attained by observing these ratios, it is clear that other opposites may be similarly harmonised. The hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, may be united in a just blend (*κρᾶσις*) an idea to which one word "temperature" still bears witness. The medical doctrine of the "temperaments" is derived from the same source. Moreover, the famous doctrine of the Mean is only an application of the same idea to the problem of conduct. It is not too much to say that Greek philosophy was hence-forward to be dominated by the notion of the perfectly tuned string" (Ibid., P.112).

time, circumstances must not matter. cf. Kant.[56] For Vṛatas of two kinds, महाव्रत and अणुव्रत, cf. Jainism. (See Hiriyanna, P.167).[57] Virtue is virtue irrespective of clime or time. One must not kill under any circumstances.

V. Occultism[58]

10. The different powers :

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56 Kant's moral law is a Categorical Imperative and not a hypothetical imperative, because its observance is demanded unconditionally and of every one. "...we are under moral obligation, not in order to reputation here below and happiness above, but without all "ifs" and "in order to's". Thou shalt unconditionally, whatever be the outcome" (R. Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, P.384).

57 Jainism talks of two Vratas or Codes of conduct– one for the layman (अणुव्रत) and one for the monk (महाव्रत). "Like Buddhism, Jainism also admits a two-fold training – that of lay life and that of the monk, and places the latter above the former. Naturally the precepts for the ascetic are more rigid and the vows for the layman are therefore called the 'lesser vows' or aṇu–vrata, to contrast them with the former known as the mahāvrata" (M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Museum Street, London, Eighth Impression, 1970, P. 167). We may note that Yoga uses the word महाव्रत to mean the great vows applicable to each and every one, whereas Jainism uses the word महाव्रत to mean stricter virtues to be observed by the monks.

58 The word means belief in forces that lie beyond man's understanding. Yoga philosophy talks of some mysterious powers which a Yogin attains. (For a description of these powers, see Foot Note 59 below).

अणिमा लघिमा प्राप्तिः प्राकाम्यं महिमा तथा।
ईशित्वं च वशित्वं च तथा कामावसायिता ।।[59]

or

महिमा लघिमाणुत्वं प्राकाम्यं वशितेशिता।
प्राप्तिः कामावसायित्वं शंभोरैश्वर्यमष्टधा ।।[60]

Ecstatic impediments, post-ecstatic realities (Y.S. III.37). Powers, an impediment for Samādhi.[61] Dispassion for powers may bring Kaivalya. From the subtlest to the highest (Y.S. I. 40). Physical, psychical, moral (desirelessness may bring on isolation), and mystical (sages and Self).[62] अस्तेय प्रतिष्ठायाम् सर्वरत्नोपस्थानम् (Y.S. II.37). Cf. अस्तेय (यो भुंक्ते स्तेन एव सः ।

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59 The Siddhis or powers enumerated are: अणिमा (to become as small as an atom), लघिमा (to make the body extremely light), महिमा (to grow to infinite size), प्राप्तिः (to achieve what is desired), प्राकाम्यम् (indomitable will), वशित्वं (to control others' minds), कामावसायिता (control over passions) and ईशित्वम् (over-lordliness).

60 The same eight Siddhis are enumerated in this verse and are said to be lordly powers of Śiva. See Foot Note 59 above.

61 The Siddhis or occult powers are obstacles to Samādhi because if we become entangled in them, no progress in our spiritual life is possible. On the other hand, in the post-ecstatic state (व्युत्थानदशा or reversion to mundane life), they are powers. However, entanglement in them during the ecstatic state and their misuse in the post-ecstatic state are alike condemned.

62 It seems that the super-natural powers (see Foot Note 59 above) are classified under the following heads: अणिमा, लघिमा and महिमा are physical; प्राप्ति and वशित्व are psychological; कामावसायिता is moral; ईशित्व (over-lordliness) is mystical. The last (ईशित्व) may characterise the released souls (sages) and the Lord (Self).

Bhagavad-gītā, III. 12). As knowledge becomes infinite, the knowable becomes infinitesimal, ज्ञानस्य आनन्त्यात् ज्ञेयमल्पम् (Y.S. IV. 31).[63] For details see "Analysis."[64]

VI. Psychology of Mysticism

11. Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna, Samādhi, stages of one continuous process. (a) Dhāraṇā, local – nose, heart, navel, brain or external object (Y. S. III. 1); Dhyāna, ideological. (b) तदेव अर्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः (Y.S.III.3). तदेव = ध्यानम्. Dhyāna, nisus to continuity of experience; Samādhi, attainment of continuity. Dhyāna is defined as प्रत्ययैकतानता (Y.S.III.2), but in this way it could hardly be distinguished from Samādhi. Hence it is better to understand Dhyāna as effort to attain to continuity without reaching it, which is Samādhi.[65] (c) Trayamekatra 'saṃ'yamaḥ

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63 Knowledge is the gradual attainment of the knowable. As knowledge increases, the knowable decreases. Hence as knowledge tends to be infinite, the knowable tends to be infinitesimal.

64 From the last entry of Bibliography of this chapter, we gather that Professor Ranade's "Analysis" was an analytical-cum-synthetical study of the Yoga-sūtras. Unfortunately the MS of "Analysis" is not traceable.

65 Dhāraṇā, is concentration of Citta on one object; the object may be some part of the body (like the tip of the nose) or an external object (like the sun). Though any part of the body can serve as an object for concentration, it is specifically mentioned that concentration on the Ṣaṭ-cakras is more beneficial as it is more health-giving. Unbroken or continuous concentration results in Dhyāna. Here the concentration is on the idea, or quality or import of the object rather than on the object itself. As Dhāraṇā tends to be continuous, the object of meditation tends to be subtler. For example, if Dhāraṇā is on the sun,

(Y. S. III. 4) as opposed to Yama and Niyama.[66] Saṃyama, a search light, प्रज्ञालोक (Y.S. III.5). (d) Samādhi of two kinds. Samprajñāta (conscious), objectful; Asamprajñāta (super-conscious), objectless. Moral, physiological, psycho-physical and psychical.[67]

Dhyāna would be on the lustre of the sun. We are exhorted to continue the same process further; and even the idea of lustre vanishes. What remains is the state of deep concentration, the state where the soul abides in its own nature, untramelled by any quality.

66 संयम is a technical term in Yoga where all the three, namely, धारणा, ध्यान and समाधि are found together. The word should not be confused with यम and नियम. The phonetic similarity should not be taken as similarity of meaning.

67 It seems that the words, moral, physiological, psycho-physical and psychical refer to objects (आलंबन) of meditation, ranging from the gross to the subtle, employed in different types of संप्रज्ञातसमाधि. In सवितर्कसमाधि the object of meditation is gross, i.e. the external objects enjoyed by the senses. This is the physiological stage. In the next higher step, i.e. सविचारसमाधि, the object of meditation is तन्मात्रs which represent the psycho-physical stage. The third stage or सानंदसमाधि, dispenses with both gross and subtle objects and takes Manas in its सात्त्विक state as आलंबन. This is the psychical stage. In the fourth stage or सास्मितसमाधि there is bare awareness of the Ego bereft of all qualities. This too can be grouped with the psychical stage. Now the second kind of Samādhi, the असंप्रज्ञातसमाधि is going beyond nature or Prakṛti. Y.S. I. 18 says that this is attained by sustained practice of eliminating all mental activity. At this stage a man goes beyond the purview of सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् or beyond all traces of natural tendencies (संस्कारs). This state can be characterised as moral.

12. (i) Helps towards mental steadiness.[68] Parts of the body. Dream ideas (Y.S. I.38).[69] (ii) I am; क्षीणवृत्तेः (Y.S. I.41).[70] (iii) Personalities (virtues).[71] (iv) Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic forms, imagery preceding deep sleep and following deep sleep respectively.[72] (v) Super-sensuous objects. The sorrowless

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68 Here are listed objects of meditation that range from gross to subtle; for example, gross things like body, fine things as mind, or still finer, virtues.

69 This is not a recommendation for meditating on any objects that may appear in a dream. If and when a sacred idea occurs, or a holy person appears in a dream, one should meditate on that idea or that person. Unfortunately all dreams of all persons are not holy.

70 The Yogin is able to concentrate on subtler and subtler objects as his चित्त or mind-stuff gradually becomes bereft of Vṛttis or modifications. 'I am' implies identification of the चित्त with finer and finer entities, till there is bare awareness of the ego bereft of all qualities.

71 Meditation can also be on holy persons, or their virtues. Cf. Muṇḍakopaniṣad III. 1.10 तस्मात् आत्मज्ञं ह्यर्चयेत्... (he should worship a mystic who has realised the Self).

72 Help in meditation is also sought from the two types of twilight consciousness – the state intermediate between wakefulness and sleep (hypnagogic) and the state intermediate between sleep and complete awakening (hypnopompic). Ideas that are entertained before going to sleep are soaked in the brain and are consolidated; and hence the necessity of meditation for a साधक before going to sleep. Similarly the freshness of the mind after waking from sleep, is another help for meditation with joy and vigour; and hence the importance of meditation immediately after waking. A student can exploit this character of brain by concentrating on a topic of study before going to

luminosity, विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती (Y.S. I.36),[73] e.g. of the sun, moon, planets and gems. (vi) ईश्वरप्रणिधान (Y .S. I .23). Can an atheist be a Yogin?[74] (vii) Meditation on प्रणव and its meaning (Y.S. I.28). (viii) Breath-control. A mixture of correct and incorrect helps.[75]

13. (i) The 'dichotomy' between संप्रज्ञात and असंप्रज्ञात,

sleep and revising it, first thing in the morning. Prof. Ranade used to say that the last moment before sleep and the first moment after waking are crucial for an aspirant. If the aspirant remembers God at these two moments, by implication the chain of meditation is continuous and suffers no break. This implied continuity is explained by William James: When we go to sleep, there is a time gap between the first moment of sleep (last moment of wakefulness) and the first moment of wakefulness (last moment of sleep). This is measured by the clock. (James calls it outward time.) However, for the sleeping person, the two ends merge smoothly over the gap and the time gap is not felt at all. Thus the stream of thought is continuous. The sleeping person does not feel the gap at all, because there is no inner experience of that gap. Hence in strict psychological terms, sleep, fainting, coma, epilepsy or other unconscious conditions (for example, anasthesia), are, as if, non-existent (See W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Pp. 237 ff).

73 Meditation on the super-sensuous, effulgent light where not a grain of sorrow enters.

74 According to Dr. K.K. Kolhatkar, Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra is nothing but the practical aspect of Advaita Vedānta which advocates that one's highest ideal is the attainment of identity with Brahman – आत्मब्रह्मैक्य. As such a Yogin is necessarily an Advaitin in practice and hence can not be an atheist (See also Swami Vivekananda's Raja-yoga, Pp. 136–137).

75 See Foot Notes 68 and 69 above.

unjustifiable.[76] (ii) Four kinds of संप्रज्ञातसमाधि (वितर्क-विचार-आनंद-अस्मिता) (Y.S. I. 17). If there is विचार, how can there be Samādhi? (iii) Two kinds of असंप्रज्ञात; भवप्रत्यय and उपायप्रत्यय. भवप्रत्यय for the bodiless, विदेहप्रकृतिलयानाम् (Y.S. I.19); उपायप्रत्यय for the aspirant who practises श्रद्धा, वीर्य, स्मृति, समाधि and प्रज्ञा.[77] (Y.S. I. 20). Five kinds of nomenclature: (a) सवितर्क (Y.S. I.42), निर्वितर्क (Y.S. I.43 अर्थमात्रनिर्भासा), (b) Sabīja, seeded (Y.S. I.46),

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76 The difference between संप्रज्ञात and असंप्रज्ञात is not that of kind but of degrees. As concentration becomes more and more deep, the संप्रज्ञातसमाधि culminates in असंप्रज्ञातसमाधि. Hence the two can not be cut asunder. In the highest type of संप्रज्ञातसमाधि i.e., in सास्मित संप्रज्ञातसमाधि all modifications of the mind cease except the subtlest modification "I am" (अस्मि). In the असंप्रज्ञातसमाधि even this bare awareness ceases. The progress from संप्रज्ञातसमाधि to असंप्रज्ञातसमाधि is thus a continuous approximation to the highest state.

77 भवप्रत्यय refers to those who have overcome bodily Ahaṅkāra (विदेह) and who have merged their mind in Prakṛti or Nature. In his onward progress, from gross to subtle, the Yogin transcends the senses and comes to mind, transcends the mind and comes to intellect and then to the Mahat or the cosmic principle. After this stage the natural tendency is to enter the next higher stage, namely Prakṛti. And these Yogins do exactly that (Prakṛti-laya). Thus they remain in the domain or realm of Nature. They are still under the solicitations of the Guṇas. Eventually they come back to Saṃsāra (भवप्रत्यय). There are others who by practising virtues go from Mahat to प्रत्यगात्मन् by overcoming the natural tendency of going from महत् to प्रकृति. Instead of remaining in the realm of Nature, they go to the realm of Ends. This transcendence of Guṇas is attained by the intense determination of practising the virtues (उपायप्रत्यय) like श्रद्धा, वीर्य etc.

निर्बीज Seedless (Y.S. I.51, Y.S. III.8), (c) निर्विचार (Y.S. I.47), सविचार (Y.S. I.44), (d) सविकल्प, निर्विकल्प, (e) संप्रज्ञात (Y.S. I.17), असंप्रज्ञात (Y.S. I.18). (iv) Is there any thing like असंप्रज्ञात? Difference of degree, and not of kind. Otherwise असंप्रज्ञात would be catalepsy.[78] No आरूढ[79] (as contrasted with आरुरुक्षु and युंजान). (v) Infinite progress, as in Croce and Gentile.[80] There has never

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78 Both in संप्रज्ञात and असंप्रज्ञात, there is a continuity of consciousness. In संप्रज्ञातसमाधि there is consciousness of the object, however subtle the object may be. In असंप्रज्ञातसमाधि there is consciousness of Self, comparable to Vedāntic अहं ब्रह्मास्मि. On the other hand, if a difference of kind between the two Samādhis is maintained, संप्रज्ञात would be qualified by consciousness and असंप्रज्ञात by unconsciousness, its opposite. This would be catalepsy; however, in Yogic Samādhi, there is no loss of consciousness. See Foot Note 77 above.

79 This reference is to the Bhagavad-gītā, Chapter VI, verses 3,10,15. Mystical humility rules out the idea of having achieved the end once for all (आरूढ). A better way of describing the mystic's attitude is that he is desirous of attaining to Yoga (आरुरुक्षु) and is incessantly trying to achieve (युंजान) the end. Prof. Ranade refers to the same idea in his book, Pathway to God in Hindi Literature: "Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar going a length further used to say that he was not even a प्रपन्न, but only प्रपित्सु, not one who succeeded in surrendering himself, but one who was only desirous of surrender" (P. 181).

80 Croce holds that "...philosophy *is* history: meaning that events are only what they signify in that perpetual and progressive reinterpretation which they undergo in the thinking mind..." (Weber and Perry, History of Philosophy, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925, P. 563). Gentile maintains that the art-experience is never perfect and final; it has to be revived eternally. Both Croce and Gentile hold that the end is never

been a man who has reached the end. Approximationism.[81]

14. The conflict between the intellectual and the mystical in Yoga: Kaivalya or Samādhi? Isolation or स्वरूपावस्थान?[82] Why two independent chapters on Samādhi and Kaivalya?[83]

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finally reached, but we go on approximating it. Elsewhere, Prof. Ranade writes: "Both Croce and Gentile decry religion, and elevate moralism and infinite progress; and their doctrine of approximation, though true of the individual, is false about the whole. Croce's ever-evolving absolute is the very philosophical prototype of Mussolini's never-ending political ambition. Mussolini's Fascism might well be regarded as rooted in Croce's philosophy of the never-ending Absolute" (Philosophical and Other Essays Part I, Pp. 118–119).

81 Approximationism is a doctrine according to which we never attain to the ideal fully and finally, but go on constantly approaching it. This doctrine is discussed by Prof. Ranade in his different works. (See Pathway to God in Hindi Literature, P. 197; The Bhagavad-gītā as a Philosophy of God-realisation, Pp. 70 ff.; Pathway to God in Kannada Literature, Pp. 3 – 4).

82 स्वरूपावस्थान is a mystical ideal while Kaivalya seems to imply intellectualism. As Yoga accepts Sāṅkhya metaphysics, it advocates Kaivalya or separateness of Puruṣa from Prakṛti. But the Kevalin has to experience that state of isolation and not rest content with mere itellectual conviction. The main contribution of Yoga is ethico-spiritual and Samādhi has its own status in the teaching. However, the distinction between Kaivalya and स्वरूपावस्थान is the distinction between philosophy and mysticism.

83 According to Dr. K. K. Kolhatkar, the purpose of the first chapter, Samādhi-pāda is different from that of the fourth Pāda, namely Kaivalya-pāda. Yoga is cessation of mental modifications. This cessation is achieved gradually and culminates in

15. The Yogic Ideal: (i) Affective: painlessness (All indeed is pain, दुःखमेव सर्वम् विवेकिनः, (Y.S. II.15), and desirelessness. Cf. *Ataraxia*[84] and *Apathia*.[85] Beatification absent from Yoga. Ananda is regarded as inferior, constituting only संप्रज्ञातसमाधि (Y.S. I. 17). Is there anything higher than Ānanda?[86] (ii) Epistemological: unity of ग्रहीतृ, ग्रहण and ग्राह्य, like a jewel (Y.S. I.41) not like a mirror; this stultifies the Yogic attack on Vedāntic अस्मिता.[87] (iii) Intellectual : ऋतंभरा प्रज्ञा, intellect big with truth or truth-bearing consciousness (Y.S. I.48). ऋत superior to सत्य.

Asamprajñāta-samādhi. The first chapter describes the attainment of Samādhi and hence the relevance of the term Samādhi-pāda. The fourth chapter describes Kaivalya and its progressive stages culminating in विदेहमुक्ति. Kaivalya is a higher ideal and Samādhi is subservient to it. Hence Dr. Kolhatkar's stand justifies two different chapters.

84 Ataraxia means tranquillity or peace which is characteristic of an ideal man according to Epicurus, the Greek philosopher.

85 Apathia stands for emotionlessness, the virtue displayed by an equanimous man, according to Stoic philosophy.

86 Later, however, Prof. Ranade came to regard peace to be higher than joy. "Peace does not lead to joy, but joy leads to peace, and hence it is that peace might be regarded as the apex of joy...." (The Bhagavad-gītā as a Philosophy of God-realisation, P. 265).

87 Reflection in a mirror is not a complete unity of बिंब and प्रतिबिंब, the original object and its reflection. Though Sāṅkhya Puruṣa is reflected in Buddhi, there is no identity between them. But the unity of ग्रहीतृ, ग्रहण and ग्राह्य spoken of here, is like a jewel which 'becomes' red near a red object or blue near a blue object. There is thus not reflection but unity; hence Yoga need not find fault with Vedāntic identity of Self and Brahman. See Foot Notes 22 and 24 above.

सत्यं त्वर्तेन परिषिञ्चामि।[88] Also विवेकख्याति, discernment of the Self from not-self (see seven stages below). (iv) Mystical: स्वरूपावस्थान[89] (Y.S.I.3); also प्रत्ययानुपश्यः,[90] (Y.S. II. 20). (v) Moral: धर्ममेघः समाधिः, showers blessings like a cloud. The cloud of virtue comes to him who has no interest left in intellection. प्रसंख्याने अपि अकुसीदस्य सर्वथा विवेकख्यातेः धर्ममेघः समाधिः (Y.S. IV. 29). कुसीद=सिद्धीची सावकारी (व्यापार) करणारा[91] (vi) Ontological: Kaivalya or isolation, सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्याति (Y.S. III. 49). सत्त्व = चित्ताचे उपादान कारण.[92] अन्यता = separateness. (vii) Psychological: स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिः (Y.S. IV. 34). The power of consciousness abiding in itself.

16. The seven stages of Vivekakhyāti: (Four objective and three

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88 This occurs in तैत्तिरीय ब्राह्मण II.1.11.1. It means 'I sprinkle Ṛta on Satya'. Ṛta is a cosmic principle – the universal moral law. In philosophical parlance, सत्य or truth is epistemological, while ऋत has metaphysical, epistemological or ethical aspects. It is thus wider than or superior to सत्य.

89 स्वरूपावस्थान means abiding in one's own form. This is mystical realisation.

90 The expression implies: though Puruṣa experiences misery etc. on account of false identification with body, his original nature is pure consciousness. This has to be realised by Viveka or discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

91 This refers to Dr. K. K. Kolhatkar's clarification of the term कुसीद. (See Foot Note 25 above). The Marathi explanation of the term कुसीद means: one who commercialises Siddhis or powers.

92 This too refers to Dr. K. K. Kolhatkar's explanation. (See Foot Note 25 above). The Marathi expression means: सत्त्व is the material cause of Citta or mind-stuff. Citta is Prākṛtika or material. As Sattva is one of the constituents of Prakṛti, it can be said to be the material cause of Citta.

subjective). Too Buddhistic in character. (i) The nature of pain has been known. (ii) The causes of pain have been removed. (iii) This removal has become a fact of direct experience in Samādhi. (iv) Discriminative knowledge (विवेकख्याति), which is the means to it (हानोपायः, the cause of the removal of pain, Y.S. II.26), has been attained, which implies that Vivekakhyāti is a stepping-stone to isolation. On the other hand, Viveka-khyāti is also described as the end. Cf. तदा विवेकनिम्नम् कैवल्यप्राग्भारम् चित्तम् (Y.S. IV. 26). "The mind, weighed down by the thought of isolation, bends towards discrimination". Description of Jīvan-mukta. His mind, being laden with Kaivalya, descends to practical life with discrimination; also cf. योगांगानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकख्यातेः (Y.S. II. 28). His illumination goes on extending until he realises the separateness of the body and the self. Inconsistency.[93] Does Kaivalya proceed from विवेकख्याति or does विवेकख्याति proceed from the thought of Kaivalya? (v) The Buddhi has achieved its purpose; cf. Sāṅkhya.[94] (vi) The qualities, (here also, compare Sāṅkhya)[95] now finding no support, have been destroyed as stones rolling from a mountain top; cf. also, ततः कृतार्थानां परिणामक्रमसमाप्तिः गुणानाम् (Y.S. IV.32). (vii) The Puruṣa has thus attained to the state of complete isolation. A mere intellectual ascent to isolation. Self-hypnotism.[96]

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93 Once it is stated (Yoga Sūtra II.26) that विवेकख्याति is a means to कैवल्य; but in Sūtra IV. 26, कैवल्य is said to lead to विवेकख्याति thus making विवेक an end. The inconsistency lies in looking upon कैवल्य once as an end and once as a means.

94 Chapter I, Section X.1.

95 Chapter I, Section X.1

96 The man speculates that he is separate from Prakṛti and expresses it by word of mouth without having an immediate

17. Effacement of the distinction between समाधि and व्युत्थान.[97] Value of the संस्कार of Samādhi. It destroys all other संस्कारs; तज्ज: संस्कार: अन्य संस्कारप्रतिबन्धी (Y.S. I.50).

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experience of his separateness from Prakṛti. By verbal knowledge he, as if, hypnotises himself.

97 Though the Yogin has to come down from the Samādhic experience, his व्युत्थान state is not the same as pre-realisational state. The व्युत्थान state can not be called a layman's state. In the case of a Yogin it continues to carry the holy संस्कारs or impressions of the Samādhi. As such, समाधि and व्युत्थान are not antithetical. The Samādhic experience has its own value; because it has its impact on the worldly life too. The more the duration, frequency and intensity of the Samādhic experience, the more is the Yogin established in virtue.

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or philosophic judgement.

S. N. Das Gupta : Study of Patanjali (Calcutta University) might be read.

Rajendra Lall Mitra : Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali (Asiatic Society of Bengal, Bibliothica Indica). Text and Translation both of Yoga-sūtras and Bhoja's "Rāja Mārtaṇḍa". Mitra's reflections are subjoined in square brackets to the translation of the commentary. The Index is valuable. But besides reference to Sanskrit words in the text and the commentary, it contains references to English words also in his own reflections and no reference to words in the Preface. The Preface is valuable philosophically and contains good English but it is somewhat long.

R. D. Ranade : "Analysis" of the Sūtras seriatim and reflections thereon according to subject-matter such as Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics, Occultism and Mysticism.

CHAPTER III

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BUDDHISM

I. The Problem of the Historical Buddha

(a) The doctrines of the Buddha recently separated from the doctrines of Canonical Buddhism. Mrs. Rhys Davids (1934) entirely changes her old opinions as expressed in her book Buddhism, Home University Library, London, 1912.[1] *peccavi.*[2]

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1 About her first book Mrs. Rhys Davids says, "But the 'poor thing' has now out-lived its usefulness....the historical study of Buddhism is a very new science.... I had not discerned that this 'tradition', as shown in the Pali Canon is but a 'tradition of the elders', not necessarily the 'New Word' brought fresh into Indian religion by the founders of 'Buddhism'.... I did not know enough to see that the New Word had survived only in a fragment here, a fragment there, built over by the later superstructure of the 'teaching of the elders', which was largely a matter of formula and ritual of the mind" (Buddhism, Home University Library, London, 1934, Preface Pp. 7–8). By 'New Word' Mrs. Rhys Davids means the original teaching of the Buddha. By the 'teaching of the elders', or 'tradition', she means the doctrine taught by later Buddhist monks, which is known as Canonical Buddhism or Pali Canon. Mrs. Rhys Davids further observes that her studies of the Pali Canon and Commentaries convinced her that the teaching in the Pali Books regarding man's nature, life and destiny is not the original Buddhism (Ibid. P. 41). She often confesses that she did not know the Piṭakas well at that time (Ibid. P. 127), or that she groundlessly omitted certain things (Ibid. P. 132).

2 Peccavi (Latin word) means, I have sinned. It is a confession of sin or guilt. Mrs. Rhys Davids felt guilty about her earlier

The first Edition of Mrs. Rhys Davids was written from the stand-point of materialistic pluralism.[3] "Mrs. Rhys Davids' method sound" : see Article on Pre-Canonical Buddhism by Keith in the Indian Historical Quarterly, March 1936. The problem of the historical Buddha[4] thus exactly resembles the problem of the historical Socrates. Cf. Burnet and Taylor.[5] To

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opinions on Buddhism. "In the first edition of this book I ignorantly supported this belief... let the confession peccavi! absolve me from quoting myself, I did not then know the Pitakas in the somewhat better way I know them now" (Ibid. P. 127).

3 T. Stcherbatsky also holds that the Hīnayāna school is a system of pluralism (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Motilal Banarasidass, Bungalow Road, Delhi–7, 1977, P. 19). As noted above, the earlier version of Mrs. Rhys Davids' opinion was materialistic. She stood for the common belief that Buddhism taught Anattāvāda or the doctrine of no-self, i.e., the absence of any spiritual principle. The 'self' was taken to be nothing but an aggregate (saṅghāta) of ever-fleeting sensations and thoughts without any kind of unity. This is pluralism.

4 "We may say that the life of Siddartha Gotama of the Sakyas, as an historical fact, is at least as well demonstrated as that of the founder of any other religion of any antiquity" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1934, P. 21).

5 Burnet on the problem of the historical Socrates : "It is possible to construct a biography of Sokrates from the dialogues of Plato, and on the face of it, they seem to present us with an intelligible and consistent account of the man and his ways. It would be far better to say at once that we cannot know any thing about Sokrates, and that for us he must remain a mere *X*. Even so, however, the Platonic Sokrates is actual enough, and he is the only Sokrates we can hope to know well. If he is a fictitious character, he is nevertheless more important than

add to the analogy, Buddha like Socrates, is regarded as a mystic. Religion requires uncommon insight, must go not to the Less but to the More, and thence to the Most (Mrs. Rhys Davids).[6] No foundatin or propagation of Religion without mystic insight. (b) Very different from the doctrines of the Buddha are the doctrines of Canonical Buddhism. Buddha, according to the new

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most men of flesh and blood" (John Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Thales to Plato, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., St. Martin's Street, London, 1932, Pp. 126–128).

Taylor on the problem of the historical Socrates : "The life of a great man particularly when he belongs to a remote age can never be a mere record of undisputed fact... He (the biographer) must penetrate behind mere events to the purpose and character they disclose, and can only do so by an effort of constructive imagination" (A. E. Taylor, Socrates, Peter Davies Ltd., T. and A. Constable Ltd., University Press, Edinburg, second edition, 1933, P. 9). "Socrates himself left no record of his own thought or actions" (Ibid. P. 10). "Thus for serious purposes we are thrown back almost entirely upon what we are told about Socrates by persons who could speak from their own direct knowledge, that is, in the main upon Aristophanes, Plato and Xenophon" (Ibid. Pp. 13–14). "Plato, no doubt, had the intimate knowledge and the dramatic gifts which might have enabled him to draw a faithful and vivid picture. But his purpose, it was generally held, was not that of the protrait-painter. His Socrates was meant either as a fancy picture of what a great philosopher should be, or as a 'mask' for himself" (Ibid. Pp. 14–15).

6 "Both Gotama the Sakyamuni and Jesus taught a way by which the Man, in experiencing a More, could advance towards a realising of the Most, the Highest" (Buddhism, 1934, P. 33, See also pages 242 ff).

theory, must be regarded as merely the mouth-piece of the Canonists. What are the reasons for this disparity between the teachings of the Buddha and the teachings of Canonical Buddhism? They are probably these: (i) The Canonists misunderstood the teachings of the Buddha (lapse of three centuries, want of writing, necessity of system, dogma and so forth). (ii) The Canonists misrepresented the doctrines of the Buddha in the interest of their monkdom. "Monkish hostility".[7] The negative side of the Buddha's teaching thus emphasised by the monks at the cost of the positive. They retained Buddha's Ethics, dropped his Mysticism and stressed the negative[8] side of his Metaphysics (viz., Change and Causality).

II. The Teachings of the Historical Buddha

Mrs. Rhys Davids cites Fragments to prove that the Buddha believed in the Self, the reality of the Moral Law, and so on; cf. expressions like Ātmadīpa.[9] 'Live as they who have the Self for

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7 Mrs. Rhys Davids elsewhere calls it 'the monastic distortion' (Outlines of Buddhism, Oriental Books Corporation, New Delhi 55, First Indian Edition, 1978, P. 105). About Canonical Buddhism she uses derogatory words like monk-cult (Ibid. P. 46), smear of the monkhand (Ibid. P. 52), or ecclesiastical hardening and contraction in outlook (Ibid. P. 111).

8 See Buddhism, 1934, Preface, P. 10 ; Pp. 148–150. Mrs. Rhys Davids observes that everything stated about man in the tradition is negative except the fourth truth. Now the fourth truth taught by the Buddha is that there is a way to eradicate suffering. Mrs. Rhys Davids says that here also the monks fail to point out the positive goal to which the way leads. According to her the positive ideal is bliss. The monks reduced religion to a mere matter of ethical conduct (Ibid. P. 36).

9 Attadīpā (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1934, P. 74).

a lamp, the Self for a refuge; as they who have *dharma* for a lamp, *dharma* for a refuge and none other' (P. 73) in Mrs. Rhys Davids' work, Buddhism, Home University Library: cf. Butler's Candle of the Lord within us.[10] Buddha likewise believed in what in western terminology may be called God (P. 148 in Mrs. Rhys Davids' Ch. VII entitled 'The Message of the Fragments').[11] Also see Mrs. Rhys Davids' criticism of Max Muller's five marks of religion.[12] The only difference between

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10 Bishop Samuel Butler gives a prestigious place to conscience in his theory. The quotation given here could not be located. However, the topic is discussed by Butler in his Sermons II and III.

11 According to Mrs. Rhys Davids, the Fragments reveal, "not a denial, but an acceptance of what in *Western idiom* is termed God and the Soul... they reveal a definite teaching of a More about the man, about his nature, life, destiny" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1934, Pp. 148–150).

12 To the question 'Is Buddhism a religion', Mrs. Rhys Davids' answer is that the Fragments leave no doubt that the original teaching of the Buddha was a religion (Buddhism, 1934, P. 148). She mentions the opinion of Mr. Rhys Davids in this connection. "My husband raised this question in his last published writings. He submitted "Buddhism" (and certain other creeds) to the test of Max Muller's "five broad foundations on which all religions are built up", namely, "the belief in a divine power, the acknowledgement of sin, the habit of prayer, the desire to offer sacrifice, and the hope of a future life". His conclusion was, that either we must exclude Buddhism from "religions", or we must define religion otherwise" (Ibid., Pp. 242–243). It is obvious that she does not agree with the view. She criticises Max Muller by saying, "But 'will' finds no place in Max Muller's five points. So much the worse for a man of Schopenhauer's

the doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the doctrine of the Buddha is that while the Upaniṣads preach *Tattvam Asi*, the Buddha preaches *Tattvam Bhavasi* (Bhava = Becoming or growth).[13] See Review of Mrs. Rhys Davids' Manual of Buddhism, I. B. Horner, Pp. 307–312, Journal of Theological Studies, 1933. The doctrine of Anatta only means that the body, the senses and the rest are not the Self. Cf. the important reference in Keith to the reality of the Self, in the Alagaddūpama-sutta in his "Buddhist Philosophy", Pp. 64 – 65.[14] Buddha harks back to the Upaniṣads: Cf. Chapter V, 'A Mis-reading of Buddha' in E. Holmes' book Creed of Buddha.[15] The author severely criticises

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country, so much the worse for us of his adopted country, that such an omission was possible" (Ibid. P. 244). She herself holds the Buddha as an Apostle of Will (Ibid. P. 124). She applies the five marks of religion given by Max Muller and concludes that Buddhism is a religion (Ibid. P. 247).

13 The expression Tattvam asi (Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 8.7) means: That thou art. Tattvam Bhavasi means: That thou becomest. The latter implies progressive development or the idea that there is not perfection but progress. According to Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddha cut asunder the fetters of older beliefs. She says that Buddha brought a New Word, largely to purge, to expand, to quicken that which had stiffened into a tradition (Buddhism, 1934, P. 31).

14 What Buddha "bids men throw off is the non-ego consisting of the five constituents, bodily form, perception, feeling, the dispositions and intellect. As the owner of the wood, the argument seems to run, is not injured by the taking away of the grass, boughs and so on, so the real entity is not destroyed by the laying aside of the constituents" (Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1923).

15 "Set forth in as few words as possible, Buddha's message to

the no-soul doctrine read by Mr. Rhys Davids and Mr. Paul Carus, in the teachings of the Buddha.[16] The author says (Chap.

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man is an appeal to him to find his true self, with all that this can give him – joy, peace, knowledge, love – by suppressing egoism, with all the desires and delusions on which it feeds, and breaking, one by one, the fetters of the surface life and the lower self.

"Those who have followed me thus far will, I think, admit that Buddha's scheme of life coincides, at all its vital points, with the scheme that I worked out by drawing practical deductions from the master ideas of that deeply spiritual philosophy which found its highest expression in the Upanishads" (Seema Publications, C–3/19 R. P. Bagh, Delhi 7, First Indian Edition, 1975, P. 112).

16 "Foremost among the distinguished scholars who have satisfied themselves that Buddha was a negative dogmatist – a meta-physician, whose propositions were all fundamental negations – is Dr. Rhys Davids... Elsewhere he says that no other school of religious thought is "quite so frankly and entirely independent as Buddhism of the two theories of God and the Soul." (Ibid., Pp. 118–119). What is certain is that he regards Buddha's rejection of the soul-theory as thorough-going and uncompromising" (Ibid. P. 122).

"Dr. Paul Carus, who has taken it upon himself to popularise Buddhism and to vindicate it from the disparaging criticism of its "Christian critics", is in the main in full agreement with Dr. Rhys Davids..." (Ibid. P. 123).

E. Holmes calls such views as a misreading of Buddha. He says, "the great Teacher is always a reformer as well as an innovator; and to reform is to go back to an ideal which had been forgotten, or otherwise obscured. The chances are, then, that Buddha, who was unquestionably one of the greatest of all moral

VIII) : 'Western Thought is bankrupt'.[17] The whole is very valuable as being a positive interpretation of the doctrine of Buddhism. Cf. also Radhakrishnan. E. Holmes probably supplied an inspiration to Radhakrishnan and Mrs. Rhys Davids.[18]

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teachers, went back from what was corrupt and degenerate in the thought and the consequent practice of his age to what was pure and spiritual" (Ibid. P. 152).

17 "The higher thought of the West is bankrupt, in the sense that it can no longer meet its obligations" (Ibid. P. 232). Mr. E. Holmes describes this bankruptcy in a language through which only a student of economics or commerce can wade. The sum and substance of his detailed argument is that the function of higher thought is to provide philosophical theories to satisfy the soul's spiritual desires. But sometimes the ideas which thought provides, become stereotyped and dogmatic. Fresh ideas cease to flow and thought with its capital of pale and stale material proves incapable of meeting the new challenges of widening spiritual desires of the soul. The demands of the developing soul grow higher and higher but the spiritual philosophy supplied by stagnant thought can not rise to reach the mark. It remains totally inadequate. According to Holmes western thought was reduced to such bankruptcy. It did not take into account new evidence regarding Buddhism and continued to play with the rotten idea that Buddhism taught a negative philosophy.

18 "I am not alone, I need hardly say, in linking the word 'becoming' with Buddhism. But that its very gospel was one of Becoming I see no one, save only Edmund Holmes, affirming. The only use of it by other writers is in just the sense of mere change and impermanence. Thus Sir S. Radhakrishnan, recently echoing the formulated way of the Pali tradition : "All is transient.... Every thing is a becoming, a passing away." Neither

Buddha taught a doctrine of 'two truths', the exoteric and the esoteric,[19] one for the layman and the other for the philosopher(?)[20] This is probably an anachronism going later to the times of Nāgārjuna.[21] Buddha had no philosophical

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he, nor those who with less excuse than he, have studied the Pali tradition at first hand, have come to see, that in the roots of "Buddhism" we are up against something bigger than "mere change". (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1934 Pp. 106–107).

19 The ultimate Truth can not be known in its entirity by reason and much less by senses. Ultimate knowledge is really intuitive experience and is termed esoteric truth. But most men, for most of the time, and for most of the purposes, have to rely on knowledge that falls short of the esoteric truth, but is useful for practical life. This is termed exoteric truth. The exoteric truth is not unreal; it is less real. It will have more and more reality as it more and more approaches the esoteric truth. Thus exoteric knowledge has degrees. The doctrine of two truths means that the highest truth is one and perfect, but the lower truth has infinite grades (See also Foot Notes 131 – 137 below).

20 Japanese scholars maintain that the Buddha instructed his pupils according to their capacities. Vyakta Upadeśa i.e. exoteric teaching or common-place knowledge was meant for the layman while Guhya Upadeśa i.e. esoteric teaching or mystical instruction was reserved for more advanced pupils. It is difficult to guess why the question mark is put here. Perhaps it may imply that the esoteric truth is beyond the reach of even the philosopher. It can be realised by a mystic in his intuitive experience.

21 Anachronism comes in when an earlier doctrine is interpreted or criticised in terms of a later one. It is like criticising Newton from the standpoint of Einstein. An earlier thinker is innocent of later developments and cannot be judged from the standpoint

insight, says Poussin, to understand the inconsistency of the two doctrines; his silence on metaphysical questions interpreted as incapacity for rational thought.[22] Did not care for Metaphysics. Buddha refuses to answer questions concerning the soul, because they do not conduce to enlightenment and Nirvāṇa (Dīgha-nikāya 9).[23]

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of the latter. This has happened many times in the history of thought and in every sphere of knowledge. The doctrine of two truths was taught by Nāgārjuna and the doctrine of the Buddha who flourished centuries earlier cannot be judged in the light of Nāgārjuna's philosophy. As per Mrs. Rhys Davids the same mistake was committed when Milinda Questions, which are later compositions, were quoted to support earlier doctrines. She warns the reader not to fall into the Milinda-trap (See Buddhism, 1934, P. 128).

22 Stcherbatsky refers to M. de la Vallee Poussin's view : "However M. de la Vallee Poussin explains Buddha's silence by his incapacity in the philosophical field. He did not know what to answer! (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi 7, Second Edition, 1977, P. 25). However, Stcherbatsky does not accept the view of M. de la Vallee Poussin, for he says on P. 23 : "It is the common lot of every philosophy or religion to reach a point where further explanation becomes impossible. A higher and mystical principle is then invoked, because the usual methods have failed to give satisfaction. With Descartes and Leibnitz it is God, with many Indian systems, it is Yoga as a mystical power. An appeal to this power plays a considerable part in Buddhism..."

23 "Whether we call 'philosophy' a metaphysical system, or an attempt to explain the world, or just 'love of wisdom', on such matters the Founder is recorded as refusing to be drawn" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1934, P. 243). "(a) We find him famous

Postscript. The so-called Anatta-lakkhaṇa-sutta proves that Buddha believed in Self by denying the reality of body, mind and senses (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Ibid., P. 78). The dying Buddha said: 'Heed ultimately not what men say,...Heed the inner Monitor, the still small voice' (Mrs. Rhys Davids, P. 86). Paṭicca Samuppāda means setting afoot of beneficent causes which should on no account be stopped[24] P. 92. Progress to Nirvāṇa instead of suffering. Buddha's doctrine of Bhava or growth.[25]

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as a lover of silence, (b) we find him sitting with his disciples in utter silence, (c) we meet with short, pithy sayings, pointed, abrupt, fiery, which do not bear the stamp of the edited, the inserted, (d) he not seldom refuses to answer at all... he taught far more by example 'of Godly living' than by words" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Outlines of Buddhism, P. 50).

24 "That your very progress in the Better, in the Way in Welfaring is equally a setting on foot of beneficent causes which *should on no account be stopped* : herein is a teaching of "the More" which we nowhere find put into terms of causation" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1934, P. 92). Mrs. Rhys Davids' contention seems to be that the Pratītya-samutpāda is a doctrine, more of progress than of causation. This is in accordance with her thesis that Buddhism is a doctrine of going to the More and then to the Most, that Buddha was an apostle of Will or that Buddhism can not be characterised as negative or pessimistic in outlook. In ethics also, she depicts life as way-faring i.e. selecting the best. "This fortunately made it unnecessary to drag in the Causation-chain" (Ibid. P. 112)

25 "Gotama was, in what was virtually a gospel of will, standing out against the skepticism of his day" (Ibid. P. 123). "Herein is he shown a very Apostle of Will as if he knew to what heights in the mystery of life becoming would be revealed as growth in man's will" (Ibid. P. 124). 'Wayknower was he, Waywitter,

A Deva appears in a vision to the Buddha and says : "Teach religion, sir! Teach religion, welfarer... Learners of religion will become" (P. 102).[26] Cf. also 'Bhava' in the expression Bhava-śuddhi, in Asoka's edicts,[27] also compare 'Now am I

Waymaster. They that come after can follow where he led' said Ananda (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Outlines of Buddhism, 1978, P. 18). "For the static he substituted the dynamic. For the rapt complacency he taught the divine unrest of the inner urge we call 'duty', 'conscience'" (Ibid., P. 21).

26 The full sentense is: "Teach religion, sir! Teach relgion, welfarer! There are beings who have little dust in their eyes, from not hearing religion they are perishing. Learners of religion will become" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1934, P. 102).

27 The expression, Bhava-śuddhi stresses growth or development of moral life. It occurs in the seventh Rock Edict of Asoka of which, versions with minor changes are available in Girnar (Saurashtra), Kalsi (U.P.), Shahbazagarhi (Pakistan), Mansehar (Pakistan), Dhauli (Orissa), and Jaugarh (Orissa). It occurs in the second and fifth line. In the fifth line of Girnar Edict, the expression is Bhava-śuddhita instead of the usual Bhava-śuddhi. E. Hultzsche in his Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum Vol. I (Inscriptions of Asoka) 1952, translates the expression as 'purity of mind' while Dr. D. C. Sarkar translates it as 'purity of thought'. Dr. D. C. Sarkar's translation of the seventh edict runs as :

"King Priyadarśi, beloved of the gods feels that all religious sects should live harmoniously in all parts of the dominions. In fact all of them desire to achieve self-control and purity of thought. People, however, are of diverse inclinations and diverse passions. They will perform either the whole or only a part of their duty. However, even if a person practises great

bound to become one turning no more back, I shall become a Further Farer in the life divine' (P. 122).[28] Just as a man who has climbed up a crag can see more, lovely garden, lovely wood, lovely landscape, while the crag blocks the view of the other, similarly Jhāna adds to one's vision[29] (Pp. 138–139).

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liberality but does not possesses self-control, purity of thought, gratitude, and firm devotion, he is quite worthless." (Inscriptions of Asoka, Publication Division, Government of India, New Delhi, Second edition, 1967, Pp. 51–52).

Mrs. Rhys Davids observes : "There is in six of the Asokan Edicts a compound which goes some way to bear out this recognition of becoming as an ideal in religious teaching : the term *bhava-śuddhi*. This, differing from other translators, I see, not as "purity of soul" or "mind", but as "Salvation in (or of, or by) becoming...." (Buddhism, 1934, P. 100). But whereas Asoka is perpetually urging "becoming" as "growth" as a moral More, in his Edicts, he is not interested in bidding folk be as they are. Hence it is nearer the spirit of his lessons to see, in *bhava*, "Becoming" (Ibid., P. 101).

28 This is a description of continuous and gradual progress. Mrs. Rhys Davids quotes another saying, "wherefore train yourselves in this way, striving from further to further, from good to good, let us realize the liberation beyond which naught remains" (Outlines of Buddhism, 1978, P. 25).

29 The higher one climbs, the wider the range of one's vision. If one reaches the top of a mountain one can have a panoramic view of all things which is denied to a man who remains on a lower level. This is also true of moral and spiritual life. The more perfect you are, the nearer you are to the goal and the farther from lower cupidities. The more you have attained to spiritual progress, the nearer you are to God and the more removed from mundane attachments.

कीर्तिः पृष्ठं गिरेरिवा।[30] Also देव पाहों देव पाहों उंच ठायीं उभें राहों।[31] Lofty ethics of moral tele-volition[32] (P. 144) : abundance of benevolence towards others through Telepathy.[33]

III. A Critical Estimate of Canonical Buddhism

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30 Taittirīya Upaniṣad, I.10. This is the post-ecstatic monologue of Triśaṅku. It means that his glory was like the top of a mountain.

31 The meaning is: 'you can realise God if you stand on the high pedestal of Atamānic experience.' The quotation is from Tukārāma (See Abhang No. 1267 in Tukārāma Gāthā).

32 Tele = at, over, from or to a distance. Volition = the act of using the will. Televolition means using the will to produce effects at a distance. The injunction was that a monk should suffuse all quarters with the virtues like amity (मैत्री), pity (करुणा), gladness (मुदिता) or poise (शम). It is necessary that he should himself have that virtue in abundance before he can will it to others. It is spreading of virtue by thinking well of others. Obviously the monk must have vast resources of that virtue and a heartfelt desire to benefit others.

33 The word telepathy was coined in 1882 by F. W. Meyers. It means supposed communication between minds by some means other than the normal sensory channels. It is transference of thought. Mrs. Rhys Davids observes, "The point is, that a man abounding in benevolence, should, by what we call telepathy, but what ought to be called televolition, 'will' another, whom he sees abounding in the opposite sentiment or stinting amity, to be filled with his own amity. And the same Will-exercise should be practised with the sentiment of 'pity' of 'benevolent joy' and of 'poise' or moral stability" (Buddhism, 1934, Pp. 142–143).

(i) Saṅghāta and Santāna, contradictory conceptions.[34] Saṅghāta and Santāna, cardinal points also in Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika

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34 Saṅghāta means an aggregate or putting together. The Self is nothing but a body-mind complex – an aggregate of thoughts, sensations and body. Self is not an entity to which the states of consciousness belong. The states of consciousness are themselves the self. Add an element of time to Saṅghāta and you get Santāna. Santāna means incessant change. The aggregate is always in a flux. Now, a conglomeration of thoughts and sensations (Saṅghāta) without any substance to hold them, is inconceivable in the first instance. Secondly, change in time cannot be perceived, unless there is something to change. Flux (Santāna) is inconceivable without a substance. Hence Saṅghāta and Santāna taken individually are inconceivable. Taken together, they are contradictory. Change will be consistent with something that changes and not with a transient bundle of sensations.

"The conception of a *dharma* is the central point of the Buddhist doctrine. In the light of this conception Buddhism discloses itself as a metaphysical theory developed out of one fundamental principle, viz. the idea that existence is an interplay of plurality of subtle, ultimate, not further analysable elements of Matter, Mind and Forces. These elements are technically called *dharmas*, a meaning which this word has in this system alone. Buddhism, accordingly, can be characterised as a system of 'Radical Pluralism' *(saṅghāta-vāda)*: the elements alone are realities, every combination of them is a mere name covering a plurality of separate elements" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, Indian Edition, Motilal Banarasidass, 1979, P. 73).

"Buddhist philosophy is an analysis of separate elements, or forces, which unite in the production of one stream *(santāna)*

school, that of materialistic pluralism. See Śaṅkara's criticism below.[35] Incessant change (cf. P. Carus, Gospel of Buddha, Identity and non-identity, Pp. 131, 140)[36] without a permanent

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of events" (Ibid. P. 9).

Buddhism never denied the existence of a personality, or a soul, in the empirical sense, it only maintained that it was no ultimate reality (not a *dharma*). The Buddhist term for an individual, a term which is intended to suggest the difference between the Buddhist view and other theories, is *Santāna*, i.e. a 'stream', viz. of inter-connected facts. It includes the mental elements and the physical ones as well, the elements of one's own body and the external objects, as far as they constitute the experience of a given personality. The representations of 18 classes *(dhātu)* of elements combine together to produce this inter-connected stream. There is a special force, called *prāpti*, which holds these elements combined. It operates only within the limits of a single stream and not beyond. This stream of elements keeps together, and is not limited to present life. Having its roots in past existences and its continuation in future ones, it is the Buddhist counterpart of the Soul or the Self of other systems (Ibid. Pp. 25–26). (See also Foot Notes 165, 166 below).

35 See Section VI below: Bādarāyaṇa's Criticism of Buddhism.

36 Buddha gives two illustrations to explain change. The flame which burns in the first watch of the night is not the flame that burns in the second or third watch of the night. It is different at every moment. Similarly what is called self is a constant change. The babe, the boy, the youth and the man are different. However, there is identity in a certain sense only. This identity consists in the continuation of Saṃskāras, which are produced by man's past deeds. The man is identical only in the sense that he himself reaps the fruit of what he sows, but he is different because, besides the combination of Saṃskāras there is no self

substratum, is an impossible concept; cf. Kant.[37] No Substance, Self, Cause and God.[38] Buddha's catechism to Rāhula on Impermanence: Many Gods come to listen, (cf. Cūḷa-Rāhulo-vādasutta, 147 of Majjhima-nikāya).[39] Does the doctrine of

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(See The Gospel of Buddha, Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, First Indian Edition 1961, Chapter LIII, Identity and Non-Identity, Pp. 121 ff).

37 According to Kant, in all change of appearances, substance is permanent. All existence and all change in time have to be viewed as simply a mode of the existence of that which remains and persists. When we notice a change in something, this 'something' is that which changes (See Kant's Critique of Pure Reason : Tr. N. K. Smith, Pp. 212 ff).

38 It has already been explained that there is no substance and no self. (See Foot Note 34 above). Nāgārjuna, the great Buddhist dialectician, says at the very beginning of his Mūla-madhyama-kārikā that causation is an illusion, because a thing is not born of itself nor is it born of others. It is well known that Buddhism accepts no God.

39 Buddha did not want to give Rāhula the things which were perishable or impermanent but wanted to bequeath spiritual wealth. "Rāhula followed him, asking for his inheritance. The Buddha was still silent, but as he did not stop his son's asking, so neither did his disciples interfere. When they reached the Nigrodha grove, Gautama thought, 'This wealth that he is seeking from his father perishes in the using, and brings vexation with it; I will give him the seven-fold nobler wealth I acquired under the Bo-tree, and make him the heir of a spiritual inheritance'. Then turning to Sāriputta, he told him to admit Rāhula into Order, which was accordingly done" (T.W. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, being a Sketch of Life and Teachings of

Becoming involve merely the 'impermanence' of phenomenal existence? This line of interpretation adopted by certain modern interpreters of the doctrine of Māyā. Evenescence, instead of illusion.[40] Herakleitos, though he recognises incessant change,

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Gautama, the Buddha, London, Society for promoting Christian Knowledge, New York, Macmillan Co., 1920, P. 67). "What do you think about this, Rāhula? Is the eye.... are the material shapes.... is visual consciousness.... the ear.... the nose.... the tongue.... the body.... permanent or impermanent?"
"Impermanent, revered Sir".
"But, is what is impermanent, anguish or happiness?"
"Anguish, revered Sir".
"But, is it right to regard that which is impermanent, anguish, liable to alteration as, 'This is mine, that am I, this is my self'?"
"No, revered Sir."....
"Seeing thus, Rāhula, the instructed disciple of the ariyans turned away from the eye;.... from the ear...., In turning away he is dispassionate; by dispassion he is freed : in freedom is the knowledge that he is freed, and he comprehends : Destroyed is birth, brought to a close the Brahma-faring, done is what was to be done, there is no more of being such or so".
"Thus spoke the Lord. The venerable Rāhula rejoiced in what the Lord had said. While this exposition was being given, the venerable Rāhula's mind was freed from the cankers without grasping. And to those various thousands of *devas* there arose the dustless, stainless vision of *dhamma* that, 'whatever is liable to uprising all that is liable to stopping'" (I. B. Horner, The Middle Length Sayings, Vol. III Luzac and Company, Ltd., London, 1959. Majjhima-nikāya 147, Cūḷarāhulovādasutta, Pp. 329–330).

40 Prof. Ranade himself holds this view. He says that in the doctrine of ephemeralism there is reconciliation of the two

yet recognises a God.[41] Bergson, in spite of his doctrine of change, has made a place for mystical reality in his book 'Two Sources of Morality and Religion'.[42]

(ii) The Self. The Milinda-praśna primarily responsible for the defective analogy of the Self with the chariot (probably Greek influence). See E.J. Thomas, Buddhist Scriptures, Pp. 123–124. Questions of King Milinda, Pp. 46 ff. Buddha: Self[43] : Canonists: No Self.[44] The image of the chariot better utilized by the Upaniṣads and Plato.[45] In Buddhism, chariot an assemblage of

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opposite doctrines, one saying that the world is real; the other advocating that the world is Māyā or illusion. (See The Bhagavad-gītā as a Philosophy of God-realisation, Pp. 186–188).

41 Heracleitos did recognise God. He called it Logos or the spiritual principle.

42 This is what Bergson says: "I mean mystic experience taken in its immediacy, apart from all interpretation. True mystics simply open their souls to the oncoming wave. Sure of themselves, because they feel within them something better than themselves. They prove to be great men of action, to the surprise of those for whom mysticism is nothing but visions and raptures and ecstasies" (The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., St. Martin's Street, London 1935, P. 81).

"We must first note the fact that mystics generally agree among themselves" (Ibid., P. 211). See also Pp. 40, 188 and 274 of the book).

43 See Foot Note 11 above.

44 See Foot Note 34 above.

45 The image of the chariot is found in Kaṭhopaniṣad I.3.3 ff. In Plato's dialogue it occurs in Phaedrus 253 d – 254 e. Buddhism uses the concept of the chariot to prove the doctrine of no-self.

parts; in Upaniṣads and Plato, the chariot a vehicle drawn by the white and dark, the ruly and the unruly, horses.[46] No

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Just as a chariot is a symbol for the assemblage of physical complexes like the pole, wheel, axle, seat, roof and so on, so too the self is but a symbol for the aggregate of psychial complexes like form (Rūpa), idea (Vijñāna), feeling (Vedanā), sensation (Sañjñā) or impression (Saṃskāra). The concept of chariot or for that matter, the concept of self is only an aggregate without any underlying unity. In the Upaniṣads as well as in Plato, however, the chariot is a single entity or an organic unity. So is the body a 'harmonious embodiment of a single purpose'. The members of the body are organically interrelated. The body-chariot described both by the Upaniṣads and by Plato is one unit, complete with the horses and the charioteer.

46 The parable of the chariot in the Kaṭhopaniṣad is as follows: "The body is a chariot.... of which the Soul is the Lord, and intellect the charioteer; the mind constitutes the reins, while the senses are the steeds which roam on the pasture-lands of worldly objects. A person whose mind is not composed, is taken to evil paths by the unruly and wicked steeds, while he whose mind is composed is taken to good paths by the noble steeds" (S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade, The Creative Period, Bilvakunja Publishing House, at Bilvakunja, 102 A, Bhamburda, Poona, 1927, P. 263). Similar is the Phaedrus myth: Our soul is a charioteer (reason) riding in a chariot drawn by two winged horses, one of a mortal (appetite), and the other of an immortal nature (Spirit). In the case of the gods both of the horses are pure and noble. It is only in the case of man that one is unruly and the other ruly.... A very furious struggle takes place between the charioteer and the dark vicious horse that wishes to draw the chariot of the soul on to the unlawful deeds. Happy is the charioteer who with the help of the white immortal steed can

'Charioteer' in Buddhism. Hume: entire disparity of ideas; billiard balls.[47]

Buddhism: projection of energy or efficacy.[48] James: an ever-enveloping unity. The Buddhist view, in between the views of Hume and James.[49] The Canonical doctrine of the annihilation

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win victory in the struggle.

47 According to Hume, even if one billiard ball hits another and the other moves, we can not conclude that the motion in the second ball is caused by hitting; because, the two balls are entirely disparate and there can not be any causal connection between them. There is time sequence but no causal sequence.

48 This implies transmission of Saṃskāras or traces of good and bad thoughts. Stcherbatsky renders the word energy by Saṃskāra (The Central Conception of Buddhism, P. 23). In Buddhism elements are really discrete or separate. "A force, it must be recalled, should not be regarded as a real influence of something extending beyond its own existence in order to penetrate into another– this would be *upakāra* – but simply as a condition, a fact, upon which another fact arises or becomes prominent *(utkarṣa)* by itself – this is *Saṃskāra* in the Buddhist system" (Ibid., Pp. 21–22).

49 According to James, thoughts are not separate or independent; on the other hand, the previous thought completely envelopes the next one for they both belong to the same self. The thoughts which come later inherit all that the previous one had (See William James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Pp. 339–340). According to Hume the self is a bundle of discrete sensations. Buddhism agrees with Hume in saying that thoughts are completely disparate having no relation to each other. It agrees with James in maintaining that when the first thought dies, it bequeaths all that it had, to the succeeding. Buddhism, while agreeing with Hume that there is discontinuity, agrees

of personality symbolized by the absence of the representations of Buddha in early Buddhist sculpture and painting, his place being taken by his foot-prints or by the royal umbrella. Cf. The hand on the horse,[50] or Kaaba[51] in Mahomedenism. Eidola (Carlyle).[52] The nemesis of the denial of God in Buddhism is the apotheosis of its Founder.[53] The very nails and bones, hair and teeth of the Buddha worshipped and made immortal. Distribution of Buddha's 'relics' in the Mahā- parinibbāna-sutta. Buddha's three bodies (trikāya),[54] closely akin to the

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with James that Saṃskāras are passed on. Thus in Buddhism there is discreteness as in Hume and inheritance as in James.

50 The reference is to a wooden framework for punishment to soldiers. By implication it means: running the risk of punishment. It is a symbol of award of justice.

51 The sacred Muslim shrine at Mecca, toward which believers turn when praying : it contains a black stone supposedly given to Abraham by the angel Gabriel. On this, "all pilgrims who visit the shrine imprint a kiss."

52 Eidola (Greek word) means an image without real existence, it is a phantom. Carlyle vividly describes how we live in a world of phantoms. Life is made of dreams. Immersed in dreams and shadows we miss reality (See R. D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, Pp. 168–169).

53 Nemesis, in Greek mythology is a goddess of retributive justice. Buddha dethroned God but his followers enthroned Buddha himself by making him God. Justice was done as the place of God never remained vacant.

54 The three bodies of Buddha are: (i) Dharma-kāya (the body of the moral Law), (ii) Nirmāṇa-kāya (the body of transformation) and (iii) Sambhoga-kāya (the body of bliss) (See Paul Carus, The Gospel of Buddha, 1961, P. 206). "The Sambhoga-kāya or the body of bliss was a concept evolved later

Christian conception.[55] Nobody ever went to break God, but God ultimately broke him. No-soul psychology, no-God religion and no-substance metaphysics.[56] Then again, evasion of moral responsibility in the Canon (Cf. E. J. Thomas, Buddhist Scriptures, Pp. 123–124. Questions of King Milinda, Pp. 46 ff). Explanation of Milinda-praśna that a new mind and a new body are created, which is really no explanation at all. Morality requires that he who sows must reap. Moral responsibility comes

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by the Yogācārins. The Mādhyamikas speak only of two bodies of the Buddha, namely, Dharma-kāya and Nirmāṇa-kāya" (T. Stcherbatsky: The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Professor Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 47). See also Foot Note 144 below.

55 The three persons, namely Father from whom, Son to whom and Spirit through whom all things are. These three constitute the Supreme Deity, namely God. This is the doctrine of Trinity.

56 Stcherbatsky says in this connection: "It is thus assumed that there has been a primitive Buddhism, very much different, even, as it would seem, quite contrary to what later on finds its expression in the Pali canon. Pessimism, nihilism, soul-denial, psychology without a soul, annihilation as ultimate end, all these features that mark out Buddhism among other religions, Indian as well as non-Indian, did not exist. It was the Buddhism of Buddha himself which was so radically different from any thing that appeared later, in historical times, as Buddhism". (T. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism 1979, P. 5). This account of canonical Buddhism is as if summarised in the criticism occuring in the text. The Pali version of Buddhism can not explain the psychological fact of memory; its atheism does not justify religion. As regards metaphysics the Buddhist schools, among themselves, refute each other.

to be entirely shelved. No ethics without a metaphysical foundation.[57]

(iii) A critical examination of the doctrine of Paṭicca-Samuppāda, a very defective theory of causation.[58] It has been argued that the concatenation of the 12 links in the chain of causation merely symbolises the fatuity or the non-existence of the self and the reign of mechanical law,[59] vide Keith, Ch. V Section 4, Buddhist Philosophy, for various interpretations of the Law (Pp. 105–107). According to Keith, the first link in the chain of Causation,

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57 Without an abiding self it is difficult to uphold the categorical nature of the moral law that he who sows must reap. On Buddhistic metaphysics he who sows disappears the next moment and does not remain to reap the consequences of his action. This is the implication of their contention that a new self is born every moment. Therefore, the real doer escapes the responsibility either of his good actions or bad actions. Again, it is only on the metaphysical basis of the permanence of the Self, that Ethics becomes possible. One of the postulates of Ethics is immortality of the soul.

58 The chain of links is not self-sustaining, because it breaks at every link. And therefore to own such states as अविद्या, तृष्णा etc. there must be a permanent self (See Foot Note 59 below).

59 The argument of Buddhism is that the concatenation of 12 links (निदानs) namely, ignorance (अविद्या), impression or memory (संस्कार), consciousness (विज्ञान), name and form (नामरूप), five senses and mind (षडायतन), contact or perception (स्पर्श), feeling (वेदना), desire (तृष्णा), holding to existence (उपादान), becoming (भव), birth (जाति), old age and death (जरामरण) is sufficient to explain the dependent origination (प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद) and that no permanent self or mechanical law of causation is necessary (See Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon. See also Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1912, P. 120).

namely, "Avidyā", has no 'Vedāntic' significance; Jacobi says it has only a Sāṅkhya significance. Kern interprets the Chain of Causation as based on a cosmogonic myth and says it only implies the creation and destruction of the world; Franke says, on the other hand, that the chain has only an ideal significance. Burnouf tells us that the Chain implies the emergence of concrete entity from non-existence; while Kirste says that it tries to bring about a relation between independent temporary existences, which are not changes as in an organism. Oltramare similarly tells us that the Chain does not try to explain the origin of life, but only points out to the emergence of misery; while Mrs. Rhys Davids says that the Chain may imply progress to Nirvāṇa (Pp. 91–92), and not necessarily the emergence of misery.[60] It need not be a pessimistic doctrine but may be a melioristic one. The Buddhists did not make sufficient use of their doctrine of Santāna to explain causation; otherwise causation to them would have meant no more than mere continuity. Das Gupta tells us that the Pratītya-samutpāda means dependent emergence which is only another name for collocative production, assemblant origination or contingent necessity;[61] while to us it seems to imply the doctrine of 'asamutpāda' or non-creation as experienced in 'Pratīti' or intuition (Pratīti + asamutpāda). The Asamutpāda doctrine of the Buddhists thus comes quite near to the Ajāti doctrine of Vedānta.[62]

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60 See Foot Note 24 above.

61 See Indian Philosophy Vol. I, Pp. 138 ff.

62 The point is discussed by Prof. Ranade in his Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, Pp. 114–116. The Vedānta Sūtra II.2.28 means that the world is real because it is actually experienced. The Sūtra II. 2.30 says that the world does not exist as it disappears in the ecstatic state. According to

(iv) Probably the chiefest defect of Canonical Buddhism is the doctrine of re-incarnation running riot. Buddha remembers on his death-bed that in his previous life he was King Sudassan (Dīgha-nikāya 17). Mahāgovinda also (Dīgha-nikāya 19). Also Makhādeva (Majjhiṁa-nikāya 83). 547 "Jātaka" tales.[63] (Khuddaka-nikāya 10). Previous lives of monks and nuns also (Khuddaka-nikāya, 13). (Apadāna).[64] Is Buddhism a religion of Reason? (Cf. Grimm[65]

Gauḍapāda, the world is not born at all (Ajāti). He gives arguments for his stand and criticises the opponents. The difficulties in the doctrine of causation lead the wise to stick to the theory of non-creation, says Gauḍapāda. See Māṇḍūkya Kārikā IV. 19, 21, 22.

63 "550 Jātakas or Birth Stories which recount the edifying histories of Gautama's previous existence as man, animal a fairy... Associated with the doctrine of the Bodhisatta is that of previous Buddhas who are duly named in the *Mahāpadāna Sutta*, and the details of their lives set forth according to a set formula; their number is three or seven, or according to a later account, twenty-four. Of future Buddhas, only the Bodhisatta Metteya, the personification of Loving-kindness, is mentioned, and that in the *Milinda Panha*, which is a little better than the canonical scriptures" (Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism, First Indian edition, 1974, Munshiram Manoharlal, 54, Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi 55, P. 226).

64 Apadāna means a legend treating of former and future births of men and exhibiting the consequences of their good and evil actions.

65 G. Grimm advocates that Buddhism is a religion of reason. "And it happens that the doctrine of this man whom many call the greatest of the Aryans and therefore the greatest of men, precisely at this moment is making its way among mankind

and P. Carus.)[66] That long host of Christian paeanists.[67]

(v) Occultism: Meditation on emptiness (Majjhima-nikāya, 121). Practising internal emptiness (Majjhima-nikāya 122). Superstition of Buddha : A spell (in verse) given by the four great Kings to Buddha to serve as protection against evil spirits which he repeats to the monks (Dīgha-nikāya 32). A poem on the Three

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looking longingly for a teaching that on the one hand may present to it the kernel of all religions and all metaphysics, pure and unmixed, and on the other guaranteed its solution in accordance with the methods of exact science, by self-experimentation. This is the doctrine of Gotama the Buddha, the Awakened One, the culminating point of Indian wisdom" (George Grimm, The Doctrine of the Buddha, Indian Edition, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi 7, 1982, Pp. 42–43). The title of the original book is, The Doctrine of the Buddha, The Religion of Reason, 1915.

66 According to Paul Carus, reason has its own place in Buddhism. It guides the instincts and controls the body; and as such makes room for love. But it is a double-edged sword and by inflaming passions it makes room for hatred. Reason is only an instrument, for no truth is attainable without reason: nevertheless in mere rationality there is no room for truth. Paul Carus upholds the supremacy of the moral law by stating that righteousness is the place in which Truth dwells (See Paul Carus, The Gospel of Buddha, Pp. 207–208).

Yamakami Sogen says: "....but Buddhism in itself is not a philosophical system, although it is the most rational and intellectual religion in the world" (Systems of Buddhistic Thought, University of Calcutta, 1912, P. 301).

67 Paeanists mean Hymn-singers – hymns of thanks-giving to God, especially Apollo (See Grimm's book, The Doctrine of the Buddha, for list of Western writers praising Buddhism).

Jewels, the Triratna viz., the Buddha, the Doctrine and the Order,[68] forming a charm to win the good will of spirits (Khuddaka-nikāya, 1, Khuddaka-pāṭha). Also spiritual Exercises in Coomaraswami.[69] Read Section 'Ecstasy' in Rhys Davids'

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68 बुद्धं शरणं गच्छामि धर्मं शरणं गच्छामि संघं शरणं गच्छामि.

69 "A regular part of the daily work of the members of the Sangha - whether Brethren or Sisters – consisted in the practice of certain contemplations. These stations of meditation differ only in minor details from those which are regularly practised by Indian ascetics of other orders. With characteristic systematization, these modes of training heart and mind are often spoken of as forty-four in number. How essentially self-educational is the purpose of these stations of meditation appears from the fact that certain ones are appointed for persons of one temperament, and certain others for those of other temperaments. I have spoken of these meditations deliberately as 'work', because it is important to understand that we do not speak here of any simple matter such as day-dream or reverie, but of a severe system of mental training, founded on an elaborate psychology, and well calculated – now by auto-suggestion, now by close attention – to produce the type of character aimed at.... The first meditations are of an ethical character, and in some respects may be compared to prayer. They consist in cherishing the moods *(bhāvanās)* of loving-kindness, compassion, sympathy and impartiality *(mettā, karuṇā, muditā* and *upekkhā)*. These are called the Four Illimitable Sublime Moods (Brahmavihāras)....

"With the Four Meditations just mentioned is associated another *(asubha-bhāvanā)*, on "Foul things." This very different contemplation is appointed for those whose emotional nature is already active enough, but are on the other hand too readily moved by the thought or sight of physical beauty, or feel a pride

book, Early Buddhism, Pp. 86–89.[70] Read also 'skilful practice of Trances' in Poussin's book, Way to Nirvana, Pp. 159–166.

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in their own physical perfection. The object of this meditation is to impress on the mind that every living organism is subject to change and decay....

"With regard to the purpose of these meditations: we may observe that they are not intended for ascetics only, but equally for laymen, and must have resulted in active deeds of compassion. Buddhist thought, however, is more concerned with states of mind than with direct injunctions to labour for others; and the true purpose of the Four Sublime Moods is to correct the disposition of those who are ill-tempered and uncharitable....

"A further group of meditations consists of the Jhānas or Dhyānas strictly so-called; these, too, are disciplines of attention and abstraction almost identical with those which are better known as belonging to Yoga" (Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism, 1974, Pp. 133–137.)

70 "Another point of Buddhist teaching adopted from previous belief was the practice of ecstatic meditation.... In India, from the Soma frenzy in the Vedas, through the mystic reveries of the Upaniṣads, and the hypnotic trances of the ancient Yoga, allied beliefs and practices had never lost their importance and their charm. It is clear from the Dialogues, and other of the most ancient Buddhist records, that the belief was in full force when Buddhism arose, and that the practice was followed by the Buddhist teachers. It was quite impossible for him to ignore the question; and the practice was admitted as a part of the training of the Buddhist Bhikshu" (T. W. Rhys Davids, Early Buddhism, Bharatiya Publishing House, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 7, First reprint, 1976, Pp. 86–87).

Cf. also the occult process of Jhāna or tele-volition in Mrs. Rhys Davids.[71] Tele-volition good in a moral sense, but its objective validity questionable.[72] See Buddhist Ethics below. Nudity also of Mahāyānists' Dhyāna : Meditation called Tathatālambana (Das Gupta, P. 150).[73]

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71 See Foot Note 32 above.

72 Prof. Ranade displays a scientific attitude in asking for the objective validity of this hypothesis. The same is true of his observation regarding the hypothesis of Liṅga-śarīra.

73 "The four Dhyānas spoken of in the Laṅkāvatāra seem to be different from those which have been described in connection with the Theravāda Buddhism. These dhyānas are called (1) *bālopacārika*, (2) *arthapravicaya*, (3) *tathatālambana* and (4) *tathāgata*. The first one is said to be that practised by the Śrāvakas and the pratyeka buddha. It consists in concentrating upon the doctrine that there is no soul *(pudgalanairātmya)*, and that every thing is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on till all conceptual knowing ceases *(āsamjñānirodhāt)*; we have what is called the Vālopacārika dhyāna (the meditation for beginners).

"The second is the advanced state where not only there is full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the comprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that appears. This is called the *arthapravicaya* dhyāna, for the sage concentrates here on the subject thoroughly seeking out *(pravicaya)* the nature of all things *(artha)*.

"The third dhyāna, that in which the mind realises that the thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances, is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into thatness *(tathatā)*. This dhyāna is called *tathatālambana*, because it has

Postscript : Stories of celestial mansions. Beings who have been reborn in one of the heavens explain the acts of merit that led to their reward (Kuddaka-nikāya 6, Vimanvatthu). Stories of Petas, Beings condemned for their former misdeeds to a wretched existence as ghosts (Khuddaka-nikāya 7, Petavatthu). No purgatorio in Buddhism.

IV. Buddhistic Ethics

The sublimity of empirical or descriptive ethics[74] in Buddhism. Its strongest point, the message of peace and contentment. Sanctity of Life. India, the true representative of Buddhism, says

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for its object the *tathatā* or thatness. 907230

"The last or the fourth dhyāna in which the lapse of the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realised" (S. N. Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I, 1932, P. 150).

"According to the *Laṅkāvatāra* the attainment of the highest knowledge may be accomplished by Bodhisattvas through the realisation that things are nothing but mental creation... To aid in the attainment of this end a special series of meditations is prescribed.... In the third meditation it is realised that the thought that there is no self and no appearance is itself an outcome of delusion, and the mind then falls back on the conception of suchness *(Tathatālambana)*" (A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 4th Edition, 1963, P. 249).

74 Empirical ethics deals with the actual 'here' and not with the hypothetical 'hereafter'. Ultimate good of the soul has no place in this ethics. Buddha was mainly concerned with man's life on the earth and taught that one should try for peace to oneself and peace to others.

Mahatma Gandhi; neither Burma nor Ceylon, neither China nor Japan. As Logic sprang full-blown from the head of Aristotle, so Ethics sprang full-blown from the head of the Buddha. Hīnayānists and Mahāyānists could only add a point here or a point there. The Elephant (Bodhisattva) gives over his 'physical' tusks in order to gain 'spiritual' tusks (knowledge). Cf. Coomaraswamy, Pp. 290 – 293. Chaddanta Jātaka[75] : "the tusks

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75 "Introductory episode : A well-born girl of Sāvatthi, recognizing the misery of the worldly life, had adopted the homeless state, and was one day seated with others of the Sisters, hearing the Master's teaching; and the thought came into heart, 'Was I in some former life an attendant of his wives?' Then she remembered that in the time of the elephant Chaddanta, she herself had been his wife, and her heart was filled with joy. But 'Was I well or ill-disposed to him?' she thought, 'for the greater part of women are ill-disposed to their lords.' Then she remembered that she had borne a grudge against Chaddanta, and had sent a hunter with a poisoned arrow to take his tusks. Then her grief awoke, and her heart burned, and she burst into sobs and wept aloud. On seeing that the Master smiled, and being asked by the company of the Brethren, 'What, Sir, was the cause of your smiling', he said, 'Brethren, this young sister wept for an injury she did me long ago'. And so saying he told a story of the past.

"Once on a time the Bodhisatta was born as the son of the chief of a herd of elephants in the Himalayas. He was pure white, with red feet and face; when he grew up he became the chief of a great herd, and he worshipped private Buddhas. His two chief queens were Cullasubhaddā and Mahāsubhaddā. One year it was reported, 'The great sal-grove is in flower'; and with all his herd he went to take his pleasure there. As he went along he struck a sal tree with his forehead, and because

Cullasubhaddā was standing to windward, twigs and dry leaves and red ants fell on her, while Mahāsubhaddā stood to leeward, so that flowers and pollen and green leaves fell on her. Cullasubhaddā thought, 'He let the flowers and pollen fall on his favourite wife, and the twigs and red ants on me,' and she bore him a grudge. Upon another occasion, when a lotus with seven shoots had been offered to him, he presented it to Mahāsubhaddā.

"Then Cullasubhaddā was still more estranged, and she went to a shrine of private Buddhas and made offering of wild fruits, and prayed : 'Hereafter, when I pass away, I would be reborn as the daughter of a king, that I may become the queen of the King of Banaras. Then shall I be dear to him, and may work my will, and I will have him to send a hunter with a poisoned arrow to kill this elephant and bring me his sixfold tusks.' And in time to come she becomes the chief queen of the King of Banaras. She remembers her former life and thinks : 'My prayer has been fulfilled.' She feigns sickness, and persuades the king to grant her a boon, which alone will restore her health and spirits; what the boon is she will tell when all the king's huntsmen are assembled. It is that some one of them should bring her the tusks of Chaddanta....

"Of all the huntsmen, one by name Sonuttara, who was a hideous lout and big and strong, undertook the task, and being furnished with all needful implements, he set forth on his way. It needed seven years of weary going to reach Chaddanta's haunts; but no sooner come there, than Sonuttara dug a pit and covered it with logs and grass, and donning the yellow robes of a man of religion, and taking his bow and poisoned arrow, he hid himself and lay in wait. Presently Chaddanta passed by, and Sonuttara wounded him with the poisoned arrow. But the elephant, subduing his feelings of resentment, asked the hunter, 'Why

of omniscience are a thousand times dearer to me than these; and may this worthy gift be the cause of my attaining Omniscience". Buddha on taking meat. Buddha tells us that a monk should eat meat only if he has not seen, heard or suspected

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have you wounded me? Is it for your own ends or to satisfy the will of another?' The hunter answered that Subhaddā, the consort of the King of Banaras, had sent him to secure the tusks. Chaddanta reflected, 'It is not that she wishes for the tusks, but she desires my death'; and he said:

Come now, thou hunter, and before I die
Saw through my ivory tusks;
And bid the jealous queen rejoice –
'Here are the tusks, the elephant is dead'.

"So Chaddanta bowed his head, and Sonuttara began to saw the tusks; and when he could not cut them, the great elephant took the saw in his trunk and moved it to and fro till the tusks were severed. Then he gave up the tusks and said, 'I do not give you these tusks, my friend, because I think them of little value, nor to win the status of a god, but because the tusks of omniscience are a thousand times dearer to me than these; and may this worthy gift be the cause of my attaining Omniscience.' Then the hunter departed with the tusks; and before the other elephants reached Chaddanta he had died.

"The hunter came then before the queen and said:

Here are his tusks, the beast is dead.

'Do you tell me that he is dead?' she cried; and he answered, 'Rest assured that he is dead, here are the tusks.' Then she received the six-rayed tusks, and laying them across her lap, and thinking, 'These are the tusks of him who was once my lord,' she was filled with sorrow so great that she could not bear it, but there and then her heart broke and she died the same day.

that it was specially prepared for him (Majjhima-nikāya 55). Contrast Tachibana's book. The Ethics of Buddhism: "As to Buddhism, it is perfectly clean from this sort of bloodshed. As we say repeatedly, it has no gods to appease or to control by means of sacrifice; and killing any animal, to say nothing of a human being, is interdicted as an abominable sin in Buddhism" (P. 41).[76] Peacocks may be killed (cf. The Ideal of Kingship[77]

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76 Tachibana further writes, "Words such as Yanna (Yajña)... Yāga.... Havya.... are used in Buddhist texts; but they always have particular meanings, they simply mean 'offering', 'alms', and 'almsgiving', so far as Buddhist custom is concerned, whether they refer to something offered or the action of offering. It is only when these words refer to Brahmanic practices that they mean sacrifice or oblation. The destruction of life, whatever the living object may be, is absolutely prohibited as an un-Buddhistic action, and on the other hand, love, sympathy, liberality, humanity and so on are taught as highly commendable virtues; how can such bloody sacrifices be consistent with this?" (S. Tachibana, The Ethics of Buddhism, first edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926, London, Curzon Press Ltd. and Harper and Pow Publishers, Inc. New York, 1975, P. 41). It may be observed that Tachibana's views are clearly prejudiced. For him the words Yajña, Yāga, Havya mean offering or alms when referred to Buddhism, and the same words mean killing when referred to Brahmanism! He forgets that these words preeminently mean offerings in Brahmanism. Right from the Upaniṣadic times they have a symbolic significance – as when the Atman is regarded as the sacrificer and passions like anger, the objects to be sacrificed, (तस्यैवं विदुषो यज्ञस्य आत्मा यजमानः... मन्युः पशुः... Nārāyaṇopaniṣad, 80). The Bhagavad-gītā clearly speaks of the inner sacrifice (IV. 26–27).

77 An article by Prof. R. D. Ranade reprinted in his book,

or D. R. Bhandarkar's book, Asoka). Let the monk wander alone like a rhinoceros; cf. Khaggaviṣāṇa sutta in Khuddaka-nikāya, 5, (Sutta-nipāta). Even though a monk were to be sawn limb from limb, he should not lose equanimity, Majjhima-nikāya, 21 (Kaka-cūpama-sutta). The gain that a man obtains by leading religious life (see the entire Sutta on the 'Fruits of the Life of a Wanderer,' Coomaraswamy, Pp. 266 – 268).[78] Vammīka-sutta:

Philosophical and Other Essays, Part I. Prof. Ranade notes that it was customary with Asoka to kill two peacocks, and one deer every day for his curry. But Asoka is sorry that he should have been compelled to kill any animals at all, and he therefore orders that no animals shall be killed thence-forth for his table (P. 155).

78 "Of more enduring interest is the Sutta upon the *Fruits of the Life of a Wanderer.* Here, moreover, we do not get a purely Buddhist, but rather an Indian point of view. The whole Sutta constitutes a reply to the question, what advantage is the life of a recluse? King Ajātasattu of Magadha points out the gain that men derive from their worldly occupations, and wishes to know what corresponding fruit, visible here and now, the members of a religious Order obtain. Gautama replies that the fruit of the life of the member of an Order may be seen in : "1. The honour and respect shown to such men by others in the world; even the king, for example, would show respect to a man who had formerly been a slave or a servant, if he adopted the homeless life. 2. The training in mere morality, as kindness, honesty, chastity etc. 3. Confidence, freedom from fear, etc. born of conscious rectitude. 4 and 5. Recollectedness and self-possession. 6. Contentment with little. 7. Emancipation from the Five Hindrances: Covetousness, ill-temper, laziness, anxiety and perplexity. 8. The consequent joy and peace. 9. Practice of the Four Jhānas. 10. Insight arising from knowledge. 11. The

the anthill smokes by night and blazes by day. A monk is commanded by a Brahmin to dig into it. The ant-hill is the human body and the Brahmin is Buddha himself (Majjhima-nikāya 23). Buddha leaves instruction behind. Buddha asks the monks not to perform a miracle except the miracle of instruction (Dīgha-nikāya 11). Buddha set up no monk after him to take his place, but he left only his Doctrine after him (Majjhima-nikāya 108).[79] Many of the Buddha's disciples left him because he did not work a miracle, or expound the beginning of things (Dīgha-nikāya 24).

Post-script : Devadatta leaves Buddha's Order

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power of projecting mental images. 12. Five modes of mediumship and clairvoyance (thought-reading, audition, etc.) and finally 13. (which alone is distinctively Buddhist), realization of the Four Truths, destruction of the Flood of Passion, attainment of Arahatta.

The argument concludes :

"Thus with the pure Heavenly Eye, surpassing that of men, he sees beings as they pass away from one state of existence, and take form in another; he recognizes the mean and the noble, the well-favoured and the ill-favoured, the happy and the wretched, passing away according to their deeds."

"And the recluse perceives the Four Ariyan Truths, and he knows Rebirth has been destroyed. The higher life has been fulfilled. What had to be done has been accomplished. After this present life, there will be no beyond!" (Anand Coomaraswamy, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism, Pp. 270–271).

79 "The dying Founder names his successor as no man, but as Dharma" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Outlines of Buddhism, P. 55).

(Majjhim-nikāya 29).[80] Jaina Nātaputta[81] sends Abhaya to Buddha to ask him about the severe condemnation which he passed on Devadatta (Majjhima-nikāya 58). Buddha's discourse to the Brahmins of Kosambi who were quarrelling violently (Kosambiya-sutta, Majjhima-nikāya 48). Buddha is offended at a band of noisy monks at Chātumā, but is appeased (Majjhima-nikāya 67). Why did India lose her greatness? On account of atheism + pessimism + passivism. Maitrī, Karuṇā, Muditā common to Yoga and Buddhism.[82] The Buddhists condemn suicide, the Jainas uphold it. Four Ārya-satyas: not four but one, viz. Suffering.[83] Insistence on suffering *ad nauseam.* Buddhist Ethics, universal appeal; hence the Christian sympathy.

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80 Devadatta is "brother of Yasodharā and Buddha's brother-in-law. He tried to found a sect of his own with severe rules than those prescribed by Buddha. He is described undoubtedly with great injustice in the Buddhist Canon and treated as a traitor" (Paul Carus, The Gospel of Buddha, P. 222).

81 "Nātaputta means 'son of Jñāta, Patronym of Vardhamāna, the founder of Jainism' (Ibid. P. 226).

82 For an elucidation of these virtues in Yoga, see Swami Vivekananda, Rajayoga, Pp. 148–149.

83 The four noble truths, according to Buddhism are: (i) There is suffering, (ii) It has a cause, (iii) It can be removed, (iv) way to removal. They can be reduced to one viz., suffering. If there is suffering there must be a cause. So the first truth includes the second. Now whatever is caused is subject to destruction. Hence suffering can be destroyed. So the third truth need not be independent. Now if suffering is to be destroyed there must be a way. This fourth truth is covered by the third. So suffering, considered in all its aspects, can be said to include the other three.

Post-script : Buddhism effected expansion in the nature of the moral life,[84] not in the parental, the filial and the conjugal relations.[85] Buddha built up an interworld or intermondial ethics (Mrs. Rhys Davids P. 149).[86] Paṭicca-samuppāda in its moral aspect, a double-edged sword. It works up and it works down: down to suffering and up to Nirvāṇa.[87] On the various ways of meditating on impassibility (incapacity for passion) (Majjhima-nikāya 106). On the middle path between two extremes (Majjhima-nikāya 139).[88] Cf. The Aristotelian mean. Metta-

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84 Section (3) of "On the Nature of the Moral Life": Mrs. Rhys Davids has quoted Upaniṣads as teaching that all love has its basis in the Divine Self who each is. This also is echoed in Jesus. The teaching is present in the Fragments (Buddhism, 1934, Pp. 145–146).

85 Mrs. Rhys Davids observes: "But the real expansion effected in the nature of Moral Life by Buddhism was not in the parental, the filial, the conjugal relations; monasticism would tend to make little of and largely overlook these; the expansion was in the cult of human sodality as amity" (Ibid. P. 141).
And yet, "The monk is enjoined to look upon every woman as sister or mother, and the husband enjoined to treat the wife with respect, courtesy, faithfulness and trust" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Outlines of Buddhism, 1978, P. 29). "... we are at once struck, if we are not Buddhists, by the curious omission of filial duty" (Ibid. P. 28).

86 The Fragments, says Mrs. Rhys Davids, reveal a great preoccupation with the nearness, the worth, the intervention of the man of other worlds, opening up an interworld ethics (Buddhism, 1934, P. 149).

87 The topic is discussed in detail by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Ibid. Pp. 89 ff.

88 "Significance of the concept of Madhyamā Pratipad – The

Buddha used to say that Truth did not lie in the extreme alternatives but in a middle position *(Madhyamā Pratipad)*. Hīnayānists generally use the concept of *Madhyamā Pratipad* in the ethical sense, in the sense of neither taking too much food nor too little, neither sleeping too much, nor too little etc. "The Mādhyamikas interpreted *Madhyamā pratipad* in a metaphysical sense also. Says Nāgarjuna:

कात्यायनाववादे चास्तीति नास्तीति चोभयं ।
प्रतिषिद्धं भगवता भावाभावविभाविना ।। (मूलमध्यमकारिका XV. 7)

"In the *Kātyāyanāvavāda-sūtra* the Lord who had the right insight into both *bhāva* (ens) and *abhāva* (non-ens) rejected both the extreme alternatives of 'is' and 'is not'.

"In commenting on this, Candrakīrti has quoted the relevant passage in the *Kātyāyanāvavāda-sūtra* which is accepted as an authority by all the Buddhists. In this, Buddha says to Kāśyapa, "Oh Kāśyapa, 'is' is one extreme alternative, 'not is' is another extreme alternative. That which is the *madhyama* position is intangible, incomparable, without any position, non-appearing, incomprehensible. That is what is meant by *madhyamā-pratipad* (the middle position), Oh Kāśyapa. It is perception of Reality, *(bhūta-pratyavekṣā)* (Prasannapadā, P. 118). Nāgārjuna takes his stand on this authoritative statement of the Buddha. The word madhyama is not to be taken in its literal sense of 'in between' or a 'mean between the two'. As is clear from the adjectives 'intangible, incomparable, incomprehensible' etc., *madhyamā pratipada* (the middle position) means that Reality is transcendent to the antinomies of Reason, the dichotomies of thought, and can not be 'cavined, caged, and confined in the alternatives of 'is' and 'is not'. It is on this basis that Nāgārjuna called his philosophy *madhyamaka* i.e. 'pertaining to the transcendent.'" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977 Introduction, Pp. 49–50).

sutta: On friendliness; Khuddaka-nikāya 1 (Khuddaka- pāṭha). Social Ethics. Classification of offences that involve exclusion from the Order (Vinaya-piṭaka 1). 'Description of Individuals', especially according to their stages along the Path (Abhidhamma -piṭaka 4). (Puggala-paññatti). Is this a spiritual gradation?[89]

Ethics in Mahāyāna : The conception of Pāramitās[90] from Subhuti's Aṣṭa-sāhasrika-prajñā-pāramitā[91] such as

89 Puggala means an individual and Paññatti means designation or notion. So the phrase Puggala-paññatti indicates designation of types of persons.
'Division of human types by one' gives one quality which the individuals possess. But the gradation is not spiritual. Psychological characteristics like perturbable or imperturbable, ethical ones like capable of progress or incapable of progress, metaphysical like persons with determined or undetermined destiny and spiritual like enlightened or perfectly enlightened are all mixed up. There is no gradation as such. 'Division by two' is mostly psychological. They are classes rather than grades. But one class can be said to be superior to another e.g. 'One of perturbable nature', is inferior to 'one of imperturbable nature'. However a sort of gradation is sometimes found: The person whose attachment to sensual pleasures and malevolence has been destroyed is said to be a 'once returner'....'the person whose attachment to sensual pleasures and malevolence has been entirely put away is said to be a 'non-returner'.... 'The person whose attachment to form and the formless, to pride, haughtiness and ignorance has been entirely put away is said to be an Arahant. (See Designation of Human Types (Puggala-Paññatti) Tr. Bimala Charan Law, London, Oxford University Press, Amen Corner, E. C. 1922).

90 Pāramita means perfection of virtue.

91 Prajña-pāramitā – "All the millions of existences (Bhūta-koṭi)

Dāna-pāramitā, Kṣānti-pāramitā, Dhyāna-pāramitā, Śila-pāramitā, Vīrya-pāramitā and so on.

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must be regarded as the body of the Buddha manifested in them. This is Relativity, the climax of wisdom *(Prajñā-pāramitā)*. (See Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977, P. 53). By *Śūnyatā* is meant relativity or contingency (Ibid. P. 49). The term Śūnya in Mahāyāna, is a synonym of dependent existence *(Pratītya-samutpāda)* and means not something void but something "devoid" of independent reality *(Swabhāva-śūnya)* with the implication that nothing short of the whole possesses independent reality (Ibid. P. 50). This unique reality although declared to be uncharacterisable *(Anirvacanīya)*, has been variously characterised as the "element of the elements" *(Dharmāṇām dharmatā)* or *(Dharma-dhātu)*, as their relativity *(Śūnyatā)*, as "thisness" *(idantā)*, as their relation to "thisness" *(idam pratyayatā)*, as "suchness" *(tathatā)* as the "suchness of existence" *(bhūta-tathatā)*, as the matrix of the Lord *(tathāgata-garbha)* and lastly as the "cosmical body of the Lord," as Buddha's *Dharma-kāya*" (Ibid. P. 55).

A Foot Note to this runs: The terms *Prajñā-pāramitā* and *abhisamaya* when used in an objective sense *(Karma-sādhana)*, mean the same, (Ibid. P. 55). We may note that objective sense here means accusitive case or Dwitīyā Vibhakti as per P. 7 of the book under reference. There are six spiritual qualities that have to be acquired. Prajñā-pāramitā is a blanket term for all these qualities. They are (i) *Dāna* (charity), (ii) *Śīla* (withdrawing from evil deeds), (iii) *Kṣānti* (forebearance), (iv) *Vīrya* (enthusiasm and exertion), (v) *Dhyāna* (concentration), (vi) *Prajñā* (transcendental insight). (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977, Dr. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 45).

V. Scholastic Buddhism

1. General

2. (A) Four Buddhistic Schools

(B) Mahāyāna Buddhism

1. General: (a) According to some,[92] the Sarvāstivādins were the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sauntrāntikas. Das Gupta says they were the Vaibhāṣikas (P. 167).[93] The Theravādins[94] are the Canonists. The materialistic pluralism of Sarvāstivādins (cf. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception of Buddhism).[95] Contradiction in the

92 "... the adherents of Hīnayāna believe in the reality of outward objects – however they may conceive of reality itself – and are for that reason often described in Hindu works as sarvāstitva-vādins...." (See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 8th impression, 1970, P. 196). Both Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas are included under Hīnayāna. In Buddhist tradition the term is Sarvāstivādins and not Sarvāstitva-vādins.

93 "In association with the logical activity we find the activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarvāstivādins (known also as Vaibhāṣikas) and the Sautrāntikas" (S. N. Das Gupta, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, 1932, P. 167).

94 Theravāda, i.e. Sthavira-vāda, the doctrine of the elders. Scholastic Buddhism is variously styled as Pali Buddhism, Canonical Buddhism or Southern Buddhism.

95 "The central conception in Early Buddhism is the idea of the plurality of ultimate elements *(Dharmas)*" (T. Stcherbatsky; The Central Conception of Buddhism, 1979, P. 49). "The worlds are 'produced' by *karma* which corresponds to a conception of evolution going on under the influence of an accumulation of moral merit. Simple materialism leaves no room for the working of this law. But neither does, according to Buddha, an eternal

conceptions of Saṅghāta and Santāna; also incompatibility of Saṅghāta and Santāna. This point has already been mentioned.[96] Curious explanation of perception as due to the conglomeration of a sense-atom, a mind-atom, and an object-atom.[97] Mere continguity. Cf. Greek Philosophy.[98] The Dharmas[99] no better

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spiritual principle leave room for it. The moral law conduces through a very long process of evolution the living world into a state of final quiescence where there is no life, but something lifeless, inanimate. In this sense, the Vaibhāṣika outlook resembles the materialism of modern science" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna, 1977, P. 33).

96 See Foot Note 34 above, also Foot Notes 165 and 166 below.

97 "A moment of colour *(rūpa)*, a moment of the sense-of-vision-matter *(cakṣuḥ)*, and a moment of pure consciousness *(citta)*, arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation *(sparśa)* of colour" (Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, 1979, P. 55). Here *rūpa* means the object atom, *cakṣuḥ* means the sense atom and *citta* means the mind atom.

98 "Empedocles with the aid of his theory of effluxes and pores carried out the thought that every element in our body perceives the same element in the outer world, so as to teach that each organ is accessible to the impress of those substances only whose effluxes fit into its pores" (Windelband, History of Philosophy, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1957, P. 65). According to Democritus, perception arises from the action of things upon the five atoms of the soul. "The effluxes which proceed from things to set in motion the organs and through them the fire atoms he called images (εἴδωλα), and regarded them as infinitely small copies of the things. Their impression upon the fire atoms is perception" (Ibid. P. 113).

99 Dharma, "originally meant the natural condition of things of

than Vaiśeṣika अणुs.[100]

(b) The history of Buddhism is its refutation. Four important schools : Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. The first two Realists (Hīnayāna)[101] and the other two Idealists (Mahāyāna).[102] The doctrine of Svalakṣaṇa (cf. Radhakrishnan). Svalakṣaṇa unnecessary between Universal and Particular, as debated between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.[103] (Cf. "The Indeterminate" of Plato, which however, is mathematical

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beings, the law of their existence, truth." Later it meant religious truth (See Paul Carus, Gospel of Buddhism, P. 222).

100 According to Buddhism, Dharma is the unanalysable ultimate reality (See Foot Note 34 above). For Vaiśeṣikas, the partless, eternal ultimate material causes of things are called atoms (Paramāṇu). There is qualitative difference between an atom of one element and an atom of another element. A fire atom is qualitatively different from water element. Atoms of one element can not produce another element (See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 229, 238).

101 "Hīnayāna means 'the small vehicle', viz. of salvation. A name invented by Northern Buddhists, in contradistinction of Mahāyāna, to designate spirit of Southern Buddhism. The term is not used among Southern Buddhists" (Paul Carus, The Gospel of Buddha, P. 223).

102 "Mahāyāna means 'the great vehicle', viz. of salvation. Name of the Northern conception of Buddhism, comparing religion to a great ship in which men can cross the stream of Saṃsāra to reach the shore of Nirvāṇa" (Ibid. P. 225).

103 Svalakṣaṇa "....is the bare unrelated particular and is supposed to be given in an earlier stage of perception, described as 'indeterminate' (nirvikalpaka), which we may perhaps regard as mere sensation" (M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 203–204). (For an excellent exposition and

in character).[104] Vijñānavāda, ideas or reality of consciousness; Śūnyavāda, reality of nothing whatsoever. The general parallelism of these four schools to Descartes, Locke, Berkeley

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criticism of Svalakṣaṇa, see Ibid. Pp. 203 ff.)

"Consequent upon the denial of substance is the denial of every difference between the categories of substance and quality. There is no 'inherence' of qualities in substance; in this respect all real elements are equally independent. As separate entities they then become substances *sui generis.* "Whatever exists is a substance," says Vasubandhu (Abhidharma Kośa ix, Vidyamānam dravyam). Yaśomitra adds Svalakṣaṇato vidyamānam dravyam. An element is something having an essence of its own" *(Svalakṣaṇa dhāraṇāt dharmaḥ)* (Yaśomitra, Abhidharma Kośa, i. 3) is the current definition" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism). "In such judgements as "this is Devadatta," ..."This is moving" etc... the element "this" refers to the *svalakṣaṇa* (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, P. 143). According to Diṅnāga the particular again is not the concrete object usually so designated, but the absolutely particular, the unique, the thing which neither has extension *(deśānugata)* nor has it duration *(kālānugata)*, it is the thing-in-itself, *(svalakṣaṇa),* apart from anything else *(Sarvato-vyāvṛtta trailokya-vyāvṛtta)*, the point-instant *(kṣaṇa)* (Ibid. P. 149). This moment cannot be characterised by something else, since this would convert it in a relational existence. It is characterised by itself *(Svalakṣaṇa)* (Ibid. P. 154).

104 Plato thought that materia or matter is shapeless, indeterminate "plastic" mass. We have to grant its existence though we do not know its qualities. Plato argued that this materia is necessary in between the Idea and the particular thing. This is discussed in his dialogue, Timaeus, his only scientific dialogue. Here the influence of Pythagoras, the mathematician, is clearly seen.

and Hume. Application of this principle to their teachings about Nirvāṇa. Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa, real and unreal; permutations and combinations. (See Stcherbatsky, "Conception of Buddhist Nirvana)." (i) Vaibhāṣika: Saṃsāra real; Nirvāṇa real. (ii) Sautrāntika : Saṃsāra real; Nirvāṇa unreal. If Nirvāṇa is unreal, how can the Sautrāntika be a Buddhist?[105] (iii) Vijñānavādin: Saṃsāra unreal; Nirvāṇa real. (iv) Śūnyavādin: Saṃsāra unreal; Nirvāṇa unreal (See Stcherbatsky, P. 27).[106]

(c) Yogācāra : The concept of Ālaya-vijñāna[107] for the Yogācāras (vide Suzuki) takes the place of God.[108] Aśvaghoṣa's Bhūtatathatā[109] implies the ineffable character of being, cf. the This-ness of Bradley.[110] The Dharma-kāya is the moral

105 Stcherbatsky justified the Sautrāntika stand that Nirvāṇa is unreal by saying that what it denied was the materialistic Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa meant the end of passion and life *(Kleśa-janmanoḥ kṣayaḥ)* without any material residue. Thus Nirvāṇa lost its materialistic character (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977, P. 34).

106 Ibid. In the 1977 Indian Edition, this discussion is on P. 31.

107 Ālayavijñāna is "the granary of consciousness containing the 'seeds' of all future ideas and the residue of all past thoughts and deeds" (Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana).

108 See D. T. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism, Schocken Books, New York, 1963, Pp. 128–132.

109 The meaning of Tathatā is 'thisness'. Tathatā, the true nature of things, "is present in every one as his inmost ground and essence" (Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 57). See also S. N. Das Gupta, Indian Philosphy, Vol. I, Pp. 129–138.

110 "The 'this' and the 'mine' are names which stand for the immediacy of feeling" (F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality,

equivalent of God.[111] Buddha's Three Bodies.[112] Nobody ever went to break God, but God ultimately broke him.

(d) Mādhyamika : The Mādhyamika philosophy of Nāgārjuna consisting in its Self-relativism and Scepticism.[113] The Mādhyamika : middle path. Four classical truths not real; Buddha unreal ; Nirvāṇa unreal.[114]

2 (A) Four Buddhistic Schools (Detailed Class-notes)[115]

Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 9th impression, 1930, P. 197). Reality is being in which there is no division of content from experience, no loosening of 'what' from 'that'. Reality, in short, means what it stands for, and stands for what it means. And the 'this' possesses to some extent the same wholeness of character (Ibid. P. 198). 'Thisness' means presentation of Reality as something particular (Ibid. P. 155). This is unique really so far as it is a member in a series, and so far as that series is taken as distinct from all others (Ibid. P. 202).

111 "The Dharmakāya may be compared in one sense to the God of Christianity, in another sense to the Brahman or Paramātman of Vedantism... The Dharmakāya... is capable of willing and reflecting, or to use the Buddhist phraseology, it is *Karuṇā* (love) and *Bodhi* (intelligence), and not the mere state of being" (D. T. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism, 1963, P. 46).

112 See Foot Note 54 above and 144 below.

113 According to Nāgārjuna nothing is absolutely true; everything is relative. His doctrine of relativism will not hold water. Nāgārjuna 'seeks rest in negation'. He denies everything. His 'reasoned despair of knowledge' amounts to scepticism.

114 See T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977, P. 31.

115 For purposes of teaching, Prof. Ranade had referred to the following chart:

(a) Vaibhāṣika (optionalists). Diṅnāga, Descartes. Hīnayāna.

(i) Descartes: Direct perception. Presentative perception. Nothing interposing between object and mind. Stimulus and direct perception.

(b) Sautrāntika. Kumāralabdha, Locke.

(ii) Locke : Indirect perception. Representative perception. Ideas interposing between matter and mind. Impression between stimulus and perception.

(c) Yogācāra or Vijñānavādins. Vasubandhu, Berkeley.

(iii) Berkeley : only ideas are real. Both recognised ideas but Berkeley, also mind. Mahāyāna. Mahāyānists = expelled belie-

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

See Chapter IX of M. Hiriyanna's Outlines of Indian Philosophy.

vers in soul who went to China (Mrs. Rhys Davids, P. 26).[116]

(d) Mādhyamika or Śūnyavādins. Buddha does not exist. Nothing exists. Doctrine of the void. Nāgārjuna, Hume.

(iv) Hume : If matter goes, mind also goes.

The first two are realists – realists so far as knowledge is concerned; objects must be beyond knowledge. The other two are idealists – idealists so far as knowledge is concerned; objects must be inside knowledge.

Vaibhāṣika : Conception of Svalakṣaṇa[117], i.e. that which characterises itself. It is equivalent to attribute, quality, characteristic, etc. e.g. blueness.

Vaibhāṣikas say that only Svalakṣaṇas exist and they are objective. Cf. Dharma.[118] They say that the Svalakṣaṇas are directly perceived.

Sautrāntika : Relying upon Suttas. The Sautrāntikas say that Svalakṣaṇas are perceived not directly but indirectly.

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116 "But meanwhile from the tradition, represented by the teaching of the Pali Canon, there were growing out many limbs of divergent doctrines and sects. The story of these growths, told only in Commentaries, is obscure, but it points to a calamitous schism, in which the *upholders of the older teaching* were expelled by the new majority, entitled for the occasion, Vibhajjavādins, or Analysts. The expelled upholders, who refused to deny the persisting reality of the man or soul, found their way to China, and came *later* to be called Mahāyānists. The Analysts, represented *then* mainly by Ceylon, were called Hīnayānists, i.e. men of the Great and the Low Vehicle respectively" (Buddhism, 1934, P. 26).

117 See Foot Note 103 above.

118 See Foot Note 34 above.

Psychological analogy: Between stimulus and perception there is impression.[119] Vaibhāṣikas do not recognise impression.

Yogācāra : Relying upon Yoga. The Yogācāravādins or Vijñānavādins use Vijñāna i.e. idea for Svalakṣaṇa or Dharma (Stcherbatsky) only. They are floating ideas. Cf. Berkeley. They advance the following arguments for their Idealism. (i) The Svalakṣaṇa is objective, Vijñāna is subjective.[120] (ii) Analogy of the dream.[121] (iii) Triplet of knowledge, knower and known. The latter two go away and Jñāna (knowledge) alone remains.[122] Disproof of inference or Vyāpti. All inferences and judgements are wrong. Because both of them deal with matters of fact which do not exist. Hence inference cannot exist. (iv) Relativism. Cf. Protagoras.[123] Thorns are good for the camel and bad for man.

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119 An object provides a stimulus; but it is not perceived directly. It is perceived indirectly through an impression of the object that stands between the perceiver and the perceived object.

120 Svalakṣaṇa is replaced by idea or Vijñāna by the Yogācāravādins. Only Vijñāna is true and the so called objective स्वलक्षण is not recognised by Yogācāravādins. Only the idea is known.

121 In dream experience there are no objects. But still there is experience where the mind experiences its own ideas. The internal ideas appear as external.

122 The object of knowledge (known) is only the impression because in the knowledge process the material object is dispensed with. Now the mind (knower) is only a bundle of ideas. So the knower and the known are not different from knowledge as all consist of only ideas.

123 Protagoras, an early Greek philosopher, advocated the doctrine of relativism according to which the nature of things is relative and not absolute. There is nothing like absolute good and absolute bad. A thing useful to one man may be harmful to

So they are both good and bad. So no judgement is possible. Cf. Antinomianism in Plato[124] or Relativism. Hence objectivity is impossible. So only ideas are real.

Mādhyamika : Relying upon eight-fold middle path.[125] Ālayavijñāna,[126] Bhūtatathatā.[127] They say that even ideas do not exist. Nāgārjuna says nothing exists. Cf. Zeno.[128] This is

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another. Hence judgements like, 'a thing is good' or 'a thing is bad' are subjective and not objective. No absolute statement of value can be asserted about any object.

124 In his Republic, Plato gives a fitting reply to Herakleitos' antinomianism. Herakleitos had said that no absolute judgement is possible because sea water is good for fish and bad for men; or the beginning of a circle and the end of a circle are the same; or again, night and day are the same. This antinomianism evoked a counter-antinomianism from Plato when he said, 'A man and no man, seeing and not seeing, a bird and no bird, sitting upon wood and no wood, struck it and did not strike it, with a stone and no stone...' (See R. D. Ranade, Philosophical and Other Essays, Part I, Pp. 11–12).

125 This is the description of the famous middle path of the eight "NO'S", (1) no hindrance (Anirodham), (2) no production (Anutpādam), (3) no destruction (Anucchedam), (4) no persistence (Aśāśvatam), (5) no unity (Anekārtham), (6) no pluarality (Anānārtham), (7) no coming in (Anāgamam) and (8) no goint out (Anirgamam), (Nagarjuna, Mūlamadhyamakārikā, I. 1).

126 See Foot Note 107 above.

127 See Foot Note 109 above.

128 Zeno, the Eleatic philosopher, can be said to agree with the Mādhyamika view so far as the skeptical side is concerned. Zeno held that neither multiplicity, nor motion, nor space is possible. But we have to remember that both Zeno and

only his sceptical side. Positive side: He believes in mystical intuition. Cf. Stcherbatsky.[129] Thus there comes to be a world of two Realities[130] : Saṃvṛti-satya and Pari-niṣpanna-satya.[131]

Nāgārjuna have a positive side to their philosophy.

129 "The real Buddha must be perceived directly by intuition...." (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977, P. 52). "The Buddhist saint is supposed, in a moment of mystic illumination, suddenly to perceive the whole construction, with its gross and mystic worlds, as vividly as if it were a direct sense perception. As a psychological process, it is equally taught in Hīnayāna and in Mahāyāna, but its content, the picture which reveals itself at this moment, is quite different in both systems. It corresponds to their theoretical parts, to the system of pluaralism which is taught in Hīnayāna and to the monist view which is the central conception of Mahāyāna" (Ibid. P. 19). "The supreme moment of illumination is the central point of the teaching about the path of salvation. An enormous literature, especially in Mahāyāna, is devoted to this conception of mystic intuition" (Ibid. P. 20).

130 See Foot Note 19 above.

131 द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।
लोकसंवृति सत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ।। (मूलमध्यमकारिका, XXIV. 8)
"The Buddhas teach the *Dharma* by resorting to two truths, *Saṃvṛti-satya* (empirical truth) and *paramārtha-satya* (absolute truth)" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Dr. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 52). The term generally used in Buddhism is Pariniṣpanna-satya in place of Paramārtha-satya. "But at the end of their career both brothers (Vasubandhu and Asanga) settled in the conviction that the Universe was a logical construction, that all its separate elements were relative, not real, in themselves, but that they possessed another reality, the Pariniṣpanna, a reality in the Absolute; they were real when

Cf. Vyāvahārika-satya and Paramārtha-satya;[132] also Phenomenal and Noumenal Reality;[133] Opinion and Knowledge;[134] Appearance and Reality;[135] Not-being and Being;[136] Thisness and Thatness;[137] ineffable character of Reality.

Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara exactly believed in these two conceptions. Hence the two are called 'crypto-Buddhists'. They are also called Pracchanna-Bauddhas, and Ardha-vainā́śikas.

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regarded *sub specie aeternitatis*" (Ibid. P. 39). The controversy between Candrakīrti and Diṅnāga regarding the doctrine of two truths is also mentioned in this book on Page 173, Foot Note 3.

132 This is the expression used by Śaṅkara.

133 This is the expression used by Kant.

134 This is the expression used by Plato.

135 This is the expression used by Bradley.

136 This is the expression used by Parmenides.

137 "*...dharmadhātu* or *dharmatā* or *tathatā* is the word used in Madhyamaka philosophy for the Absolute. Candrakīrti says, *Yā sā dharmāṇām dharmatā nāma saiva tatsvarūpam*" (Prasanna-padā). (That which is the essential being of all elements of existence is the nature of Reality). (Ibid. Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 55). It is *tathatā*, it is Reality such as it is. In the words of Bradley, we can only say *that* it is, not *what* it is. According to Candrakīrti – tathābhāvaḥ avikāritvam sadaiva sthāyitā" (Prasanna-padā), (The thatness of Reality consists in its invariability, in its remaining for ever as it is) (Ibid. Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction P. 55). The higher truth is indicated by 'thatness' or tathatā; thisness is the truth as it appears to us. All agree that 'Tathatā' is the higher truth and it indicates the essence of a thing but the word Tathatā is sometimes rendered as 'thisness'. Inspite of this the implication of Tathatā is unchanged.

Vaiśeṣikas also are called Ardha-vaināśikas.[138] Nāgārjuna says: nothing comes into existence. Nothing goes out of existence. Creation is impossible. Annihilation is impossible. Cause is an illusion, effect is an illusion. No unity exists, and no plurality exists.

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138 The Vaiśeṣikas hold that nearly half of the objects in the world are subject to destruction. Hence they are called Ardha-vaināśikas (semi-nihilists). The Bauddhas advocate that all things in the world are subject to destruction. Therefore, they are called Sarva-vaināśikas (universal nihilists). Because Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara uphold the doctrine of two Realities like the Bauddhas, critics of Advaitism call them Ardha-vaināśikas or semi-nihilists.

"The Buddhistic doctrine of total annihilation... is only a further and an inevitable development of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of असत्कार्यवाद; while the categories or *Padārthas* of the latter find their counterpart in the five *Astikāyas* or essences of the *Jainas*. The atomic theory moreover is largely adopted by the *Jainas*, and even enters into their legendary mythology. The epithet *Ardha-vaināśikas* or Semi-Buddhists, contemptuously bestowed upon the *Vaiśeṣika* by *Śaṅkarācārya* concealed a historical truth, if the Vaiśeṣikas were the half-hearted precursors who by their materialistic speculations paved the way for the extreme radicalism of *Gautam Buddha*" (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhatta, Introduction, P. xxv).

"The Bauddhas denied the authority of the *Vedas* altogether, while the *Naiyāyikas* made it dependent on God's authoriship. This may be one reason why the *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* were termed by their more orthodox rivals, अर्धवैनाशिकs or Semi-Buddhists" (Ibid. P. 353).

अनिरोधं अनुत्पादं अनुच्छेदं अशाश्वतम् ।

अनेकार्थं अनानार्थं अनागमं अनिर्गमम् ।। (मूलमध्यमकारिका I. 1).[139]

Mādhyama may imply that continuity exists. Dharma (Yogācāra).[140] Ten stages of Bodhisttvahood. Last being consecration or Abhiṣeka.[141]

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean analogous to Nāgārjuna's Doctrine of the माध्यम.[142] The mean must steer clear of Scylla and Charybdis.[143] Dharmakāya from the moral point of view.[144]

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139 See Foot Note 125 above.

140 See Foot Note 34 above.

141 See Foot Notes 186 and 187 below.

142 In the original Notes of Prof. Ranade the space remains blank. The typist who filled in the blanks with words in Devanāgarī script in the typed copy, seems to have forgotton to write the word which belongs to this blank space. The word seems to be माध्यम. This word makes the sentence meaningful, because माध्यम literally means that it is flanked by something on both sides. It implies that continuity exists. Moreover, immediately after the blank space, there is a comparison between Aristotle and Nāgārjuna regarding the doctrine of the mean (i.e. the middle path).

143 "Scylla, a dangerous rock on the Italian side of the Straits of Messina, opposite the whirpool Charybdis; in mythology both Scylla and Charybdis were personified as female monsters. 'Between Scylla and Charybdis', means between two perils or evils neither of which can be evaded without risking the other."

144 Dharmakāya is identified with the Absolute and is also connected with the phenomenal. Therefore it is Dharmakāya alone that can descend to earth as the saviour of mankind. Whenever Dharmakāya decides to come down to earth in

2 (B) Mahāyāna Buddhism

Three chief conceptions in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Mahāyānists expelled believers in soul.[145] (i) The Tathatā or Thatness. (ii) Vijñāna or Idea (iii) Śūnya or void. (Vijñānavādins, Śūnyavādins: See Das Gupta).[146] The first is stressed by Aśvaghoṣa,[147] the second by the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra[148], and the third by Nāgārjuna.[149] All the three really are interrelated. Aśvaghoṣa

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human form, He conjures up a phantom body called Nirmāṇakāya. It is through this that He incarnates as a Buddha, as a saviour of mankind. The actual physical body of the Buddha is the Rūpakāya. It will thus be seen that Buddhism is not a historical religion like Christianity. The Buddha is not the founder of a religion. He only transmits Dharma which is eternal. There have been many Buddhas before, and there will be many Buddhas in the future. (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, Pp. 48-49).

Dharmakāya is also known as Swābhāvika-kāya or the essential, natural kāya of the Buddha. The Nirmāṇa-kāya is assumed for the time being for a specific purpose. The Rūpa-kāya or the actual physical body of the Buddha is visible to every one. The Nirmāṇa-kāya is visible only to adepts (Ibid. Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 49). See also Foot Note 54 above.

145 See Foot Note 116 above.

146 The Tathatā philosophy of Aśvaghoṣa is discussed by S. N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Pp. 129–138; the Mādhyamika or the Śūnyavāda School, Pp. 138–145, Vijñānavāda, Pp. 145 ff.

147 See Foot Note 146 above.

148 लंकावतारसूत्र, a work belonging to the Yogācāra School.

149 Nāgārjuna, probably a pupil of Aśvaghoṣa; Nāgārjuna is the author of the celebrated work– मूलमध्यमकारिका, also known as

stresses Tathatā, but refers incidentally to Vijñāna and Śūnya. Laṅkāvatāra stresses Vijñāna, but refers to Tathatā and Śūnya. Nāgārjuna stresses Śūnya, but also refers to Tathatā and Vijñāna. The difference between the three conceptions is the difference of stress. Tathatā is the *ne plus ultra*[150] of Buddhist Philosophy. It is their Absolute or God. It transcends all pairs. It is ineffable.[151] Tathāgata is one who has realized this That-ness. And

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नागार्जुनकारिका.

150 The expression means 'no more beyond'; it is the highest point of perfection. The Kaṭha expression पुरुषात् न परं किंचित् सा काष्ठा सा परागतिः (I. 3.11) (Higher than the Person there is nothing at all, That is the culmination, That is the higher course) means exactly the same.

151 "When the concepts of *bhāva* (empirical existence) and *abhāva* (the negation of *bhāva*) can not be applied to the Absolute, the question of applying any other concept to it does not arise, for all other concepts depend upon the above two. In one word, the Absolute is transcendent to thought and as such, is inexpressible.

निवृत्तमभिधातव्यं निवृत्ते चित्तगोचरे।
अनुत्पन्ना निरुध्दाहि निर्वाणमिव धर्मता ।। (मूलमध्यमकारिका XVIII. 7)

"what can not be an object of thought can not *a fortiori* be an object of speech. The Absolute as the essence of all being is neither born, nor does it cease to be" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 51).

सर्वं च युज्यते तस्य शून्यता यस्य युज्यते।
सर्वं न युज्यते तस्य शून्यं यस्य न युज्यते ।। (मूलमध्यमकारिका XXIV. 14)

"For him who accepts *Śūnyatā*, everything stands in its proper place within the harmonious whole, and for him who does not accept Śūnyatā, everything is out of joint" (Ibid. Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 43).

Tathāgata-garbha is the womb of such. Considered in such a way, the Tathatā Philosophy of Aśvaghoṣa comes dangerously near to Vedāntism.[152] The Buddha says that all things forever abide in Nirvāṇa. The Tathatā of Aśvaghoṣa comes nearer to the Vedāntic Absolute. Aśvaghoṣa's approach to the Vedāntic Absolute in his philosophy of Tathatā may be explained by his early Brahmanical nurture.

Vijñānavāda : Vijñānavāda is a philosophy of ideas. Consciousness creeps in only surreptitiously. In Berkeley consciousness is the very foundation. Ālayavijñāna which is another name for mind is merely the habitat of ideas. The Vijñānas are to the Ālayavijñāna as the waves are to the ocean. In the Ālayavijñāna are produced the ripples of sense-experience or ideas. They are what we may call the modes. The relation between Vijñāna and Vijñānālaya is both that of identity and difference. The ocean is both identical with and different from waves. What causes these waves? The Vijñāna philosophy tells us that Avidyā causes it, just as the wind is responsible for the waves in the ocean. This principle of Avajjā in Vijñānavāda comes again perilously near to the Vedāntic doctrine of Māyā. What exists essentially is merely the idea. In the all-conserving mind, ignorance manifests itself in the shape of the perceiver and the perceived. Various grades of individuation due to ignorance, more than the number of the sands on the Ganges. Buddha's answer to Rāvaṇa in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. Buddha does not teach the Nairātmya or Niḥsvabhāva doctrine, lest his followers should be scared away. The external world is merely an expression of these ideas. Hence there is no objective world as such. Cf. Berkeley and Johnson's

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152 The Tathatā is analogous to Vedāntic Absolute or Brahman which is transcendent, beyond all pairs or ineffable.

criticism.[153] A fight takes place between Tathatā and Avidyā. If Avidyā conquers, sorrow and the world appearance are produced; and if Tathatā conquers, Nirvāṇa is the result.[154] The fight between Tathatā and Avidyā may be compared to the fight between the ego and the Id in Freud, or the reality-principle and the ego-principle, or death instinct and life instinct in Jung.[155]

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153 Johnson disagreed with Berkeley's view that matter does not exist. I refute it, he said, and kicked the ground with his foot till it rebounded. The re-bounding of the foot implies that the earth, i.e. matter exists.

154 The primary cause of the unhappy condition of life, "is illusion *(avidyā)*, the first fundamental member in the wheel of life. It continues to exist and exhibit its influence as long as the "wheel" turns, and is gradually neutralised and finally stopped by an antidote in the form of transcending wisdom *(prajñā amalā)*" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, 1979, P. 35). "Influenced *(sāsrava)* by the element of *avidyā*, the process is in full swing. Influenced by the element *prajñā*, it has a tendency towards appeasement and final extinction" (Ibid. P. 74). The process mentioned here is the world process.
A summary of a table given by Stcherbatsky tells us that when in the world-process, there is influence of *avidyā* there is *duḥkha-samudāya*, and *saṃsāra* is the result. On the other hand, when there is influence of *prajñā*, there is *nirodha* or suppression and *nirvāṇa* is the result. (Ibid. P. 95).

155 "The id is the deepest and most primitive part of the personality. It is profound, obscure, unconscious, and powerful... it is unmoral, unenlightened, imperious, and rash... The ego develops out of the id through the contact of the self with external reality, and becomes the mediator between the self and the external world... Perception, together with capacity for manipulating the environment and regulating the id with

Śūnyavāda has seven modes of voidness: (i) interdependence of things, (ii) essencelessness of things, (iii) unknowability, (iv) phenomenal causality, (v) ineffability, (vi) pollution by desire (vii) temporal and spatial limitation. On its sceptical side from Gorgias downwards.[156] Disbelief in Space, Time, Cause, Mind,

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reference to it, is the distinctive activity of the ego" (Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies, Appleton Century-Crofts Inc. New York, 1933, P. 398). The ego permits of adaptation to reality and supports the reality principle. Freud compared it with the rider who "must curb the superior strength of his horse and must borrow the means to do so". The ego tries to curb the blind demands of the id, and hence the conflict between the two. According to Freud the death instinct is the counterpart of the life instinct or love instinct (libido). Freud postulates that the organism has an innate tendency to revert to its initial state. This instinct, which would lead to self-destruction, has to be diverted outward by the developing organism. The life instinct is largely synonymous with energy. It is responsible for love, friendship, co-operation, constructive activity and so on. The death instinct, on the other hand, is responsible for enmity, ill-will, envy or destruction. The conflict between them goes on.

C.G. Jung, a follower of Freud, later disagreed with him on many counts. For him the primary drive in animals is life energy. It expresses itself in many ways in life. As ego principle in man, it has to face the external circumstances – the reality. When the ego principle is not powerful enough to deal successfully with the reality principle, mental disorders arise, says Jung. In Freud also there is polarity between Pleasure-principle and Reality-principle.

156 Gorgias, the ambassador from Leontini to Athens, is a nihilist–sophist. According to him, Being does not exist; if it exists, it

Substance and the World. On the other hand, there is a mystical side to Nāgārjuna's philosophy.[157]

The seeing of the Buddha and the Tathāgatas.[158] Mahā-

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can not be known and even if it is known, it can not be communicated.

157 See Foot Note 129 above.

158 "Tathatā is the Truth, but it is impersonal. In order to reveal itself, it requires a medium. Tathāgata is that medium. Tathāgata is the epiphany of Reality. He is Reality personalized. Tathāgata is an amphibious being partaking both of the Absolute and phenomena. He is identical with Tathatā, but embodied in a human form. That is why Tathatā is also called Tathāgatagarbha (the womb of Tathāgata).

"The word Tathāgata is interpreted as tathā + gata or tathā + āgata i.e. 'thus gone' or 'thus come' i.e. as the previous Buddhas have come and gone. This, however, does not throw much light on the concept of Tathāgata. There is one verse in the Mahābhārata which, it seems to me, removes completely the obscurity surrounding this word.

Śakuntānāmivākāśe matsyānāmiva codake
Padam yathā na dṛśyate *tathā* jñānavidām *gatiḥ*
(Śāntiparva, 181. 12)

(Just as the foot-prints of birds flying in the sky and of fish swimming in water may not be seen: *So or thus* is the *going* of those who have realized the Truth) (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 55). "Tathāgata-Sugata – 'so going' and 'well going' were evidently Way-names applied to all adherents of the Way-gospel, and only later reserved for the quasi-deified teacher of the Way" (Mrs. Rhys Davids, Outlines of Buddhism, Pp. 44–45). See also Foot Note 137 above.

karuṇā.[159] Buddha is an illusion, Nirvāṇa is an illusion and Pratītya-samutpāda is itself an illusion, and also four Ārya-satyas are an illusion. Yamakami's interpretation of the Śūnya. He says it does not mean the void.[160] No process or Change, अशाश्वतमनुच्छेदम्। अनागमगनिर्गमम्। Middle path. Grace derived from them. Dhyāna or the mode of meditation preached as that of Tathatālambana, which corresponds to *Aham Brahmāsmi*. Stages of Bodhisattvahood.[161] Two grades of Reality.[162] Saṃvṛti-satya and Pariniṣpanna-satya. Cf. Parmenides, Plato, Kant, Bradley and Śaṅkarācārya. The statement of untruth is itself untrue. To this Candrakīrti replies that truth consists in silence.[163]

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159 "... in order to attain the supreme knowledge of the Buddha, the first step to be taken is an initial vow of devoting oneself to the Final Deliverance of all living creatures (this vow harmonising with a monistic view of the Universe, and inspired by a feeling of Great Commiseration)" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977, P. 87). The Mahāyānistic Great Commiseration (Mahākaruṇā) differs from the Hīnayānistic one; it agrees with monism. This means that the Mahāyānist strives for the weal of all living beings. Cf. Suzuki, Mahayana Buddhism, Pp. 292 ff.

160 "Śūnyatā, however, as I have pointed out in my first lecture does not imply 'nothingness'; it simply expresses "the ever changing state of the phenomenal world" (Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhistic Thought, 1912, P. 194). "He (the Buddhist) understands the word (शून्य) to mean the perpetual changes occuring at every step in this phenomenal world" (Ibid. P. 14).

161 See Foot Notes 186 and 187 below.

162 See Foot Note 19 and also Foot Notes 131 to 137 above.

163 Candrakīrti, the 7th Century commentator of Nāgārjuna says :

VI. Bādarāyaṇa's Criticism of Buddhism

Bādarāyaṇa's criticisms of Buddhism fall into two Adhikaraṇas.[164] The first is supposed to be devoted to the realists, including the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, the second either to the Vijñānavādins (Belvalkar) or to the Śūnyavādins (Jacobi). Jacobi does not seem to be wrong; on the other hand, he seems to be right on account of the reference in the Sūtras to Abhāva. In any case, it is a criticism of the doctrine of the void by whomsoever it may have been preached, and at any rate, the Śūnyavādins preached it more than the Vijñānavādins.

Points in Śaṅkara's criticism: (i) Samudāya (=Saṅghāta, cf. Stcherbatsky), an impossible concept : conglomeration impossible.[165] (ii) Santāna (cf. Stcherbatsky), or continuity, an

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Paramārthohi āryāṇām tūṣṇīm bhāvaḥ" (To the saints the Absolute is just silence, i.e. it is inexpressible). (See T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977, Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 51). Cf. also: "A long discussion about the essence of the absolute is given in the Vimalakīrti-sūtra. The question is tackled from different sides and when Vimalakīrti is at length asked to summarise, he remains silent, where upon Bodhisattva Manjuśri exclaims, "Well done, Well done, non-duality is truly above words!" (Ibid. P. 27).

164 The two Adhikaraṇas are (i) Samudāyādhikaraṇa (II. 2. 18–27) and Abhāvādhikaraṇa (II. 2. 28–30) of the Vedānta-sūtras. (See also R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, Pp. 101–102 for Samudāyādhikaraṇa and Pp. 114–116 for Abhāvādhikaraṇa).

165 It is impossible to explain the conglomeration of mind-elements and matter-elements. The Sarvāstivādins hold that matter is a conglomeration of four elements, namely, पृथ्वी (earth), अप् (water), तेजस् (fire) and वायु (air). Similarly mind is a

impossible concept; because when a later existence is produced, the previous is destroyed (Pūrvanirodha).[166] (iii) The simultaneity of cause and effect (Yaugapadya), an impossible concept. The horns of a bull are not causally related, says Gauḍapāda.[167] (iv) The Buddhists speak of Nirodha or destruction, (see (ii) above), but neither caused-destruction as of a pitcher (pratisaṅkhyā), nor uncaused-destruction as of the world into the elements (aprati-saṅkhyā), can be explained on the hyphothesis of incessant becoming. Nirodha, in other words, inconsistent with Santāna.[168] See Yamakami's criticism of Śaṅkarācārya.[169]

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conglomeration of रूपस्कंध (senses and their objects), विज्ञानस्कंध (series of self-cognitions), वेदनास्कंध (pleasure and pain), संज्ञास्कंध (cognition of things by their names), संस्कारस्कंध (passion, aversion, Dharma and Adharma and so on). Śaṅkara in his commentary refutes the view by saying that it is impossible to explain the conglomeration of matter-elements and mind-elements, because the parts constituting the conglomeration are devoid of intelligence and there is no permanent intelligent being like Atman who can bring about the conglomeration (Vedānta-sūtra II. 2. 18). The doctrine of dependent causation may explain origination but not conglomeration.

166 Śaṅkara states that a continuity of momentary existences is impossible. Out of continuity and momentariness, the Bauddhas may have to choose only one, either of which is inconvenient to them (Ibid. II. 2. 20).

167 Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, IV. 16. In his commentary on Vedānta-sūtra II. 2.21, Śaṅkara argues that a simulteneity of causing element and caused element is unthinkable.

168 Śaṅkara maintains that destruction can not be explained on the hypothesis of continuity (Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya, II. 2.22).

169 Yamakami Sogen criticises the above view by saying that Śaṅkara wrongly holds that प्रतिसंख्यानिरोध and अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध

(v) 'Anusmṛti' or recollection becomes impossible. Subjective sphere.[170] These are the arguments against the Realists. (vi) As against the maintenance of a Void, Bādarāyaṇa says that the Void does not exist, because Reality is actually experienced, cf. Nābhāva upalabdheḥ;[171] cf. also Na bhāva anupalabdheḥ.[172]

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are contraries. In fact, the two refer to entirely different sets of Dharmas. अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध is non-consciousness of Dharmas in ordinary life, or unawareness of things round about, which is a common feature. But प्रतिसंख्यानिरोध is cessation of Kleśas or it is निर्वाण itself (Systems of Buddhistic Thought, P. 167). Śaṅkara's contention in his commentary on Vedānta-sūtra II. 2. 23 is that the eradication of ignorance must be effected either by perfect enlightenment or by itself. In both the cases, it is inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrine; the first alternative contradicts the Buddhist hypothesis that every thing destroys itself without needing any cause. In the second, the Buddhist teaching of eight-fold path becomes superfluous. But Yamakami points out that eradication of ignorance is its transformation into perfect enlightenment and not its annihilation, for nothing according to Sarvāstivādins can be annihilated (Systems of Buddhistic Thought, P. 168). However, it may be pointed out that though ignorance is said to be 'transformed' into enlightenment, it no longer exists as ignorance.

170 The next criticism of Śaṅkara pertains to impossibility of memory on the hypothesis of momentariness (Commentary on Vedānta-sūtra II. 2. 25). The doctrine of momentariness makes memory an *ignis fatuus*, a deceptive hope or delusion.

171 Vedanta-sūtra II. 2. 28. (See R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, 1970, P. 114).

172 Vedanta-sūtra II. 2. 30 (See also, R.D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, Pp. 115–116).

Śaṅkara fights Realism with the weapons of Idealism and Idealism with the weapons of Realism. The world is phenomenally real, but noumenally unreal. Empirical reality and transcendental ideality as in Kant.[173] Śūnya ≠ Void: Yamakami Sogen.[174]

VII. Dialectical Buddhism[175]

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173 Ibid. Pp. 115–116.

174 Śūnya is not equal to Void. See Foot Note 160 above.

175 Dialectic is a way of argument which scrutinises all sides of a question and shows that reason can not explain all problems but that one has to go beyond reason in search of the solution of the problem. Reason can work only in the empirical world. It gets stuck up if it tries to enter the transcendental realm which is out of bounds for it. Hence one has to take resort to dialectic. The origin of Buddhist dialectic lies in Nāgārjuna's attempt to find out why Buddha was silent on certain questions. Nāgārjuna enumerated fourteen such questions, arranged them in four sets – the first three sets consisting of four questions and the last consisting of two. The first two sets refer to the World (its eternity and infinitude), the third to Tathāgata (his existence after death) and the fourth to the soul (its relation with body). In each set the question is dealt with by giving four alternatives, i.e. 'is', 'is not', 'both is and is not' and 'neither is, nor is not'. One example will suffice. The first set of questions runs: (a) the world is eternal (b) The world is not eternal (c) The world is both eternal and non-eternal (d) The world is neither eternal nor non-eternal.

Nāgārjuna showed that the way out of the impasse was not to get entangled in such wranglings but to go beyond reason. In all this, Nāgārjuna, as if, foreshadowed how Kant, centuries later, was to argue. Kant also gave four antinomies – two concerning the world, the third to self and the last to God.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (Typed separately).[176]

VIII. An Exfoliation of the Different Conceptions of Nirvāṇa[177]

(1) Psychological: (i) Rooting out of Desire, (ii) Cessation of Suffering (especially Ādhyātmika).

(2) Epistemological: (i) Discovery of the Law of Causality. (ii) Destruction of Avidyā or ignorance. Snapping of the first link

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Nāgārjuna examined the views of his opponents by applying such dialectic and showed that they were logically absurd. The purpose of Nāgārjuna's dialectic was to disprove the views of opponents, and not to prove his own thesis because he had no thesis to put forth. The purpose of the destructive endeavour was to attack the dogmatism of his opponents who depended only on reason. Nāgārjuna wanted to take resort to Prajña or intuition. The problems of causality, motion and rest, or Nirvāṇa were subjected to a searching examination with the help of the dialectic (See T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977, Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, Pp. 14 ff). See also T. Stcherbatsky, Buddhistic Logic, Vol. I. P. 44 and Pp. 444 ff.

176 Śāntarakṣita is a leading figure of the Sautrāntika school. So are Kamalaśila, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. The dialectics of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila against Cārvākas is famous. "It may be said in passing that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila represent a syncretism of the Madhyamaka system and Vijñānavāda and can not be strictly called Mādhyamikas. Śāntarakṣita flourished in the 8th century A. D. His great work was Tattva-saṅgraha (Compendium of Reality). His celebrated pupil Kamalaśila wrote the Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā, a learned commentary on Tattva-saṅgraha." (Ibid. P. 14). (Prof. Ranade's typed notes on this head could not be found).

177 See B. R. Kulkarni, "Professor R. D. Ranade's Contribution to Indian Philosophy", University of Poona, 1987, Pp. 25–27.

in the chain of the twelve Nidānas (by knowledge).

(3) Ontological: (i) Annihilation of being, and perpetuation of Being. Realisation of essencelessness, negative; realisation of Tathatā, positive. (ii) Going beyond Being and not-Being. Transcending duality.

(4) Ethical: (i) Equanimity, cooling away or peace. The ocean becomes still. Cf. apathy and ataraxy.[178] (ii) Sanctification. Cf. The Mahāyāna conception of consecration.

(5) Mystical: (i) Realization of supreme bliss. The different conceptions of Nirvāṇa are summarised very beautifully by Mr. Rhys Davids in his book, Early Buddhism, with a wealth of epithets such as, "the harbour of refuge, the cool cave, the island amidst the floods, the place of bliss, emancipation, liberation, safety, the supreme, the transcendental, the uncreated, the tranquil, the home of ease, the calm, the end of suffering, the medicine for all evil, the unshaken, the ambrosia, the immaterial, the imperishable, the abiding, the further shore, the unending, the bliss of effort, the supreme joy, the ineffable, the detachment, the holy city".[179] (ii) Living in Dharmakāya here and now. Dharmakāya is a logico-metaphysical, as well as an ethico-religious conception. This last conception of Nirvāṇa may be compared to the Vedāntic Jīvanmukti, the Pari-nirvāṇa being comparable to the Vedāntic Videhamukti. The Mahāparinirvāṇa of the Buddha may be something higher!

IX. The Mystical Element in Buddhism

No great religious genius without an uncommon insight. A vein of mysticism throughout the history of Buddhism. Buddhist

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178 See Foot Notes 84, 85 in Chapter II.

179 T. W. Rhys Davids, Early Buddhism, Pp. 72–73.

Mysticism. Two occasions of light.[180] (Cf. Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XI, Buddhist Suttas, P. 81). Also Gṛhakāraka in Buddha's post-illuminational soliloquy.[181] This is in Majjhima.

Advice to Rāhula on contemplation by breathing in and out (Majjhima-nikāya 62). Practising meditation by in and out breathing (Majjhima-nikāya 118). The practice of breathing in and out (Khuddaka-nikāya 12).

Buddha's Enlightenment (see Warren, Buddhism in Translations, Pp. 71–83). Spiritual experience under the Bo-tree, What?

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180 Elsewhere Prof. Ranade refers to the same point, "Further, in the Mahāparinibbāṇa-sutta we are told how there were two occasions of light or *nimbus* in the case of the Buddha, one at the time of his spiritual illumination, and the other at the time of his passing away. These facts point unmistakably to the Buddha's teaching about the reality of the Self, as well as to the mystical experience which the Buddha enjoyed" (Philosophical and Other Essays, Part I, P. 118).

181 In his post-illuminational soliloquy, Buddha refers to the soul as गृहकारक, the builder of the body. See धम्मपद 154.
गहकारक ! दिट्ठोऽसि पुनगेहं न कारसि
सब्बा ते फासुका भग्गा गहकूटं विसंखतम् ।
विसंखार गतं चित्तं तण्हानं खयमज्झगा ।।
(But now, Maker of the tabernacle, thou has been seen! thou shall not again build up this tabernacle. All thy rafters are fallen. Thy ridge-pole is broken. The mind, approaching the Eternal, has attained to the extinction of all desires). (Quoted in The Master as I saw Him by Sister Nivedita, Udbodhana Office, 1, Udbodhana Lane, Bagh bazar, Calcutta, Tenth Edition, 1966, P. 47, Foot Note).

The light that is seen round about the Buddha (Nimbus), see Monier-Williams, Lecture X, Mystical Buddhism, Pp. 232–238, for a fine description of the stages of Buddha's Enlightenment.[182] Buddha's criticism of mystical experience in the story of the two Brahmins (see P. Carus, Pp. 117–122; probably Canonical influence).[183] Immeasurable light of moral comprehension (see P. Carus, P. 98).[184] Knowledge of the chain of the twelve Nidānas constitutes Enlightenment (see Monier Williams and Warren). This is enlightenment without light. As if the

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182 "....In brief the Buddha's enlightenment consisted, first in the discovery of the origin and remedy of suffering..." Buddhism, Second edition, London, John Murray, Albemerle Street, 1890, Pp. 234–236. See also Foot Note 185 below.

183 Two Brahmins Vaśiṣṭha and Bhāradwāja went to Buddha to know the right path leading to union with the Brahmā. When asked, they replied that no Brahmin versed in the Vedas had seen Brahmā face to face. Buddha remarked that if Brahmā can not be known or seen, those who search for him search in vain. It is like making a stair-case to a mansion about which no one has the faintest idea. The implication of Buddha's answer in this story is that apprehending God face to face is impossible. This distrust of mystical experience is probably because of Canonical influence. There is an unmistakable element of mystical intuition in early Buddhism. (See Paul Carus. The Gospel of Buddha, Pp. 112–113).

184 The reference is to a description of the highest goal. "The rational nature of man is a spark of the true light; it is the first step on the upward road. But new births are required to insure an ascent to the summit of existence, the enlightenment of mind and heart, where the immeasurable light of moral comprehension is gained which is the source of all righteousness" (Ibid. P. 96).

Pratītya-samutpāda is a great discovery! In the last watch of the night, Buddha discovered the Law of Dependent Origination under the Bo-tree, H. C. Warren (P. 82). Also he discovered the Builder of the House (P. 83).[185] A great halo of light was seen round about the Buddha by one who went to see him.

Ten stages of Bodhisattvahood, the last stage is that of Consecration (Abhiṣeka), see Suzuki,[186] also E. J. Thomas, the Chapter on Bodhisattva's career, Pp. 202–203. (1) दुरारोहा (2) बद्धमाना (Bound) (3) पुष्पमंडिता (4) रुचिरा (5) चित्रविस्तरा (6) रूपवती (7) दुर्जया (8) जन्मनिदेश = discussion of Buddha's 7 births in which he gradually attains consummation. (9) यौवराज्य (10) अभिषेक.[187]

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185 "And then, while the Bo-tree in homage rained red... he acquired in the first watch of the night the knowledge of previous existences; in the middle watch of the night, the divine eye; and in the last watch of the night, his intellect fathomed Dependent Origination.... Now while he was musing on the twelve terms of Dependent Origination, forwards and backwards, round and back again.... when thus he had attained to omniscience.... he breathed forth, that solemn utterance... This is the famous utterance गहकारक दिट्ठोऽसि..." (H.G. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Harward University Press, 1915, Pp. 82–83). See also Foot Notes 181, 182 above.

186 Gradation in the spiritual life: (1) Pramuditā (Delight), (2) Vimalā (purity), (3) Prabhākarī (Brightness), (4) Arciṣmatī (inflammation), (5) Sudurjayā (very difficult to conquer), (6) Abhimukhī (showing one's face), (7) Durangamā (going far away), (8) Acalā (immovable), (9) Sādhumatī (good intelligence), (10) Dharmamegha (clouds of Dharma). See D.T. Suzuki: Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism, Pp. 311–330).

187 (i) The first stage is Durārohā, "hard to reach". In this stage

Bodhisattvas are at first unconverted. They exercise the eight good qualities like liberality, compassion and so on. Through certain vices (sensual pleasure, sloth and so on), they may fail to reach the next stage. They are reborn again and again till the vices are eradicated. (ii) Baddhamānā, "bound". Here they have a dislike for existences. On account of 28 vices (love of gain and praise etc.) they fail to reach the next stage. (iii) Puṣpamaṇḍitā, "adorned with flowers". They sacrifice their wealth and themselves to obtain a single "well-spoken" verse of the Doctrine. Because of 14 vices, they fail to reach the next stage. (iv) Rucirā, "Beautiful". The Bodhisattvas avoid certain great crimes and receive births as gods or in high positions. For sins such as corrupting nuns they fail to reach the next stage. (v) In the fifth stage, Citravistarā, "of varied expanse", they look on all existence as on fire with lust, hate and delusion. (vi) They arrive at the next stage, Rūpavatī, "of fair form", with the thought, "few delights has this terrible whirlpool of the world". Here there are innumerable Buddhas each in a separate field or universe. (vii) Durjayā, "hard to conquer". Their minds turn to self-control. Through the thought of great compassion they pass to the next stage. Now onward there is no turning back. (viii) Janma-nideśa, "discussion of birth". A list of Buddhas is given, under whom in the first seven births Śākyamuni made the roots of goodness to grow. Here Bodhisattvas become Buddhas. They are great teachers. (ix) Yauvarājya, "Viceroyship". The list of such Buddhas is continued. (x) Tenth stage is Abhiṣeka, "Consecration as King". The Bodhisattvas are born in the Tuṣita heaven, and then they have a desire for a human existence. They do not indulge in sensual pleasures. "Although Bodhisattvas develop into beings in whom human action is a mere appearance, yet they have begun as ordinary fallible creatures and it is through their great

Different degrees of Bodhisattvahood, all reaching towards Buddhahood.[188] As a consequence, there ought to be only one

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compassion and desire to save all beings that they have arrived at a state beyond the world of impermanence, pain and soullessness" (Edward J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1933, P. 203).

188 "The Mahāvastu is a long exposition of the career of the Bodhisattva... The stages (Bhūmi) are ten, and are described in a chapter called the Daśabhūmikā (i. 63–193). The chapter begins by giving in verse the story of the elder Kāśyapa hearing of the death of Buddha, Buddha's funeral, and an account of the first Council. Kāśyapa then asks Kātyāyana to set forth the career of the Buddhas (1 to 10). The Bodhisattva in gradually getting rid of moral vices, of desire for existence, and false views, is following the training of the disciple" (Ibid. Pp. 201–204).

"We know, too, that the Buddha went through still higher progressive stages of meditation at the moment of his death or final release (Parinirvāṇa), thus described in the Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta (Davids, VI. 11).

"Then the Venerable One entered into the first stage of meditation (pathamajjhānam); and rising out of the first stage, he passed into the second; and rising out of the second, he passed into the third; and rising out of the third, he passed into the fourth; and rising out of the fourth stage, he attained the conception of the infinity of space (akasanancayatanam);.... and rising out of the conception of the infinity of space, he attained the conception of the infinity of intelligence (vinnanancaya-tanam); and rising out of the infinity of intelligence, he attained the conception of absolute non-entity (akincannayayatanam); and rising out of the idea of non-entity, he entered the region

Buddha and not many. But Buddha himself says that there have been many Buddhas before his time.

History of the Buddhas. Buddha tells the history of the twenty-four previous Buddhas, concluding with an account of himself (Khuddka-nikāya 14, Buddhavaṃśa). Also see Majjhima-nikāya 116, Isigili-sutta. Buddha cites the names of the Paccеka-Buddhas[189] who formerly dwelt on the Isigili hill.

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where there is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness; and rising out of that region, he entered the state in which all sensation and perception of the ideas had wholly ceased" (Ibid. P. 233).

"A higher name, however, for all the higher trance-like states is Samādhi, and by the practice of Samādhi the six transcendent faculties (Abhinnā) might ultimately be obtained, viz. the inner ear, or power of hearing words and sounds, however distant (clair-audience as it might be called); the inner eye or power of seeing all that happens in every part of the world (clair-voyance); knowledge of thought of others; recollection of former existences; the mode of destroying the corrupting influence of passion; and finally the supernatural powers called Iddhi..." (Ibid. P. 234).

"We read in the Lalita-vistāra (Chap. i) that at the supreme moment of his intellectual illumination brilliant flames of light issued from the crown of his head, through the interstices of his cropped hair. These rays are sometimes represented in his images, emerging from his skull in a form resembling the five fingers of an extended hand" (Ibid. P. 234–235).

189 "Pratyeka Buddha is one who in 'solitary singleness', in independence of all external support, attains Arhatiship. The word 'Pratyeka' means 'private', 'individual', 'single', 'solitary'. He does not share with others his hard-won knowledge of the means for the attainment of Nirvāṇa. He believes that others

Also Dīgha-nikāya 14; an account by Buddha of the six previous Buddhas.

One has a vision of the Tathāgatas[190] and Buddha (in Mahāyānism) and receives instructions from them. Grace or Mahākaruṇā[191] of the Buddha. Mahāyāna Mysticism. Cf. Mystic intuition in Nāgārjuna (Stcherbatsky).[192] God in us and we in God (cf. Sogen, P. 301).[193] Buddha present in all things, in stars, flowers etc. (Cf. Yamakami Sogen).[194] Buddha must be heard, seen etc. at all times (Rockhill : 'Life of Buddha' P. 198).[195] The Buddha must be the cynosure of all our senses.

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too driven by the stern reality of the miseries of life, may some day take to the holy path, but does not bother to teach or enlighten them" (T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, 1977, Prof. Jai Dev Singh's Introduction, P. 31). (See also Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 1912, Pp. 242–243).

190 See Foot Note 158 above.

191 See Foot Note 159 above.

192 See Foot Note 129 above.

193 "We must be able to find paradise here, because God, according to the proclamation of the Buddha, is immanent in the universe, and not transcendent. Or more properly speaking, "God is in us and we in God" must be the fundamental doctrine upon which should rest the entire fabric of every religion, be it Hinduism or Islamism, Christianity or Buddhism" (Systems of Buddhistic Thought, P. 301).

194 He quotes Asaṅga: "As ether is all-pervading, so also is Buddha all-pervading; as ether is all-pervading in the material world, so also is Buddha all-pervading in the world of living beings" (Ibid. P. 302).

195 "To reflect, as a means for arriving at perfection, that the Tathāgata must be considered (seen) as eternally visible, that is the āyatana of the eye. To reflect as a means for arriving at

Mahāyānists = expelled believers in soul (Mrs. Rhys Davids, P. 26).[196] Cf. also Nāgārjuna's mystical intuition as in Stcherbatsky.[197] Suzuki, a Neo-Buddhist, Sogen, Suzuki, Stcherbatsky, all Neo-Buddhists.

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perfection, that one has heard "the Tathāgata is eternal," that is the āyatana of the ear. To reflect, as a means for arriving at perfection that one has heard the essence *(garbha)* of the Tathāgata is the odour of eternity (or is an integral fragrance), that is the āyatana of the nose. To reflect, as a means for arriving at perfection, that the essence of the Tathāgata is the doctrine *(bstan-pa)* is the āyatana of the tongue. To reflect, as a means for arriving at perfection, that one has heard and felt that the Dharmakāya of the Tathāgata is the most exalted mind of that body *(sku dei-dam-pa)*, that is the āyatana of the body...." (W. Rockhill, The Life of The Buddha, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubber and Co. Ltd., Broadway House, 68–74 Carter Lane E.C. and 25 Museum Street, W.C. 1884, P. 198).

196 See Foot Note 116 above.

197 See Foot Note 129 above.

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CHAPTER IV

JAINISM

I. Pan-psychism (a better word than Monadism)[1]

1. More consistent Atomism than that of the Vaiśeṣikas. All

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1 Jainism believes that all matter is ensouled. So did Leibnitz, the German philosopher who gave the doctrine of Monadism. His monads, like the Jaina atoms, are psychical in nature; they are spiritual centres of force. But Leibnitz taught another doctrine – the Identity of Indiscernibles: if two things can not be discerned from each other, i.e. if they are same in all respects, they are not really two but are identical. Monads are discernible from one another; they all mirror the world differently, in their own particular way. Each monad is different from all other monads and there is no possibility of one being transmuted into another. Qualitative transformation is thus ruled out from monadism. On the other hand, it is an essential feature of Jainism. As per Leibnitz, the monads develop internally and represent different grades. They give a hierarchy. The gradation reaches the highest point in the central monad or the Monad of monads. This Monad is equivalent to God. On the contrary, Jainism is atheistic; it allows no God. Another difference between Jainism and Leibnitz is, that for Leibnitz the lowest matter *(materia prima)* has force and it represents a grade of spirit though the lowest one. The Jainas make a clear cut distinction between spirit and matter (Jīva and Ajīva). It is therefore not proper to call Jaina doctrine monadism. The better word to describe it is pan-psychism (pan = all, psyche = mind) according to which everything has a soul or mind. (See also, R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Dr. K. M. Munshi Marg, Bombay 7, 1970, Pp. 10–11). See also Foot Note 21 below.

atoms qualitatively alike.[2] Transmutation of metals into gold, therefore, not chimerical.[3] The Jainas did not make sufficient use of Dharma or motion (Anaxagoras) in their cosmology.[4]

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2 Scientifically all atoms are qualitatively alike. All elements consist of atoms. All atoms contain three main particles – protons, electrons and neutrons. Protons are positively charged particles, electrons are negatively charged particles, while neutrons have no charge. Protons and neutrons are in the core, called nucleus. Electrons revolve round the nucleus. In an atom, protons and electrons are the same in number. The chemical properties of an atom depend on the number of protons in the nucleus. Each element has a specific number of protons in its atom. Thus all the atoms are qualitatively alike but quantitatively different. By quality is meant the type of particles present and by quantity, the number of particles present. See Foot Note 3 below.

3 According to Jainism, all atoms are of the same kind and can not be categorised. They all have touch, taste, smell and colour. By developing any of these characteristics, qualitative differentiation can take place. Thus, matter which is quite indefinite, can be transmuted. One metal, say iron, can be transmuted into another, say gold. To turn metals into gold was a dream of the alchemist. On the Jaina view, this is very much possible. See Foot Note 2 above and Foot Note 14 below. Contrast, however, Nyāya view in Foot Note 13 in Chapter V.

4 The Jainas explained combination of atoms as due to humidity of atoms. Anaxagoras (a Greek philosopher, died about 429 B.C.) introduced the concept of an intelligent force, *nous*, which arranges and organises everything with a definite design. It sets atoms in motion. Likewise the Jainas could well have attributed the power of motion to the ensouled atoms.

Contrast Democritus "Give me matter and motion".[5] Inter-linking of atoms explained on account of wetness or humidity (Kundakunda).[6]

2. Every material atom ensouled by Jīva. Hylozoism[7] (Jacobi) or pan-psychism. According to Śaṅkara there is Caitanya in Pāṣāṇa and Mṛttikā, only it is not Āvirbhūta.[8] The Jaina

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5 Democritus, the atomist (Greek philosopher, about 460–370 B.C.), transferred motion to the primary substance itself. The atoms are in a state of rotary motion. By this motion, atoms are brought together or are separated. Out of this motion the worlds are created. Thus formation of things depends on the twin principles of matter and motion (E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, Pp. 66–67). Empedocles (Greek philosopher, about 495–435 B.C.) had used love and hate as principles which are responsible for motion. Anaxagoras introduced nous (mind) for the purpose. But Democritus does not need any outside force. He is reported to have said, 'Give me matter and motion and I will explain the whole world to you'. See also Foot Note 112 in Chapter VI, and Foot Note 100 in Chapter V.

6 Kundakundācārya is a Jaina teacher. He is the author of Pancāstikāya-saṅgraha-sūtra. According to him atoms have different degrees of humidity. Some are dry, some are viscous. "Two atoms form a compound (Skandha), when one is viscous and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscocity or dryness" (S.N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, P. 196). See also Foot Notes 16 and 17 below.

7 Hylozoism is a doctrine according to which all matter has life.

8 यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानाम् अपि आत्मनां स्वापमूर्च्छादि अवस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाष्यते, एवं काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते। शांकरभाष्य on Vedānta-sūtra II. 1.4. (Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep,

conception of substance. Substances can not exist without qualities (See Upadhye). Contrast Naiyāyika's view आद्ये क्षणे निर्गुणं द्रव्यं तिष्ठति ।[9] According to Jainas, Dravyas or substances are divided into Jīvas and Ajīvas, the former of which are of five grades or degrees and the latter are of five classes or kinds. Their pan-psychism goes against the division of existence into Jīvas and Ajīvas.[10] These latter are (i) Kāla, (ii) Dik, (iii) Dharma = motion (Ṛgveda), (iv) A-dharma, and (v) Pudgala (atoms). Time is Nāstikāya while the four others are Astikāyas. Substance must be One, and not many as the Jainas suppose,[11] cf. Plural number of substances in McTaggart.[12]

Atomism in Jainism and Democritus: (a) Pudgalas are atoms. They are qualitatively alike while Democritus says they are

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swoon and so on, so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). (Thibaut's translation, Vol. I, P. 302.).

9 The Naiyāyikas hold that at the moment of their production all substances stand without qualities. Qualities arise at the next moment. "... if the qualities are supposed to rise simultaneously with the substances and not a moment later, all distinction between qualities and substances will virtually disappear" (Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-Saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 77).

10 If every particle of matter is ensouled, the very idea of Ajīva (dead matter), which is claimed to be an ever-lasting category by the Jainas, is unthinkable.

11 The general tendency of Prof. Ranade is to reduce the many to one – may they be categories or substances or any other things. He criticises the many-substances-theory and comes to the conclusion that spirit is the only Substance (See, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, Pp. 30–31).

12 See Foot Note 30 in Chapter I.

qualitatively different.[13] As the atoms are alike "alchemy"[14] is possible in Jainism. (b) Both recognise motion. Dharma is the principle of motion in Jainism.[15] (c) The combination of the atoms is explained in Jainism by humidity; in Democritus, it is explained by hooks.[16] In contemporary science it is explained by electric attraction. In Nyāya God is responsible for making a द्व्यणुक, others follow themeselves.[17] (d) While Democritus

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13 According to Jainism, matter is ultimately indefinite, having no specific nature. Atoms have no size and qualitative changes are very much possible. Atoms are divisible. In Democritus, atoms (dense bodies) are indivisible. Unlike in Jainism they are distinguishable by their shape and size and are absolutely incapable of qualitative change.

14 Alchemy – an early form of chemistry, with philosophical and magic associations, studied in the Middle Ages. Its chief aims were to change baser metals into gold and to discover the elixir of perpetual youth. (See also Foot Note 3 above).

15 In Jainism Dharma is the principle of motion, and Adharma the principle of rest. Dharma helps matter to move as water helps fish to move. On the other hand, Adharma helps matter to remain stable. Hence Dharma and Adharma are physical principles as contrasted with moral ones. They do not mean merit and demerit, but mean motion and rest.

16 According to Democritus atoms are in perpetual motion. Because of the motion they are combined or are separated. The combination takes place on the basis of size and shape of atoms. Some atoms have even surfaces, some have rough surfaces, some have sharp or hooked surfaces. On account of this they catch hold of each other. See also Foot Notes 6 above and 17 below.

17 The Tarka-dīpikā states that motion is first produced in the atoms as a result of God's will. This motion produces

recognised secondary qualities, the Jainas did not.[18] (e) Democritus did not deny God, while the Jainas did.

3. Gradation of Jīvas according to development of sensations (Is this biologically sound?)[19] One sense: minerals; touch. Two senses: worms; touch + taste. Three senses: ants; (Do not the ants see?); touch + taste + smell. Four senses: bees; touch + taste + smell + sight. Five senses: men; touch + taste + smell + sight + hearing. Hearing seems to be the highest sense according to

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conjunction of two atoms which is called a द्व्यणुक (Diad). Further production takes place by combination of द्व्यणुकs (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 118). See Foot Note 6 above for Jaina view.

18 Things differ in their qualities because of the difference of shape and size as well as position and arrangement of atoms out of which they are constituted. Democritus does not treat all qualities of things alike. He says that weight, density or hardness are qualities which belong to things themselves. Other qualities like colour, depend on the perceiver. Qualities which belong to objects themselves, were called primary qualities by John Locke (an English philosopher, known as father of modern empiricism, 1632–1704). Those depending on the perceiver are called secondary qualities. Thus we find that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities was very much present in Democritus. In Jainism, Pudgala or matter has some inalienable qualities like touch or taste. By a development of these qualities, objects acquire newer qualities. The new qualities do not depend upon the perceiver. As such the question of primary and secondary qualities does not arise in Jainism.

19 The distribution of sensations right from minerals upto man is not scientifically justifiable.

Jainas.

4. Also, mirroring of all experience in the perfect soul; ordinary souls do not mirror. Cf. the nature of omniscience or Kevala-jñāna discussed later.[20] (In Leibnitz, there is a *monas monadum*. In Jainism there is not, except it be the Tīrthaṅkara). In Jainism difference between matter and spirit. In Leibnitz matter, a lower grade of spirit.

5. Hylozoism + gradation + Representation = a theory of monadism. No God required in either. Cf. Jaina Tīrthaṅkara. (The Tīrthaṅkaras in Jainism have not the power of incarnation but are otherwise like the liberated souls of Bādarāyaṇa, who also have not the power of creation which God alone possesses). Pan-psychism, a better word for the Jaina theory than either hylozoism or monadism, though with either it has got analogies.[21]

II. Probabilistic Epistemology

(i) The discussion of the Nayas is a necessary ancillary to the

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20 See Section VI. (ii) (a) below.

21 There is agreement between hylozoism and Jainism. Hylozoism gives life to everything; so does Jainism. But atoms in Jainism have certain qualities like touch, taste, colour and so on. Thus their atoms have not only life but souls. Therefore, inspite of agreement between Hylozoism and Jainism in attributing life to everything, Jainism is better described as pan-psychism.

Now Jainism and monadism agree in maintaining that all substances are psychical in nature, and agree again in holding that atoms are indistinguishable from one another and are shapeless. Notwithstanding these common points, monadism is not a fitting description of the Jaina theory. (See Foot Note 1 above).

Syādvāda.[22] The Syādvāda-mañjarī, which is a standard epitome of Jaina doctrine, discusses both the Nayas as well as the Syādvāda (which is itself called Sapta-bhangī naya). For the discussion of the Nayas vide also Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya on the Niryuktis of Bhadrabāhu.[23] (a) There are infinite Nayas (philosophical standpoints or doctrines) possible. Anekānta- vāda.[24]

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22 Naya means 'a point of view' or 'a standpoint'. A thing has infinite qualities. But to take any early, familiar or otherwise accidental characterisation of a thing as definitive is a fallacy. R. B. Perry calls it a fallacy of definition by initial predication. For example, the letter 'a' is the second letter in the word man, no doubt; but to define the letter 'a' as a second letter in the word man is wrong. The letter appears in innumerable ways in innumerable words. The fallacy occurs because only an exclusive character out of a multiple characters is taken to describe a thing. (See, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1929, Pp. 127–128). The typical Jaina example is the story of blind men describing an elephant. Each of them thinks that his exclusive standpoint is definitive. He who touches the foot of the elephant calls the elephant a pillar and so on with different parts of the elephant's body. This, according to the Jainas, is wrong. To describe a thing only from one standpoint is a fallacy (Nayābhāsa). In order to avoid the fallacy, every statement should be prefixed by the word 'Syād' (probably). No judgement is absolutely true; and no judgement is absolutely false; hence all judgements are relative or probable.

23 Bhadrabāhu – a celebrated author, looked on by the Jainas as an Arhat (433–357 B.C.).

24 To think that there is only one way of looking at things is Ekānta-vāda (fallacy of exclusive particularity); to recognise that there are infinite points of view is Anekānta-vāda (doctrine

But the Jainas consider only four Nayas as prominent.[25]

The Saṅgrahanaya (synoptic) of Vedānta, all-inclusiveness. The Vyavahāra-naya of Sāṅkhya, the practical (pragmatic) or scientific standpoint. The Naigama-naya of Nyāya. This refers to the Nigamana of Naiyāyikas. And the Ṛju-sūtra-naya of Buddhism (see Das Gupta).[26] The Jainas approve of the straightness of the Buddhists![27] (Radhakrishnan, however, says

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of multiple predication).

25 The four Nayas are: (i) Saṅgraha-naya, (ii) Vyavahāra-naya, (iii) Naigama-naya and (iv) Ṛju-sūtra-naya. (i) Saṅgraha-naya consists in including things under the widest class; for example, a book is included under 'entity'. The book may have specific qualities, but its most general character of being an entity is here referred to. The Jainas ascribe this view to Vedānta because according to Vedānta everything, whether animate or inanimate is subsumed under Brahman. (ii) The Vyavahāra-naya takes into consideration both the general and specific characteristics of a thing; for instance, the book is a useful entity. Along with being an entity its specific character of being useful is also mentioned. As per the Jaina opinion, Vyavahāra-naya is held by the Sāṅkhyas. (iii) Naigama-naya is an empirical view. Here not much stress is laid on either general or specific characters. Talking about a book, we may call it an entity, or we may call it a useful thing as well. The Jainas lay this view at the door of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. (iv) Ṛju-sūtra-naya takes a thing as a mere conglomeration of qualities with no underlying substratum. The book is a bundle of qualities like size, shape, weight or colour. According to the Jainas, this view is held by the Buddhists.

26 A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge, At the University Press, 1957, Pp. 196 ff.

27 All the four Nayas mentioned above are, say the Jainas, only

that Saṅgraha-naya belongs to Sāṅkhya and Vyavahāra-naya belongs to Vedānta (Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, P. 301). Is this right?[28] Just because all these Nayas look at Reality each from its special point of view, they can not apprehend Reality at all. Hence arise Nayābhāsas or antinomies.[29] Four antinomies as

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partial stand-points and hence fallacious (Nayābhāsas). Now, if the Jainas regard the Buddhist view as erroneous, how can they call it Ṛju (straight or upright)?

28 The Vedānta takes a synoptic or all-inclusive view. Brahman is the most general or universal category in which everything is included. Hence Vedānta view must be described as the Saṅgraha-naya, as the Jainas rightly do. Dr. Radhakrishnan's inclusion of Vedānta under Vyavahāra-naya does not seem to be right. Likewise, the Sāṅkhya view is scientific and pragmatic; and Vyavahāra-naya is its proper description. Dr. Radhakrishnan's inclusion of the Sāṅkhya view under Saṅgraha-naya does not seem to be correct.

29 The Jaina stand is that all the four Nayas, Saṅgraha-naya, Vyavahāra-naya, Naigama-naya and Ṛju-sūtra-naya are dogmatic statements. Now, one dogma is always countered by another dogma. Dogmas contain only partial truth. To treat it as the absolute truth, is Nayābhāsa, a fallacy. This is exactly how Kant criticised the two theories of rationalism and empiricism. Both were one-sided according to him. Edward Caird describes this stand in his monumental volume on Kant. We may quote Prof. Ranade's summary of Caird's exposition: "Such a one-sidedness, however, calls forth an opposite one-sidedness: this half truth, according to the law of Nemesis, another half truth. A one-sided dogmatism has the opposite dogmatism latent in itself. And the history of metaphysics is a splendid record of the perpetual conflict of opposite dogmatisms."

in Kant.[30] (b) Or, as in Radhakrishnan, the Sāṅkhyas believe in Satkārya-vāda, effect in cause; the Vaiśeṣikas believe in Asatkārya-vāda, effect not in cause; the Jainas would say that these views are only probable. (c) Or again, the Upaniṣads say that the self exists and the Buddhists say that it does not exist (See Das Gupta)[31]; both views again are only probable. It follows, therefore, that not absolute knowledge but Relativity alone is the truth. Cf. Sophists.[32] What we call knowledge is only probable knowledge.

(ii) Hence, the seven-fold formulation of Syād-vāda or as it is

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30 An antinomy consists in putting forth a thesis which is confronted by its opposite or the anti-thesis. Kant gives the following four antinomies: (i) Thesis: The world is limited in space and time. Antithesis: The world is not limited in space and time. (ii) Thesis: Things are divisible into simple parts. Antithesis: Things are not divisible into simple parts. (iii) Thesis: There is freedom in nature. Antithesis: There is no freedom in nature. (iv) Thesis: The absolutely necessary Being exists. Antithesis: There is no absolutely necessary Being.
It may be noted that Kant does provide a reconciliation or synthesis of all the four antinomies.

31 See Foot Note 26 above.

32 Sophists, generally speaking, shifted their interest from philosophy of nature to philosophy of man. There was also a slight distrust of human powers to probe the depths of natural phenomena. The most important representative of the Sophists, Protogoras, gave the maxim – man is the measure of things, he is the judge of things. What appears good to one man may not be so to another man. There is no absolute religion, no absolute morality and no absolute justice and so on. This fits in the mould of the Jaina concept of Nayābhāsa.

also called the Sapta-bhaṅgī doctrine : (the seven dicta of Probabilism or antinomianism)[33] : (1) Probably it is, (2) Probably it is not, (3) Probably it is both is and is not, (4) Probably it is ineffable, (5) Probably it is, and is ineffable, (6) Probably it is not and is ineffable and (7) Probably it is, is not and is ineffable. Cf. मोडणी[34] in mathematics:

$$\begin{array}{r} 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ \hline 4 \\ \hline 5 \\ 6 \\ 7 \end{array}$$

$$5 = 1 + 4$$
$$6 = 2 + 4$$
$$7 = 3 + 4$$

(iii) Criticism of Syād-vāda: (1) The first implies the second; hence the second becomes tautologous. (2) The third combines two incompatibles, Asti and Nāsti. It breaks the Law of Contradiction (Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja).[35] Heracleitos: Sea-water is good for fish, bad for men. Grapes have seeds and have not seeds. The tree is moving and yet is not moving. Black teeth are beautiful, black teeth are ugly. Slender waist is a mark of beauty, slender waist is a mark of ugliness. Thorns are good for the camel, but bad for man. Antinomianism. (3) Probability may itself be probable, just as the relativity of Nāgārjuna itself is

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33 See Foot Note 124 in Chapter III.

34 The dictionary meaning of मोडणी is: the way of putting things. Here the सप्तभंगीनय is presented in a mathematical fashion.

35 See Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra II. 2. 33. See also Rāmānuja-bhāṣya on the Vedānta-sūtra II. 2. 31.

relative.[36] (4) Probability not applicable to the Moral Law, to Mokṣa, to Tīrthaṅkara;[37] just as Heracleitos' Relativism stops at God. Twenty Tīrthaṅkaras out of twenty four[38] may have died in the Pārasnāth hill.[39] As the subject, the object, and the

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36 See Foot Note 113 in Chapter III.

37 The moral law is a Categorical Imperative. It is unconditional and admits of no exception. It is to be observed not for gaining anything, but simply because it is obligatory. Hence a probable moral law is an absurdity. Mokṣa which implies freedom from clinging to matter must be absolute. If the highest ideal or Kaivalya is itself probable, the whole striving for its achievement would be an exercise in futility. The Tīrthaṅkara is an embodiment of perfect knowledge. If we were to give up the idea of perfect knowledge, we have likewise to give up the idea of Tīrthaṅkara and with this the Jainas will never agree. For them Tīrthaṅkara is very much a reality.
Hence probability is not applicable to the moral law, to Mokṣa and to Tīrthaṅkara.

38 The twenty four Tīrthaṅkaras are ऋषभनाथ, अजितनाथ, संभवनाथ, अभिनंदननाथ, सुमतिनाथ, पद्मप्रभ, सुपार्श्वनाथ, चंद्रप्रभ, सुविधिनाथ, शीतलनाथ, श्रेयांसनाथ, वासुपूज्य, विमलनाथ, अनंतनाथ, धर्मनाथ, शांतिनाथ, कुन्थुनाथ, अरनाथ, मल्लिनाथ (Mallinātha according to Digambara tradition; or मल्ली, female Tīrthaṅkariṇī, according to Śvetāmbara tradition), मुनिसुव्रत, नमिनाथ, अरिष्टनेमि, पार्श्वनाथ and वर्धमान महावीर. Of these ऋषभनाथ, वासुपूज्य, अरिष्टनेमि and वर्धमान महावीर died at different places. The remaining twenty Tīrthaṅkaras died in Sameta-śikhara (Pārasnātha Hill in Hazāribāg District, Bihar). (See Chapter 2, written by Shri M. N. Deshpande in Jain Art and Architecture, Vol. I, edited by A. Ghosh, Bharatiya Jnanapitha, New Delhi, Pp. 14–16).

39 In the above text, two words – 'twenty' and 'may' are underlined. It implies that if the Jaina dictum of probability is applied here,

subject-object relation all become indefinite, how can the Tīrthaṅkara teach with authority", asks Śaṅkara, "and how can his followers act on his precepts?"[40] Ethics thus which is the

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the whole account of the Tīrthaṅkaras crumbles to pieces– their number or the fact of their death becomes probable.

40 Śaṅkara's criticism (contained in his Bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra II. 2. 33) states that if the Jaina doctrine of relativity is accepted, the Tīrthaṅkara's teaching would itself be relative. It is just an application of a general statement to a particular case. So far so good. It is beating the enemy on his own ground. But a couple of observations which Śaṅkara makes before he comes to the above-mentioned conclusion, are not sound. Śaṅkara puts to the Jaina philosopher that his unlimited (निरंकुश) assertion viz., 'all knowledge is relative' should be applied to itself. If so applied, contends Śaṅkara, it loses certainty and the Jaina thinker's claim of the relativity of knowledge just vanishes. But this can not be granted to Śaṅkara. The Jaina statement of the relativity of knowledge can not be applied to itself. Here is a parallel. "A similar paradox has become classic in the history of philosophy, the paradox of Epimenides the Cretan, who said: all Cretans are liars. Now if what he says is true his assertion is a lie and so Cretans are not liars. But if Cretans are not liars, his first assertion is true and so Cretans are liars. Thus, when he tells the truth, he lies and when he lies he tells the truth, which is a self-contradiction. The self-contradiction disappears, according to Tarski if we make a distinction between language and meta-language. He points out, that a sentence asserting that some sentence *S* is a true sentence of some language L, can not itself be a sentence of the language L, but must belong to a meta-language in which the sentences of L are not used but are mentioned and discussed" (S.S. Barlingay and Padma Kulkarni, A Critical Survey of Western Philosophy, The

pivot of Jainism would come to an end. May it not be, however, that, as recently in the case of Buddhism, so in the case of Jainism, the founder and the dogma might be sharply distinguished?[41] Yes. Cf. पूज्यपाद's समाधिशतक which is perfectly spiritual.[42] It is

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Macmillan Company of India, Ltd., Delhi, 1980, P. 52). So in the sentence: 'A Cretan says All Cretans are liars', the part: 'A Cretan says' does not belong to the same language L but to a meta-language M. So when a self-reference is eliminated the contradiction disappears. Similarly, the Jaina statement that 'all knowledge is relative', may be applied to any piece of knowledge except itself. See Foot Note 113 in Chapter III.

41 The study of Buddhism on the basis of Fragments of ancient writings revealed that what the later schools of Buddhism i.e. Canonical Buddhism, taught was very much different from what Buddha taught. The former teachings crystalised into a dogma and for centuries these dogmatic teachings of the schoolmen came to be regarded as real Buddhism. Mrs. Rhys Davids has thrown a good deal of light on the point. (See Foot Notes 1, 2, 7 and 8 in Chapter III. See also Foot Note 42 below).

42 Prof. Ranade here observes that this might have happened in the case of Jainism as well. The teachings of the Jaina schoolmen may not be what Mahāvīra himself taught. Can we say that the original teaching was spiritualistic and can Pūjyapāda be taken to represent that teaching? The Samādhi-śataka of Pūjyapāda is a treatise the purport of which is to raise the Antarātman to the state of Paramātman. Three stages of self or Atman are here described: (1) Bahirātman (2) Antarātman and (3) Paramātman. The Bahirātman looks on the body as the self. The Antarātman overcomes this stage and ceases to look on mind, passions etc. as constituting the self. He looks on pure self as self. Higher than this is Paramātman who is entirely free from all Karmamala. He is described in

only in Bhadrabāhu, the author of Niryukti, 1st century B.C., that we probably definitely hear of Syād-vāda. There would be also great justification for this as the Canon is separated in Jainism from the Founder by a longer period than in Buddhism. (800 years instead of 400 years). (5) Coming to Ineffability, combination of Asti with Avaktavya is impossible. It is Vadato-vyāghāta.[43] (Avaktavya = Anirvacanīya?).[44] (6) The ineffability would be justifiable (Ward criticises Spencer by say-

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almost theistic-monistic terms:
निर्मलः केवलः शुद्धः विविक्तः प्रभुः अव्ययः ।
परमेष्ठी परात्मेति परमात्मा ईश्वरोजिनः ॥ 6 ॥
(Immaculate, alone to oneself, pure, devoid of mind-body complex, Master, infallible, Overlord, the highest self, ubiquitous, Conquerer). The Antarātman has to leave the Bahirātman and become Paramātman. The whole text can be summarised in one line of Rāmadāsa: देहेबुद्धि ते आत्मबुद्धि करावी (the body-consciousness must be metamorphosed into Self-consciousness). In fact, but for a few words like अर्हत्, सिद्ध, जिन and the like, there is no mention of typical Jaina doctrines like Syād-vāda or atomism in Pūjyapāda's Samādhi-śataka. The rigorous and detailed Jaina code of conduct is also conspicuous by its absence in the text. More evidence is required to hold that the original Jaina doctrine was monistic-spiritualistic and that the controversial doctrines like Syād-vāda were a later addition. (See also Foot Note 41 above).

43 The very fact of saying that a thing probably exists means that you know something about it, that it is not something like खपुष्प (a sky-flower), hence the thing does not remain अवक्तव्य.

44 If अवक्तव्य is taken to mean अनिर्वचनीय or incapable of being described fully, Syād-vāda would come dangerously near मायावाद.

ing that he knows his unknowable),[45] if spiritual experience is to be stressed, (e.g. in तदेजति तन्नैजति etc. in Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad), instead of intellectual conviction.[46] (7) Why should we stop at

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45 Herbert Spencer's contention is that the First Cause can not be known but its positive existence is a necessary datum of consciousness. To put it simply, Spencer's position is that he knows that the First Cause exists, though not what it is. He calls that principle Incomprehensible Power. James Ward's criticism is that once you attribute Causality or Power to the Unknowable, it no longer remains unknowable. Another contention of Spencer is that strict knowledge is confined only to appearances and the ultimate reality can by no means be called an appearance, and hence it remains unknowable. Ward's objection to such a position is : if there is appearance, there must be, behind it, some reality that appears. But how, "can reality appear, shine forth, and yet remain totally and for ever beyond the knowledge of those to whom it appears?" Why not take appearance to be a manifestation of a Supreme Mind? Why attach to it the bad sense of concealing rather than the good sense of revealing, queries Ward. Therefore if you know the appearances, to that extent you do know reality; its unknowability melts away (See, J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnoticism, Vol. II, Adam and Charles Black, London, second edition, 1903, Pp. 267–276).

46 The Īśāvāsya Mantra (5) runs as :
तदेजति तन्नैजति तद्दूरे तद्वन्तिके
तदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य तदु सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः ।
(It moves, it moves not. It is far and it is near. It is within all this, and it is outside of all this). This is the experience of saints and sages and is very much real. Discursive intellect which operates under the banner of the Law of Contradiction can not explain this; and therefore, calls it ineffable.

the seventh stage, and not go on further? *Progressus ad infinitum.* Why not add Syād na avaktavyaḥ as the eighth? And then go on with further formulations, later adding Syād avaktavyaḥ ca na avaktavyaḥ, and permuting and combining these with Asti and Nāsti, go on *ad infinitum*?[47] (Na avaktavyaḥ is different from vaktavyaḥ).[48] Relativism, ultimately, inconceivable without an Absolute (Radhakrishnan). Relativism is relative to Absolute. Change implies permanence, Relativism implies the Absolute.[49]

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47 Combinations 8th onwards would be :

	8	स्यात् न अवक्तव्यः
1 + 8 =	9	स्यात् अस्ति च न अवक्तव्यः
2 + 8 =	10	स्यात् नास्ति च न अवक्तव्यः
3 + 8 =	11	स्यात् अस्ति च नास्ति च न अवक्तव्यः
	12	स्यात् अवक्तव्यः च न अवक्तव्यः
1 + 12 =	13	स्यात् अस्ति च अवक्तव्यः च न अवक्तव्यः
2 + 12 =	14	स्यात् नास्ति च अवक्तव्यः च न अवक्तव्यः

and so on *ad infinitum.*

48 वक्तव्य and अवक्तव्य are contrary terms. Therefore वक्तव्य is not the same as न अवक्तव्य. The contradictory of वक्तव्य is नवक्तव्य. Therefore वक्तव्य would be the same as न नवक्तव्य and not न अवक्तव्य.

49 Change without a permanent identity is absurd, because there would be nothing to change. If there is transition of independent things, to talk of change is meaningless. If A changes into B, A must have some sensible duration and not merely momentary existence (See A.E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, 13th Edition, 1952, Pp. 160 ff). A thing is relative to some other thing. That other thing would be relative to yet another thing and so on. This leads to infinite regress. To overcome this we have to stop somewhere and posit some entity as absolute.

'(8) Logically speaking, Probability may have a categorical basis, as negation itself has.[50] Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive; Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic.[51] Is there greater reality from categorical to hypothetical and from hypothetical to disjunctive? "Yes, if the hypothetical is the expression of the Causal Law, or the disjunctive exhausts reality", would say Bosanquet.[52] But if this is not so, then

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50 Bosanquet holds that no negation is possible without a positive basis. 'A is not B' would be a significant negation only on the basis of some positive background. A is not B means A is something else (Ibid. P. 19 and Foot Note 1 where this view is supported by mentioning Bosanquet). See also Foot Note 10 in Chapter V.

51 Traditional logic gives twelve kinds of judgements out of which six are mentioned here. (a) The categorical judgment unconditionally attributes a predicate to a subject, e.g., God is just. (b) The hypothetical judgement expresses some kind of dependence or a condition, e.g. If God is just, He will punish the wicked. (c) The disjunctive judgement gives different alternatives, e.g. he is either a fool or a knave. (d) The problematic judgement gives only possibility, e.g. Mars may be inhabited. (e) Assertoric judgement expresses reality. e.g. The earth is round. (f) The apodictic judgment spells out necessity, e.g. God must be just.

52 Kant makes a distinction between Categorical, Hypothetical and Disjunctive judgments. In the first we consider only two concepts – substance and quality. A categorical judgment attributes a predicate to a subject. In the second or hypothetical judgment, a relation of ground and consequence is given. This judgment is an expression of the causal law. Kant gives an example: If there is perfect justice, the obstinately wicked are punished. The hypothetical may be said to mark an advance

Bosanquet is not right in giving greater and greater reality from categorical to hypothetical and from hypothetical to disjunctive. Ultimately there must be a categorical basis for the hypothetical and the disjunctive. Tattvamasi is a categorical proposition. Bosanquet puts a premium upon the knowledge of conditions or upon doubt, which the Vedāntin does not allow.[53]

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over the categorical, in that it asserts a logical sequence. In the third kind of judgment, namely the disjunctive, two or more alternatives are given. These alternatives exclude one another. There is logical opposition among these different alternatives. Again the alternatives taken together occupy the whole sphere of knowledge in question. Kant gives the example: The world exists either through blind chance, or through inner necessity, or through an external cause. The more the alternatives, the wider the sphere of knowledge. Taken together, the alternatives exhaust the sphere of knowledge at the moment. Thus the disjunctive judgment evidently steals a march over the first two types of jugments – namely categorical and hypothetical. See also, B. Bosanquet, Logic or The Morphology of Knowledge, Vol. I, Oxford, 1911, Chapter VI.

53 Prof. Ranade gives a central place to the categorical judgment. Unless there is some positive basis, mere expression of conditions or putting forward various alternatives, does not take us far. The hypothetical may express a causal law; though it does not do so in every case. Again, it must be remembered that the causal law is only a postulate of science. It does not have the status of an axiom. The 'ifs' and the 'in order to's' make the statement of truth weak. Again, the various alternatives in the disjunctive proposition are only so many doubts. Theoretically there may be infinite alternatives. In order to assert one alternative, the host of other alternatives will have to be annulled. This being an almost impossible task, truth

(9) Spinoza said, Determination was Negation; the Jainas say Indeterminism is Reality.

A is B

Not–A is not–B

Inverse does not follow. Some non-A is non-B should be the immediate inference. If Spinoza is right, Jainas are wrong.[54]

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escapes. Only the categorical judgment possesses the adamantine certainty. Tattvamasi (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 8. 7) loses its Olympian height if it is reduced to hypothetical or disjunctive judgment. The fundamental unity of Self and God does not depend upon fulfilment of conditions as in the hypothetical judgment or elimination of doubts as in the disjunctive.

54 Spinoza's statement, 'Determination is negation', if symbolically expressed, would be a universal affirmative proposition, S a P. Similarly the Jaina statement, 'Indetermination is reality' would again be a universal affirmative proposition. The symbolical expression itself would be right only if determination and indetermination (as also negation and Reality) are taken to be contradictory terms. Assuming for the sake of argument that they are, and assuming again that Spinoza is right, let us see whether we can arrive at the Jaina position by inversion.

S a P Original proposition
S e not-P obversion
not-P e S conversion
not-P a not-S obversion
∴ not-S i not-P Inverse of the original proposition.

The symbolic representation of Jaina position (Not–A is Not–B) is an attempt at Inversion. But it is not correct. The correct inversion would be not-S i not-P (Some not–A is not–B). Hence from Spinoza's dictum, Determination is negation, the valid immediate inference (Inversion) would be:

(10) Relativism good only as a tentative stage. Relativism as a necessary ancillary to Mysticism is what Gauḍapāda himself would teach.[55] Cf. Bradley: blend of scepticism and mysticism.[56] But to dissect relativism and mysticism is not

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Some indetermi-nation is reality. The upshot is that philosophy can not survive on the assumption that all knowledge is indeterminate or probable.

55 The day to day experience is relativistic. From this stand-point there is multiplicity. This relative experience is both affirmative and negative. In it there is affirmation of the world but the world exists only on the background of the non-dual Reality which is absolute. The relative experience again has a negative element as it is sublated on the realisation of the non-dual Brahman which is free from affirmation or negation. There is no distinction between the waking state and dream (Gauḍapāda-kārikā, III. 29); both are unreal. But a common man takes for granted the reality of the waking world; he experiences joy and suffers pain. At the same time he refutes the reality of the dream. This is because he has created a false relative standard for himself which affirms the waking experience but denies the dream experience which is in fact unreal. It is only by the development of the power of discrimination that he learns to treat the waking experience also as unreal. It is from relativism that a man attains to the experience of non-duality. Relativism is thus a tentative stage, a training ground for mystically realising the ultimate Reality or Brahman. Only because man is caught in relativism, he seeks the Absolute.

56 In Bradley we find both the elements, those of scepticism and mysticism. His philosophy is sceptical in the sense that he sets out to question (and to negate) the reality of a number of conceptions. He is against relativism and ruthlessly denies the

desirable.

III. Doctrine of Two Truths[57]

Two degrees of truth: Vyavahāra and Niścaya. Cf. two degrees of reality in Nāgārjuna: Samvṛti-satya and Pariniṣpanna-satya, also two degrees of Reality in Śaṅkara. The Ātmapravāda-pūrva which is certainly earlier than the Aṅgas and therefore may express the opinion of Mahāvīra himself,[58] states two different points of view, namely, those of Vyavahāra and Niścaya, common sense and philosophy, which correspond to the phenomenal and the noumenal. (1) From the common sense point of view, the self does good or bad actions (Kartā); from the philosophical point of view, it remains absolute in its own nature. (2) In common sense, it enjoys the fruits of its actions (Bhoktā);

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tenability of the categories like space, time or the laws of causality and uniformity. He believes in the non-spatial, non-temporal Reality which is free from the reign of any empirical law. The ultimate Reality is known not by reason, but is got only in the immediate experience, where the individual is totally merged and dissolved in the Absolute. Here enters the mystical element in Bradley. Here also the attainment of the Absolute proceeds on denying the relativistic standpoint.

57 See Foot Notes 19 and 131 to 137 in Chapter III.

58 "According to the Jainas, there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen Pūrvas and the eleven Aṅgas. The Pūrvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were gradually lost. The works known as the eleven Aṅgas are now the oldest parts of the existing Jaina canon.... The Digambaras, however, assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the present works which pass by the old names are spurious" (S.N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, P. 171).

in reality it enjoys nothing. (3) In common sense, it absorbs the material Karmas and is material or corporeal; in reality, it is not matter and is incorporeal. (4) In common sense, it fills the whole body; in reality it fills the whole world and is therefore called Viṣṇu (See Jaini).

IV Arguments for the Non-existence of God

Jaina criticisms of the Nyāya doctrine of God. All these are included in Hemacandra's द्वात्रिंशिकास्तवन[59] with its commentary called स्याद्वादमंजरी. Cf. कारिकावली and मुक्तावली.[60] (1) Has God intelligence? (2) Does He perceive or infer? If so, has He any organs such as eyes and so forth? (3) Is God omniscient? (4) Has God a body? Then, He must have a very big brain in order that He may create this world. Du Bois Reymond.[61] (5) Nobody

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59 Syādvāda-mañjarī is a commentary by Malliṣeṇa on Hemacandra's Anyonya-vyavacchedika. The name द्वात्रिंशतिस्तवन is a later addition in the text. It is in the handwriting of a disciple of Prof. Ranade. Perhaps by a slip of hand he has written द्वात्रिंशतिस्तवन instead of अन्योन्यव्यवच्छेदिक. Syādvāda-mañjarī levels criticisms against other systems.

60 Kārikāvalī by Viśvanāth Pañcānana, is a Nyāya manual. Viśvanātha Pañcānana himself has written a commentary called Siddhānta Muktāvalī on Kārikāvalī. It is not merely an explanatory gloss on the original work, but is more like a larger edition of the original.

61 LaPlace talks about an imaginary intelligence which will know every event in nature with the help of mechanical calculations. In this connection Du-Bois-Reymond says: "To such a spirit even the hairs on our heads would all be numbered and without his knowledge, not a sparrow would fall to the ground" (James Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. I, P. 42). Ward mentions that he once heard Du-Bois-Reymond say that

creates the shoots of corn, they spring of themselves (Nature or Svabhāva). Hence the Naiyāyika's syllogistic argument is wrong.[62] Creation according to Jainism is without beginning or end. (6) Has God a will and a purpose? (7) Does God move in order that He may create the world? (8) Is the world an effect of God's caprice or whim? (9) Is God dependent upon the action of men? (10) Why should we not regard Karma or the Order as creater of the world instead of God? (11) Is God dependent on Adṛṣṭa? (12) Is the world merely His play? (13) Is not God partial; has God not hatred? (14) Has He any instruments for the world-creation? (15) Is God subject to change? (16) Supposing there are many gods would they not quarrel with one another? If so, the ants and the bees would be superior to these gods because they do not quarrel. See Guṇaratna's Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā, as well as Haribhadra Sūri's Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya (which is earlier than Mādhavācārya's Sarva- darśana-saṅgraha), edited by L. Suati, Bologne, 1905, Pp. 115–124); also Das Gupta, Vol. I, Pp. 203–206. On the whole, we can not understand creation. The world has been real from eternity and will continue to be so till eternity. Anādyananta and real. Jainism: The world always exists and is not created. Vedānta: the world does not exist and is not created, Ajātivāda.[63]

Science has banished the gods from the universe (Ibid. P. 277).

62 For the न्याय standpoint see Foot Note 73 in Chapter V.

63 According to Gauḍapāda, nothing is created. All that appears is an illusion. 'This is the highest truth that nothing is ever born' (Gauḍapāda-kārikā, III. 48). As the world does not exist, there is no question of finding out its cause. Gauḍapāda says that he heartily sympathises with them who declare the doctrine of Ajāti or non-creation (Gauḍapāda-kārikā IV. 5). See Foot Note 62 in Chapter III.

V The Ethical Code of Jainism

(i) Five chief virtues: Ahimsā, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacarya and Aparigraha. Close analogy with the virtues of the Bhagavad-gītā. The story of five grains of rice given by a father-in-law to his four daughters-in-law. The first throws them away, the second neglects them, the third preserves them and the fourth sows them and propagates them (See Winternitz, Vol. II, P. 446). Preservation and propagation of the Faith.[64] (ii) Other virtues : (1) Gandhi and the diseased calf. Unity of life. "Thou art thyself the animal thou wishest to kill" (See Winternitz, Vol. II, P.

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64 A merchant had four daughters-in-law. In order to put them to the test, he gives each of them five grains of rice with orders to preserve them carefully until he shall ask for them back again. The first daughter-in-law throws the grains away, and thinks to herself : "There are plenty of grains of rice in the larder, I shall give him others instead." The second thinks in the same way, and eats the grains. The third daughter-in-law preserves them carefully in her jewel-casket. But the fourth one plants the grains, and reaps; she again sows the harvest and reaps again, until at the end of five years she has accumulated a large store of rice. Then the merchant returns and punishes the first two daughters-in-law, assigning them the meanest tasks in the household; he entrusts the third one with the guarding of the entire property; but he gives the entire management of the large household into the hands of the fourth daughter-in-law. (These four women represent the monks some of whom do not keep the five great vows at all, others neglect them, the better ones observe them conscientiously, but the best of whom are not content with observing them, but propagate them also). (See M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, translated from the original German by Mrs. S. Ketkar and Miss H. Khon, B.A., University of Calcutta, 1934, P. 446).

436).[65] (2) Humanitarianism. Walking veiled for fear of inhaling organisms. Not to clean the teeth and not to take a bath.[66] Straining water and not partaking of honey and curds. The Go-rakṣaka Viceroy. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to

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65 "You yourself are the (being) which you intend to kill; you yourself are the (being) which you intend to ill-use;.... Therefore the righteous one, who has awakened to this knowledge, and lives according to it, will neither kill nor cause to kill". Āyāraṅga-sutta (Ācārāṅga-sūtra), Section I. (See Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, P. 436).
We may quote here an experience of a disciple of Prof. Ranade as it was narrated to us. The disciple writes, "It was about 1955. I had a passion for hunting. My friends tried to dissuade me from that habit, but I did not listen. One day I had a dream where I had killed a deer. I was holding the animal by its leg and was reaching for a knife to cut the creature. As I turned my face for getting hold of the knife, I felt that the animal was moving. I directed my gaze towards the deer and lo, there was no deer. Instead it was my son. Words came out from his mouth, 'Of, father, what you are doing?' I was stunned. It was a revelation for me. Never again did I go a-hunting. By God's grace, in a fraction of a second, I left hunting for good".

66 "He wandered naked and homeless. People struck him and mocked at him – unconcerned, he continued in his meditations. In Ladha the inhabitants.... set the dogs on him.... They disturbed him in his meditations by all sorts of torments. But.... Mahāvīra withstood it all.... He took no kind of medicaments, he never washed, did not bathe and never cleaned his teeth. In winter he meditated in the shade, in the heat of summer he seated himself in the scorching sun.... and pursued his meditations without craving." Āyāraṅga-sutta, Section I. (See M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, P. 437).

Animals.[67] (3) Nudity or nakedness, the dividing point between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras. Nudity in respect of the Tīrthaṅkara and his raiment.[68] Whether the Tīrthaṅkara was naked or clad and consequently whether his image should be naked or clad. This refers to all the Tīrthaṅkaras but *par excellence* to Mahāvīra. A contemporary of Akbar, Yaśovijaya Sūri, tries to reconcile the two. Mendicancy.[69] (4) Hatred of women. Internal stench. The story of Mallī and the six princes (See Winternitz, Vol. II, P. 447).[70] (5) Imperturbability. Dogs

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67 This Society tries to alleviate the suffering of animals, especially the abandoned ones. It also keeps an eye on whoever treats animals cruelly.

68 See Foot Note 66 above.

69 Mendicancy is asking for alms or begging. In certain religious Orders, members are not expected to possess any personal or communal property. They feed themselves by begging. When absolutely no property is allowed remaining naked follows as a corollary.

70 Mallī, the daughter of the king of Mithilā, was of wondrous, incomparable beauty. Six princes learn of her beauty, each in a different way, and woo her. One of them, the king of the Kuru land, gets to know of Mallī through a portrait which an artist had painted of her, after he had seen only the princess' great toe. Mallī's father refuses all the six princes. They are infuriated, and combine to wage war against the king. Mithilā is besieged, and the king is helpless. Then Mallī advises the king to invite each one of the princes into the city, promising each one her hand. Owing to her power of clairvoyance, she had already foreseen everything long before, and had a "puzzling house" constructed; then she made a figure which bore an exact resemblance to herself, and put it into this house. This figure had an opening on the head, into which she put remnants of

bark at Mahāvīra.[71] Nature of Bacilli.[72] Infectious diseases. (6) Suicide increaseth life. Greater period of eternal life. Contrast Buddhism,[73]

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her meals every day. She took care to conceal the opening carefully with lotus blossoms. The princes were conducted into this "puzzling house". While they are admiring the figure of the princess through a wall of netting, Mallī herself appears. She opens the figure, and a terrible stench is spread about, so that the princes hastily cover their faces and turn away, whereupon the beautiful princess moralises on the fact that the inside of her lovely body is even much more loathsome than the in-side of this figure. They should therefore not set any store on the enjoyment of love. She then tells the story of her former births, in which the six princes also played a part, and announces that she has decided to become a nun, where-upon the six princes also renounce the world (See M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, Pp. 447–448).

71 See Foot Note 66 above.

72 Bacilli mean bacteria which occur in chains. They cause diseases. Inclusion of bacilli and infectious diseases seems to imply that even when attacked by disease, the virtuous man remains undisturbed. See Foot Note 66 above.

73 "The essential difference between the monastic rules of the Jainas and the Buddhists is, that those of the Jainas lay much more stress on severe asceticism, and even go, as far as to recommend religious suicide... If a monk suffers from cold, he should rather freeze to death than break his vow.... A long verse.... includes, it is true, the famous ascetic rule,... "He should not desire life, he should not long for death"; this is, however, immediately followed by the characteristic rules on the various methods by which the accomplished sage is to starve himself to death by slow degrees" (See Maurice Winternitz, A History

(also Hamlet).[74] Starvation to death highly recommended.[75] We may kill ourselves but not others. Sadism – inflicting pain upon others; Masochism – inflicting pain upon oneself. The expressions come from two proper names, Sade and Masoch.[76] Kant's universalisation.[77] Kant's celibacy.[78] One's virtue and others' happiness.[79] (7) Philanthrophy. Charity and beneficence.

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of Indian Literature, Vol. II, Pp. 436–437).

74 Hamlet wants to finish with his life once for all, but remembers that the divine ordinance is against this.

'O, that this too too solid flesh would melt,
Thaw, and resolve itself into a dew!
Or that the Everlasting had not fixed
His canon against self-slaughter!'

(Hamlet, Act I. Scene 2)

75 See Foot Note 73 above.

76 Killing oneself would be masochistic, while killing others would be sadistic.

77 Kant says that if we want to know which act is moral and which immoral, we should ask ourselves the question, "What will become of humanity if everyone were to act according to the same principle?" This is universalisation. A moral act should be capable of being practised by one and all.

78 Kant was a celibate. But if the act of celibacy is universalised, that would lead to extinction of human race, and there would be no one to practise the virtue of celibacy. Hence, celibacy can not be a moral act. What about Kant's celibacy then?

79 Kant prescribes a dual end to humanity – perfection of oneself and happiness of others. We may not strive for perfection of others; for, that would be denying them moral freedom. Similarly seeking of one's happiness need not be prescribed as an end; because, everyone naturally seeks pleasure. Kant's formula goes well with the Jaina ethical teaching. There is

(8) Excessive self-mortification. Mahāvīra meditating in cool places during cold weather, and under the mid-day sun during summer (See Winternitz, Vol. II).[80] Contrast Buddhism.[81]

VI Liberation vs Omniscience[82]

(i) Process of liberation : How Karma attacks the soul. Empedocles : Love and Strife.[83] Holes in the ship of soul (See Winternitz, Vol. II).[84] Karma, the material fluid. Inflow,

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rigorous moral discipline for oneself and compassion for others. See also Foot Note 94 in Chapter VI.

80 See Foot Note 66 above.

81 Buddha advocated the middle way between extremes. For example, he wants one to choose the middle path, between self-indulgence and self-mortification.

82 It appears that Prof. Ranade makes here a distinction between liberation and omniscience. Real liberation is not mere freedom from Kārmic bondage; that would be a negative ideal. Real liberation would be attainment of omniscience, which is positive. According to Pūjyapāda, Kevalajñāna or infinite knowledge is indestructible (अविनाशी) and unlimited (अनंत) and is the very nature of a liberated soul (ज्ञानस्वरूप). Kevalajñāna is necessarily accompanied by omnivision (अनंतदर्शन), omnipotence (अनंतवीर्य) and infinite bliss (अनंतसुख). Therefore, अनंतज्ञान, अनंतदर्शन, अनंतवीर्य and अनंतसुख in a word, अनंतचतुष्टय constitute liberation.

83 In Empedocles, Love and Hate (strife), are two principles, the former of which is responsible for union and the latter for separation. Things come together when Love prevails; they fall apart when Hate rules. This kind of integration and disintegration is similar to the attachment of Karmic particles to the Jīva and their detachment from the Jīva respectively.

84 "Souls and substances permeate one another, as water permeates a sunken ship". (Bhagavatī Viyāha-Paññati, (Bhagavatī

catalepsy, obscuration, decadence and release. Āsrava, Bandha, Saṃvara, Nirjara and Mokṣa. Bandha and Saṃvara seem to be identical in meaning.[85] Cf. Stages of the eclipse of the sun. The second, the third and the fourth may be compared to the penumbra, the umbra and once more the penumbra.[86]

(ii) (a) Doctrine of the Superman: The nemesis of the denial of God is the apotheosis of the founder. Hopkins: "Deny God, worship man, nourish vermin". The spiritual superman. The Tīrthaṅkara in Jaina philosophy takes the place of God. Qualifications of a Tīrthaṅkara: Infinite knowledge, infinite bliss, infinite power. Infinite knowledge, Kevala-jñāna or Omniscience:

जिनेंद्रो देवता तत्र रागद्वेषविवर्जितः ।
हतमोहमहामल्लः केवलज्ञानदर्शनः ।।[87]

Vyākhyā-Prajñapti), 1.6). See M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, P. 444.

85 Saṃvara is total obscuration while Bandha is partial obscuration. But it is obscuration nonetheless. It is an attack of Karma on Jīva.

86 The second, the third and the fourth stages in the process of the liberation of the soul are: Bandha, Saṃvara and Nirjara. In Bandha there is influx of Karma in the soul; in Saṃvara the influx of fresh Karma is stopped and the Jīva is completely obscured by Kārmic matter which has already infiltrated. In Nirjara the shedding of Karmas begins. These stages can be compared with the three stages, namely, penumbra, umbra and again penumbra of the solar eclipse. In the first, light is partially obscured; in the second there is perfect darkness or obscuration when no light is received from the sun. In the third light begins to appear.

87 The verse means: The great conqueror who is free from

Distinction between Arhat (Jīvan-mukta) and Siddha (Videha-mukta);[88] A Jīvan-mukta might also be a Videha-mukta. Cf. Janaka called Videha; also distinction between Siddha and Tīrthaṅkara (See Jaini, Pp. 1–2). To deserve, to accomplish and to sanctify. The Tīrthaṅkaras are those Siddhas who propound the Truth during their life-time, which is a higher thing. The Tīrthaṅkaras are Asāmānya-siddhas; the others are Sāmānya-siddhas. The Tīrthaṅkaras, however are like a society of gods (Mc Taggart).[89] The Holy Mallī, a Tīrthaṅkariṇī. They sit on the Siddhaśilātala. Tīrthaṅkaras limited? Probably not.[90] It is possible for every man to reach the highest state or divinity. The Tīrthaṅkara is the only lone being in a world of possibles.[91]

(b) The nature of Omniscience: Omniscience, not serial (क्रमरहित)[92]; Omniscience = Omni-presence, Omniscience =

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attachment and hatred, who has destroyed infatuation, who is omniscience itself, is verily the deity.

88 On the attainment of Kevala-jñāna, the Jīva becomes enlightened. He may lead an active life; but his activity does not bind him. His passions and interests in worldly life come to an end; and he leads a life of tranquillity and equanimity. At this stage he is known as Arhat. This is the same as the Vedāntic ideal of Jīvan-mukti. At last when the body is cast off, he becomes a Siddha. He rises to the top of the universe called Lokākāśa and rests in eternal bliss. This corresponds to the Vedāntic Videha-mukti.

89 See Foot Note 30 in Chapter I.

90 As all liberated souls are gods, their number can not be limited. Only addition is possible; reduction is impossible.

91 Attaining to the status of a Tīrthaṅkara is a possibility no doubt, but a very rare possibility; one in a myriad may achieve the goal. Hence, a Tīrthaṅkara is bound to be alone.

92 As Omniscience includes Omnipotence, Omnipresence and

Omnipotence. Omniscience = Bliss. अनंतचतुष्टय.[93] Cf. the copresence of light and heat (See Kundakunda by Upadhye). Vedāntic synthesis of Cit and Ānanda. No past, present and future. Beyond time and space. Kevala-jñāna, mirroring.[94] Supersensuous. Self-consciousness possible.[95] (See Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra).

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bliss, they are all simultaneous. There is no serial order of one following another.

93 See Foot Note 82 above.

94 After enlightenment, the Jīva attains to Omniscience. He "knows all objects vividly and precisely as they are." Kevala-jñāna is supersensuous and hence is not coloured by the perceiver's mind and senses, thus eliminating the subjective element. Since objects are known as they are, Kevala-jñāna may be said to mirror the world (See also R.D. Ranade, Vedānta The Culmination of Indian Thought, P. 10).

95 The pure Atman is known only by himself (स्वसंवित्). Here knowledge is self-evident and no other criterion is needed.

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S.K. Belvalkar: Article on "Undercurrents of Jainism" Pp. 32 ff. Indian Philosophical Review Vol. I refers to Śaṅkara's criticism of Jainism whose Relativism ill-assorts with its Ethics (ब्रह्मसूत्र II. 2.33, Thibaut Vol. I, P. 479).

CHAPTER V

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF NYĀYA–VAIŚEṢIKA

I. Reduction of all Categories (Vaiśeṣika) to One

1. (i) History of the doctrine of the categories. Hegel's[1]

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1 A category is a class. This view is shared by Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. "The term 'category' means literally 'predicate'. Its most general signification – common to Aristotle, Kant and Hegel alike – is 'fundamentally important class'. The main difference between Kant and Aristotle in their enumeration of categories is to be found in the fact that Kant starts from the subjective side, considering the categories first as forms of conscious judging, whereas Aristotle – herein followed by Hegel – regards the categories as relations of the objects of knowledge" (M.W. Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, The Macmillan Company, London, 1921, Pp. 525–526). Put simply, it means that under category, Kant discussed the relation of mind to objects, whereas Aristotle and Hegel discussed the relation of objects to one another. The former is epistemological while the latter is ontological.

"Categories, especially in the Aristotelian sense, are a classification of predicates only, and not an enumeration of all namable things (including both subjects and predicates) as the *Padārthas* of the *Vaiśeṣikas* are. In this respect, the classification of the *Vaiśeṣikas* is superior to that of Aristotle. The latter enumerated ten categories, 1. Substance, 2. Quantity, 3. Quality, 4. Relation, 5. Place. 6. Time, 7. Posture, 8. Appurtenance or Property, 9. Activity and 10. Passivity" (Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 73).

According to Hegel, categories "..... are not only modes of *thinking* things; they are the modes of *being* of the things themselves. They are not empty frames, which receive their

contents from without; they are *substantial forms*, as the Middle Ages used to say; they give themselves their own content; they are creative acts of divine and human reason. They are both the forms which mould my thought and the stages of eternal creation" (Weber and Perry, History of Philosophy, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925, P. 407).

According to Kant, a category is a pure concept without any empirical content. A crow as a concept is a category. It does not refer to any particular crow, but crow as such. Categories are connective concepts. Kant recognises twelve categories. Traditional Logic considers propositions under four heads – Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, each having three sub-heads. Thus there are twelve forms of judgement. Taking this table as a guide, Kant gave twelve categories. They are:

I Under Quantity – Unity, Plurality, Totality;

II Under Quality – Reality, Negation, Limitation;

III Under Relation – Subsistence and Inherence (Substance and Accident), Causality and Dependence (Cause and Effect), Community (Reciprocity between the Active and the Passive);

IV Under Modality – Possibility-Impossibility, Existence-Non-existence, Necessity-Contingency.

Categories are results of mind's activity unlike a sensation where the mind is passive. We have knowledge when we get data from the external world and systematise the data by contributing something from the mind. This contribution of the mind to the knowledge-process is a category.

The aim of the Upaniṣadic seers was to find out the ultimate existence or the ultimate category under which all things were subsumed. Prof. Ranade has traced the development of the concept through the Upaniṣads. Cosmological categories, namely, elements like fire or water were supposed to be fundamental. Finding them wanting, physiological categories

categories. Kaṇāda recognises only six, and does not recognise Abhāva.[2] Abhāva comes to be added later on.[3] (ii) There are four kinds of Abhāvas: (a) Prāgabhāva, anterior negation which implies anterior eternity.[4] (b) Pradhvansābhāva, posterior negation which implies posterior eternity.[5] The meeting point of prior eternity and posterior eternity is the "specious present".[6]

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like the eye or the ear were substituted. These made way to psychological categories like consciousness and ultimately to God or Atman (See A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, Pp. 181 ff).

2 According to Vaiśeṣika-sūtra I.1.4, the six categories recognised by Kaṇāda are: (1) Dravya (substance), (2) Guṇa (quality), (3) Karma (action), (4) Sāmānya (Universal), (5) Viśeṣa (individual) and (6) Samavāya (inherence or necessary relation).

3 The seventh category, namely, Abhāva (non-existence) was added by commentators. Nyāya recognises 16 categories. Their second category viz. प्रमेय or 'Knowables' includes all the seven categories of the वैशेषिक्स.

4 प्रागभाव means negation of a thing before it comes into existence. This negation has. anterior eternity in the sense that it is beginningless; this negation was always there till the thing came into existence. But it comes to an end as soon as the thing is created.

5 प्रध्वंसाभाव means negation of a thing after the thing is destroyed. It is posterior negation; it has posterior eternity; for, the non-existence of a thing after it is destroyed, is endless.

6 Prior eternity comes to an end when the thing comes into existence. Posterior eternity starts after the thing is destroyed. Obviously their meeting place is the duration of the thing's existence. This duration may be either short or long; its span can be as small as a mere moment; but even then it has some

अव्यक्तादीनि भूतानि.[7] (c) Anyonyābhāva, reciprocal negation which implies the law of contradiction, e.g., the sun is not the moon. And (d) Atyantābhāva, absolute negation which is negation proper, e.g., hare's horn or mountain of gold. Mountain Meru does not exist, but it exists in parts, namely, mountain and gold. शशशृंग does exist, according to Rāmānuja. Also पित्तोपहतः शंखमपि पीतं पश्यति, according to Rāmānuja, is not a भ्रांति.[8] This Abhāva has no reference to time and is independent of the past, the present and the future. (iii) While Abhāva is supposed to be apprehended by Pratyakṣa in Nyāya philosophy, it is supposed to be apprehended by a new criterion, viz., Anupalabdhi in Mīmāṃsā.[9] (iv) When Abhāva is regarded as a category it involves that negation implies affirmation. Cf. Bosanquet who says that all negation has a positive basis. Cf. also प्रतियोगिप्रमितिं विना निषेधानुपपत्तेः ।[10] The very fact that prior negation and

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dimension or breadth. E.R. Clay calls it 'specious present'. William James illustrates it by saying that it is no knife-edge which has practically no breadth, but a saddle-back which has a measurable breadth. (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, P. 609). Perching on a thing's duration, one can look back to its prior non-existence or peep into its posterior non-existence.

7 The Bhagavad-gītā (II. 28) uses three expressions (i) अव्यक्तादीनि भूतानि (ii) अव्यक्तनिधनानि and (iii) व्यक्तमध्यानि. The first implies prior negation of a thing, the second its posterior negation and the third, its duration or specious present. (See R. D. Ranade, The Bhagavad-gītā as a Philosophy of God-realisation, P. 188).

8 See Foot Note 147 in Chapter VI.

9 See Foot Note 4 in Chapter VI.

10 This is from तर्कदीपिका, Section 2. Negation can not be explained in the absence of the knowledge of its प्रतियोगी. The

posterior negation imply prior eternity and posterior eternity, itself makes Abhāva a positive category.[11] Also the fact that the Naiyāyikas say that Abhāva is apprehended by Pratyakṣa, is another argument for its positive character. Two significant negations, says Bosanquet, may imply a valid conclusion. Cf. also the pragmatic view of negation in Bergson.[12] Negation implies affirmation; but this does not mean that it is a positive entity. Abhāva has thus no characteristics of a separate category.

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positive notion by which a particular notion of Abhāva is explained, is called the प्रतियोगी of that Abhāva. A घट is a प्रतियोगी of घटाभाव (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 197). सिद्धांतचद्रोदय (a commentary on तर्कसंग्रह by श्रीकृष्ण धूर्जटि दीक्षित) defines Abhāvatva as प्रतियोगि- ज्ञानाधीन-विषयत्वम् i.e., a पदार्थ, the knowledge of which is dependent on the knowledge of its contradictory. So knowledge of अभाव would depend on knowledge of भाव. Thus has negation a positive basis (Ibid. P. 101). See also Foot Note 50 in Chapter IV.

11 If अभाव is absolutely nothing, it can not imply any thing whatsoever. The very fact that it implies prior and posterior eternity, means that it has some capacity and is of some positive nature.

12 For Bergson pure negation is unimaginable and inconceivable. Reality does not mean 'that which exists but which may as well not exist'. The absence of reality is not nothingness, but presence of some other reality. Such a positive interpretation of negation has a pragmatic value. It has solved many a problem in philosophy. It has done away with the dualism between positive and negative existence as all existence is now only positive. As void is dismissed, problems like creation out of nothing or existence of formless matter do not remain at all. (See H.W. Carr, Henri Bergson, T.C. and E.C. Jack, Ltd., London and Edinburgh, 1919, Pp. 69–74).

(2) An indefinite regress in Viśeṣas. "Qualitative" distinction between atoms of the different elements. Viśeṣas among atoms even of the same element (Svatovyāvartaka).[13] Consequent merger of Vaiśeṣika in Nyāya. Contrast Jainism, where all atoms of any element whatsoever are always alike.[14] The particular and the general together constitute the Definition of Aristotle.[15]

(3) (i) The Nyāya conception of Sāmānya attacked by Vedāntins, Buddhists and Jainas. Criticism by Parmenides and Śaṅkarācārya : Divisible or plural?[16] (ii) The Vaiśeṣikas retort by saying

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13 Atoms of different elements are qualitatively different. An air-atom will never be a water-atom. But how to distinguish between one water-atom and another water-atom? Here the Vaiśeṣikas say that it is the Viśeṣa which distinguishes them. Now the question arises how to distinguish between the Viśeṣa of one atom and the Viśeṣa of another atom. Logically we have to posit additional Viśeṣas to do that job, and this will lead to an idefinite regress. The Vaiśeṣikas, however try to escape from the impasse by holding that the Viśeṣas are स्वतोव्यावर्तक, i.e. they differentiate themselves from other Viśeṣas. A विशेष performs a two-fold function of distinguishing an eternal substance from all others as well as distinguishing itself from other विशेषs. We may observe that if two विशेषs can be self-differentiating, why not two different atoms of the same element themselves be so? See also Foot Note 2 in Chapter IV.

14 See Foot Notes 2 and 3 in Chapter IV.

15 According to Aristotle, definition is Genus + Differentia. Viśeṣa or particularity works as a differentia i.e. a characteristic distinguishing one species from another, belonging to the same genus.

16 See R. D. Ranade, Philosophical and Other Essays, Part I, Pp. 39-40.

that this criticism is wrong because it presupposes a spatial view. On the other hand, they say that the particular is only the revealer (Vyañjaka) of the universal. (iii) There is no Sāmānya for Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, Samavāya and Abhāva. There is Sāmānya for the first three Padārthas – Dravya, Guṇa and Karma, but Dozenness or Quality-ness seems to be an absurdity, also action-ness. There is not merely Dravyatva, Guṇatva and Karmatva, but there is also cowness, redness and running-ness. (iv) Sāmānya is also of two kinds: Para and Apara Sāmānya. The highest Sāmānya is Sattā, thus indistinguishable from reality. This involves probably a hierarchy as in Plato's "Theory of Ideas".[17] If there are two Sāmānyas, there must be a Sāmānya for them. *Nityam ekam anekānugatam sāmānyam.*[18] Why then two kinds of Sāmānyas?[19] (v) Two meanings of the word Sāmānya: (a) a universal characteristic and (b) a class concept (Jāti). In the first, it is a correlative of Viśeṣas, involving quality; in the second, it is a correlative of Vyakti involving number.[20]

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17 See Foot Note 40 in Chapter VI.

18 Tarka-saṅgraha, Section 77. This definition of Sāmānya means: Sāmānya is eternal, it is one and it resides in many.

19 If Sāmānya is one, there is no point in speaking of two kinds of Sāmānyas, Para and Apara. There is no finality in characterising any Sāmānya as Para or Apara. For example, four-footedness is Apara (lower) with reference to animality; but it is Para (higher) with reference to cow-ness. Quadruped is more extensive than cowness but less extensive than animality; and so it is both पर and अपर. The distinction is only relative.

20 As per the first meaning, Sāmānya is a universal characteristic that resides in many. घटत्व is one and resides in all घटs. A particular घट possesses घटत्व no doubt; but in addition, it possesses its own unique quality or विशेष by which it is

Connotation	Denotation
Universal	Particular
सामान्य	विशेष
जाति	व्यक्ति
Genus	Individual.[21]

(4) (i) Criticism of the concept of Samavāya or the relation of inherence, as the red colour in the rose. This is also supposed to be an eternal and intimate relation. Differentia or inseparable accidens.[22] The separation of the relata conjoined by it, means

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distinguished from all other घटs. So Sāmānya is a universal characteristic residing in all घटs, and is different from विशेषs which serve as distinguishing characteristics of each and every घट. So in a single घट, both the Sāmānya and the Viśeṣa reside, the former as a general character and the latter as a distinguishing mark. The difference between them refers to characteristics and is obviously only qualitative. As per the second meaning, Sāmānya is Jāti or a class-concept, and serves as a distinguishing character of a group of things from other groups. घटत्व as a Jāti distinguishes all घटs from पटs or from वृक्षs and so on. It stands for the whole group comprising of a number of individuals who can be counted as different व्यक्तिs. So Jāti being one and व्यक्तिs being many, the distinction between them involves number. Incidentally, Nyāya has used very subtle logic in giving different reasons why सामान्य can not always be a जाति (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, Pp. 91–92).

21 The categories of Sāmānya and Viśeṣa are related to connotation and denotation. A term connotes attributes and denotes objects. Items on the left side in the list given above, refer to attributes, while those on the right, refer to objects.

22 Samavāya or inherence can be compared with differentia – a

the destruction of at least one of them.[23] Such relata are called Ayuta-siddhas i.e. those which are not Yuta-siddhas.[24] They are five: अवयव-अवयविनौ, गुण-गुणिनौ, क्रिया-क्रियावंतौ, जाति-व्यक्ती, विशेष-नित्यद्रव्ये चेति.[25] अवयव-अवयविनौ, there is *no* Samavāya relation between part and whole (Avayava and Avayavin); while it is *doubtful* whether there is such between Kriyā and Kriyāvān, Jāti and Vyakti. (ii) The problem of external (Samyoga) and internal (Samavāya) relations. Saṃyoga, a Guṇa; Samavāya, a Padārtha. Bradley's criticism of relations as involving infinite regress.[26] Similar criticism by Śaṅkarācārya. The maternal relation is in the mother; the filial relation is in the son. These can not be brought together. The relation of above-ness is in the book and that of below-ness is in the table; they can not be brought together. Infinite regress in these cases also. To relate relata and the relation between them, new relations must be found out, and so on *ad*

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distinguishing feature which a thing possesses as part of its nature; it can also be compared with inseparable accidens i.e. a quality which can not be separated from an object. Differentia and inseparable accidens are terms used in Western Logic.

23 See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, P. 235.

24 Yuta-siddha means things which are proved to have been joined and, therefore, which must have once existed in a state of separation (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 96). अयुतसिद्धs on the other hand can never exist in separation.

25 This occurs in Annambhatta's Tarka-saṅgraha, Section 79. It means: (i) Part and whole, (ii) Quality and substance, (iii) Action and agent, (iv) Universal and particular, (v) Ultimate thing (नित्य द्रव्य) and its distinguishing feature (विशेष).

26 For elucidation of Bradley's view, see A.E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, Pp. 140–146.

infinitum. Samyoga always predicable about Ākāśa as well as Atman, in relation to things.[27] (iii) Intensification of the difficulty in संयुक्त समवाय, समवेत समवाय, or संयुक्त समवेत समवाय.[28] Hence Samavāya does not exist. A useless category. The

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27 Objects are in Ākāśa or space. The relation between objects and Ākāśa is संयोग. Objects may disappear; but आकाश remains. So is the relation between Atman and body.

28 (i) संयुक्त-समवाय is contact-cum-inherence. In the cognition of entities like qualities, the contact is of the form of संयुक्त-समवाय. For example when I see a red rose, the rose is cognised by a simple contact (संयोग) with the rose. But the quality redness is cognised as inhering in the rose. (ii) In the cognition of a quality of a quality (for example, cognition of pleasantness of the redness and redness of a rose where pleasantness inheres in the redness and redness inheres in the rose) the contact is of the nature of संयुक्त-समवेत-समवाय, i.e., contact-cum-inherence-cum-inherence. (iii) The cognition of sound is of the nature of समवेत समवाय i.e., inherence-cum-inherence. Sound is a quality and is congnised only through inherence. But Ākāśa, though a substance, is supposed to be cognised not through contact of the ear with Ākāśa, but only through inherence. Hence the cognition of sound is through inherence-cum-inherence. (See The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III, Ramakrishna Mission, Calcutta, 1969, P. 600).

All this shows how simple facts are made complicated.

The combination of संयुक्त and समवाय in different things, takes different forms and can be extended *ad infinitum*. Again, it is not known why Ākāśa is supposed to be cognised not through direct contact but through inherence. Ākāśa being a Dravya, should be known through simple contact. If light waves are directly contacted, why not sound waves?

unrelated Absolute.[29]

(5) and (6) Dravya, Guṇa and Karma.

An exhaustive investigation of the different Dravyas. The seven categories are reduced to one, viz., substance as in Citsukha.[30] Substance is that which exists by and for itself – Spinoza.[31] Atman the only ultimate substance and not fire, water, air and earth. Cf. Truth as the adjective of Reality (Bradley)[32] and Ānanda as the adjective of Brahman (Śaṅkarācārya).[33] Guṇa and Karma adjectival to Dravya. Adjectival existence but not substantival. An exhaustive investigation of the different Guṇas.

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29 The Absolute transcends all relations. Relations like time and space operate only in the empirical world and can not be applied to the Absolute (See Foot Note 26 above).

30 Citsukha, a post-Śaṅkara Advaitin, refutes Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories and establishes that Brahman alone is the ultimate Reality. Time and space are not real as they are only relative. Atoms are a contradiction because the process of self-division can not stop. The universal can not be proved either by perception or by inference.

31 'By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived by means of itself, i.e., that the conception of which can be formed without the aid of the conception of any other thing.' Thus runs the third Definition in Spinoza's Ethics. Independence is the essence of substantiality and so the substance does not require anything either for its being or for its knowledge.

32 According to Bradley, absolute Reality and absolute Truth are one; the former is the metaphysical aspect while the latter is epistemological.

33 See, R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, 1970, Pp. 77–80.

Details

Dravya: Pṛthvī, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu, Ākāśa, Kāla, Dik, Atman and Manas. These have been very severely criticised by Buddhists and Advaitins.[34] They make a common attack. Ākāśa is ether, while Dik is space. Ākāśa and Dik distinguished from each other by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa.[35] Śrīharṣa's view (?) Ākāśa: Śabda-guṇam

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34 Śrīharṣa's खंडनखंडखाद्य aims at establishing the pure self-shining consciousness (Brahman) as the only reality by refuting all arguments put forward by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas to support the reality of the *Pramāṇas* (the means of valid cognition) and the *Prameyas* (the objects of valid experience). Śrīharṣa attempts to prove that all empirical experiences and their objects are but conventional relative truths, having no ultimate reality in them. This negative method of destructive criticism *(Khaṇḍana)*, originally started by nihilistic Buddhist philosophers like Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti and others, was first avowedly applied by Śrīharṣa in the field of Advaita Vedānta and was followed by Citsukha, Ānandagiri and others" (See, The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III, P. 271).

35 The Buddhistic hypothesis of momentariness rules out the very idea of substance, not to speak of counting them. The realists among them (वैभाषिकs and सौत्रांतिकs) admit the existence of external objects. But the objects are also momentary and there is no enduring substance anywhere. According to Advaita Vedānta, there can not be many substances, there is only one substance, viz., ब्रह्मन्. The Mīmāṃsā holds that the senses are derived from the elements whose distinctive qualities are their respective objects. For example, the sense of sight is derived from the element Tejas whose distinctive quality is Rūpa. This Rūpa is the object of the sense of sight. This, however, does not hold good about the sense of hearing which is said to be derived, not from Ākāśa or ether (in line with the derivation of

ākāśam.[36] Modern views – ether carries light waves while air carries sound waves.[37] The Pythagorians called it the fifth entity over and above earth, water, fire and air: the "quintessence" or fifth essence as we may call it. But the Pythagorians did not care to define what this fifth entity is.[38] Kāla and Dik both realistic and objective in Naiyāyika philosophy; subjective according to the Buddhists, and phenomenal according to Vedāntins. Bhartṛhari, Dik-kālādi-anavacchinna. Atman: difficulties about it. (i) Put on par with other elements; (ii) All Atmans are Vibhu, jostle with one another qualitatively.[39] (iii) Jīvātman and

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other senses), but from Dik or space. Dik is different from Ākāśa.

36 Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, Section 14.

37 The idea of ether has now been given up completely. In all outer space, wherever there is no matter, only vacuum exists. All electro-magnetic waves (light, radio waves, X-rays, gamma rays, heat rays etc.) travel through vacuum at a constant velocity of 3×10^8 m/sec. They require no medium to travel. Sound waves are transversal waves, i.e., their direction of propagation is at right angles to the movements of air particles.



Sound can not travel in a vacuum. But the medium need not necessarily be air, it can well be a solid thing. The speed of sound waves depends on the medium through which it travels.

38 The fifth entity or quintessense is supposed to be the ultimate substance of which the heavenly bodies are taken to be composed.

39 If all the Atmans are Vibhu (present everywhere), and exist at

Paramātman. God comes under Paramātman, reduced to an epiphenomenal entity.[40] The Buddhists bring in the doctrine of relativity in Kāla and Dik.[41] Guṇa: Saṅkhyā a quality![42] The objections of Vedāntins and Buddhists.[43] One quality qualifies another. Three colours, two colours, for example, (Tadguṇā-laṅkāra).[44] Saṃyoga is also a Guṇa, external relation, separated

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the same time, they would jostle with or confront each other. This confrontation can not be quantitative, because Atmans do not have any spatial quality. It can only be qualitative, i.e., higher or lower, good or bad or Paramātman or Jīvātman.

40 Vibhutva is not a unique characteristic of God, because He shares that characteristic with other Atmans. Again, He is supposed to be the creator of the universe. Creation means creating suitable dispositions in atoms. As per Nyāya theory of causation, dispositions themselves give rise to new things; what then is the function of God? In creating the dispositions, He does not work independently but is guided by the past Karmas (अदृष्ट) of beings. He is thus reduced to an epiphenomenal entity, i.e., a superfluous accessory without any determining influence.

41 According to the Buddhists, काल and दिक् are mental constructs. The स्वलक्षणs which are the only bases of the external world, have neither extension nor duration. Space and time are not objective realities.

42 To say that Saṅkhyā is a quality appears curious, because संख्या is a measure of quantity and not of quality. But the Naiyāyikas do not make a distinction between quality and quantity; they include both under Guṇa.

43 संख्या is surely a subjective property superimposed on the substance by our mind, says the Vedāntin. It does not have a substantival existence.

44 तद्गुणालंकार means transfering the qualities of one thing to another. It is "a figure of speech in which an object is

from Samavāya which is regarded as a Padārtha. "Aboveness" is a Padārtha. Karma: Five kinds. Sāmānya (connotation, general characteristics), Para sāmānya and Apara sāmānya. Sāmānya for Sāmanyas? Sāmānya for Viśeṣas?[45] Four kinds of Abhāva. The whole scheme not well carried out. Has Abhāva a Sāmānya? Samavāya between Dravya and Guṇa. Samyoga is separable relation. Samavāya is inseparable. To say that there is Sāmānya for Guṇa and Karma, is non-sense.[46] Self, a Dravya.

II. Analysis of the Concept of Cause

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represented as giving up its own quality and assuming the quality of another excellent thing. Example: 'Balarāma spoke after whitening the bees, which were hovering round the corners of his lotus-like face with the (radiating) lustre of his own large teeth...' Here the bees which are black, are represented as giving up their colour and assuming the whiteness of the shining teeth of Baladeva" (Nagendra (Ed.), A Dictionary of Sanskrit Poetics, B.R. Publishing Corporation, 461 Vivekananda Nagar, Delhi 110 052, 1987, Pp. 172–173). In the Nyāya contention of Guṇa having another Guṇa, the first Guṇa as if gives up its nature of being a Guṇa and assumes the nature of Dravya so that further Guṇas are attributed to it.

45 Wherever there are two things, some property is common between them. This common property is सामान्य or universal. If there are two Sāmānyas, there must be some common property between them. This will be the सामान्य of सामान्यs. This will go on *ad infinitum*. Similarly with सामान्य for विशेषs.

46 Red is a Guṇa or quality. We talk of redness. This is Sāmānya (redness) as applied to Guṇa. But in this process, Guṇa ceases to be a Guṇa and becomes a Dravya; because redness is a noun (abstract noun) and not an adjective. It should be included under Dravya (substance) and not under Guṇa (quality).

(1) The three-fold definition of Kāraṇa as Samavāyi, Asamavāyi and Nimitta, not tenable. The Samavāyi and the Nimitta compared to Aristotle's material and efficient causes. As the formal or the final cause of Aristotle is not a real cause, similarly the Asamavāyi in Nyāya philosophy is not a cause.[47] The Final cause useless in Science – Bacon.[48] As illustrations of Samavāyi or the material cause we have earth for pot, and atoms for the world (the word Samavāya has got nothing to do with Samavāyi),[49] and as illustrations of Nimitta or the efficient cause, the rod, the wheel and the man. Also the ass. The ass plays such an important part in Indian Logic.[50] Nimitta = exciting

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47 The तंतुसंयोग is said to be the असमवायि कारण of पट. It roughly corresponds to the shape or plan of the cloth and is comparable to the formal cause of Aristotle. Both the final and the formal causes can be dispensed with. So too the असमवायि कारण of the Naiyāyika (See Foot Note 52 below).

48 Bacon was an empiricist to the core, and recommended the methods of observation and experiment in science. The habit of human mind to attribute purposes or final causes to nature, was decried by him. He called it an idol or a prejudice of the mind. This particular idol of attributing final causes, is named Idol of the Tribe. It results in anthropo-morphism, i.e. applying human qualities and motives to the non-human entities.

49 See Foot Note 52 below.

50 There is a plurality of instrumental or efficient causes in Nyāya. For a pot, earth is the material cause; rod and wheel constitute the efficient causes; so does the potter. The ass bringing the clay, too, becomes an efficient cause; the potter's father becomes an efficient cause and so on. (This account we get from a student's note-book who took this down in the class-room when the topic was taught by Prof. Ranade during the

or predisposing cause; not occasional cause.

(2) Futility of the conception of the Asamavāyi. By definition, the Asamavāyi is said to be either Guṇa or Karma, as the Samavāyi is said to be Dravya. The Sāṅkhyas do not recognise Asamavāyi (?).[51] In the case of Paṭa, the तंतुs (Dravya) is Samavāyi-kāraṇa and the Tantu-saṃyoga (Guṇa) or Tantu-prasaraṇa (karma) Asamavāyi-kāraṇa. In the case of Paṭa-rūpa, Paṭa (Dravya) is Samavāyi-kāraṇa, and the Tantu-rūpa or the whiteness of the तंतुs (Guṇa) the Asamavāyi-kāraṇa. (Difficulties in the conception of Asamavāyi arise because a quality or motion can never be a cause.[52]

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academic year 1939–1940). See Foot Note 55 below.

51 There is no need of such a superfluous conception like an असमवायि कारण for the Sāṅkhyas. In their Satkāryavāda, cause and effect are directly connected and require no intermediary like the असमवायि कारण. No system other than Nyāya recognises an असमवायि कारण. (See Foot Note 52 below).

52 Neither Guṇa (quality) nor Karma (motion) can serve as a cause because, as per the Nyāya theory, they can not exist without Dravya (substance). Far less, then, can they operate independently. Obviously here Dravya becomes the real cause. But Dravya is said to be the Samavāyi kāraṇa in Nyāya. The Asamavāyi kāraṇa is thus reduced to Samavāyi kāraṇa. It is important to remember that Asamavāyi in this context does not mean 'not-samavāyi' (non-intimate), or that which is not connected by Samavāya relation. It means something else. The Naiyāyika classifies causes into separable and inseparable ones. The former are instrumental causes. The latter are divided into material and non-material. Of these, the material cause समवायि कारण is Dravya and असमवायि कारण is either Guṇa or Karma. The Asamavāyi kāraṇa is brought in to save the theory of

Presentationism).[53] Emergence of new qualities out of old. Ultimately there is no cause except God; all causation is artificial. (3) (i) Three points in the Nyāya definition of cause. That which is not epiphenomenal (अनन्यथासिद्ध), that which invariably precedes the effect (नियतपूर्ववृत्ति) and that which is unique (असाधारण)[54] is the cause. अन्यथासिद्ध, that which can be dispensed with. अनन्यथासिद्ध, indispensable. Five kinds of epiphenomenal cuasation.[55] (ii) The conception of Sādhāraṇa kāraṇas, such as

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epigenesis. The effect पट according to Nyāya does not exist in the cause, तंतु; it is newly created. The Asamavāyi kāraṇas like तंतुसंयोग or तंतुरूप (the definitions of which are merely technical jargon) are just brought in as a link from cause to effect. Otherwise they are useless (See Foot Note 47 above and Foot Note 53 below).

53 The Dravya leads directly to the effect (presentationism) and not indirectly through Guṇa and Karma which can not serve as causes. The vaunted doctrine of आरंभवाद is reduced to सत्कार्यवाद (See Foot Note 52 above).

54 साधारण कारण is a general or universal cause. It is always there. Eight universal causes are enumerated : God, His knowledge, His will, His effort, antecedent negation, time, space and destiny comprising both merit and demerit. Some add the absence of counter-acting influences as a ninth universal cause. (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 166). Real cause is असाधारण, that which is not general but unique as per तर्कसंग्रह, Section 37.

55 The five kinds of epiphenomenal (dispensable) causes or variable antecedents (अन्यथासिद्ध) are summed up by Viśva-nātha, a commentator on Tarka-saṅgraha:

एते पञ्च अन्यथासिद्धा दण्डत्वादिकमादिमम् ।
घटादौ दण्डरूपादि द्वितीयमपि दर्शितम् ।।
तृतीयन्तु भवेद् व्योम कुलालजनकोऽपरः ।

time, space, God.[56] Definition of cause which corresponds to Mill's definition of cause, as the invariable (अनन्यथासिद्ध) and unconditional (असाधारण) antecedent (नियतपूर्ववृत्ति). If S.C. Vidyabhushana is right in saying that Gautama borrowed his syllogism from Aristotle, then why did he not borrow definition of cause from Mill? Four thousand years hence, a man might rise up and say that Gautama had borrowed from Mill.

(4) Unnecessary distinction between Kāraṇa and Karaṇa.[57] In

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पञ्चमो रासभादिः स्यादेतेष्वावश्यकस्त्वसौ ।।

(i) दंडत्व or दंडत्वजाति means a rod of a particular kind, say, mango, Neem, Babul etc. (ii) दंडरूप is rod of a particular shape. (iii) Sky which already exists before an effect takes place. (iv) The father of the potter or antecedent of an antecedent (which would lead to an *infinite regerss*). (v) Ass is just another antecedent, if and when it happens to be used. Clay can be brought by other means, and ass is, therefore, dispensable. (Ibid. Pp. 194–195)

56 See Foot Note 54 above.

57 "करण is that efficient cause which directly and immediately produces the effect by its own action" (Athalye and Bodas, The Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 210). It is a proximate cause which brings about the effect when all other accessories are present and which is absolutely indispensable for the production of the effect. The original notion of a करण seems to be to find out the cause par excellence. There are many causes for an effect but all are not related to the effect equally closely. Those that are so related are distinguished from others by a special designation, करण. The distinction between कारण and करण, instead of making the notion of कारण clear, only succeeds in complicating it. It is very difficult in practice to draw a sharp line between even material and efficient causes. (The Advaita

the conception of Karaṇa the expression Vyāpāravat is occasionally added.[58] Karaṇa = Vyāpāravat Asādhāraṇam Kāraṇam.[59] Process becomes a cause.[60] Criticism by Citsukha. Sādhakatamam karaṇam = Pāṇini's definition of Kāraṇa in Aṣṭādhyāyī.[61] Four such करणs : Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna

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Vedāntins, incidentally, combine the two when they call God as both material and instrumental cause of the world). It is still more difficult to separate the करण which is said to be प्रकृष्टकारण or the most efficient cause from other causes. By adding the further qualification the difficulty is not solved. Thus there come to be additions and more additions of qualifications like व्यापारवत् and असाधारण and so on. Instead, it would be easier to give up the original distinction between कारण and करण.

58 The preeminance of the करण is said to consist in its activity or efficiency (व्यापारवत्व). Hence a करण came to be defined as व्यापारवत् कारणम्। (See Athalye and Bodas, The Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, Pp. 186–189). There had been a raging controversy between ancient and modern Naiyāyikas regarding करण. A करण is defined as a cause which is peculiar (असाधारण). For example, a दण्ड or stick is असाधारण निमित्तकारण of घट; and so it is a करण of a घट. But a stick in the forest can not be a करण of the घट because it is not operative at the time of producing the घट. Therefore the ancient Naiyāyikas introduced another qualification व्यापारवत्, i.e. operational. So करण comes to be defined as व्यापारवत् असाधारणम् कारणम्. When an axe lops off a tree, the axe is the करण, the cutting is the final product and the contact of the axe with the wood is Vyāpāra or process. Here the process itself becomes the cause (Ibid. P. 37; Pp. 186–187).

59 See Foot Note 58 above.

60 See Foot Note 58 above.

61 Pāṇini's definition of cause is साधकतमम् करणम् (Aṣṭādhyāyī, I. 4.42).

and Śabda.[62]

III Proofs for God's Existence in Nyāya

(1) Cosmological Proof. (a) All production requires perception of materials by agent. God so required for perceiving the supersensuous atoms. (b) God is required for the original motion: Prime Mover. (c) God is required for creating the first binary compound : 2! Why not bring in God in between all stages from 2! to n!?[63] Occasionalism.[64]

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62 Indriya is the करण of प्रत्यक्ष (तर्कसंग्रह Section 43). Parāmarśa is the करण of अनुमान (तर्कसंग्रह Section 44). सादृश्यज्ञान is the करण of उपमान (तर्कसंग्रह Section 58) and शब्द is the करण of शाब्दज्ञान (तर्कसंग्रह Section 63) (See, Athalye and Bods, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 190 and P. 348).

63 God is brought in to create a binary compound, i.e., 2! (Factorial 2). 2! = 2 x 1 or the binary composed of two atoms. The argument refers to the stage of creating the binary compound. But creation does not stop at the binary compound or द्व्यणुक; it goes on to त्र्यणुक, चतुरणुक and so on. Stages between 2! and n! are : 1 x 2 x 3 x 4.... x (n–1) x n. Why not bring God for the creation of all these later stages? That amounts to bringing in God for every act of creation, and this would result in occasionalism.

64 "Occasionalism denotes the theory of occasional causes.... It is God who, "on the occasion" of the physical motion (of the air and nerves) produces the sensation (of sound), and "at the instance" of the determination of the will, produces the movement of the arms" (R. Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, P. 111). God intervenes on every occasion of interaction between mind and body. He is the necessary and only mediator between matter and soul. This is the view advocated by Geulincx and Malebranche in Western philosophy.

(d) Adṛṣṭa[65]: unseen force: physical, biological and moral. Adṛṣṭa thus responsible for earth-quakes, growth of plants and recompense for actions. In a physical sense, it is equivalent to the conception of original motion in Democritus which he superadded to those of atoms and void.[66] Adṛṣṭa in the moral sense is equivalent to Apūrva in Mīmāṃsā philosophy.[67] It is also equivalent to the Vedāntic law of Karma. Adṛṣṭa is an impersonal force, and Daiva is the power of God. Cf. दैवं चैवात्र पंचमम् (The Bhagavad-gītā XVIII. 14). Adṛṣṭa in Nyāya is like Satan in Christianity as one opposed to God.[68] Five proofs given by Udayana for Adṛṣṭa: सापेक्षत्वात्, अनादित्वात्, वैचित्र्यात्, विश्ववृत्तितः, प्रत्यात्मनियमात्.[69] Problem of God in Nyāya doubly precarious

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65 Adṛṣṭa or destiny needs some intelligent Being to regulate it. This Being is God. So God's existence is proved by Udayana as the regulator of Adṛṣṭa.

66 See Foot Note 5 in Chapter IV and Foot Note 112 in Chapter VI.

67 See Foot Note 110 in Chapter VI.

68 The sentence 'Adṛṣṭa is an impersonal...one opposed to God' is later added to the text. It is in the handwriting of a disciple who seems to have suggested it. We do not know whether Prof. Ranade would have retained it in the final copy.
Lokamanya Tilak interprets दैव to mean a phenomenon of which we do not have knowledge at the moment. दैव is not blind chance, it indicates causes which are as yet unknown. दैव is also defined as पूर्वजन्मकृतं कर्म. It is a result of our own past actions. In this sense, it is consistent with the Adṛṣṭa of the Naiyāyikas, Apūrva of the Mīmāṃsakas, and Karma doctrine in general.

69 This occurs in उदयन's न्यायकुसुमांजलि I.4. The verse runs as:
सापेक्षत्वात् अनादित्वात् वैचित्र्यात् विश्ववृत्तितः ।
प्रत्यात्मनियमात् युक्तेरस्ति हेतुरलौकिकः ।।

on account of the presence of Adṛṣṭa. Is Adṛṣṭa dependent on God or independent of Him? If the first, it is unnecessary; if the second, God is not all-powerful. (2) Logical or ratiocinative proof. God must be proved by reason alone. (a) All revelation condemned as proof of God.[70] Revelation according to Naiyāyikas is created, and hence non-eternal. Contrast Nyāya on this head with Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.[71] (b) Syllogistic argument. A blade of grass exists; therefore, God exists. Cf. the causal argument in Descartes: I exist, therefore God exists. (c) Fused with teleological.[72] Teleology only incidentally brought

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सापेक्षत्वात् means due to dependence on something. Actions of beings can not be self-dependent. They depend on something. This something is अदृष्ट. अनादित्वात् means: because there is no beginning. When God creates the world, he takes into account something which is already there. This beginningless something is अदृष्ट. वैचित्र्यात् means due to multiplicity. There must be some cause for the variety we find in the world. This is due to something. This is अदृष्ट. विश्ववृत्तितः i.e. because of the presence everywhere. The world goes on because of something which has its sway everywhere. This is अदृष्ट. प्रत्यात्मनियमात् means related to individual souls. The present condition of every जीव as to what it is and what it is not, depends on something. This is अदृष्ट.

70 The argument of the Naiyāyikas is that the scriptures are human productions and hence fallible.

71 See Section II (A) and Foot Notes 18–24 in Chap. VI.

72 The causal argument says that God exists as the cause of a thing. The teleological argument would add that the thing is so created by God with some purpose. The causal argument would state that God exists as a cause of a blade of grass. The teleological would come in when a purpose is attributed to this creation.

in. A blade of grass (Aṅkurādikam)[73] or a flower (Tennyson)[74] on all fours with a watch (Paley) or an eye;[75] only analogical

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73 A sprout (अंकुर) is a product or an effect (कार्यत्वात्) produced by someone (कर्तृजन्य). Therefore it must have an intelligent producer, viz. God. (See तर्कदीपिका on तर्कसंग्रह Section 17).

74 In a celebrated poem Tennyson addresses a little flower which grew in a crannied wall by saying that if he could know the little flower through and through, he would know the whole world. The implication is that the entire universe is purposefully interconnected. The lines run :
Little flower – but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is
(Poems of Tennyson, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1943, P. 828).

75 It seems to imply that a watch is created for some purpose. So is the universe. Paley (William), 1743–1805; English theologian and philosopher. His book is Natural Theology. Newton maintained that an intelligent Agent was behind the movements in the universe. "But now, in place of this direct intervention of an intelligent Agent, modern astronomy substitutes the nebular hypothesis of Kant and Laplace. Think again of the remarkable instances of special contrivance and design collected by Paley in his *Natural Theology*..... "Stermius", says Paley, "held that the examination of the eye was a cure for atheism". Yet Helmholtz, who knew incomparably more about the eye than half a dozen Sturms, describes it as an instrument that a scientific optician would be ashamed to make: and Helmholtz was no atheist". (See James Ward : Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. I, 1903, Pp. 6–7). It seems that contrivance and design in the above quotation refer to a watch which Prof. Ranade mentions. Again Paley quotes the view of Stermius that

inference. (d) Denying God is worshipping Him, says Udayana. Udayana a rational theologian. A logical investigation of God, he says, is also His worship. Even those who are controverting His existence, are earnestly meditating on Him.

(3) Udayana's proof by experiment. *Solviture ambulando*[76] or *Argumentum ad baculum*[77] *mortuum.*[78] He throws down a Buddhist and a Brahmin from the top of a hill; the Buddhist dies, the Brahmin survives and therefore God exists.

(4) Moral proof. (a) Cf. Kant. Supervisor: God required to equate virtue with happiness and vice with misery. Dhammapada : तत एनं दुःखमन्वेति चक्रमिव वहतः पदम्.[79] Moral law instead of God.

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the constructin of an eye will convince a man of the agency of God. Our conjecture is that as he held Church preferments, Paley used the examples of a watch and an eye to prove the existence of God.

76 The Latin phrase means: the problem of reality of motion is solved by walking i.e. by practical experiment.

77 *Argumentum ad baculum* is not a proof but a logical fallacy. It consists in carrying one's point by threatening the adversary with a stick (baculum = a stick).

78 *Argumentum mortuum:* Argument by death. This amounts to a proof by occurance of death, as one person actually dies. It is our conjecture that on the lines of baculum, Prof. Ranade might have coined the term mortuum, which means death.

79 मनोपुब्बंगमा धम्मा मनोसेट्ठा मनोमया।
मनसा चे पदुट्ठेन भासति वा करोति वा।
ततो नं दुक्खमन्वेति चक्कं व वहतो पदम्। (धम्मपद, यमकवग्गो 1)
(Mind is the fore-runner of (all evil) states. Mind is the chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, because of that, suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught ox). (Dhammapada, Pali text and

(b) God the painless Soul. Cf. यन्न दुःखेन संभिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम्.... अपनीतं च तत् सुखं स्वः पदास्पदम्। स्वः = स्वर्ग, मीमांसा.[80]

(5) Intuitive proof by Vātsyāyana: Probably only negative. God, says Vātsyāyana, transcends perception, scripture and inference; he thus sees the limits of reason and possibly inclines towards intuitive apprehension of God. योगजप्रत्यक्ष[81] is recognised by all Naiyāyikas.

(6) The Jainistic criticism of the Nyāya doctrine of God (vide Das Gupta) is of the routine type.[82]

IV. Nyāya Doctrine of Epigenesis or Qualitative Novelty

(1) General Theory of Epigenesis. The Ārambhavāda or the Asatkāryavāda of the Naiyāyikas is a doctrine of epigenesis or new creation. The Pariṇāmavāda or the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhyas is the doctrine of equilibration or evolution.[83] The Naiyāyikas suppose that the effect was not present formerly, viz., in the cause; hence epigenesis. The Sāṅkhyas suppose that the effect was present formerly, viz., in the cause; hence equilibration.

(2) Epigenesis in Atomism. (i) Differences of quality among atoms. Nyāya philosophy lays stress on differences of quality between atoms, not merely of the different elements, but even of the same element, not so Jainism which recognises only

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translation with stories in brief and notes, by Narada Thera, published by Buddhist Missionary Society, Kaulalumpur, III Edition, 1978).

80 See Foot Note 167 in Chapter VI.

81 योगज प्रत्यक्ष is a variety of अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष or super-sensuous perception.

82 See Section IV in Chapter IV.

83 See Foot Notes 38–39 in Chapter I.

differences of quantity. To use another terminology, Nyāya considers the differences as physical, Jainism considers the differences as mathematical. Physical differences or differences of quality are epigenetic in character. (ii) Formation of द्व्यणुक. It is strange how from the अणु which, according to the Naiyāyikas, enjoys only infinitesimality (पारिमांडल्य) or a mere ideal content, a द्व्यणुक should ever be formed. The rise of the द्व्यणुक is an illustration of epigenesis.[84] (iii) Factorial n, an epigenetic product. The general formula for successive atomistic formations or patterns is: 1 x 2 x 3 .... x n or n! The द्व्यणुकs, the त्र्यणुकs, the चतुरणुकs and the rest are all epigenetic formations as they involve the process of multiplication and not of summation.[85] The Mīmāṃsā differs from Nyāya in regarding the त्र्यणुक as the minimum visible (minimum perceptible) and not the द्व्यणुक as

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84 The dimension of an atom is अणुत्व (infinitesimality); that of the binary or द्व्यणुक is also अणुत्व. The अणुत्व of an atom has a special name पारिमांडल्य, which is not applied to the binary. From three binaries when compounded, arises the Tryaṇuka or the tertiary. This last is the minimum visible particle. Now the binaries have अणुत्व or subtleness and from subtleness, no magnitude can ever arise. The Nyāya argument is that magnitude is a result of three factors बहुत्व (number), महत्त्व (size) and प्रचय (arrangement), number being the most important. So the cause of the magnitude in a त्र्यणुक is not the अणुत्व or subtleness in the द्व्यणुक, but their number. This makes it clear that magnitude does not come out of subtleness; for, it is a different species and it must be a new product. Thus does the Naiyāyika harp on new creation or epigenesis.

85 All genesis is multiplication; when things are just put together it is summation. When they interact, it is multiplication. At such times, there is a new product, i.e. it is epigenesis.

the Nyāya supposes.[86]

(3) Epigenesis in Generation: (i) Generation of a product. Generation, destruction. The doctrine of momentary existence of the Buddhists is a hobgoblin[87] to the Indian logicians. Two moments instead of one. Momentary existence according to them can explain neither generation nor destruction. For both generation and destruction, more than one moment is necessary. Thus they hold that the Ghaṭa comes into existence one moment after the Kapālas are united, thus involving epigenesis; also they hold that the Ghaṭa is destroyed one moment after the Kapālas are destroyed.

Criticism. This latter doctrine as applied to an organism would be manifestly absurd because the cells would have to die first before the body dies. Now it is a fact of experience that the cells live even after the body dies. The most that we can say is that the body and the cells die together. Also the action of a decapitated frog or a decapitated warrior shows that the parts are active even though the whole may be dead, e.g., Murarbaji Deshpande. (ii) Emergence of qualities. The Indian logicians are not content with explaining generation and destruction, only as occupying more than a moment's span. They say that every product, e.g., a pitcher at the moment of production, is a neutral entity, and that qualities, e.g., red colour in the pitcher or smell in the rose, emerge later, say, in the second moment, and which

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86 There is a difference of opinion among thinkers regarding this point. Some stop at द्व्यणुक and some at त्र्यणुक. According to Annambhatta, the smallest visible particle is त्र्यणुक, (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, Pp. 122–124).

87 A frightening apparition.

are, therefore, epigenetic. (iii) Cumulative vs. total metamorphosis. पीलुपाक, पिठरपाक. Much discussion has centred on the emergence of qualities in the product between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas who are respectively called पीलुपाकवादिन्s and पिठरपाकवादिन्s or those who hold the doctrines of cumulative metamorphosis and total metamorphosis respectively.[88] According to neither, is the emergence of qualities co-eval with the emergence of the object. It comes later, is emergent and therefore, epigenetic. The पीलुपाकवादिन्s in their different schools hold that the emergence of red colour for example, may occupy 5, 9, 10 or 11 moments[89] and would involve disintegration first into द्व्यणुकs and then into अणुs which, having assumed the new qualities, reintegrate into new द्व्यणुकs and a newly metamorphosed red pitcher. This has a significance for cosmogenesis.[90] The पिठरपाकवादिन्s say that the whole black pitcher is metamorphosed into red without the process of disintegration and integration. The quality of holding water in

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88 The पीलुपाकवादिन्s and the पिठरपाकवादिन्s have criticised each other. In fact upholding either पीलुपाक or पिठरपाक has become a test of whether a thinker is a Vaiśeṣika or a Naiyāyika.

89 They describe the changes that take place at different moments (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, Pp. 157–158).

90 The order of creation of the world (cosmogenesis) is exactly the same as cumulative metamorphosis. Motion is first created in the atoms as per God's will. This gives rise to the formation of a द्व्यणुक out of two atoms. Then follows creation into त्र्यणुकs, चतुरणुकs and so on. At the time of destruction the process again is the same and not in the reverse order as is expected. The atoms first get separated, thus destroying the binary. Then the process continues (Ibid. Pp. 118–119).

a pitcher, for example, could be explained on the hypothesis of the पिठर school and not of the पीलु school, as evidently that quality belongs to the whole pitcher, and not to atoms or parts constituting it (R.D.R.).[91]

(4) Epigenesis in Causation. We have also the doctrine of epigenesis in the concept of the Asamavāyi kāraṇa of the Indian logicians. They hold, for example, that the many Tantu-rūpas constitute a qualitatively new Paṭarūpa being its Asamavāyi kāraṇa. The whiteness of the Tantus, in other words, produces a new whiteness of the Paṭa which is unique and *sui generis*. As compared with the Tantu-rūpas, therefore, the Paṭa-rūpa is an epigenetic formation.[92]

(5) Epigenesis in Knowledge. The self, according to the Naiyāyikas, is without knowledge in Suṣupti, while Jñāna emerges later in Jāgṛti, and is therefore epigenetic in character. In Prabhākara, the soul is always Jaḍa. In Nyāya the soul is Jaḍa in Suṣupti, but in Jāgṛti it gets the attribute of knowledge. Knowledge is thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, adventitious; a quality of the self (Cf. Buddhi in the चतुर्विंशतिगुणs)[93] and not its

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91 R. D. R. means R. D. Ranade. The initials are put to indicate the view which he holds.

92 See Foot Note 52 above.

93 Buddhi here, is just a property and not a material element as in Sāṅkhya; neither is it the nature of the soul as in Vedānta. It figures in the list of गुणs. The twenty-four qualities according to Nyāya are: (1) रूप (colour), (2) रस (taste), (3) गंध (odour), (4) स्पर्श (touch), (5) संख्या (number), (6) परिमाण (dimension), (7) पृथक्त्व (severalty), (8) संयोग (conjunction), (9) विभाग (disjunction), (10) परत्व (priority), (11) अपरत्व (posteriority), (12) गुरुत्व (weight), (13) द्रवत्व (fluidity), (14) स्नेह (viscidity),

substance. In Kumārila the soul has Saṃvit even in deep sleep, not to speak of the state of wakefulness. In Vedānta the soul is Saṃvid-rūpa at the least. There may be even अपरोक्षानुभूति. We may thus, so far as the problem of knowledge is concerned, arrange the four systems in a graded order as follows: Prabhākara, Nyāya, Kumārila, Vedānta.

V. Nyāya Criticism of Buddhism

(1) (i) Vātsyāyana criticises the Buddhistic Relativism in his Bhāṣya on IV. 1. 39 and IV. 1. 40.[94] He shows that relativism is self-contradictory. The long and the short must be regarded as self-existent; otherwise no relation can be established between them, and relativism would be impossible. (ii) He criticises the Buddhist doctrine of Vijñāna or knowledge alone as real, in his Bhāṣya on IV. 2. 26 and IV. 2. 27. He tells us that the doctrine is self-destructive, in as much as the Buddhist, in separating things from thoughts, is giving reality to them. (iii) The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is criticised in his Bhāṣya on III. 2. 11. We must always suppose that there is a connecting link between the origination of an entity and its cessation.

(2) Udyotakara, in his Nyāya-vārtika, III. 1.1, criticises the Buddhist doctrine of soul-less-ness. He tells us that the Bhadanta teaches that there is a burden and there is a burden-bearer. The five Skandhas are the burden, and the burden-bearer must, therefore, be the soul. (ii) In his Vārtika on the Nyāya-sūtra.

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(15) शब्द (sound), (16) बुद्धि (intellect), (17) सुख (pleasure), (18) दुःख (pain), (19) इच्छा (desire), (20) द्वेष (aversion), (21) प्रयत्न (effort), (22) धर्म (merit), (23) अधर्म (demerit), (24) संस्कार (faculty).

94 Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya is on Gotama-sūtras or Gotama's Aphorisms of Nyāya.

I. 1. 37 Udyotakara criticises a Buddhist logician who says that the middle term and the major term co-abide in a syllogism. Udyotakara passes two criticisms: (a) How can a Buddhist, a holder of the doctrine of momentariness, teach the doctrine of co-abidance and (b) if we take so much a syllogism as Śabdaḥ anityaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭatvāt, Anityatva which designates posterior non-eternity, and kṛtakatva which designates prior non-eternity will have to co-abide in the Ghaṭa which according to the Buddhists exists for a moment.[95]

(3) Udyayana's Kusumāñjali is devoted to the refutation of Kalyāṇa Rakṣita's Īśvara-bhaṅga-kārikā. Udayana in his Ātma-tattva-viveka refutes the four Buddhist theories: (i) Kṣaṇabhaṅga, (ii) Bāhyārtha-bhaṅga, (iii) Guṇa-guṇi-bheda-bhaṅga, and (iv) Anupalamba. The last doctrine tells us that a substance exists in relation to its qualities only, and the qualities exist in relation to the former. In this net-work of relations which constitutes the veil of Saṃvṛti, the world is verily void, says the Buddhist.

(4) Jayanta, in his Nyāya-mañjarī, says that the Buddhists hold

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95 The fact that the Ghaṭa exists at the present moment implies that there is at least one moment prior to its creation. This is prior non-eternity. The word kṛtakatva or production implies this prior non-eternity, or non-existence before creation. Similarly, the word Anityatva or perishability implies its posterior non-eternity. It will be destroyed and will not exist thereafter. If Kṛtakatva and Anityatva are to be applied to one and the same Ghaṭa, it will have to be related at least to three moments: one moment of prior non-eternity, one moment of existence and one moment of posterior non-eternity. This contradicts the Buddhist contention that the Ghaṭa exists only for one moment.

that there is no soul and yet they raise the Caityas. They hold that every thing is momentary and yet they construct Vihāras or monastaries. They say that the world is void and yet require that wealth should be given to the Gurus. Verily they are a monument of hypocrisy.

(5) Buddhist criticism of Nyāya. See Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśila's criticisms. (Typed separately).[96]

Fair : Later draft

VI. Doctrine of Perception

(1) The doctrine of atomicity of sense, also this sense exists at the tip of the respective sense-organ, नासाग्रवर्ती[97] and जिह्वाग्रवर्ती[98] etc. (अणुपरिमाणमिंद्रियम् । अतींद्रियम्).

(2) Perception requires actual contact between sense and object. This is to be effected by the further artifice of the motion in sense-organ. Doctrine of three-fold contact; contact between soul and mind, mind and sense, and sense and object.[99] This is a truly crass materialistic conception. (Cf. Windelband).[100]

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96 These notes of Prof. Ranade could not be traced.

97 तर्कसंग्रह, Section 10.

98 Ibid., Section 11.

99 This is from Vāt̄syāyana-bhāṣya on Gotam-sūtra I. 1.4. (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 107; P. 212).

100 In Democritus all psychical life is regarded as motion of fire atoms. Now motion of atoms is conditioned by contact and impact. Perception is the impact of the impressions of things on the fire atoms. So also is thought an impact of impressions. Nowhere a qualitative change is recognised. Thus perception and thought are explained in terms of quantitative and

Sannikarṣa has two aspects (i) contact and (ii) proximity, e.g. vision is Aprāpyakāri, touch is Prāpyakāri.

(3) Gangeśa criticises this original doctrine of perception, saying that it is both too wide and too narrow. It is too wide because it includes recollection, which is the contact between the mind and the image; and too narrow because it excludes perception by God. Has God, for example, mind and the senses? The question whether God perceives or not, can be solved by the Naiyāyikas only by taking an anthropomorphic view of God.

(4) With this Naiyāyika theory of perception, we may contrast the Vedāntic theory as well as the Buddhistic theory. The Buddhist theory of perception is presentationistic in the extreme, so their theory of perception consists in the succession of one presentation by another, not involving the mind at all.[101] The Naiyāyika's theory involves mind, but states that, perception consists in the physical contact of the mind and the object through the senses. The Vedāntic theory takes a *via media*, the अंतःकरणवृत्ति, taking the form of the object, and it is this form which is known (cf. Dharmarājādhvarīndra).[102] The present

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mechanical motion. Matter in its form and motion, is regarded as the true reality. With such ideas, the system of Democritus assumes the character of conscious, outspoken materialism. See W. Windelband, History of Philosophy, Pp. 109 ff. See also Foot Note 5 in Chapter IV and Foot Note 112 in Chapter VI.

101 There are only impressions and no mind. So perception means a chain of impressions or presentations without a mind or self to sustain them, far less to unite them.

102 See R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, P. 54. See also Vedānta-paribhāṣā of Dharma-rājādhvarīndra, Tr. Swami Madhavananda, P. 14.

scientific theory would explain perception as due to an electro-magnetic influence being carried by the sense-organ through its respective nerve to the nerve-centre.[103] Another theory which might be contrasted with the Vedāntic, is the theory of *eidola* or *similacra*.[104]

(5) Difference between sensation and perception recognised by Vācaspati and Udyotakara. A very clever anticipation of modern theory.[105] Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka. In this, the Naiyāyikas

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103 This was written more than half a century ago. The process of old theories giving place to new ones, is continuous. In the field of physical sciences, it is very fast too. The electro-magnetic theory might have given place to wave theory or some other theory by now. It was also held that the transmission of a nerve impulse is chemical in nature. What is important to note is that Prof. Ranade never lost sight of the development of science which was taking place around him.

104 See R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, Pp. 54–55.

105 Pratyakṣa is divided by the Naiyāyikas into निर्विकल्पक and सविकल्पक – indeterminate knowledge and determinate knowledge. The former is likened to what psychology calls sensation while the latter is perception. निर्विकल्पक or निष्प्रकारक is an unanalysed something while in सविकल्पक or सप्रकारक we have knowledge of a particular thing with its properties. Being realists, the Naiyāyikas recognise outside reality from which the निर्विकल्पक proceeds. "...but the निर्विकल्पक or निष्प्रकारक ज्ञान according to Naiyāyikas is not actually perceived and is to be inferred only.... the सप्रकारक ज्ञान alone constitutes *percept* proper, while निष्प्रकारक is simply assumed as a necessary condition of it" (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 216). Similarly, modern psychology treats

with their realistic bias fall into the mistake of supposing that there is a 'perception of the Universal'. Diṅnāga had said that perception concerns itself with the individual and not with the universal. The Naiyāyikas answer that we must be supposed to perceive the universal, otherwise we can not communicate it to our fellow men (cf. Russel and his doctrine of the perception of the universal).[106] Stout's doctrine takes, however, a via media between idealism and realism.[107] All categories of the understanding are latent in sense, and there is only a difference of degree and not of kind. This is a doctrine to which the Naiyāyikas should have subscribed in respect of their distinction between sensation and perception.[108]

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sensation as a result of analysis. "*A pure sensation is an abstraction*", says William James (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, Dover Publications, Inc., 920 Broadway, New York 10, N. Y., P. 3). Sensation is 'postulated' as an element of experience (Ibid. P. 4). Perception of an object cannot arise out of nothing. To know a ball we must have had some stimulus from the outside world. This is sensation but sensation as such is not known. If known, it becomes a perception. Therefore sensation is presupposed as a previous condition of perception.

106 See R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, P. 55.

107 See Foot Note 106 above.

108 There is no dividing line between sensation and perception. Nirvikalpaka is necessary, but is only assumed, while सविकल्पक which presupposes previous knowledge of the class of things (you must know what a ball is, before naming a new thing, as ball) is not pure प्रत्यक्ष. It is a complex of many factors, inference and analogy included. Therefore a distinction of degrees between निर्विकल्पक and सविकल्पक instead of a distinction of kind,

(6) We have thus a sensuous perception of the cow, and again a sensuous perception of cow-hood;[109] but we have a supersensuous perception of cows.[110] (Cf. Laukika and

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would be more proper.

109 The Naiyāyikas hold that the universal is directly perceived (प्रत्यक्षज्ञान). The question is, whether a universal is apprehended by ordinary, direct perception (लौकिक प्रत्यक्ष) or by extra-ordinary, direct perception (अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष). It is generally maintained that the perception of the universal falls under अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष. The universal घटत्व (pot-ness) is comprehended immediately on the direct perception of घट (pot). "When we see a jar we do not know the jar alone, but get also the general class-notion of jar; this latter is derived by extra-ordinary perception" (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 214).

However M. Hiriyanna notes certain peculiar views of the Naiyāyikas, an instance of which is the perception of the universal. The peculiar view noted is that the universal is apprehended not by extra-ordinary (अलौकिक) perception, but by ordinary (लौकिक) perception. "We perceive that a rose is red through the eye; and the same organ of sense is also able to show the universal redness (raktatva) characterising the red colour.... all these kinds of pratyakṣa are described as laukika or ordinary" (Outlines of Indian Philosophy, P. 249). He also quotes a line to show that the perception of the universal involves a sense organ and hence it is Laukika or ordinary. येन इंद्रियेण या व्यक्तिः गृह्यते तेन एव इंद्रियेण तज्जातिः.... गृह्यते। (A universal is apprehended by the same sense organ by which its corresponding particular is apprehended) (Ibid. P. 249, Foot Note 2).

110 So far about the लौकिक प्रत्यक्ष of the particular and the universal (cow and cowness). The Naiyāyikas, however, do not stop here.

A-laukika pratyakṣa). Really speaking we ought to have a super-sensuous knowledge of cowhood.

(7) Gangeśa however tries to evade the difficulty by making a three-fold classification of non-sensuous perception. (i) Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, (ii) Jñāna-lakṣaṇa, and (iii) Yogaja. According to the first, we have a super-sensuous perception of all cases of smoke or cow – past, present and future. According to the second, we have an associational perception of fragrance, when we see a piece of sandal-wood; according to the third, we have an intuitional perception of the supreme Being, of atoms, of duty, of things past and future, and so on. In this last doctrine of Yogaja Pratyakṣa Gangeśa is playing into the hands of the Intuitionists.[111]

Fair : Later Draft

VII. Judgment, Inference and Induction

(1) The Naiyāyikas are scientists and realists and not idealists. Hence they start with perception and conception and not with judgment as the unit of thought. Jayanta alone of Indian logicians, regards the sentence or the judgment as the beginning of all thought ; 'words' he says, 'are parts of a sentence'. This is a position very similar to that of Bosanquet who regards the judg-

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They hold another peculiar view regarding the apprehension of all cows – past, present and future. "...with the aid of this knowledge of the universal cowness we are able to apprehend directly,.... but in a transcendental manner all the particular cows that exist now or ever existed or are going to exist, though only as belonging to that class. This knowledge of all the particulars falling under a universal.... is regarded as a case of Alaukika Pratyakṣa." (Ibid. Pp. 249–250).

111 The योगज प्रत्यक्ष which is necessarily अलौकिक is nothing but the अपरोक्षानुभूति (intuitive apprehension) of the Vedāntins.

ment as the unit of all thought.[112] As against the position of Bosanquet, one might ask, why we might not start with the percept or concept on the one hand, or with inference on the other? Jayanta alone takes the idealistic view of judgment. His theory is like that of the Anvitābhidhāna-vādins, who take a representational view, as against the Abhihitānvaya-vādins, who take a presentational view. The first view depends upon meaning, the second upon fact.[113]

(2) Nature of inference. We can not understand the nature of inference in Nyāya without contrasting it with that of the Buddhists or of Bosanquet. (i) In the first place, inference as with Diṅnāga, moves from particular to particular, and yet Diṅnāga feels the necessity of taking recourse to the law of causation. Herein he commits the same fallacy as Mill, who says that inference moves from particular to particular and yet recognises the law of causation. Causality among particulars is a contradiction in terms. Hume was thus more consistent than Mill for he recognises the particulars but denied the law of causation.[114] (ii) Bosanquet also denies causation, but

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112 See Foot Note 36 in Chapter VI.

113 For अभिहितान्वयवाद words have independent meaning. They refer to facts directly and so the view is presentationism. Words are uttered together in a sentence. This view is held by Kumārila. It implies realism. The contrary opinion is that words convey meanings not directly but only when joined in a sentence. This is indirect or representational view. There is no reference to facts. This is अन्विताभिधानवाद of the idealists. It is advocated by Prabhākara.

114 For Mill, inference is from particular to particular and the intervention of the universal is not necessary. Now causation is a universal law and need not have any place in Mill's thought.

substitutes the law of ground and consequent, as the basis of inference. No time element is involved in inference.[115] When Reality is the subject of all judgments, there is no reason why causality should exist.[116] (iii) The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, recognise causation. They, however, over-hit the mark in that, they recognise all cases of inseparable accident also as cases of causation (for example, the green colour of parrots). It is only our ignorance of the real nature of things which makes us suppose that there is anything like accident.[117]

But inconsistently enough, he recognises the law of causation. In fact his definition of a cause stands as a point of reference in the history of Logic. Causation is a universal relation and to take recourse to it, in the world of particulars, is contradictory. Hume also opted for particulars, but does not recognise any universal relation like causality; he is here consistent, though wrong. 'Two things are conjoined, but not connected'; 'there is sequence but no consequence' are his favourite utterances.

115 In causality, there is a necessary reference to time. The Naiyāyika's characterisation of causation as नियत-'पूर्व'-वृत्ति and Mill's adjective 'antecedent' are enough to prove this. Time is always associated with particulars. This cow means the cow which I see 'now'. Cowness on the other hand is universal and is above time. The basis of a rope-serpent-illusion is the rope; there is no question of time reference, for the rope serves as the ground (अधिष्ठान) of the serpent for all time. The relation is timeless as time has no function when ground and consequent are substituted for cause and effect. Here time is non-operational and withers away.

116 See Foot Note 43 in Chapter VI.

117 When causation is substituted for inseparable accident, it means that fundamentally every thing in the universe stands in causal relation to all other things. Nothing will now remain

(3) Nature of Induction. The chief problem is – how do we arrive at scientific laws, how is it that we are able to formulate the major premise? What, in short, is the 'Vyāptigrahopāya' or the means of attainment of the knowledge of induction, as Gaṅgeśa puts it. (i) According to the Buddhists, there can be no scientific induction as logic deals merely with perception. Inference, they take as invalid. As against this, Gaṅgeśa tells us that those who try to prove the invalidity of inference can not do so without themselves invoking the aid of inference.[118] Mere percepts without concepts are beads without a thread. (ii) Udyotakara, an earliar logician, however, says that the Vyāptigrahopāya can be explained by the combination of perception and remembrance: perception of the minor term, and remembrance of the concomitance of the major term and the middle.[119] (iii) Even against

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distinct, and ultimately the world will end up in being a unity of all that exists. What about the atomistic realism held by Nyāya in such a contingency?

118 This is how the Pūrvapakṣin's argument to establish the necessity of Tarka, is anticipated by Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya on the Vedānta-sūtra II. 1.11. Inference depends on the universal relation between the major term and the middle term. This is called Vyāpti.

Vyāpti is necessary for inference.

In a world of particulars there is no Vyāpti.

∴ In a world of particulars there is no inference.

So, to disprove inference they take resort to inference.

119 Put in the form of a syllogism, it can be expressed thus: You perceive Socrates who is a man (perception of the minor term). Then you have memory of the concomitance of mortality and man (memory of concomitance of major and middle terms). Then you arrive at the inference that Socrates is mortal. The

this, Gaṅgeśa argues by saying that perception is not required for induction at all. Induction is arrived at by the Method of Agreement and Difference.[120] (a) To illustrate this, we have to

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question is – how can you have memory of the concomitance unless you have previous knowledge of it? In all subsequent inferences, the plea of memory would work, but what about the first act of inference, where no memory exists? In the absence of memory, there can be no concomitance. It means you must have knowledge of the causal law. So the question of arriving at Vyāpti remains unsolved. To add to the difficulty, one has to beware of the fallibility of memory, and consider whether such an important place could be given to it.

120 व्याप्ति is arrived at by repeated observation of invariable concomitance or साहचर्य. But this alone can not give us certainty. There always is a possibility of a contrary instance or व्यभिचार. Therefore along with साहचर्य, there should be absence of contradiction अव्यभिचरितत्व. साहचर्यज्ञान and व्यभिचार-ज्ञानविरह are thus the two causes of व्याप्ति. They correspond to Mill's Method of Agreement and Method of Difference respectively. Inductive inference is based on invariable causation. When necessary causal connection is established between two events, say, food poisoning and death, it can be inferred in all new cases that food poisoning leads to death. Mill's methods seek to establish causal connection. Mill gave five methods in all. Of these, two are mentioned here. The Method of Agreement says that if two instances of a particular phenomenon agree only in one respect, that can be said to be the cause. Some people from a locality fall ill after the evening meal. It is found that in addition to a variety of items, all of them had consumed stale and fermented sweets from a common stock. These sweets (called positive instances) can be the likely cause of illness. The Method of Differece states: If in one

understand what the older logicians called the सपक्ष and the विपक्ष,[121] that is to say, the positive instance and the negative instance, corresponding respectively to the Table of Presence and the Table of Absence in Bacon.[122] b) Again Vācaspati's

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instance, a particular phenomenon occurs and in another instance it does not occur, the circumstance in which they differ is likely to be the cause. This method makes use of a negative instance. If it is found that a person in the same locality where people became ill, had not eaten sweets and had not become ill, though he had eaten all other items consumed by others, sweets under referemce are likely to be the cause of illness. The man not eating the sweets is the negative instance. If causal connection is established for certain, we can inductively draw a general proposition. Granting all this, the question remains, whether we are not arguing in a circle. There is no difference between establishing necessary causal connec-tion and inductively inferring a universal or general proposition.

121 Take the Stock example of Nyāya: 'the hill is on fire' because there is smoke. Here known instances of presence of fire and those of absence of fire become positive and negative instances respectively. सपक्ष is a similar or positive instance where the existence of fire is already known, e.g., kitchen. विपक्ष is a contrary or negative instance where the absence of fire is definitely known, e.g., a lake (See Foot Note 120 above).

122 "Bacon had anticipated Mill in describing his inductive method. The observation of positive instances in the collection of data, which Bacon calls the Table of Presence is similar to Mill's Method of Agreement. Bacon's recommendation was that this must be supported by a Table of Absence, i.e. the observation of negative instances. This is Mill's Method of Difference" (S.S. Barlingay and Padma Kulkarni, A Critical Survey of Western Philosophy, P. 26). See Foot Notes 120 and 121 above.

doctrine of Upādhi as साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः।[123] The syllogism to be valid must be free and unfettered and have no delimiting conditions. The Upādhi is the delimiting condition, for example, in the transposed or re-adjusted (inverted) syllo-

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123 Tarka-saṅgraha, Section 56. A condition or उपाधि is defined as that which is greater in extent than the thing to be proved (साध्य) but is not more extensive than the reason (साधन). (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 116). Unless the condition is fulfilled, the conclusion is not valid. The topic of उपाधि comes in, in the discussion of fallacies. For this purpose Annambhatta gives the example of a transposed syllogism where धूम (smoke) which is usually हेतु or साधन (reason) is made the साध्य and वह्नि (fire) which is usually the साध्य is made the हेतु. This syllogism is stated as पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्नेः। (The mountain is smoky because there is fire on it). Now, fire (साधन) does not always give rise to smoke, i.e. does not pervade smoke (साध्य). It gives rise to smoke on the fulfilment of an extra condition, viz. contact with wet fuel (आर्द्रेधनसंयोग). This contact always gives rise to smoke, so it pervades smoke धूमव्यापक, i.e., साध्यव्यापक. But presence of wet fuel is not a necessary condition for the presence of fire which can exist in an iron ball without wet fuel. So wet fuel does not pervade fire वह्नि अव्यापक, i.e., साधनाव्यापक; hence the definition of a condition as more extensive than साध्य (साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति) but less extensive than साधन (साधनव्यापकत्व). Wet fuel, which is a condition, pervades smoke but does not pervade fire; and so presence of fire does not assure us of presence of smoke. Such a syllogism which takes recourse to a condition is fallacious because the usual procedure of pervading the साध्य by हेतु is not observed and so the fallacy is व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, Pp. 312–313). See also Foot Note 124 below.

gism, पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्वात् contact with wet fuel, आर्द्रेधनसंयोग, is the Upādhi. In Udyotakara, there is no आर्द्रेधनसंयोग; while, however, wherever there is आर्द्रेधनसंयोग, there is smoke. The fallacy called व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध, which is one of the three kinds of Asiddhas.[124] (c) Gaṅgeśa, like Mill, tells us that it is the Method

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124 असिद्ध is inconclusive or unproved reason. The fallacy committed is uproved middle. The error in the proof may lie in either of the three terms of the syllogism, viz., पक्ष (minor term), हेतु (middle term) or व्याप्ति (major term). The first is आश्रयासिद्ध, the second is स्वरूपासिद्ध and the third is व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध.
(i) आश्रयासिद्ध – the fallacy when the middle term is not present in the minor term, e.g.

All lotuses are fragrant.
Sky-lotus is a lotus.
∴ Sky-lotus is fragrant.

Here the middle term, lotus, is not present in the sky-lotus at all, for there exists nothing like a sky-lotus. So the conclusion is wrong. (ii) स्वरूपासिद्ध is absence of association between the middle term and the minor term.

Where there is smoke there is fire.
There is smoke in the lake.
∴ There is fire in the lake.

Here, there is absence of smoke in the lake, and it makes the conclusion incorrect. (iii) व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध. Here the middle term is not invariably associated with the major term.

Where there is smoke there is fire.
The mountain has golden smoke.
∴ The mountain has fire.

There is no invariable association between golden smoke and fire. Therefore, the conclusion is wrong.
See Foot Note 123 above.

of Agreement, the Method of Difference and the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference, which give us the induction. These, he calls, respectively the केवलान्वयि, केवलव्यतिरेकि and अन्वयव्यतिरेकि अनुमानs. In short, it is reason alone which, according to Naiyāyikas, gives us the major premise.[125] (iv) As contrasted

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125 The Joint Method of Agreement and Difference is the third method mentioned by Mill. It is the combination of the first two methods, viz., the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference. If all people who ate stale and fermented sweets fell ill and none of those who did not eat stale and fermented sweets fell ill, sweets are likely to be the cause of illness. If a causal connection is thus established, there can be inductive generalisation, namely, eating stale and fermented sweets leads to illness (See Foot Note 120 above.)

Mill has been anticipated by Nyāya in this. the Naiyāyikas speak of an अन्वयिहेतु i.e., a positive instance and a व्यतिरेकिहेतु or a negative instance. The inference based on the former is केवलान्वयि and on the latter, केवलव्यतिरेकि. When both kinds of हेतुs or reasons are given, the inference is अन्वयव्यतिरेकि. A stock example of केवलान्वयि is :

All knowable objects are namable.
The pot is a knowable object.
∴ The pot is a namable object.

There is positive connection between knowability and namability. Here we can not have a negative हेतु i.e., there is no concomitance between non-namability and non-knowability; hence this is 'only positive' or केवलान्वयि. In केवलव्यतिरेकि there is a negative हेतु. The Nyāya example is:

What is not different from other elements has no smell.
The earth has smell.
∴ The earth is different from other elements.

There can be no अन्वयिहेतु in this case. It is not possible to have

with this, is the Aristotelian explanation of the formation of the inductive law, as due to the combination of experience and intuition, which supervenes all of a sudden, and gives us the knowledge of a scientific law. In the last resort, therefore, laws are discovered by intuition and not by reason.[126]

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a positive instance where both गंध and the quality of being different from objects other than earth, are found together. 'Different from' and 'other than' are two negatives and together they imply the original object, earth. As there is no positive instance, the inference is केवलव्यतिरेकि. In the अन्वयव्यतिरेकि both positive and negative instances are present. Where there is smoke there is fire, and where there is no fire there is no smoke. This is अन्वयव्यतिरेकि. This corresponds to Mill's Joint Method (See Foot Note 120 above). Incidentally, there is a lot of subtle discussion whether केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान is possible at all. It is riddled with logical difficulties. It is claimed that the Naiyāyikas recognise the केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान only to avoid admitting a fifth source of knowledge, viz., अर्थापत्ति. Instances of अर्थापत्ति given by Mīmāṃsakas, are brought under केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान by the Naiyāyikas, thereby cancelling अर्थापत्ति as an independent प्रमाण (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, Pp. 281–290).

126 The Naiyāyikas do not regard induction to be an inference because there is no परामर्श or knowledge of हेतु as invariably concomitant with fire, e.g., knowledge of smoke as invariably concomitant with fire. There is no such thing in induction. Nor is it ordinary perception for there is no इंद्रियसंनिकर्ष. Induction is based not on reasoning but on अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष, extra-ordinary perception or immediate apprehension. This is akin to intuition which is supra-rational (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, Pp. 260–261).

In science, four stages of creative thought are described –

VIII. Problem of Validity in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā

(a) The Nyāya theory of knowledge is known as Parataḥ-prāmāṇya,[127] while the Mīmāṃsā theory of knowledge is known as Svataḥ-prāmāṇya. The Nyāya theory of error is known as Anyathā-khyāti, while there are two Mīmāṃsā theories of error, the Akhyāti of Prabhākara and the Viparīta-khyāti (which is almost equivalent to the Anyathā-khyāti of Nyāya) of Kumārila. The difference between the two Mīmānsā theories of error, viz., the Akhyāti and the Viparīta-khyāti, we shall notice under "Prabhākara and Kumārila" in the next chapter).[128] At present we shall consider the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya theories of knowledge, viz., Svataḥ-prāmāṇya and Parataḥ-prāmāṇya, as well as the very famous discussion by Vācaspati, of the five theories of error (See S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇ, History of Indian Logic, Pp. 138–139). The five theories of error here enumerated are:–

(i) The Ātma-khyāti of the Yogācāra Buddhists (Vijñānavādins),

(ii) The Asat-khyāti of the Mādhyamika Buddhists (Śūnya-

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preparation, incubation, illumination and verification (See R. S. Woodworth, Experimental Psychology, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, Reprinted 1951, Pp. 818 ff). In the first, data are collected; in the second, there is conscious work or even unconscious work (work going on in the brain inspite of the subject not being in the centre of attention); in the third, there is illumination or inspiration and in the fourth, hypotheses put forward are verified. It is the third stage of inspiration which is akin to intuition. Rational work precedes it, but the actual spark is not explained by reason. This flash leads to inductive inference.

127 Svataḥ-prāmāṇya means self-proved. Parataḥ-prāmāṇya means proved by something else.

128 See Section VI. 5 in Chapter VI.

vādins), (iii) The Anirvacanīya-khyāti of the Advaita Vedāntins, (iv) the Akhyāti of the Prābhākaras and (v) the Anyathā-khyāti of the Naiyāyikas.[129] As Vācaspati is a Naiyāyika, he puts the Anyathā-khyāti last. The Advaita Vedāntin may put the Anirvacanīya-khyāti last. A fuller discussion of all these theories should be carefully read from Kuppuswami Sastri's Primer of Indian Logic, Pp. 157–180, where there is a Vedāntic criticism (from the point of view of the Anirvaçanīya-khyāti) of the other theories of error; See P. 160 where he puts the Anirvacanīya-khyāti last. The Rāmānujian theory of error is referred to on P. 164.[130] This will enable one to form one's own independent opinion of all the different theories and then to construct one's position.

(b) (i) Corresponding to the Svataḥ-prāmāṇya and Parataḥ-prāmāṇya of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya (theories of intrinsic and extrinsic validity) we have, so far as the authorship of the Vedas is concerned, their theories of Apauruṣeya and Pauruṣeya-vāda. According to Mīmāṃsā, knowledge has its criterion within itself. According to Nyāya, knowledge has its criterion outside itself. Mīmāṃsā inclines towards internal coherence, Nyāya towards external reference.[131] (ii) Thus according to Nyāya, knowledge

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129 See Section VI. 5 in Chapter VI.

130 See Foot Note 147 in Chapter VI.

131 Coherence is internal consistency. Two statements can not be true together if they are inconsistent. For example, A is accused of murdering B. Supposing, it is proved that A was not present in the town on the day of murder, his being away and the accusation of murder are not coherent. Consistency or harmony is a mark of truth. Bradley would say that the smallest of the small or the meanest of the mean can not be dispensed with as it has its appointed place in the harmony of the Absolute. When

would be valid, (a) provided the source from which it springs is perfect, i.e., the cause from which it proceeds is real (Keith, P. 18), (b) provided the sense-organs are not deficient or (c) provided that it leads to some useful purpose. Thus, e.g., the dream-consciousness would be invalid because there is no perfection in its cause; the yellowness of the conch would be invalid because there is jaundice in the eye; and again, the water of the mirage would be unreal, because it does not lead to the quenching of thirst. The realism of Nyāya, however, is tinged with Pragmatism.[132] Thus according to Naiyāyikas, knowledge *is* not true by its very nature, but *becomes* true by the fulfilment of an extra condition, Samvādi-pravṛtti,[133] e.g., quenching of

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every thing is connected with every other thing, real coherence results. Coherence is generally advocated by the idealists. Correspondence, however, deals with external reality. Reference to outside reality, is necessary to determine correspondence. A statement is not true by itself, but has to represent outside circumstances. The theory is held mostly by the realists. (See, Padma Kulkarni, Prof. R. D. Ranade as a Mystic, Shri Gurudev Ranade Samadhi Trust, Nimbal, R. S., 1986, Pp. 43–46).

132 Pragmatism holds that truth is that which works or that which leads to successful results, i.e., which is useful. The theory was started by C. S. Peirce and William James.

133 According to Nyāya, truth is correspondence with reality. But there is no way to ascertain the correspondence unless you previously know the fact. Truth is then sought to be established by successful activity. "So the doctrine proposes an indirect test– fruitful activity (Samvādi-pravṛtti). What serves as the test is thus really another experience – that of thirst being quenched....." (See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philo-

thirst. Cf. the Arthakriyākāritva of the Buddhists.[134] Thus Nyāya

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sophy, P. 308). We believe that there is water. This gives rise to a desire in us to partake of it. When actually the water is drunk and the thirst is quenched there is satisfaction of desire. This however is an extraneous condition. The pragmatic test, it must be borne in mind, is only for verification and does not constitute the definition of truth, which is correspondence with reality तद्वति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानम् (knowledge of a thing as it actually is. (Ibid. P. 253). वेदान्तपरिभाषा combines correspondence and satisfaction in its definition of truth : तथाहि स्मृतिअनुभवसाधारणं संवादिप्रवृत्तिअनुकूलं तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वं प्रामाण्यम् ।। (Valid knowledge is that knowledge regarding something possessing a particular attribute, which has that attribute as its feature *(prakāra)*, which is conducive to successful effort, and which includes recollection as well as fresh experience). Vedānta-paribhāṣā, of Dharmarājādhvarīndra, Tr. Swami Madhavananda, Pp. 143–144. The explanation is that "valid knowledge is knowing a thing as it is, and not as something else, which would be error. For instance, the sentence, "The lake has fire", does not give us valid knowledge, for a lake contains water and not fire" (Ibid. P. 145, Note 4). Again, when we mistake a conch for silver our effort to take it, is not successful (Ibid. P. 145, Note 5).

134 अर्थक्रियाकारित्व is a term used by modern Naiyāyikas in the discussion of import of words. When a word like घट is uttered, the hearer should understand what entity is referred to. The घट primarily denotes घटव्यक्ति, the particular object. Hence the capacity of being the 'subject of any act' (अर्थक्रियाकारित्व) resides in the concrete object घट. Thus according to the Modern Naiyāyikas, the import of word is केवलव्यक्ति. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that a word implies a class-concept (जाति); घट implies घटत्व (केवलजाति). The ancient Naiyāyikas avoid these two

includes in the criterion of reality both correspondence and satisfaction, objective verification as well as subjective utility. See Hiriyanna.[135] (iii) The criticism which Mīmāṃsā would pass on the Nyāya theory of knowledge is that, to guarantee one cognition, such as reference to a correct source, another cognition would be required, this, another cognition, and so on *ad infinitum*, so that no knowledge could be valid.

(c) Realistic Pragmatism in Nyāya. (i) The realism of Nyāya. All secondary qualities reduced to primary. Even secondary qualities objective.[136]

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extremes and hold that the word घट implies a particular object घट as possessing the class-notion घटत्व (जातिविशिष्टव्यक्ति). The import of a word according to the Bauddhas is अपोह, or distinction of a particular thing from all other things. By the word घट we do not understand an external object, becuase we never know external objects, nor the जाति because जाति is nothing more than a conception formed by us and imposed on what we call external objects. By घट we understand that a thing possesses certain peculiarities that tell it to be different from other things. Thus घट does not tell us what a thing is but what it is not. It is negative knowledge and not a positive definition (See Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, Pp. 335–336).

135 See Foot Notes 133 and 134 above.

136 It was John Locke who made the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are objective i.e. they belong to the object. Locke names figure, extension, etc. as primary qualities. Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are powers in the substance to produce various sensations in us by the primary qualities. These are colour, sound, taste and so on. They can change; and their removal does not affect the

Cf. the tertiary qualities in Neo-realism.[137] Holt's

existence of the substance. Now according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, secondary qualities are also objective, i.e. primary. They belong to the object. They are sensed by us because there is likeness between the object and the sense, e.g. the colour is *in* the object and is made up of Tejas atoms, so is the eye made up of Tejas atoms; and so the eye knows the colour. The realism of Nyāya does not allow the colour to be contributed by the knowing mind. It is in the object itself.

137 Neo-realism began as a polemic against idealism. Then there arose a desire to spell out in a cooperative spirit the constructive doctrines of neo-realism. Consequently, 'The Program and First Platform of Six Realists' by the advocates of the new philosophy – E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding was published in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. VII, 1910. A volume entitled 'The New Realism' by the same writers also indicates the direction of their thinking.

According to Neo-realism all relations are external. Objects may enter into new and new relations; but they do not alter the structure of the object. The relation is an added character. An object may enter into a relation with a knowing subject. A person's consciousness of a thing is made up of (i) the thing and (ii) its relation to consciousness. For instance, in 'a person knows the book', the person's consciousness of the book consists of (i) the book and (ii) the relation of the book to him. The latter is a character which is added to the person's consciousness. In Idealism, it is the mind which contributes to the knowledge process. In Neo-realism on the contrary, the object is the contributor. Whenever a thing enters into a relation with another entity, it acquires a new character which may be termed tertiary (third) quality. Perry does not use the term

physiologism.[138] (ii) Realistic theory of error. The illusory

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tertiary qualities but his description of 'relations as an added character' seems to imply that relations are a 'third quality', distinguishable from the traditional primary and secondary qualities. See R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chapter XIII. See also Foot Note 136 above.

138 Some physiological aspects are specially emphasised by E. B. Holt. Neo-realism has its own philosophy of mind. Mind to them is not exclusively available to the method of introspection. It is available, equally easily to the method of general observation. This leads further to the assertion that a man's mind is known not solely to himself but also to others. Common place behaviour of a man is a window to his mind. From his buying a thing in the market we know what he must be thinking. His verbal reports also help an outsider to follow the speaker's mind. So bodily behaviour is a mirror to a man's mind. It is true to say that a person has his own internal sensations (called proprioceptive sensations) that only he can know. For example, pressures and strains from internal organs are peculiarly his own. But even then, an outsider, though he cannot experience these with others, can know them. A doctor may even know them better by his study and a little imagination. So perhaps a physiologist would be in a better position to report on my mental processes. A man's mental content is part of the environment on which his organism acts – it is his interested behaviour. A cat's mind is its interested behaviour towards a rat. Mind is thus reduced by the neo-realists to physiological elements. Holt's two articles – 'Concept of Consciousness' and 'Response and Cognition', in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. XII, Nos. 14 and 15, constitute an able statement of his 'physiologism' (See R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chapter XII).

yellow colour itself objective. The Naiyāyikas hold that when a jaundiced man sees a conch to be yellow, the 'yellowness' as well as the 'Samavāya' relation in which it stands to the conch, are equally real along with the conch itself.[139] (iii) Yet, error results because there is no correspondence with fact; the silver is Āpaṇastha. Also, no quenching of thirst follows. Hence, fusion of realism and pragmatism.

(d) In regard to Prāmāṇya-vāda or validity of knowledge, Gaṅgeśa tells us that two questions arise: (i) Whence is the validity of knowledge derived and (ii) How are we conscious of it? (In our opinion these two questions reduce themselves to the same thing).[140] The Mīmāṃsakas answer the question by saying

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139 All the factors in a judgment may be severally true; but the whole complex may not have a corresponding complex in the objective world and is therefore, false. The conch, the yellowness and the Samavāya are not present together in one single complex whole; and so it is error (See Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, P. 252).

140 Prof. Ranade reduces the two questions to one from the idealistic point of view. The question of validity assumes significance only when it enters a knower's consciousness. Till then he may be blissfully unaware of whether any piece of knowledge is valid or not. Thus the two questions would be reduced to one question, viz. How are we conscious of the source of validity? But the questions will very much remain two if we accept the stark realistic position. This latter would be interested in validity as such irrespective of any knower whatsoever. This can be compared with the definition of truth-in-itself (Satz an sich) given by Bernard Bolzano : 'By a "Satz an sich" I mean any statement whatever to the effect that some thing is or is not, irrespective of whether the statement be true

that knowledge is self-evident. If so, says Gaṅgeśa, invalid knowledge would be identical with valid knowledge. It follows therefore that knowledge is not self-evident, but is inferred from the fruitful correspondence between the knowledge and the activity. After a Ghaṭa is known, a quality called Jñātatā is produced in Ghaṭa according to Mīmāṃsakas and a quality called Jñātṛtva or संविति is produced in Atman (knower) according to the Naiyāyikas. As regards Apramā or invalid knowledge, the Mīmāṃsakas (Prabhākara?) do not admit invalid knowledge or error at all.[141] All knowledge according to them is valid. According to Gaṅgeśa, Apramā is that knowledge which does not abide in its own subject but in the subject of another generic nature (Anyathākhyāti). Moreover, in our consciousness 'this is silver', says Gaṅgeśa, we must suppose that there is only one kind of knowledge, and it is cumbrous to assume two like the Mīmāṃsakas, viz., perception and recollection. See Vidyā-bhūṣaṇ.[142]

(e) In a general way, the problem of validity and invalidity may be mathematically exhibited as follows:–

Validity	Invalidity
(a)	(b)
Self-evident	Other-evident
(c)	(d)

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or false, irrespective of whether any person ever formulated it in words, and even irrespective of whether it ever entered into any mind as a thought' (Paradoxes of the Infinite, Routlege and Kegan Paul, London, 1950, P. 45).

141 See Section VI. 5 and Foot Note 119 in Chapter VI.

142 Mahamahopaḍhyaya Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇ's book A History of Indian Logic, Calcutta University, 1921 is an excellent compendium on the subject. (See pages 138 ff).

abcc	. . . .	Sāṅkhya,
abdd	. . . .	Nyāya,
Acbd	. . . .	Mīmāṃsā, and
adbc	. . . .	Buddhism

Worked out in plain language this means:–
Sāṅkhya – Both validity and invalidity self-evident;
Nyāya – Both validity and invalidity other-evident;
Mīmāṃsā – validity self-evident, invalidity other-evident; and
Buddhism – validity other-evident, invalidity self-evident.[143]

(See Kane, Pūrvamīmāṃsa (references to श्लोकवार्तिक and प्रकरणपंचिका).

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143 In this connection Mādhavācārya quotes two verses:
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः सांख्याः समाश्रिताः ।
नैयायिकास्ते परतः सौगताश्चरमं स्वतः ।।
प्रथमं परतः प्राहुः प्रामाण्यं वेदवादिनः ।
प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्चाप्रमाणताम् ।।
(Of the two things, 'authoritativeness' (प्रामाण्य) and 'non-authoritativeness' (अप्रामाण्य), the *Sāṅkhyas* consider both to be self-proved; the *Naiyāyikas* hold both to be known externally; the *Bauddhas* think that 'non-authoritativeness' is self-proved but the other is proved externally. Lastly teachers of the *Vedas* i.e. the *Mīmāṃsakas* maintain that प्रामाण्य is self-proved but अप्रामाण्य requires external proof" (Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-saṅgraha of Annambhatta, P. 351).

Bibliographical Note

Y. V. Athalye and M. R. Bodas (Editors) : "Tarka-saṅgraha". The Introduction which is historical in character should be read. The notes are very good, every chief topic being discussed separately in a different note. The notes are of much philosophical importance. The topics of the notes are concerned with separate philosophical problems.

A. B. Keith : Indian Logic and Atomism – Part I is a historical Introduction, containing in two Chapters the old school and the new school respectively. The notes are philosophical. In Part II, the philosophy of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The following Chapters might be read. Chapter I is epistemological and discusses the nature of knowledge and error according to the School, contrasting it with the standpoints of Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā. Chapters II and III discuss प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान (Perception and Inference) respectively. Chapter VII discusses the categories of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika respectively. Chapter VIII discusses the Atomic Theory. Chapter IX is Psychological and Chapter X Theistic. On the whole, a valuable book.

Satish Candra Vidyabhushan : The Nyāya Sūtras of Gautama translated by Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan (Sacred Books of the Hindus) Vol. VIII. Typography excellent. A very fine copy. Contains a historical, not a philosophical Introduction. कुसुमांजलि of Udayana (University copy, Sanskrit 120/33) contains at the beginning the Kārikās simply, in five Stabakas (20 + 4 + 23 + 6 + 19). Nyāya arguments for the existence of God.

Ganga Nath Jha : Translation of वात्स्यायन - भाष्य on the Gautama Sūtras.

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Nand Lal Sinha : Vaiśeṣika-sūtras of Kaṇāda. Translated by Nand Lal Sinha (Sacred Books of the Hindus). Fine typography as in न्यायशास्त्र. Contains a good philosophical introduction to the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras (Pp. 1–34). The age of Kaṇāda, The Philosophy of Kaṇāda, Logic and Epistemology, Predicables, Creation and dissolution and the Soul.

A. E. Gough : The Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda (Translated). Fine copy (Lazarus). Extracts from two commentaries with translation.

CHAPTER VI

PŪRVA-MĪMĀṂSĀ

I. Reduction of all Pramāṇas to one[1]

Progressive delineation of the six Pramāṇas.[2]

Cārvāka	–	Pratyakṣa
Vaiśeṣika	–	Pratyakṣa + Anumāna
Sāṅkhya	–	Pratyakṣa + Anumāna + Śabda
Nyāya	–	Pratyakṣa + Anumāna + Śabda + Upamāna
Prabhākara	–	Pratyakṣa + Anumāna + Śabda + Upamāna + Arthāpatti
Kumārila	–	Pratyakṣa + Anumāna + Śabda + Upamāna + Arthāpatti + Anupalabdhi

Bauddhas do regard Anumāna as a Pramāṇa but their Anumāna is invalid.[3] Criticism of these Pramāṇas in the light of the Vedāntic "Anubhava".

A. (1) Anupalabdhi or non-perception cannot be a criterion at all. It is invented to explain our apprehension of "Abhāva" or

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1 For the entire topic see the exposition given in Prof. Ranade's Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, Pp. 36–39.

2 The table exhibits the प्रमाणs or criteria accepted by different philosophical systems or different philosophers.

3 Inference depends on व्याप्ति or invariable concomitance, i.e. invariable, universal relation between two things or events. The Bauddhas do recognise inference in the sense that they accept a general statement relating two things to be true, when it is made the ground of practical activity. Their acceptance of relation is only pragmatic. But their inference is invalid because theoretically all relations according to them are false and as inference is necessarily based on relations, their view of inference can not be valid.

negation. Set a thief to catch a thief. Both are non-existent. If Abhāva is Bhāva-rūpa, Pratyakṣa will suffice.[4] (2) Pratyakṣa does not lead to valid knowledge. We see the sun to be only of a span's length. Rāmānuja makes Upamarda of Pratyakṣa as ज्वालाभेदानुमानेन प्रत्यक्षोपमर्दायोगात्।

ज्वालाभेद = भिन्नज्वाला. But Rāmānuja who believed in the reality of the world should not stultify Pratyakṣa.[5]

B. (3) (i) Upamāna involves the analogy of a 'गवय' with 'गो', as well as of a 'गो' with 'गवय'. Indefinite and infinite reciprocity. Reciprocal similarity involves an unending series of resemblances.[6] (ii) At most, it may be a case of Anumāna only. Analogy,

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4 If अभाव is something negative or that which does not exist, no criterion is, in fact, necessary to apprehend it; a negative criterion like अनुपलब्धि is moreover least fitted to apprehend अभाव. However, if अभाव is भावरूप i.e. positive or something existing, प्रत्यक्ष can be used to apprehend it. Thus in both the cases, अनुपलब्धि is driven out of court.

5 The quotation is from Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra 1.1.1. When a flame is burning, it appears to be one and the same to Pratyakṣa or perception. But inference will stultify the oneness of the flame by proving that there are many flames (भिन्नज्वालाः), as different particles are burning one after the other. Which of the two – perception or inference – has greater validity? Rāmānuja says that inference here sublates perception, because what is given by Pratyakṣa can be accounted for otherwise i.e. the one-ness of the flame is due to the very rapid succession of different flames. (See, Śrībhāṣya, published by Shrī Nimbārkācārya Pīth, 12 Mahajani Tola, Prayag, Samvat 2030, P. 31). Whatever the explanation, the very fact that Rāmānuja, a realist, degrades Pratyakṣa, goes against his realism.

6 For example, a गो will resemble a गवय in respect of horns, and

such as the "counting" of points of resemblance between Earth and Mars in respect of their suitability as habitations for life. Mars is a planet like the Earth. Therefore, it must have life on it. Does not "weigh" but only count. Analogical inference cannot be valid inference. It only leads to probability. (4) (i) Arthāpatti or "Implication" (which is the soul of Inference). It can, therefore, be very well reduced to Anumāna either of the Kevalānvayi or the Kevalavyatireki type, which can be shown to be not Linear Inference, but implication (Bosanquet).[7] (ii) Prabhākara says

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a गवय will resemble a गो in respect of hoofs and so on, so that there never will arrive a point where all the similarities are exhausted and a valid conclusion is arrived at.

7 "Characteristics which attract general notice only when full grown, are traceable far back when we come to look for them; and further, they are frequently implied by the nature of an individual long before any scrutiny can detect them.... The labour of genuine science is to disentangle the *true* continuity of process, limiting it only by modifications which are certainly traced or inevitably implied; never assuming the existence of a highly developed attribute or function where it is not seen in operation, or shown to be implied to the exclusion of all conceivable alternatives." (B. Bosanquet, Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge, Vol. I, Pp. 15–16). What Bosanquet means is that science should always trace back the obvious characteristics to their source where they are not so obvious but are only potential; nevertheless they imply the obvious. Again the characteristic which we say is "implied" must be the only alternative which explains the situation, e.g. पीनो देवदत्तः दिवा न भुंक्ते। (The fat Devadatta does not eat during day). The fatness can be explained only on the hypothesis of his eating at night. Therefore, रात्रौ भुंक्ते (eats at night) is clearly implied.

that there is doubt in Arthāpatti which is ultimately resolved. Kumārila says there is contradiction which is ultimately reconciled. Both recognise Arthāpatti. Sanśaya is required as an initial stage even in Anumāna नानुपलब्धे न निर्णीतेऽर्थे न्यायः प्रवर्तते.[8]

(iii) While the Mīmāṃsakas contend that we must recognise Arthāpatti to be a new Pramāṇa, as we cannot assign a Liṅga or Hetu or Midle term which alone would justify its being classed under Anumāna, the Naiyāyikas hold that we cannot regard Arthāpatti as a new Pramāṇa, but that it can very well be shown to be included under Anumāna: and Nyāya is right. The formula for Arthāpatti can very well be exhibited in the form of "Barbara" in the First Figure as follows:

All fat non-eaters by day must eat at night.
S. N. is a fat non-eater by day.
Therefore, he must eat at night. (Kevalānvayi type).

The "non-eater" here, however, is a negative expression. Or, alternatively, the formula could be exhibited as follows in EAE in the First Figure:

No fat man non-eating by day is a non-eater at night.

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8 The expression occurs in वात्स्यायन भाष्य on गौतमन्यायसूत्र I.1.1. The latter portion of the sentence is : 'किं तर्हि संशयितेऽर्थे' (What, if there is doubt?). This indicates the exact subject-matter of न्याय. न्याय can not proceed where no data are available (अनुपलब्ध) nor does it proceed where an indubitable conclusion is arrived at (निर्णीत). In the first case, it is impossible; in the second it is superfluous. केशव मिश्र in his तर्कभाषा adds a positive sense by quoting a commentator's expression– अपि तु संदिग्धे (न्याय proceeds when there is ambiguity about the conclusion). He refers to the expression twice – once in अनुमान प्रकरण and another time in हेत्वाभास प्रकरण.

Devadatta is a fat man non-eating by day.
Therefore, Devadatta is not a non-eater at night. (Kevalavyatireki type).

Formally, this Anumāna would be correct; also the "implication" of it would cover what is intended to be proved by Arthāpatti. Arthāpatti is thus implicative inference. (5) The Anumāna gives us only a partial grasp of reality. Judgment and Inference are only appearances and not reality. Truth, as Bradley says, always falls short of Reality. Therefore, Anumāna invalid. (See Buddhist criticism of Anumāna in Śāntarakṣita, as well as Vedāntic Criticism in Śrīharṣa). We can not bring all the Tārkikas together; पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात्, Śaṅkara.[9] Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt.[10] Śaṅkara uses logic to combat the logicians and to defend 'insight'.[11]

C. (6) Varieties of opinion in regard to the value of Śabda as a philosophical criterion. The Vaiśeṣikas do not recognise this at all. The Sāṅkhyas recognise it hoping that the Upaniṣads might be regarded as advocating only Sāṅkhyaism.[12] Cf. अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णाम्.[13] The Naiyāyikas believe in it; but make it ancillary to God. The Mīmāṃsakas exalt it above every other Pramāṇa making it supreme even above God whom they feel no necessity of recognising. At most Deva = Devatā.[14] Śabda-

9 Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya, II. 1.11.

10 Ibid. II. 1.11.

11 Though Śaṅkara says that logic is ill-founded, he uses a sustained *logical* argument in his commentary on the above Sūtra, to prove that ill-foundedness. Here Śaṅkara has defended श्रुति as against logic (तर्क). But in his commentary on Vedānta-sūtra II. 1.4, he assigns the highest position to intuition or mystical experience (अनुभव).

12 See Foot Note 12 in Chapter I.

13 See Foot Note 52 in Chapter II.

14 Though God is not necessary, देवताs or deities are recognised

pramāṇa would only be a ritualistic dogma unless we mean by Śabda the eternal sound, which can be validated only by "Anubhava."[15] In that sense it becomes equivalent to Sphoṭa or the primal sound which is validated only by "Anubhava". Hence it follows that "Anubhava" is the only true criterion of Reality.[16] For a complete statement of the relation between Śabda and Sphoṭa, see next point.

II. The Doctrine of Śabda and the Doctrine of Sphoṭa

(Max Muller[17] Pp. 516–544; also Das Gupta, Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, Appendix).

(A) The supremacy of the criterion of Śabda in Mīmāṃsā. Śabdapramāṇakā vayam yacchabda āha tadasmākam pramāṇam, Śabara on III. 2. 35.[18] The eternity of sound. Its self-creation.

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by Mīmāṃsā, as recipients of oblations.

15. In this sense Śabda is the ultimate Reality which is intuitively experienced. It is supersensuous experience of sound or अनाहत नाद.

16 Anubhava means direct, mystical or spiritual experience. The faculty involved in this experience is intuition. Hence it is termed intuitive experience. It can be classed under perception because it is direct experience. However, it is not sensuous perception or Laukika Pratyakṣa as no sense-organ is involved in it. Ordinary or sensuous perception does not give indubitable knowledge whereas intuitive experience gives absolutely certain knowledge, like deductive inference. Thus it shares directness with perception and certainty with inference. Intuitive experience is the same as mystical experience.

17 The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, New Impression, Longmans Green and Co., 39 Paternoster Row, London, 1912.

18 श्रीमज्जैमिनिप्रणीत मीमांसादर्शन (Editor V. G. Apte, आनंदाश्रम, पुणे, 1930, P. 793). The expression means: As a matter of fact, the

Word greater than God, Apauruṣeya-vāda. Contrast the Pauruṣeya-vāda of the Naiyāyikas, and their insistence on God as the creator of the Vedas. The Naiyāyikas give only lip-service to Vedas. The Vaiśeṣikas take this tendency to its logical conclusion in the denial of Āpta-vākya. According to Vaiśeṣikas, verbal testimony is included under inference. As against this Gaṅgeśa[19] tells us that verbal testimony does not depend upon invariable concomitance, like inference; hence, it cannot be included under inference. Like La Place, the Mīmāṃsakas did not feel the necessity of a Creator.[20]

Mīmāṃsa doctrine of the supremacy of Word attacked by the Naiyāyikas on various grounds : (i) Word adjectival, not substan-

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Vedic Word is our sole authority; what the Word says that alone we regard as authoritative. (Śābara-bhāṣya, Tr. Ganga Nath Jha, Gaikwad Oriental Series, 1933, Vol. I, p. 426).

19 Promulgator of नव्यन्याय or the new phase of न्याय and author of the epoch-making work तत्त्वचिंतामणि. He flourished in East Bengal in the twelfth century.

20 La Place (1749–1827), a celebrated French mathematician and astronomer, attained a position among mathematicians and astronomers almost equal to Newton's. "When Laplace went to make a formal presentation of his work to Napoleon, the latter remarked : "M. Laplace, they tell me you have written this large book on the system of the universe and have never even mentioned its Creator." Whereupon La Place drew himself up and answered bluntly: "Sire, I had no need of any such hypothesis" (W. W. Rouse Bell, Short History of Mathematics, 1888, P. 388. Quoted in J. Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. I, P. 4).

tival, "Śabda" guṇam ākāśam.[21] *Petitio principii.*[22] (ii) Śabda is a product, is made, changes, is augmented, perishes (See Max Muller, P. 524). (iii) Eternity of Word only in the sense of "uninterrupted tradition" (Sampradāya).[23] Sound, according to Naiyāyikas, is non-eternal. Also there are certain "branches" of the Vedas that are lost as we know from Smṛtis and tradition. Hence the Veda is non-eternal; and the Mīmāṃsakas are wrong in saying that it is eternal because its continuity is uninterrupted. (iv) Word created by God. God, author with unlimited

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21 शब्द (sound) is a quality of आकाश (ether) which is the substance. Now a quality or adjective has a dependent existence. Word is not thus supreme according to the Naiyāyikas.

22 The phrase means begging the question or taking for granted what is to be proved. When Nyāya philosophy gives arguments for the existence of God, it states that God exists because Vedas say so. Now to say that God created Vedas and again to say that God exists because the Vedas say so, appears to beg the question in as much as the existence of Vedas depends on God and the proof of God's existence depends on the Vedas. The apparent circularity of the argument is resolved by recognising two orders, viz. order of existence, *ratio essendi,* and order of knowledge, *ratio cognoscendi.* In the order of existence, God comes first and creates the Vedas. It is only in the order of knowledge that the Vedas come first because it is through the Vedas that we know God.

23 "The true eternity of the Vedas consists, according to Gautama, in the unbroken continuity of their tradition, study and employment, both in the Manvantaras and the Yugas, which are past and those that are still to come, whilst their authority depends on the authority of the most competent persons." (Max Muller, The Six systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 414).

intelligence; hence, God greater than Word, Pauruṣeyavāda. The thesis and the anti-thesis of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya[24] reconciled by Vedānta by identifying Word with God. Śabda-brahma; cf. Kabir, Śabda.[25] While with Mīmāṃsā, Word is greater than God, and in Nyāya, God greater than the Word, in Vedānta, Word is made co-eval with God. There are also personal Vedāntins and impersonal Vedāntins.

(B) In spite of their differences in regard to the Word, however, the Mīmāṃsakas (Das Gupta Pp. 181–182), the Naiyāyikas, and the Vedāntins (Max Muller, Pp. 537–39) all agree in attacking the doctrine of Sphoṭa advocated by the Vaiyākaraṇa and Yoga philosophers. The identity of the two Patañjalis.[26] Cf. Yogena cittasya padena vācām.[27] The Naiyāyikas denied both the supremacy of the word as well as the doctrine of Sphoṭa; the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins made Śabda supreme but denied Sphoṭa. Even the Vedāntins failed to understand the mystical significance of Śabda. It was Pāṇini alone who said that Śabda, which he identified with Sphoṭa (explosion), was the primal energy of the world. "What bursts forth" (स्फुटति इति स्फोटः), Sound[28] as against स्फुटति अर्थः अनेन = meaning.[29] Liberation

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24 The thesis of Mīmāṃsā is that शब्द (Word) is supreme, while the anti-thesis put forth by Nyāya is that Word is not supreme, (but God is supreme).

25 Prof. Ranade has discussed Kabir's view fully in his Pathway to God in Hindi Literature, Pp. 378–379.

26 See Foot Note 2 in Chapter II.

27 See Foot Note 4 in Chapter II.

28 The sound bursting forth is the अनाहत नाद experienced by a mystic during ecstatic meditation. This is the spiritual significance of Sphoṭa. See also Foot Note 33 below.

29 Here अर्थ or meaning is said to burst forth from Sphoṭa. This is

in consequence of the study of Śabdānuśāsana. cf. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita: Sphuṭyate avidyā anena iti Sphoṭaḥ, that by means of which ignorance is destroyed (Śabdakaustubha, first Āhnika).[30] Cf. एकः शब्दः सम्यग्ज्ञातः सम्यक् प्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके च कामधुक् भवति । पातंजलभाष्य.[31] Pāṇini also refers to one Sphoṭāyana in his Sūtra, Avaṅ Sphoṭāyanasya.[32] Later grammarians failed to catch the mystical significance of Pāṇini, e.g. Patañjali (?), Kaiyaṭa (Max Muller, P. 529), and Bhartṛhari (Das Gupta, Pp. 183–184). We should like to exclude Patañjali from this company, if possible. With them Sphoṭa meant the power of signification (Das Gupta, P. 183) or "Meaning" of a word: cf. स्फुट्यते अर्थः अनेन । A logical

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the view of the grammarians or the logical view as against the mystical viw. See also Foot Note 33 below.

30 Destruction of Avidyā seems to be the epistemological meaning of Sphoṭa.

31 The expression एकः शब्दः सम्यग् ज्ञातः शास्त्रान्वितः सुप्रयुक्तः स्वर्गेलोके कामधुक् भवति occurs in पातंजलमहाभाष्य on पाणिनिसूत्र VI. 1.84 (Keilhorn edition, Vol. III, p. 58). The expression means: even a single word, if completely understood in line with the Śāstras and if correctly employed, confers bliss both in this world and the other, like a wish-yielding cow.

32 Aṣṭādhyāyī VI. 1. 123. Max Muller says, "Hindu philosophers have actually elaborated an idea which does not exist in any other philosophy, that of Sphoṭa. It is true that in Pāṇini's own Sūtras the word Sphoṭa does not occur, but the name of a grammarian whom he quotes (VI. 1.123), Sphoṭāyana, shows that this peculiar word Sphoṭa must have existed before Pāṇini's times. Derived as it is from Sphuṭ, Sphoṭa must have meant originally what bursts forth. It means the sound of a word as a whole, and as conveying a meaning apart from its component letters" (The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, P. 402).

instead of a mystical view (see Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, Pp. 114–119).[33] Various difficulties in the conception of Sphoṭa as Meaning. Is Meaning subjective or objective? Is it individual or collective? Is it implicit or explicit? Is it a string or an aura? Does it depend upon the order of the words? दीन and नदी. Does it reach progressive consummation? (अन्त्यवर्णनिर्ग्राह्य).[34] (The Yoga Philosopher Vācaspati, Das Gupta, P. 185). Does it precede or follow the word? Different varieties of Sphoṭa: Varṇa-sphoṭa, Pada-sphoṭa, Vākya-sphoṭa. These are tried to be established by Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadīya. Is there any Meaning for sentence, such as the Vākya-sphoṭa (Das Gupta, Pp. 185–186. Anvitā-bhidhāna-vāda).[35] Lotze and Bosanquet : Concept and Judg-

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33 The subject has been well treated by Mādhava in his Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha. Here, when examining the Pāṇini Darśana he shows first of all, that the Śabda or word which Pāṇini professes to teach in his Śabdānuśāsana or grammar, is really the same as Brahman. 'The eternal word,' he writes, 'which is called sphoṭa, and is without parts, is the true cause of the world'. It is in fact Brahman, and he adds thereupon some lines from Bhartṛhari's Brahmakāṇḍa, where that grammarian (died 650 A.D.) says:

'Brahman without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of language,
Which developed in the form of things, and whence
springs the creation of the world.'

What more could be said of the Neo-Platonic Logos? (See Max Muller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, P. 402).

34 Ibid. Pp. 404–405.

35 Read R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, P. 29).

ment.[36] Where shall we stop? Grantha-sphoṭa! *ad infinitum.* Epistemologically, ultimate reality would be thus Meaning of meanings.[37] From another point of view, viz., the logical, as

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36 "As mere internal movements, the states which follow external irritants may exist side by side in us.... but if they are to admit of combination in the definite form of a thought, they each require some previous shaping to make them into logical building stones." (Lotze, Logic, English translation (by many authors), Edited by B. Bosanquet, Oxford, P. 10). "Without doubt.... pure logic must place the form of the concept before that of the judgment" (Ibid. P. 18). For Lotze concepts are prior, they are moulded, shaped and then are combined into judgments. His view is elementaristic.

Bosanquet on the other hand, holds a Gestaltist view. He does not agree that ideas are subsequent to impressions, that concepts are subsequent to ideas, or that judgments are subsequent to simpler concepts. For him mere concepts are blind without a judgment. Knowledge does not consist in laying concept-stones to concept-stones. Judgment is a unitary function of the mind. Concepts are not prior to judgments, they are the result of analysis of a judgment. Bosanquet says, "I have never been able to doubt that the central function of the intellect, I would even say of consciousness, is one from beginning to end.... In speaking of the connection between impressions and ideas and again between concepts and the judgment, I am obliged to reject the easy partition into distinct operations." (B. Bosanquet, Logic or The Morphology of Knowledge, P. 29). "Judgment is not, in relation either to impressions, ideas or concepts, a mechanical combination of parts which remain outside each other. It is an expression of the unity in which consciousness consists." (Ibid. P. 31).

37 See R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought,

Bhartṛhari cleverly saw (Max Muller, P. 531), Śabda or Sphoṭa is the highest Sattā or existence, the *Summum Genus*. All genera merely "vanishing species" of it, merely illusory forms (Bhartṛhari, Max Muller, P. 532).[38] वाक्यपदीय ungrammatical for पदवाक्यीय.[39] Relation like that of Paramātman to Jīvātmans

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P. 29).

38 "Existence being divided, as found in cows and so on, is called this or that species by means of its connection with different objects, and on it, all words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem, and the meaning of the root. This is existence, this is the great Ātman (or Brahman), expressed by affixes such as Tva, Tal and so on, which form abstract nouns, such as Go-tva, cow-hood, and so on. For existence, as the *summum genus*, is found in all things, in cows, horses and so on, and therefore all words, expressive of definite meanings, rest ultimately on the *summum genus,* existence, differentiated by various thoughts or words, such as cows, horses and so on, in which it resides. If the stem-word, the Prātipadika, expresses existence, the root expresses Bhāva, a state, or as others say, Kriyā, action!.... This is stated again by Bhartṛhari.

"The true reality is known under its illusory forms, by words under untrue disguises; the true reality is named (for a time), like the house of Devadatta, so called for a vanishing reason (that is, only so long as Devadatta is the possessor of the house), but by the word house, pure household only is expressed." (Max Muller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 405–406).

39 Vākyapadīya is the name of Bhartṛhari's celebrated work on the philosophy of grammar. The work consists of three parts (i) Brahma-kāṇḍa (dealing with the doctrine of Sphoṭa and other preliminary matters), (ii) Vākya-kāṇḍa (dealing with the nature of a sentence) and (iii) Pada-kānda (dealing with the

(Max Muller, P. 532). Compare all ideas as species of the Idea of the Good in Plato.[40] From the philosophical point of view

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nature of a term). One rule dealing with द्वंद्व compound runs as– लघ्वक्षरं पूर्वं तिष्ठति (the term consisting of लघु letters comes first in the compound). So when we take the two terms, वाक्य and पद, the द्वंद्व compound would be पदवाक्य. And after adding the ईय suffix to indicate the name of a book, the compound would be पदवाक्यीय. Hence grammatically the expression should have been पदवाक्यीय and not वाक्यपदीय. However, there is another rule, अभ्यर्हिते पूर्वं निपतति, i.e. the term which is more important comes first. According to Bhartṛhari, a वाक्य or judgment has logical priority over a पद or term, the latter being only the result of analysis of a judgment. In this case, the compound would be वाक्यपदीय. Here we have two different rules regarding the compound, the first making the compound पदवाक्यीय and the second making it वाक्यपदीय. In such a case of conflict, there is yet one more rule, विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्. In the case of a conflict of two rules, the subsequent rule supersedes the earlier one. Hence the title of Bhartṛhari's work is वाक्यपदीय and rightly so. The observation in the text, that 'वाक्यपदीय is ungrammatical' seems to be interpolated as it has no connection either with the preceding or succeeding sentence. In fact it breaks the flow of the argument. If it is excised, the para reads well. It might have been suggested by somebody when the notes were read out. Perhaps Prof. Ranade would not have allowed it in the final draft.

40 In a classificatory series, species are subsumed under a genus. That genus is further subsumed under a higher genus till we reach the *summum genus*. The whole presents a hierarchy. This is how Plato represents the world of Ideas. Ideas of less general things are subsumed under more general things and the process continues till we rise to the apex, namely, the Idea of the Good.

all, words ultimately mean God, the Logos (Max Muller, P. 532).[41] Cf. the Nārāyaṇa of Sanyāsins.[42] Cf. also Bosanquet, "Reality" as the only subject of all judgments.[43]

"The world of sense is the copy of the world of Ideas; and conversely, the world of Ideas resembles its image; it forms a hierarchy. In our visible world there is a gradation of being from the most imperfect creature to the perfect, sensible being, or the universe. The same holds true of the intelligible realm or the pattern of the world; the Ideas are joined together by means of other Ideas of a higher order; the latter, in turn, are embraced under others still more exalted, and so on; the Ideas constantly increase in generality and force, until we reach the top, the last, the highest, the most powerful Idea or the Good, which comprehends, contains or summarises the entire system, just as the visible universe, its copy, comprehends, contains, or summarises all creatures" (Weber and Perry, History of Philosophy, P. 62).

41 The philosophy of Sanskrit grammar puts forth this view. As all that exists is but the manifestation of Brahman, each word (though it stands for an object like a mountain or a river), *sub specie eternitatis,* means Brahman only. Brahman alone is the referent (प्रतिपाद्य) of every word. Word and its denotation (द्रव्यरूप) are eternal. In this connection Kaiyaṭa says, असत्योपाध्यवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं द्रव्यशब्दवाच्यमित्यर्थः। (Brahman though limited by false adjuncts is the ultimate import of all words).

42 It is said that to all questions put to a Sanyāsin, his only reply is नारायण.

43 As the ultimate referent of each word is Brahman, all sentences would be only predicates of Brahman. When we say water is sweet, it means Brahman is such that water is sweet. Bosanquet would use the word Reality and not Brahman. For him the sentence would be, 'Reality is such that water is sweet', meaning

Three points of view, therefore: Epistemological, Logical and Philosophical. From any one of these approaches, Śabda or Sphoṭa becomes identical with absolute reality. All these approaches, however, are merely intellectual and not mystical. Pāṇini alone saw the mystical significance of it. "The eternal Word", says Mādhava in his Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha, "which is called Sphoṭa, and which is without parts, is the true cause of the world." Bādarāyaṇa in the Sūtra I. 3.28 and Śaṅkara in criticising the doctrine of "Sphoṭa", failed to sympathise with the mystical significance of it. Both Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara say that the world comes from the "Word" (and not Sphoṭa), and this Word is Brahman (Max Muller, P. 521). Contrast जन्माद्यस्य यतः।[44] यतः = from God. In his criticism of the doctrine of Sphoṭa, Śaṅkara[45] particularly quotes Upavarṣa, the Mīmāṃsaka-Vedāntist, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters (वर्णसमुदायः शब्दः) as against the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called Sphoṭa which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the meaning of a word (Thibaut, P. xxxvii).[46] (1) उच्चरित शब्द and (2) Sphoṭa (Idea) suggested by उच्चरित शब्द.[47] उच्चरित शब्द is to शब्द (स्फोट), what वाच्य is to ध्वनि.[48] 'Inquilab Zindabad' (Victory to

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thereby that Reality is the ultimate subject and all that we say is only a predicate.

44 Vedānta-sūtra, I. 1.2.

45 See his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra I. 3.28.

46 The Vedānta-sūtras with the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya, Vol. I.

47 The first is the view of Upavarṣa and the second that of the grammarians.

48 A mere sound conveys no meaning, but a sound pronounced

revolution) should be uttered proximately.[49] The doctrine of Sphoṭa as understood in a mere logical sense may indeed be objectionable, but when it is identified with the mystical doctrine of Śabda, the Vedāntins and especilly Śaṅkara need have no cause of grievance against it.[50] For the doctrine of Sphoṭa, cf. the Logos of St. John,[51] the "Let there be Light" doctrine of the Old Testament,[52] the Kun (let it be done) in Arabic Philosophy,

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in a particular manner becomes a वर्ण; for example, one of the sounds pronounced from the throat, is क्. By combining वर्णs we get a letter (अक्षर). For example, क् + अ = क. These letters, pronounced at a particular time, particular place, and having regard to the intention of the speaker and the hearer, become a शब्द, for example, कमल. The meaning is conveyed not because of the aggregate of letters but because of the supersensuous power (स्फोट) which is different from the letters. The meaning bursts forth. This is Sphoṭa. From words uttered, a meaning is suggested. On similar lines, वाच्य (literal or primary meaning of a word) manifests an implication (suggestion or Dhwani). For example, the sun sets. This simple sentence primarily refers to an event. But it suggests (ध्वनि) different things to different people. A cowherd takes it as the time to take the cows home. For a thief it is time to begin his activity and so on. See also Foot Note 55 below.

49 The words will be meaningless if one of them is uttered today and another tomorrow. There must not be a time gap. See also Foot Note 48 above.

50 For the whole topic of Sphoṭa read Max Muller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 401–412.

51 New Testament, St. John, I. 1. In the eginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. (Logos = Word).

52 Old Testment I.3. Then God commanded, "Let there be Light"

the Vāk in Ṛgveda,[53] and the Anāhata Nada in Kabir.[54] The Ālaṅkārikas utilised the conception of Sphoṭa in their doctrine of Vyaṅgya or Dhwani.[55]

– and light appeared.

53 Mantras VIII. 100. 10–11. "The poet now takes an opportunity of praising the greatness of speech in general and of human speech which culminates in a hymn in particular, claiming a divine origin for it" (H. D. Velankar, Ṛk-sūkta-śatī, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 7, 1972, P. 244, Foot Note 10).

54 See Foot Note 25 above.

55 Sphoṭavāda has both warm friends and bitter enemies. Some raise the doctrine to the skies while others are not prepared to touch it even with a pair of tongs. A speaker utters a word, a hearer understands its meaning. Wherein lies the power to express the meaning? The linguistico-metaphysical view is that it is Sphoṭa. It is the vehicle of the idea which flashes on the mind or the impression produced on the mind on hearing the sound. When a word is uttered, the individual constituent letters disappear as soon as uttered. Each letter comes after its predecessor. The letters are never simultaously present. Therefore a 'group of sounds' can not express a meaning. Nor does an individual letter by itself convey the meaning, for, in that case, other letters in the word will be superfluous. The Sphoṭavādins attribute this function of conveying the meaning to Sphoṭa, the Word, which is independent of uttered letters and which lies at the back of them all. This Word is eternal (नित्य), indivisible (अखंड), not involving sequence (अक्रम). The uttered letters (वर्णसमूह) are just occasions of the expression of meaning (अभिव्यंजक) while Sphoṭa is what bursts forth (अभिव्यंग्य), when words are uttered. As such the uttered letters (वर्णसमूह) are secondary (गौण), while स्फोट is primary (प्रधान). On the same lines the Ālaṅkārikas or rhetoricians say that the

III. Metaphysical Doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā[56]

1. The Reality of the World. (a) Critical: Criticism of Buddhistic unreality. The external world is not a product of mere intellect (idea). Also no momentariness like that of an idea.[57] (b) Epistemological : Object exists because the report of one sense is corroborated by that of another. Hence the world, objective and real.[58] (c) Cosmological. The world is also eternal.

तस्मादद्यवदेवाऽत्र सर्गप्रलयकल्पना ।
समस्तक्षय जन्मभ्याम् न सिद्धत्यप्रमाणिका ।।
सर्वज्ञवन्निषेध्या च स्रष्टुः सद्भावकल्पना ।
'न च धर्मादृते तस्य भवेल्लोकाद्विशिष्टता ।।

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literal meaning (वाच्यार्थ) is secondary, while व्यंग्यार्थ or ध्वनि suggested by वाच्यार्थ is of primary importance. For the Ālaṅkārikas ध्वनि is the soul of poetry (काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिः is what आनंदवर्धन says). The uttered letters (वर्णसमूह) stand on the level of वाच्यार्थ and स्फोट stands on the level of व्यंग्यार्थ or ध्वनि. What वर्णसमूह is to स्फोट for the Sphoṭavādin, is what वाच्यार्थ is to व्यंग्य for the Ālaṅkārika. See also Foot Note 48 above.

56 Another version (which Prof. Ranade calls rough draft) which follows this section is, in some places, more elaborate than the present one and deserves a very careful study.

57 Two Buddhistic schools, viz. विज्ञानवाद and शून्यवाद are idealistic as they uphold the primacy of intellect. The world is nothing but a bundle of ideas. Mīmāṃsakas, on the contrary, are realists as according to them the world is through and through real and independent of any thinking subject. The world is eternally real, hence momentariness is a chimera.

58 For example, if we hear a bird's note with the ear, another sense, viz. the eye, can corroborate the existence of the bird by seeing it; further the skin can doubly support the first two senses by touching the bird.

न चाऽननुष्ठितो धर्मो नाऽनुष्ठानमृते मतेः ।
न च वेदादृते सा स्याद्वेदो न च पदादिभिः ।।
तस्मात्प्रागपि सर्वेऽमी स्रष्टुरासन् पदादयः' ।
स्यात्तत्पूर्वकता चाऽस्य चैतन्यादस्मदादिवत् ।।
एवं ये युक्तिभिः प्राहुस्तेषां दुर्लभमुत्तरम् ।
अन्वेष्यो व्यवहारोऽयं अनादिर्वेदवादिभिः ।।
- श्लोकवार्तिक, संबंधाक्षेपपरिहार (113–117).[59]

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59 Therefore the theory of Creation and Dissolution must be admitted to resemble the present every day processes (of production and destruction); and any particular idea of these with regard to the production and destruction of the whole universe cannot be established, for want of proofs (113). Even the existence of a Creator is to be rejected in the same manner as an omniscient person. Any such Creator cannot differ from ordinary people, except through (an excess of) *Dharma*; nor is *Dharma* possible without performance (of actions); and performance is not possible without an idea (of the action to be performed); this idea is not possible except from the Veda; nor is (a knowledge of) the Veda possible without (a comprehension of) words, and so on. Therefore it must be admitted that all these (Words and so on), existed before the Creator. And again, such a creator may be proved to have been preceded by the Veda, on account of His being an intelligent being like ourselves (who are preceded by the Veda) (114–116). It is impossible to give an adequate reply to the people who assert (the fact of the Creator being preceded by the Veda) on the ground of these reasonings explained in 114–116. Therefore the followers of the Veda must explain the usage (of Words) as being without a beginning (i.e. eternal) (117). (Śloka-vārtika by Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Tr. Ganga Nath Jha, The Asiatic Society, 1 Park Street, Calcutta, 1985, Pp. 368–369).

Uncreated (अनादि) and indestructible (अनंत). No Creator or God. The Atomistic Realism of the Mīmāṃsakas begins with Tryaṇukas and not with अणुs. Cf. Jaina Philosophy about Atmā and Sṛṣṭi.[60]

2. Proofs for the existence of the Self : Jaimini does not, but Śabara does give elaborate arguments for the existence of the Self. (a) Critical: Criticism of Buddhistic doctrine that one idea knows another. Hume and Buddhism: Separate and contiguous ideas. Like beads. James: enveloping Idea. Unity and continuity of mental life must be explained.[61] (b) स्वर्गकामो यजेत । [62] Therefore the self is Anumeya.[63] (c) (i) Cognition implies a cogniser. Self different from senses and mind. Cf. Śālikanātha. बुद्धीद्रियशरीरेभ्यो भिन्न आत्मा विभुर्ध्रुवः ।[64] The विभुआत्मा who is प्रति शरीरं नानाभूत is no other than the Vedāntic परमात्मा. Here there is incipient recognition of God. (ii) Yet the one self becomes many, cf. the next line of Śālikanātha: नानाभूतः प्रतिक्षेत्रमर्थवित्तिषु भासते । Śālikanātha, however, does not make clear whether the manifoldness is merely apparent or real. ''नानाभूतः'' may mean both. If नानाभूतः means apparent, then the individual self is unreal. If it is real, then it must posit a परमात्मा. (iii) According to

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60 Jainism also denies God as Creator. See Chapter IV Section IV.

61 See Foot Note 47 in Chapter III. Unity and continuity are possible only on the basis of an abiding self.

62 दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत ।(ऐतेरय ब्राह्मण VI. 4) (One who desires heaven should perform new-and-full moon sacrifice).

63 For performing a sacrifice an agent is necessary. So the existence of self is inferred (अनुमेय) from the performance of the sacrifice.

64 प्रकरणपंचिका (प्रभाकरमतानुसारि मीमांसादर्शनम्) by शालिकनाथ, Pp. 141 ff.

Prabhākara and Kumārila similarly, selves are many; all eternal. नित्यः सर्वगतः पुमान्। (श्लोकवार्तिक, आत्मवाद, verse 73).[65] Is this not itself ambiguous?[66] (iv) The real argument for plurality of selves in Mīmāṃsā, however, is epistemological. Plurality of selves, because same reports about an object, e.g. the sun.[67] Also analogy of the relation of bodily activity and feeling to mind.[68] (d) Even dream experience, say the Mīmāṃsakas, implies a real substratum viz. the Self.[69] (e) The Self as the seat of Apūrva[70]. (f) Reality of moral values. Punishment. The sower and the reaper must be the same.[71] (g) Transmigration also implies the soul. The sea remains despite the movements of its waves. The serpent uncoils without change of essence.[72]

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65 ज्ञानशक्तिस्वभावोऽतो नित्यः सर्वगतः पुमान्।
देहान्तरक्षमः कल्प्यः सोऽगच्छन्नेव योक्ष्यते ।।
(Therefore you must admit that there is a person (Soul) bearing the potentialities of Ideas, and being eternal, omnipresent, and capable of (migrating into) another body. And as such, even though not actually moving, it would become connected with another body). Ślokavārtika by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, Tr. Ganga Nath Jha, P. 395.

66 If the self is omnipresent (सर्वगत) from where and to where would it migrate? Hence the ambiguity.

67 The report of one self is corroborated by another self. As the reports are the same, the other seer must be a human self. Hence follows the plurality.

68 See R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, Pp. 119–120.

69 There cannot be a dream unless there is a dreamer. Descartes-wise, a dream implies a dreamer.

70 Ibid. P. 119.

71 Ibid. P. 119

72 Ibid. P. 119

3. Criticism of the Doctrine of God : (a) Vedas and no God; Apūrva or invisible potency of actions, and no God. Yet Āstika Darśana, Apauruṣeya.[73] ''नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः ।'' According to मीमांसा therefore Naiyāyika is Nāstika in this sense.[74] अपूर्व of the मीमांसक is a moral force; and the अदृष्ट of the वैशेषिक is a cosmic force. (b) *A fortiori*, no deities. हविस् more important than देवता. हविषा नियम्येत सूक्तभाजो हविर्भाजश्च देवताः ।[75] Deities partake in हविस् which is, therefore, more fundamental. The fruit of sacrifice does not proceed from deities. Devatās are गुण (subordinate). They are only symbols. Mantras are deities मंत्रशरीराः देवताः । No synonym can be used, e.g. Pāvaka for Agni cannot be used. For अग्निमीळे पुरोहितम्,[76] we cannot use वह्निमीळे पुरोहितम्. (c) Criticism of the proof of God; Jainistic: No omniscience, no omnipotence, no benevolence, no fore-knowledge. Contradictions of one with another.[77] What motive again could God have for creating

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73 The Vedas are an infallible authority. They are अपौरुषेय, i.e. produced by no author, human or divine. They are self-existent.

74 According to Nyāya, God is supreme and the Vedas occupy a subordinate position. As the Naiyāyikas have not elevated the Vedas to the highest position, they might be deemed नास्तिक्स by Mīmāṃsakas.

75 The line means – 'The Devatas (deities) who have a share in the oblations and who have to be addressed by particular hymns, are to be restrained by the oblations.'

76 Ṛgveda I. 1.1.

77 God's attributes viz. omniscience (all-knowing), omnipotence (all-powerful), fore-knowledge (knowing an event before it happens) do not go hand in hand with benevolence (kindness). If God knows everything, to wit, even before it happens, why does he not prevent human beings from doing wrong? Again if he is all-powerful why does he not remove peoples' suffering?

Vaiṣamya and Nairghṛṇya, seems to be the objection urged against God by Mīmāṃsakas. Vaiṣamya and Nairghṛṇya are arguments used by Jainas also for the disproof of God. Cf. स्याद्वाद-मंजरी.[78] Finite God.[79] God is the sum-total of all privation of knowledge: ज्ञानाभावनिश्चयः । (See Kane).[80]

[Rough Draft

Sections IIIA and IIIB in this rough draft are made to constitute Section III in the fair draft above and are together entitled: The Metaphysical Doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā.

IIIA. Mīmāṃsā Criticism of Buddhism

See Keith, Pp. 44–52; also Pp. 64–69.[81] Also

So his benevolence cannot be explained.

78 Vaiṣamya (moral evil) and Nairghṛṇya (physical evil) should not remain in the world if God is omnipotent and benevolent. See Chapter IV, Section IV.

79 See R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, P. 83.

80 न चेश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञानमपि सिध्यति ज्ञानहेत्वभावेन ज्ञानाभावनिश्चयात्.... (See Dr. P. V. Kane, A Brief Sketch of The Pūrvamīmāṃsā System, Address delivered on the opening of the Mīmāṃsā Vidyālaya at Poona, on 10th August 1924, P. 22, Foot Note 35). A privative term signifies loss of some quality, which is usually present. God may have omniscience, omnipotence or fore-knowledge; but he cannot use them. As a result, evil remains in the world and God loses the quality of benevolence also. See Foot Note 77 above.

81 A gist of these pages from Keith is given below.
The doctrine of Nāgārjuna, doubtless an effective restatement of the tendencies earlier manifested in the Buddhist schools, denies at once the reality of the external world.... The dialectic of Nāgārjuna, an Eastern parallel of Zeno urged paradoxes

Śloka-vārtika.[82] (i) We must posit the reality of the external world; of virtue and vice; of teacher and pupil. Even in dream cognition, we must posit a real substratum. The external world is not a product of mere intellect. Our ideas are imposed upon us by an external reality. (ii) It is wrong to say that "cognition" alone exists, to the exclusion of cogniser and cognised. (iii) No idea can comprehend itself; nor any one idea be comprehended by another. It is wrong to say that one idea as it originates, becomes known to the first. (iv) The unity and continuity of our mental life cannot be explained without the recognition of a

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which evoked replies from Nyāya and Vedānta that sought to refute his heresies. The reply of Mīmāṃsā is given in Vṛttikāra as cited in the Bhāṣya. There is a subtle dialectic between the Vṛttikāra and the Buddhist opponent on the reality of the external world, knowledge of the external world or knowledge of the idea.

There are some differences of opinion whether the criticism is against शून्यवाद or विज्ञानवाद. The value of Kumārila's refutation of the Buddhist schools is not inconsiderable; he brings out fully the grave difficulties which meet any effort to account for the facts of life without accepting some permanent entity. This criticism is regarding the existence of the external world. Then there is the criticism against the Buddhistic idea of no-self (covered in points (V) to (VIII) above). The Mīmāṃsā conclusion is that the soul, with the aid of the mind, is the enjoyer of all experience; the sense organs are the instruments; and the body is the abode of the sense organs and the mind, through whose instrumentality the soul has experience (A.B. Keith, The Karma Mīmāṃsā, Association Press, 1921).

82 For निरालंबनवाद see verses 1–197 and for शून्यवाद verses 1–264 in श्लोकवार्तिक.

substantival unity of the self. In Hume and Buddhism one idea contiguous with and yet separate from another. In James the next idea envelopes the first. (v) The law of retribution requires that the sower and reaper of actions must be the same. (vi) The Buddhist cannot explain "transmigration". A momentary idea cannot transmigrate itself. It is the soul alone which transmigrates. "The sea remains, despite the movements of its waves; the serpent uncoils, without change of essence." (vii) The fact that I *feel* with my hand what I *see* with my eyes shows that there exists something *beyond* sense-organs. (viii) Other souls also exist. The "perception" of another soul is impossible, but one can "infer" another soul from the activity of its body.

IIIB. Metaphysics: World, Self, God

(1) The World eternally existent :

Tasmādadyavadevātra sarga-pralaya-kalpanā,
Samastakṣayajanmabhyām na sidhyatyapramāṇikā
Tasmāt-prāgapi sarvemī sraṣṭuḥ āsan padādayaḥ
Anveṣyovyavahāroyamanādirvedavādibhiḥ

(Ślokavārtika, Sambandhākṣepa-parihāra, Verses 113–117).

Neither creation nor destruction of the world. No creator required.

(2) Jaimini gives no Sūtras for the establishment of the Self. The Self is only to be inferred: Svargakāmo yajeta. Though Jaimini is silent, Śabara enters into an elaborate proof of the soul which is independent of the body and senses, and beyond pleasure and pain. According to Prabhākara and Kumārila, there are many souls, all eternal: Nityaḥ sarvagataḥ pumān (Śloka-vārtika, Ātma-vāda, verse 73). Cf. also Śālikanātha.

Buddhīndriyaśarīrebhyo bhinna ātmā vibhurdhruvaḥ
Nānābhūtaḥ pratikṣetramarthavittiṣu bhāsate

(Prakaraṇa-pañcikā, Ātma-tattva, Pp. 141 ff).

(3) God is not required in Mīmāṃsā for giving rewards and punishments. The Apūrva or the invisible potency alone can do so. Jaimini says that the deity is Guṇa, or subsidiary in a sacrifice. Havis is more important than Devatā, cf. Haviṣā niyamyeta (Pūrva Mīmāṃsā VIII. 1. 32), and Guṇatve devatāśrutiḥ (Pūrva Mīmāṃsā IX. 1. 9). The deity has no body. The sacrifice cannot be intended to please the deity. The deity is not the Lord of all things. The fruit of the sacrifice does not proceed from the deity. The deities of the sacrifices are merely symbols and objects to whom Sūktas are addressed: Sūktabhājo havirbhājaśca devatāḥ. They are to be distinguished from the deities of the Purāṇas, which occupy a higher position. No synonym can be employed for Devatās. We cannot substitute the word Pāvaka or Śuci for Agni. No personal god required for creating the world. God is not omniscient. As there can be no object of knowledge, God has neither knowledge nor omniscience. He is only the sum total of all privation of knowledge. Jñānābhāva-niścayaḥ (see Kane).

For the arguments which Mīmāṃsā uses against God, see Keith, Pp. 61–64; also Śloka-vārtika. Cf. Jainistic arguments against God. The arguments can be summed up as follows: (1) Impossibility of God having a body. If he has a body, then there must be a matter which must have existed before him. (ii) What can be his motive in creation? Why does he feel a desire to multiply? (iii) Why should God create a world full of misery, if he is all good? Hence God is not benevolent. Vaiṣamya-nairghṛṇya-prasaṅgāt.[83] (iv) If there is moral evil in the world, God is either not omniscient or not omnipotent. (v) He has also no fore-knowledge. Did God fore-know the Bamrauli disaster? God's knowledge and power conflict with his goodness; his

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83 See Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra II. 1. 34.

fore-knowledge conflicts with man's freedom.

Here the rough draft ends].

IV. Contribution to the Science of Interpretation

The Tarkapāda of Jaimini, viz., I.1, is dedicated to a discussion of philosophical topics. The remaining Pādas of the first, and the other Adhyāyas upto the twelfth are devoted to a discussion of the principles of ritual interpretation.

The "Arthavāda" discussed in I. 2 has its value in extolling desirable or censuring forbidden acts; it thus comes into immediate connection with injunctions or prohibitions.

I.3. discusses the relation of Smṛti to Veda. Below Smṛti in value comes the practice of good men. I. 4. discusses the subject of Names or Nāmadheya. It seems that the Mīmāṃsā felt the necessity of dealing wth a number of obscure sacrificial terms.

Mīmāṃsā (II. 1) develops such principles as Ekavākyatā[84] (syntactical unity), Vākyabheda[85] (syntactical split) and Anuṣaṅga[86] i.e. the principle of extension.

Vidhis or injunctions are encitements to actions. Action may be either positive or negative, or may partake of both characters.

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84 एकवाक्यता means consistency in meaning, unanimity, or reconciling different statements. Short, simple sentences may by themselves be meaningful and independent. However, a complex sentence may be formed out of them which expresses a wider meaning. All statements are brought together in a consistent way to have a larger application. This is एकवाक्यता. See Foot Notes 96 and 97 below.

85 वाक्यभेद means a different assertion, a divergent statement.

86 अनुषंग means a mode of interpreting an incomplete sentence by supplying the required word or words from the immediate context.

When it is negative, it is called Pratiṣedha and when it partakes of both characters, it is called Paryudāsa.[87]

Actions may also be classified as Puruṣārtha[88] and Kratvartha[89] done for the sake of the agent and done for the sake of the offering.

Injunctions or Vidhis are primarily of three kinds : Adhikāra-vidhi or Vidhi relating to qualification, Utapatti-vidhi or originative injunction and Viniyoga-vidhi or injuction of application.

Originative injunctions are few in number, relating that they do to the principal Vedic offering only; they do no more than excite in the mind of a hearer the desire to perform the action.

Injunctions of application denote the exact manner of procedure (itikartavyatā) by specifying the numerous subsidiary actions. These subsidiary actions are called Śeṣas, and the distinction between Śeṣa and Śeṣin occupies the greater part of the attention of the Mīmāṃsā.

While dealing with injunctions of application, we may note the six means by which the relations of subordination of actions

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87 पर्युदास is an exception. It is indirect negation as opposed to direct negation which is called प्रसज्य-प्रतिषेध. To say that students of a particular university, say X university, should not apply for a post, is प्रसज्य-प्रतिषेध or direct negation. On the other hand, to say that students other than those of X university should alone apply is पर्युदास or indirect negation. The import of प्रसज्य-प्रतिषेध is prohibition, that of पर्युदास is exclusion.

88 पुरुषार्थ is something which, when done, results in the satisfaction of the performer.

89 "Something that is meant to subserve the purpose of the sacrifice", is क्रत्वर्थ. This is opposite of पुरुषार्थ.

may be determined. These are : Śruti or express declaration; Liṅga or indirect implication; Vākya or syntactical connection; Prakaraṇa or context; Krama or order which is the same thing as Sthāna or position; and finally Samākhyā or names. Each of these means is deemed to be of "less" value than the preceding. Contrast the Paribhāṣā of Śekhara (38) :

पूर्व-पर-नित्य-अंतरंग-अपवादानाम् उत्तरोत्तरम् बलीयः ।

(Keilhorn translation, P.185).[90]

In addition to this division according to content, injunctions may be classified on the basis of the knowledge possessed by the agent of the mode of performance. There are thus three kinds of

90 कात्यायनवार्तिक I. 3. 11. This maxim teaches that when two rules are equally weighty, the grammatical operation should proceed according to the rule which comes later. पर (later rule) is enjoined in preference to the पूर्व (earlier rule). But if the earlier rule deals with regularly prescribed action (नित्य) or with an essential part of the base of a word (अंतरंग) or with a special rule or order or command (अपवाद), the grammatical operation should proceed as per the earlier rule. Here पूर्व (earlier rule) is preferred to पर (later rule). This is the practice of grammar, and the quotation under reference comes from a grammarian. Thus मीमांसा and व्याकरण hold opposite views. In मीमांसा there is उत्तरोत्तर दौर्बल्य; in grammar on the other hand, there is उत्तरोत्तर प्राबल्य. However, in the realm of मीमांसा, मीमांसा–maxims (वेदोक्तविधिs) are honoured. In the realm of grammar, grammatical maxims (पाणिनिसूत्रs) carry the day. The upshot seems to be: Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's (Matthew 22.21). अंतरंग should prevail over नित्य, and अपवाद over अंतरंग. पूर्व, पर, नित्य, अंतरंग and अपवाद constitute the grades of priority.

Vidhis again, Apūrva-vidhi or original injunction, Niyama-vidhi or restrictive injunction, and Parisaṅkhyā-vidhi or injunction of limitation or exclusion. Over against these Vidhis or injunctions which direct a positive act, there are prohibitions or Niṣedhas, e.g., the Brahmacārin must not look at the sun.

The above are the main topics with which Pādas 2–4 of Adhyāya I and Adhyāyas II–VI of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras deal. Adhyāyas VII and VIII discuss Atideśa or transference. The process of transference, however, involves modifications (Ūhas) which are discussed in Adhyāya IX. In other cases, the transference must be accompanied by the annulment of details, which are discussed in Adhyāya X. Adhyāya XI discusses the relation of subsidiary to principal offerings, and Adhyāya XII discusses the topic of options or Vikalpa. These last might be either Vyavasthita, fixed or limited and Avyavasthita, that is to say, unlimited (see Keith. Chapter V).

The rules of Interpretation which the Mīmānsā laid down were later utilised by the Dharma-śāstras for the interpretation of their texts, and they may also be found to harmonise with the rules of interpretation which modern Law employs. Compare Maxwell.[91]

The first rule of the interpretation of Statutes is that words and sentences must be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning, which is the same as the Mīmāṃsā rule of Śruti. Another rule is that conflict between the statutes is not to be readily assumed, which is the same as laid down in Mīmāṃsā,

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91 Maxwell's book, On Interpretation of Statutes is a well known, indeed a classic work on law. The fourth impression of the 12th edition (1976) is published by N. M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., 164 Samaldas Gandhi Marg, Bombay 400 002, 1981.

that an option is to be declared only in the last resort. Another rule is that we must take into account the history of the causes of an enactment corresponding to the rule of Prakaraṇa or context in Mīmāṃsā. Another rule is that all the parts of a statute are to be construed together and each part is not to be construed separately, which corresponds to the rule of Vākya or syntactical connection in Mīmāṃsā.[92]

The Mīmāṃsā tells us that the principal word in a sentence is the verb, and that the subject is, therefore subordinate; and hence the attributes or Viśeṣaṇas of the subject are not to be supposed to be intended as a necessary part of the rule or proposition. The king is entitled to the tax on land, and not to the land itself. The sovereign ruler is not an absolute owner of his kingdom, and can not make a gift of it. In the Viśvajit sacrifice where every thing is to be given away, the sacrificer can not make a gift of the things deposited with him, or of his wife, or of his children.

Then again there is arguing from Similars; thus for example, if a Niṣāda is allowed to offer a Rudrayāga, if follows that a Śūdra can also do so.

An Arthavāda[93] is not a positive command like Vidhi. When Mitākṣarā says that one should kill without deliberation even a

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92 Kishori Lal Sarkar, a well-known legal scholar wrote a work on Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation and drew a comparison of the rules of Mīmāṃsā with Maxwell's interpretation of statutes. Dr. P. V. Kane criticises Kishori Lal Sarkar's approach. (See History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. V, Part II, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1977, Pp. 1284 ff).

93 अर्थवाद is an explanatory matter. "The value of अर्थवाद lies in either extolling desirable or censuring forbidden acts" (A. B. Keith, The Karma-mīmāṃsā, P. 80).

Guru, a child, an old man, or a learned Brahmin if he comes as an Ātatāyin, this is merely an Arthavāda and not a Vidhi or command. That sons have not the competence to divide in their father's life-time, is merely an Arthavāda extolling the prohibition to do so.

Kratvartha Vidhis are those which are of absolute obligation, and Puruṣārtha Vidhis are those which are addressed to the conscience of the agent. A breach of the first brings on sin, of the second only blame or censure. Compare Duties of perfect and imperfect obligation in Kant.[94] When Yājñavalkya says that one should marry a girl who is free from disease, who has a brother, and who is not of the same Gotra or Pravara, the last is Kratvartha and the first two are Puruṣārtha. When Manu tells us that the son to be adopted is to be given by the mother or father "in distress", the "distress" is not Kratvartha but Puruṣārtha.

Krama is illustrated in allowing, e.g. a mother a prior claim, for the word *pitarau* is explained in grammatical treatises as Mātā pitarau which means mother and father and not father and mother. Sometimes, however, there is difficulty about the understanding

94 Duties of perfect obligation are (i) perfection of oneself and (ii) happiness of others. We should avoid perfection of others because if we try to perfect others it would be restraining their freedom. Again we need not pursue our happiness as a duty because we naturally seek it. Now duties of imperfect obligation are less strict. If we do them they bring on merit; but if we do not do them they do not bring on sin. Doing such acts is a virtue but not doing it, is not a vice but moral weakness. If you save a drowning man it is virtue; if you drown him more it is vice; but if you do not do either, it is moral weakness (See E. Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. II, Glassgow, James, Maclehose and Sons, second edition, 1909, Pp. 352–355).

of this Krama, e.g. when Yājñavalkya says that the heirs of a hermit are the teacher, the good pupil, and a fellow student in order, the Mitākṣarā says that the order is to be reversed as common sense would require it. We may not, however, agree with Mitākṣarā.

Options are always an improper procedure, as both texts are thereby nullified. Hence if possible an endeavour should be made to explain the negative proposition as an exception (Paryudāsa)[95] or as an Anuvāda.

The Anuvāda is merely a variety of Arthavāda, as in the Vedic sentence 'Fire should not be consecrated on the bare ground, nor in the sky, nor in heaven.' Every one knows that no one can consecrate fire in the sky, and therefore this sentence is a mere Anuvāda for praising the Vidhi that fire must be consecrated on ground with gold. As an illustration of the Nityānuvāda we can give the instance that a man can donate what he owns, but there is no ownership in a deposit, or in wife, or children, e.g., Dharma and Draupadī. This prohibition repeats only what is well-known. When, again, Manu apparently both allows and condemns Niyoga, the Mitākṣarā tells us that this is to be understood in a "limited" sense, viz., that a maiden may marry the deceased's brother, if the intended husband dies before actual marriage. Manusmṛti (IX. 59) defines Nioyoga as follows:

Devarādvā sapiṇḍādvā striyā samyaṅ-niyuktayā

Prajepsitādhigantavyā santānasya parīkṣaye.

In this way Paṇḍu and Dhṛtarāṣṭra were born from Vyāsa from the widows of Vicitravīrya.

When it is enacted that words in the singular shall include the

95 See Foot Note 87 above.

plural, the Mīmāṃsā illustrates this by enjoining that when it is said that a vessel is to be cleansed, it is implied that all vessels are to be cleansed.

Finally, the fault called Vākyabheda occurs when one and the same sentence is construed as laying down two different rules or Vidhis, vide Śābarabhāṣya P. 1[96] and P. 44[97] for examples of Vākyabheda (see Kane).

V. The Ethical Ideal of the Mīmāṃsā

1. Jaimini's division of the Veda in five parts. The mass of the Vedas being vast, Jaimini divides it into five parts: Vidhi, Arthavāda, Nāmadheya, Pratiṣedha and Mantra.

2. Relation of Vidhi to Arthavāda. Difference between Vidhi and Arthavāda. Command-injunction and fact-assertion. Cf. Hume :

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96 न हि एतदेकं वाक्यं पुरस्ताच्च वेदाध्ययनात् धर्मजिज्ञासां प्रतिषेधिष्यति परस्ताच्चाऽऽनन्तर्यं प्रकरिष्यति । भिद्येत हि तथा वाक्यम् । अन्या हि वचनव्यक्तिरस्य, पुरस्ताद् वेदाध्ययनात् धर्मजिज्ञासां प्रतिषेधति । अन्या च परस्तादानन्तर्य्यमुपदिशति ॥ (श्रीमज्जैमिनिप्रणीत मीमांसादर्शन सव्याख्यशाबरभाष्यसमेते जैमिनिसूत्र, प्रथमो भागः, Editor V. G. Apte, P. 5). This is Śabara's commentary on Jaimini-sūtra I. 1. 1. During the course of discussion on the meaning of अथ, it is stated that to say that the enquiry into धर्म is to be taken up after the reading of the Veda does not prevent a person from the study of धर्म before reading the Vedas. Had it been so there would be two distinct sentences (वाक्यभेद) viz. (i) 'one should not enquire into Dharma before reading the Veda' and (ii) 'one should undertake the enquiry after one has read the Veda' (See Śābarabhāṣya, Tr. Ganga Nath Jha, Vol. I, Pp. 1–2).

97 The same topic is discussed in the commentary on Jaimini-sūtra I. 1.25 (Ibid. Pp. 44–45).

Relations of ideas and matters of fact.[98] Sometimes Arthavāda may not be a fact. e.g. (i) Rāma says to Cara: अर्थवादः खल्वेषः दोषं तु मे किंचित् कथय etc. (उत्तररामचरित).[99] (ii) बर्हिषि रजतं न देयम्, says the priest. सोऽरोदीत्[100] etc. because they adduce the story that when अग्नि ate the oblation on the way, he was beaten by the gods and his tears became silver. Therefore gold should be given in sacrifice as Dakṣiṇā and not silver.[101] This is Stuti of Suvarṇa

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98 "The distinction is not merely introduced by Hume but is emphasized by him. Leibnitz has talked of necessary truths and contingent truths; Hume talks of relations of ideas and relations of objects (matters of fact). The first is the way in which consistency is demonstrated, it is the deductive way of reasoning and is now called 'formal implication'. The second is the argument from probability or an inductive way of reasoning. The former gives us formal validity, the latter, material truth. By the first, Hume argues, we will never reach matters of fact, it always takes the form of hypothetical reasoning; if *P* were so and so, *q* would be so and so; it will never tell us what *P* or *q* exactly are, or whether they actually *are* at all... The second way talks of actual things. Whatever is treated in the former way is only an epistemological existence but the latter claims an ontological being." (S. S. Barlingay and Padma Kulkarni, A Critical Survey of Western Philosophy, P. 186).

99 भवभूति's उत्तररामचरितम्, First Act, Nirṇaya Sāgar edition, 1930, P. 42.

100 सोऽरोदीत् (तैत्तिरीयसंहिता I. 5. 1. 1).

101 Once the deity Fire ran away with some precious booty the gods had deposited with him. When they chased him, he cried and his tears became silver. Hence silver should not be given as remuneration to the priests in the Barhiṣ sacrifice; for it is sure to cause weeping in the sacrificer's family within a year (See Vedānta-paribhāṣā of Dharmarājādvarīndra, Tr. Swami

and Nindā of Rajata. Various kinds of Vidhi (see Kane, Pūrvamīmānsā, page 20) such as Niyama, Parisaṅkhyā, Nitya, Naimittika, Kāmya, Utpatti, Viniyoga, Prayoga and Adhikāra; also Kratvartha and Puruṣārtha. Vidhi or Niyoga means a mandate of the Veda. Arthavāda has no independent logical status and has to be interpreted as contributory to Vidhi. "Action" is the final import of the Veda: आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात् । आनर्थक्यं अतदर्थानाम् ।[102] Contrast Upaniṣads which are not क्रियार्थ but only ज्ञानप्रतिपादक. The Upaniṣadic dictum Tattvamasi, though assertive in character, refers only to a kind of action (Kriyā), which will bring on the result. Cf. Tantra-vārtika P. 13: एतेन क्रत्वर्थ-कर्तृप्रतिपादक-प्रतिपादन-द्वारेण उपनिषदां नैराकांक्ष्यं व्याख्यातम् ।[103] No "is" but "ought" in Tattvamasi.[104]

Madhavananda, P. 105).

102 The very opening statement in Kumārila's तंत्रवार्तिक, his Commentary on Śābarabhāṣya. The purport of the Veda is performance of action. आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानां तस्मात् अनित्यमुच्यते । (पूर्वपक्ष). (The purpose of the Veda lying in the enjoining of actions, those parts of the Veda which do not serve that purpose are useless, in these, therefore, the Veda is declared to be non-eternal (unreliable). (Śābara-bhāṣya, Tr. Ganga Nath Jha, Vol I, Gaikwad's Oriental Series, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1933, P. 51).

103 तंत्रवार्तिक on I. 2. 7. (श्रीमज्जैमिनिप्रणीत मीमांसादर्शन, Ed., V. G. Apte, P. 114).

104 The dictum तत्त्वमसि according to मीमांसकs is not a statement of fact; but it is prescriptive in that it prescribes the attainment of an ideal. As such it implies performance of action. Apart from the metaphysical implication, there is also an ethical implication, namely, one should not be complacent on the assurance that one is already Brahman, but must strive for the

3. Dharma: the Ideal in earlier Mīmāṃsā. It is the Vidhis which can lay down Dharma. The Ideal in earlier Mīmāṃsā is Dharma, Artha and Kāma being subordinated to it. Nitya and Kāmya-karmas constitute Dharma and Pratiṣiddha-karmas constitute Adharma. The Kāmya may be and Pratiṣiddha Karmas must be avoided; but Nitya-karmas cannot be so avoided. The Ideal in later Mīmāṃsā is Mokṣa.

4. The Meaning of Apūrva. (i) Relation of Dharma to Apūrva: the true sphere of Dharma is trans-empirical. (धर्ममध्यें धर्म स्वरूपीं राहणें हा स्वधर्म). [105] Providing Prapās[106] e.g., says Śabara, would not constitute Dharma because Vedas do not enjoin it. The Aṣṭakāśrāddha (Aṣṭamīśrāddha) may have been enjoined by a Lupta-śruti; therefore it may be performed, says Śaṅkara. Cf. Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Smṛtipāda.[107] Prabhākara gives the name Apūrva to Dharma and Adharma. Apūrva is inaccessible to any Pramāṇa except Veda (Mānāntarāpūrva).[108] Different kinds of

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realisation of the ideal.

105 Rāmadāsa says that धर्म consists in abiding in one's own form (Dāsabodha, VIII. 9. 54).

106 प्रपा is a place where water is distributed to travellers. This is just an act of benevolence and is done in the worldly sphere and is not prescribed by Veda.

107 Brahma-sūtra II. 1.3. The अष्टकादिस्मृति prescribes the performance of अष्टकाश्राद्ध. But the Śruti enjoining the sacrifice is lost (लुप्त). However, other Śrutis do not contradict the performance of अष्टकाश्राद्ध. Hence अष्टकादिस्मृति is taken to be based on some Śruti (though now lost) and is regarded as authoritative.

108 The sphere of Dharma is trans-empirical i.e. the other world and not the world of every-day experience (see Foot Note 106 above). Prabhākara gives the name Apūrva to Dharma and

Apūrva, such as Phalāpūrva, Samudāyāpūrva, Utpattyapūrva, Aṅgāpūrva. Vide Jaiminīya Nyāya-mālā-vistāra on II. 1. 5. Cf. also यदि अन्यदनुत्पाद्य यागो विनश्येत् फलमसति निमित्ते न स्यात्। Śabara on II. 1. 5.[109] (See also Ganga Nath Jha, "Prābhākara School" in detail. The whole book must in fact be studied. See our markings on Contents). (ii) Adṛṣṭa and Apūrva: The Adṛṣṭa of the Vaiśeṣikas is a cosmical principle. The Apūrva of the Mīmāṃsakas is the moral counter-part of it.[110] Atoms, Adṛṣṭa

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Adharma otherwise known as Puṇya and Pāpa. Apūrva is the result of sacrificial actions. This result abides in the self and is not objective like the sacrificial acts. Hence, not being objective, it is मानान्तरापूर्व, i.e. not accessible to any Pramāṇa except the Veda.

109 The Sanskrit quotation means: "....so that if the sacrifice were to perish without bringing into existence something else, then the cause having ceased to exist, the result (in the shape of Heaven) could never come about." (Śābarabhāṣya, Tr. Ganga Nath Jha, P. 175). The implication is that every sacrifice must produce its result viz. अपूर्व.

110 According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, when God wills to create the world, He takes into account the stock of merit and demerit (Adṛṣṭa) which the individual souls have earned. The Adṛṣṭa thus serves the cosmological purpose of creation. Though the Adṛṣṭa has a moral aspect, it is controlled by God. The Apūrva, on the other hand, works independently of God and dispenses rewards and punishments on individuals according to their deserts. In Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the merit and demerit (अदृष्ट) are used as a basis of creation; in Mīmāṃsā, the merit and demerit (अपूर्व) are used for dispensing justice. The former is cosmological while the latter is moral.

and God.[111] Cf. Matter, Motion and void in Democritus,[112] as well as the indeterminate jumping of electrons in modern science.[113] The Jack out of the Box.[114] "Indeterminism".[115]

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111 The atomism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is not purely mechanistic, but is spiritual in the last resort. The ultimate cause of the operation of atoms lies in the creative will of God. Atoms are set in motion when God wills to create the universe, which He does by taking into consideration the Adṛṣṭa of individuals. See also Foot Note 110 above.

112 Matter, according to Democritus, is divided into infinitely small bodies which are not further divisible. They are called atoms. The atoms are endowed with perpetual motion. The very fact that atoms are in motion pre-supposes that void exists. In fact void is the condition for the play of atoms. See also Foot Note 5 in Chapter IV and Foot Note 100 in Chapter V.

113 This refers to the Uncertainty Principle in quantum mechanics according to which it is impossible to measure simultaneously and exactly two related quantities, for example, the position and momentum of an electron. Heisenberg called it the Principle of Indeterminacy.

114 Jack in the Box is a toy consisting of a box from which a grotesque little figure on a spring, jumps up when the lid is lifted.

115 Determinism and indeterminism are perennial problems in philosophy. None of the two theories can either be proved or disproved. Therefore William James, the great psychologist, comes to the conclusion that Freedom or indeterminism – like God – is a matter of faith. He for one opts for indeterminism from a pragmatic point of view. If determinism is accepted the future will be nothing but an unfolding of determined events. The principle of evil which has been a part of the universe throughout its known history will always remain there. No one

The Apūrva of the Mīmāṃsakas is equally indeterminate. (iii) The Five-fold Character of Apūrva: (a) The ritualistic character of Apūrva as being the indeterminate effect of a sacrificial act which abides in the self (Ātmasamavāyi). (b) The metaphysical character of Apūrva as taking the place of God.[116] (c) The moral character of Apūrva as bestowing reward and punishment for virtue and vice. A lame moralism and a lamer theism.[117] (d) The psychical character of Apūrva as being the traces (Saṃskāras) in the self as brought out in a dream, a fact of which the Mīmāṃsakas make epistemological use.[118] (Cf. Keith page

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can act on his own and eradicate it, for determinism does not allow such freedom to act. On the other hand, indeterminism offers a chance for the world to be altogether good. Again, as a psychological fact, freedom is there, because we feel ourselves to be free. So psychologically indeterminism is accepted. Pragmatically it holds out the hope for a better future (See R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Pp. 371 ff).

116 In meting out justice the अपूर्व acts as the supreme authority. And as the supreme principle it is equal to God in metaphysics.

117 When अपूर्व which is itself an indeterminate principle, is given the function of bestowing rewards and punishments, the moral theory becomes lame or crippled. And this chance-principle discharging moral functions on its own, with little regard for God, makes theism lamer or highly ineffective.

118 The मीमांसक्s say that अपूर्व is a trace (संस्कार) in the self. This is the basis of error in both Prabhākara and Kumārila. In Prabhākara, this trace, in the form of memory is responsible for confusion of a present object and a memory image, e.g. present object like a rope is mistaken for a snake which is a memory image. Thus the psychological fact of traces (संस्कारs) is used in epistemology to explain error. "In other cases the explanation rests, not upon the intervention of memory, but on

20). See below. (c) The epistemological character of Apūrva as being responsible for the fusion of impressions, which in Prabhākara leads to Akhyāti; and for new creation which in Kumārila leads to Viparītakhyāti.[119] (iv) Vedāntic criticism of Apūrva. While Jaimini regards Dharma or Apūrva as the bestower of fruit, Bādarāyaṇa regards God or Pūrva as the bestower (cf. III. 2.38, 40, 41).[120] The Pūrvamīmāṃsā is really

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fusion of impressions. Thus the white shell appears as yellow as a result of jaundice, the cognition being a blend of the shell perceived without colour" (A. B. Keith, The Karma-Mīmāṃsā, P. 20).

119 Prabhākara's view of error is known as अख्याति or 'no-knowledge'. It is actually 'no-knowledge' of the difference between the rope and the serpent. In Kumārila a rope is said to be mistaken for a serpent because there is a wrong synthesis of the two things. At the same time Kumārila says that it is a unitary experience because there is no combination of two elements as the single object appears to be what it is not; it is distorted – विपरीत. Kumārila's view is known as विपरीतख्याति. The distortion is due to previous संस्कारs or impressions of the serpent. अख्याति is an error of omission because the difference between the rope and the serpent is not noticed; it is a fallacy of non-observation. On the other hand, विपरीतख्याति is an error of commission because in the place of a rope something else (serpent) is seen, though there is no warrant for it; it is a fallacy of mal-observation (See Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 313–317).

120 The criticism that Vedānta levels against अपूर्व is contained in Brahma-sūtra III. 2. 38. Śaṅkara in his commentary on this Sūtra points out that as अपूर्व is non-intelligent, it cannot operate unless there is some initiative from a conscious principle. Moreover, there is no criterion or प्रमाण to prove the existence of Apūrva.

Apūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta is really Pūrvamīmāṃsā as it deals with God.

5. Mokṣa, the Ideal in Later Mīmāṃsā. The conception of Mokṣa in Mīmāṃsā. For Prabhākara's and Kumārila's opinions on this head, see next point. "The Mīmāṃsā refutes the Vedāntic view that the physical world is sublated or transcended in the state of Mokṣa. The world endures in the same form, even if the soul becomes free.[121] Cf. also Mīmāṃsā criticism of the Vedāntic "Absolute" and of "Nescience."

6. Doctrine of "Jñāna-karma-samuccaya". Jñāna or the knowledge of the self obtained in the process of meditation is only a "contributory" aid, and then the doctrine is known as "Jñāna-karma-samuccaya".[122] But this might be criticised both by Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta which respectively uphold Karma and Jñāna.[123] (See Sureśvarācārya's criticism of Jñāna-karma-samuccaya in his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi).[124] In that doctrine, how-

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Śaṅkara adds in his commentary on Brahma-sūtra III. 2. 41 that according to Bādarāyaṇa, God, already referred to (पूर्व तु), is the giver of fruit.

121 See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, P. 333.

122 Ibid. P. 335.

123 Mīmāṃsā lays great stress on performance of Karma, and Advaita Vedānta holds that Mokṣa is achieved only through knowledge.

124 "Sureśvara ..... refutes the doctrine of the joint necessity of *Karma* and *Jñāna* on the view of those modified dualists, like Bhartṛprapañca, who thought that reality was a unity in differences, so that the doctrine of differences was as true as that of unity, and that, therefore, duties have to be performed even in the emancipated state, because the differences being also real, the necessity of duties can not be ignored at any stage

ever, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta meet. विद्यां चाविद्यांच..उभयं सह ।। ईशोपनिषद्.[125]

Five theories about the relation of Jñāna and Karma:

(i) Only Jñāna..... Advaita Vedānta.[126]

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of progress, even in the emancipated state, though true knowledge is also necessary for the realisation of truth as unity. Sureśvara's refutation of this view is based upon two considerations, viz. that the conception of reality as being both unity and difference is self-contradictory, and that, when the one-ness is realised through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and differences is removed, it is not possible that any duties can be performed at that stage; for the performance of duties implies experience of duality and difference" (S. N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1932, Page 100).

The subject is discussed in detail in the first Adhyāya of नैष्कर्म्य-सिद्धि. Verses 60–78 are pertinent. See especially the verse

हेतुस्वरूपकार्याणि प्रकाशतमसोरिव ।
विरोधीनि ततो नास्ति सांगत्यं ज्ञानकर्मणोः ।। 66 ।।

(The purpose, nature and functions of Jñāna and Karma are as opposite as darkness and light. Therefore, combination of Jñāna and Karma is impossible).

125 Īśopaniṣad, 11. He who knows both Vidyā (knowledge) and Avidyā (action) together, attains immortality through knowledge and passes over death through action.

126 Advaita Vedānta advocates that knowledge and knowledge alone is a means to realisation. तस्माद्गीताशास्त्रे केवलादेव तत्त्वज्ञानात् मोक्षप्राप्तिर्न कर्मसमुच्चितादिति निश्चितोऽर्थः । (Śaṅkarācārya's Gītā-bhāṣya, II. 10). According to Śaṅkara the purport of the teaching of the Gītā is that knowledge of reality alone leads to Mokṣa and never the combination of knowledge and action.

* (ii) Only Karma	Mīmāṃsā.[127]
* (iii) Jñāna and Karma on the same level.....	A kind of Mīmāṃsaka. Cf. the two wings of a flying bird,[128] and also ईशावास्य उपनिषद्.[129]
(iv) Jñāna higher and Karma subordinate.....	Rāmānuja.[130]
* (v) Karma higher and Jñāna subordinate.....	Mīmāṃsaka.

* These three are Schools of Mīmāṃsakas.[131]

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127 That the entire purport of the Vedic texts is performance of actions (आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्) is the mandate of Mīmāṃsā.

128 उभाभ्यामेव पक्षाभ्याम् यथा खे पक्षिणां गतिः । तथैव ज्ञानकर्मभ्यां प्राप्यते ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् । (Hārītasmṛti). As a bird which flies in the sky makes use of both its wings, likewise the soul attains to Brahmanhood by knowledge and action.

129 See Foot Note 125 above.

130 According to Rāmānuja, कर्म cannot be abandoned till the end. At a higher stage, कर्म is necessary for progress in the life of the spirit. However, knowledge alone is the direct cause of release and action is accessory (see M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 411–412).

131 The five views are logical possibilities. No school completely rejects Karma or action, e.g. Advaita Vedānta prescribes action for purification of mind which is propaedeutic to knowledge. Again Mīmāṃsā does not altogether rule out knowledge; it is regarded as only contributory to liberation. Ultimately the matter is only that of stress. The controversy regarding Jñāna and Karma is set aside by Prof. Ranade when he says that

VI. Prabhākara and Kumārila

The two great Mīmāṃsā philosophers : Prabhākara and Kumārila, one inclining, on the whole, more towards Nyāya, the other inclining, on the whole, more towards Vedānta. The chronological relationship between Prabhākara and Kumārila : according to some, Prabhākara is earlier; while according to others Kumārila is earlier. These latter say that Guru was a title bestowed by Kumārila on his disciple Prabhākara, when Prabhākara intelligently interpreted अत्रापिनोक्तम् तत्र तुनोक्तम् ।[132]

Prabhākara	Kumārila
Metaphysics	
1. Bheda (Hence inclined	2. Bhedābheda between the

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knowledge is a never-ending process and not an event and as such Jñāna-karma-samuccaya does not occur (See The Bhagavad-gītā as a Philosophy of God-realisation, P. 207).

132 "In course of study, the Teacher came by a sentence– अत्रतुनोक्तं तत्रापिनोक्तं इति द्विरुक्तम् । the apparent meaning of this was– 'This has not been mentioned here, nor has it been mentioned there, so it has been mentioned *twice*'; and this was an absurdity which puzzled the teacher and the pupils alike; after some cogitation, the teacher retired to rest; before he returned, *Prabhākara* put a mark between अत्र and तु and another upon त्रा which altered the whole structure of the sentence, अत्र 'तुना' उक्तं तत्र 'अपिना' उक्तम् इति द्विरुक्तम्, which thereby was found to mean– 'Here this idea has been expressed by the particle तु and there the same idea has been expressed by the particle अपि, hence it has been expressed twice'. When the teacher returned, he saw the marks and found the difficulty easily solved; and having found out who had supplied the key to it, he was very highly pleased and bestowed upon *Prabhākara,* the title of 'Guru'" (Ganga Nath Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, Benaras Hindu University, 1942, Pp. 15–16).

towards Madhva) between different categories, hence no sanction to Pariṇāma. No recognition of Abhāva as a category, or Anupalabdhi as a Pramāṇa.[133]

different categories, hence Kumārila's doctrine of Pariṇāma (hence parallelism with सांख्य in परिणाम and also with निबार्क in भेदाभेद). The Bhedābheda doctrine was probably an inspiration to Nimbārka who came about 800 years later. Das Gupta however finds the Bhedābheda doctrine in Bādarāyaṇa himself (see Vol. II) Ahikuṇḍalavat? Recognition of Abhāva as a category, and Anupalabdhi as a Pramāṇa.[134]

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133 Prabhākara recognises absolute distinctness of one category from another. Thus substance, attribute, universal, particular, are all distinct. So are the material cause and its effect. There is thus no possibility of the cause transforming into the effect. And hence Pariṇāma-vāda (transformationism) is excluded. Prabhākara does not accept Abhāva or negation because his contention is that Abhāva can always be represented as something positive. Absence of a book on a table can be expressed positively as bare table. If Abāva as a category does not exist, there is no necessity of an independent criterion to know Abhāva. So Anupalabdhi as a criterion has no *raison d'etre.*

134 According to Kumārila the relation between the material cause and its effect is viewed as Bhedābheda or identity-in-difference. The effect is not a new creation, hence there is Abheda. But the effect is a transformation; hence there is Bheda. Milk and

2. The Self is unconscious or Jaḍa (If the soul is Jaḍa how can it be the locus of Apūrva?) even in the state of Liberation, as contrasted with the Self in Vedānta which has Caitanya. The expression स्वसंवेद्य of Prabhākara is meaningless because it is bodily or physical.

2. The Self is conscious or has Jñānaśakti even in Suṣupti. Kumārila, however, occupies an intermediate position between Nyāya which says that the Self has no knowledge in the state of sleep and Vedānta which says that it has happiness also;[135] cf.

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curds are different; so there is Bheda. But milk itself is transformed into curds; hence there is identity or Abheda. Kumārila's doctrine of Pariṇāma is the same as Sāṅkhya doctrine of Satkāryavāda. Again Kumārila's doctrine of Bhedābheda is also advocated by Nimbārka. He interprets the Brahma-sūtra III. 2. 27 to imply Bhedābheda. The serpent looks different (Bheda) from its coils; yet it is the same (Abheda) as the coils. "The above discussion seems to prove convincingly that Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy was some kind of Bhedābhedavāda or a theory of transcendence and immanence of God (Brahman) – even in the light of Śaṅkara's own commentary" (S. N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, P. 42). Further Kumārila accepts Abhāva as an independent category. As none of the Pramāṇas, namely Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Śabda or Arthāpatti is competent to cognise Abhāva, a special criterion, namely Anupalabdhi is requisitioned by Kumārila. (For Foot Notes 133 and 134 see also Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 324–326).

135 Kumārila occupies an intermediate position between Nyāya and Vedānta because in Nyāya consciousness is adventitious, in Kumārila the Self is conscious and in Vedānta it is self-illuminator. See Foot Note 136 below.

	Sarvajñātma Muni, who, in his Saṅkṣepaśārīraka tells us that the self enjoys bliss even in the state of deep sleep.[136]
3. The Self though unconscious, yet an eternal subject.[137]	3. The Self, conscious and an eternal unity of subject and object.[138]

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136 While dealing with सर्वज्ञात्ममुनि's doctrine in the class-room, Prof. Ranade observed that this was a heresy of the ultra-Śaṅkarites. Brahman is not so cheap as to be had in सुषुप्ति. Here the bliss (the so called bliss) is of unconsciousness and not of self-consciousness, which alone is real bliss. Bliss is experienced in the ecstatic state and not in deep sleep. In deep sleep there is happiness and not bliss; and this happiness is inferred when one wakes up. Actually it means that there was no pain during sleep. Bliss is qualitatively different from mere happiness. Prof. Ranade deals with this topic in Pathway to God in Hindi Literature, Pp. 212–213.

137 According to Prabhākara, the Atman or self is never an object of knowledge; i.e. it is not knowable. The self is always the subject of knowledge and is revealed simultaneously with the object. This self-revelation does not mean that Ātman is self-luminous. It is Jaḍa or unconscious. See also Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 302–307.

138 Kumārila holds that the self acts as both subject and object of knowledge. He believes in Pariṇāma i.e. modal change in the self. Jñāna is said to be a mode of the self. When modal change is accepted, the self can as well be an object of knowledge. The self is known through Aham-pratyaya or 'I-notion'. It arises whenever the self knows an object. It must be remembered, however, that though Aham-pratyaya is there, the Aham or self is not known as the subject; it is known as an object. In any

Cf. the "I am I" of Vedānta.[139]

No Self in Buddhism; a Jaḍa Self in Prabhākara; a conscious Self in Nyāya, though the consciousness is adventitious; a fully conscious entity in Kumārila; the self-illuminator in Vedānta:

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piece of knowledge, there are two elements – knowing an object and knowing the self (See Ibid. Pp. 302–307).

139 The expression 'I am I' is traceable to Kant. It means the unity of self-consciousness. The ideal of knowledge would consist in the object being one with the self. The object-self is one with the subject-self in pure self-consciousness. This is the unity of the subject and the object as in Kumārila. Now as Kumārila says that the self to be known at all must at the same time be aware of some object, i.e. the self knows itself only when knowing an object, Kant also contends that, an empty 'I am I' – a judgment of self-consciousness which did not involve at the same time a consciousness of a world of objects – would be impossible (See E. Caird, the Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. I, James Maclehose and Sons, Glasgow; Second edition, 1909, P. 373). The consciousness of objects is essential for the consciousness of self. Ibid. Pp. 368–374; also M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 305–306. This is comparable to अस्मिता (bare unqualified awareness of oneself) in Yoga philosophy. See Foot Note 25 in Chapter II. This is all about the epistemological aspect of I am I. So far as its mystical aspect is concerned, it is the realisation of the unity of the individual self with the universal Self, the अहं ब्रह्मास्मि of the Upaniṣads. Prof. Ranade says that in his *Opus Postumum* Kant had arrived at a mystical Identitate philosophy when he asserts his identity with the Supreme Being. "...I, as man, am myself this Being" (See, The Bhagavad-gītā as a Philosophy of God-realisation, Pp. 296–297).

(a) happiness enjoyed in deep sleep, and (b) Bliss enjoyed in ecstasy.[140]

4. Anvitābhidhāna-vāda[141]	4. Abhihitānvaya-vāda.[142]

Both Anvita and Abhihita refer to Padas.[143]

Mīmāṃsā theories of Error

5. Akhyāti[144] (or Alpakhyāti). Three forms: (i) fusion of presentation and presentation such as is involved in illusions of perception. (a) A crystal appearing red on account of an adjacent rose; (b) appearance of two moons (visual); (c) two pencils (tactual); (d) conch appearing to be yellow; (here, the sense organ is defective).	5. Viparītakhyāti,[145] cf. the Anyathākhyāti of Nyāya. No fusion or combination, but experience new and unique. Illusionistic tinge. Doctrine of aberration or distortion on the way to Śaṅkara's doctrine of Adhyāsa or Vivarta. In Anyathākhyāti according to Naiyāyikas there is a memory of silver; in Viparītakhyāti

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140 See Foot Note 136 above.

141 See R. D. Ranade, Vedānta the Culmination of Indian Thought, P. 29.

142 Ibid. P. 29

143 अन्विताभिधानवाद refers to pronunciation of terms already joined into one unit (अन्वित = joined; अभिधान = utterance). अभिहितान्वय वाद is utterance of terms which are joined together on account of the traces (संस्कारs) left by each of them. Both theories refer to पदs or terms. The question is whether they are first joined and then uttered or whether they are first uttered and then joined.

144 See Foot Note 119 above.

145 See Foot Note 119 above.

(ii) Fusion of presentation and memory, such as is involved in hallucinations. (a) presentation of shell and memory of silver; (b) presentation of rope and memory of serpent. (iii) Fusion of memory and memory such as is involved in cases of doubt: a tall object appearing either like a pillar, or like an ascetic in meditation.

All these cases involve a fusion of two elements, both of which are real, and yet in combination lead to error. Realistic tinge. Error, thus a grade of Reality (Bradley).[146]

according to Kumārila, there is no memory of silver but only an aberration of the mother-of-pearl as silver. In Viparītakhyāti as against Anyathākhyāti, there is an element of distortion.

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146 "Error is a qualification of a reality in such a way that in the result it has an inconsistent content, which for that reason is rejected" (F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 9th Impression, 1930, P. 167). "Error is truth, it is partial truth, that is false only because partial and left incomplete" (Ibid. P. 169). "We have pointed out that it is at least possible for errors to correct themselves, and, as such, to disappear in a higher experience. But, if so, we must affirm that they are thus absorbed and made good. For what is possible, and what a general principle compels us to say must be, that certainly is" (Ibid. P. 173). "But with this we have arrived at the meeting ground of error and truth. There willl be no truth which is entirely true, just as there will be no error which is totally false.... truth and error, measured by the Absolute,

Satkhyāti (Rāmānuja).[147] Macbeth's dagger real.[148] Cf. the

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must each be subject always to degree" (Ibid. Pp. 320–321).

147 Sat-khyāti means that Sat (that which exists) is alone cognised (khyāti). There can be no knowledge if there is no real object. For knowledge there must be a corresponding object. All knowledge is thus true. A difficulty however arises because errors do occur. Rāmānuja's theory of Satkhyāti must give explanation of error. A conch is mistaken for silver because there is similarity between the two as regards lustre (चाकचक्य). This similarity is due to the real presence of particles of silver in the conch. The particles may be extremely small in number (अल्प) but they are there and their presence gives rise to error – viz. seeing silver where there is only a conch. The explanation given about the yellowness wrongly seen in the white conch is different. Rāmānuja says that the yellowness situated in the eye of the jaundiced person travels to the conch in the process of seeing and therefore the conch is seen as yellow. The yellowness obscures the whiteness of the conch. See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Pp. 390 ff. (See also श्रीभाष्य, published by श्री निंबार्काचार्य पीठ, Pp. 172–176).

148 In Macbeth we have Macbeth's soliloquy where he is addressing a dagger. In fact the dagger is nothing but a hallucination:

Is this a dagger which I see before me,..
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still
.... or art thou but
A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?
I see thee yet, in form as palpable
As this which now I draw. (Act Two Scene I).

Macbeth sees the dagger as a stark reality. Rāmānuja's realism will have to explain the vision of the dagger which has no corresponding object. The dagger, Rāmānuja would say, is not

realistic tendencies in Nyāya according to which the secondary qualities are reduced to the primary.[149] Real particles of silver in Śukti. The चाकचक्य in mother-of-pearl is according to Rāmānuja due to veritable particles of silver.[150] Real yellowness in conch.[151] Asatkhyāti (Mādhyamika or Śūnya-vādin). Void meeting Void. Idea void; Object void; Nothing exists.[152] Ātmakhyāti (Yogācāra or Vijñānavādin). Really it ought to have been called Jñānakhyāti or Vijñānakhyāti. No justification for use of the word Atman, which does not exist. It only means: "The idea manifests itself as an object".[153] Akhyāti (Prabhākara): Alpakhyāti. Grade of reality. Two reals (a) Perception + Perception; (b) Perception + Memory; (c) Memory + Memory produce an unreal.[154] Anyathākhyāti (Nyāya). Silver is Āpaṇastha. Or else it is remembered.[155] Viparītakhyāti

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subjective, but it is created by the supreme Person at that particular time and hence is real.

149 See Foot Note 136 in Chapter V.

150 See Foot Note 147 above.

151 See Foot Note 147 above.

152 Asatkhyāti means knowledge of the unreal. When there are no external objects there is neither knowledge nor error. A self knowing an object is meaningless because the self is a void and the object is a void.

153 The expression Ātmakhyāti (knowledge of the self) is a misnomer, because Buddhism does not accept the self (Atman) at all. The Vijñānavādin's theory of error is based on their metaphysics that the external world does not exist. The silver in the shell-silver does not exist in the external world. It is an idea in the mind of the perceiver which appears to be external.

154 See Foot Note 119 above.

155 Anyathākhyāti means knowing otherwise. This is the view advocated by Nyāya which is realistic. In the shell-silver illusion,

(कुमारिल). The shell forsakes its nature, and appears as silver.[156] Anirvacanīyakhyāti of Advaitins. Beyond Being or not-Being. Neither Real nor Unreal. Unknowable, Inexplicable, Ineffable. Agnosticism.[157] Connected with: (i) Adhyāsa or super-imposition of bodily characteristics on self (Kṣāma-kṣīṇa)[158] ; of world on God.[159] (ii) Vivarta, maltransformation opposed to

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both the silver and the shell are real. The silver is in the shop (Āpaṇastha). Error occurs because there is wrong synthesis of the shell which is presented and silver which is elsewhere. In other words, there is wrong synthesis of the shell which is presented and silver which is remembered.

156 See Foot Note 119 above.

157 Anirvacanīyakhyāti implies indescribability. We cannot say that silver is being i.e. existent; for, the silver seen on the shell does not exist. Nor can we say that the silver does not exist as it is actually perceived. It is neither being nor not-being but is beyond them. The same is expressed by saying that it is neither real nor unreal. Hence no knowledge of a thing can be had. When a thing cannot be categorised as real or unreal it is inexplicable and defies expression. This unknowability leads to agnosticism.

158 Anirvacanīyatā is a result of Adhyāsa or superimposition. Through Avidyā or nescience one thing is superimposed on some other thing. By identifying himself with his kith and kin, a man takes on their enjoyment or suffering on himself; he identifies himself with his body and takes on himself bodily characteristics, e.g. he says I am emaciated and worn out (क्षामक्षीण), when as a matter of fact, it is the body which is so, the eternal Self being uncontaminated by conditions.

159 By the same process of Adhyāsa a man superimposes the world on God; he regards the unreal world as real, the real nature of Brahman being concealed by Adhyāsa or Māyā.

Pariṇāma which is transformation only. Rajju-sarpa or Śuktikā-rajata.[160]

The Summum Bonum

6. Categorical Imperative or Duty. Kāryatā-jñāna. Neither pleasure nor pain.[161]	6. Recognition of End, either negative or positive, in the shape of Duritakṣaya or Ānanda. Iṣṭasādhanatā-jñāna.[162]

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160 Vivarta means unreal appearance caused by Avidyā. The object undergoes a transformation but the transformation is not real as in Pariṇāmavāda of the Sāṅkhyas (e.g. milk changing into curds) but a mal-transformation or distorted perception. The classical examples given are– रज्जुसर्प, the rope appearing as serpent or शुक्तिकारजत, the conch appearing as silver.

161 The Prābhākara school adheres to the dictum: duty for the sake of duty. One should perform one's duty because it is the mandate of the Vedas and there is no room here for any consideration of pleasure and pain. In other words, it is not the thought of pleasure and pain but the consciousness of duty (Kāryatā-jñāna) that should motivate a man to action.

162 Contrasted with the teaching of Prabhākara, Kumārila holds that pleasure and pain motivate a man to action. Acquisition of pleasure or Ānanda is positive, while destruction of pain (Durita-kṣaya) is negative in nature. Behind the performance of duties, there is the consciousness of satisfying a desire (Iṣṭasādhanatā-jñāna). The Kāryatā-jñāna of Prabhākara and Iṣṭasādhanatā-jñāna of Kumārila roughly correspond to the Bonum Supremum and Bonum Consummatum of Kant. The former implies rigid performance of duty with no thought of pleasure, the latter recognises the place of happiness in the completed good though happiness should not be a motive to do duty.

7. Prabhākara understood Mokṣa as the setting of Avidyā, Avidyāstamayo Mokṣaḥ, or as the destruction of all Dharmas and Adharmas (Niḥśeṣadharmādharma-parikṣaya).[163] Vedāntic tinge, उभे तीर्त्वा सुकृत-दुष्कृते. He, however makes room for Ātmajñāna as supported by Śama, dama etc. थाप.[164]

7. Kumārila also regards Mokṣa as the destruction of Karman, but Mokṣa is only of a negative character (na hi abhāvātmakam uktva mokṣanityavakaranam).[165] The Pratyavāya is to be taken away. Its mention is mere Arthavāda. Mokṣa follows immediately on Karmakṣaya. It is thus of the nature of Abhāva. Kumārila's position is halting. It is a step from Prabhākara to Śaṅkara.[166]

Though thus there is a general agreement between Prabhākara's and Kumārila's views about the nature of Mokṣa, it is to be remembered that in the one case, it is Pratyavāya-parihāra, while in the other case it is Duritakṣayadvārā parameśvara-prītyartham. In the historical development of Mīmāṃsā there is a passage from स्वर्गप्राप्ति (conception of स्वर्गप्राप्ति) to the conception of Mokṣa.

Cf. यन्न दुःखेन संभिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनंतरम् ।

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163 Śalikanātha, Prakaraṇa-pañcikā, P. 156.

164 The Marathi word थाप means a white lie or bluff. It is ironical that Prabhākara, for whom the self is जड, should talk of आत्मज्ञान. The word थाप is a later addition to the text by whomsoever it might have been suggested. Prof. Ranade might have deleted the word in the final draft.

165 श्लोकवार्तिक, संबंधाक्षेपपरिहार, 107.

166 See Foot Notes 170–175 below.

अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत्सुखं स्वः पदास्पदम् ।। 167

Compare this for the conception of स्वर्गप्राप्ति. Kumārila recognises that Mīmāṃsā before his time, had altogether become atheistic (Lokāyatīkṛta). Also he inclines towards recognising the utility of Vedānta. Cf.

इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकरिष्णुरात्मास्तितां भाष्यकृदत्र युक्त्या ।

दृढत्वमेतद्विषयः प्रबोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन ।।168

When Kumārila makes obeisance to Somārdha-dhārin in his Maṅgala, (Śloka-vārtika, first Śloka), Namaḥ somārdha-dhāriṇe,[169] we can conclude: (i) that he was a Śivopāsaka, (ii) that he was a Parameśvara-vādin but he does not believe that God was the Creator of the world. See Ganga Nath Jha, तंत्रवार्तिक, Introduction. (iii) that he was a Śākta, Cf. Soma. (iv) that he had nevertheless his teachings grounded in Mīmāṃsā as the half cup

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167 The verse occurs in श्लोकवार्तिक, towards the end of आत्मवाद. The verse means: That happiness which is not shattered to pieces by sorrow, that which is not eclipsed by a later sorrow, that which is uncontaminated by desire, alone deserves the name of Ātma-sukha or happiness of self or heavenly bliss.

168 "Thus has the author of the Bhāṣya, with a view to refute Atheism, established, by means of reasonings, the existence of the Soul. And this idea of the existence of the Soul (thus obtained) comes to be strengthened by studying the Vedānta (i.e. the Upaniṣads)." Ganga Nath Jha, श्लोकवार्तिक, P. 408.

169 विशुद्धज्ञानदेहाय त्रिवेदी दिव्यचक्षुषे ।
श्रेयःप्राप्तिनिमित्ताय नमः सोमार्धधारिणे ।।
See श्लोकवार्तिक, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, वाराणसी, P. 1. (Salutations to Śiva who embodies in himself pure knowledge, who has divine eyes, who leads one to the ultimate good and who dons a crescent moon on his forehead.).

of Soma was directed to be drunk in Mīmāṃsā teaching. In any case, he saw that the consummation of Mīmāṃsā must be in Vedānta.

VII. How Kumārila leads to Vedānta[170]

(1) Bhedābheda leads to Abheda, (Bheda, Bhedābheda, Abheda).[171]

(2) Jñānaśakti leads to happiness, (Ajñāna, Jñānaśakti, Ānandamaya).[172]

(3) Consciousness leads to Self-consciousness, Self-

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170 The five points noted under this head refer to the development of ideas from Kumārila to Advaita Vedānta. One has to remember, however, that the development of doctrines here is logical and not chronological. Advaita Vedānta had already reached the logical end of doctrines before Kumārila came on the scene, with his halting positions. Borrowing a phrase from Falckenberg, we can say that history was not obliging enough to carry out the development with chronological accuracy; for, she had Advaitism complete the doctrines before Kumārila prepared the way.

171 In Prabhākara there is भेद, (see Foot Note 133 above). In Kumārila there is भेदाभेद, (see Foot Note 134 above). In Advaita Vedānta there is अभेद or identity. Hence we see a process from भेद in Prabhākara to अभेद in Advaita Vedānta through the intermediate link of भेदाभेद in Kumārila.

172 Prabhākara holds that the self is जड. In Kumārila the self is a fully conscious entity. In Advaita Vedānta the self is illuminator and bliss. Here again, there is a passage from a जड self in Prabhākara to an आनंदमय self in Advaita Vedānta and Kumārila occupies an intermediate position by holding that the self is a fully conscious entity.

luminousness and self-revelation.[173]

(4) Teleological ethics leads to the doctrine of Bliss.[174]

(5) And, Viparīta-khyāti leads to the doctrine of Adhyāsa or Vivarta.[175]

The tradition related about Kumārila and Śaṅkara has got a great meaning underlying it.[176]

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173 Kumārila clears the passage from an unconscious self to a self-conscious entity by his doctrine of conscious self. In Advaita Vedānta, there is not merely self-consciousness but self-luminousness and self-revelation as well. Here the self is स्वसंवित् and स्वप्रकाश, the latter attribute implying that the self not only reveals itself but reveals other objects also.

174 Kumārila's ethics is teleological because it recognises an end (see Foot Note 162 above). Advaita Vedānta identifies bliss with Brahman. The bliss is not only an end but *the End.* If in Kumārila happiness is only an operational motive, in Advaitism bliss is the sole moving force. It may be compared to Aristotle's Theoria, the supreme, thinking and blissful Being. Hence in Vedānta, as in Aristotle, Bliss constitutes the metaphysico-moral end.

175 As a matter of fact, there is not much difference between विपरीतख्याति and विवर्तख्याति. Kumārila says that in error there is a wrong synthesis of two things (rope and serpent) because of which the object appears distorted (विपरीत). The Advaita Vedānta puts forth almost the same view by saying that the serpent is super-imposed on the rope (अध्यास). See Foot Note 119 above.

176 A staunch believer in the Vedas, Kumārila was prepared to stake his life for establishing their supremacy. Once it so happened that the declaration of his faith began with a conditional clause: "If the Vedas are true...." At once a thought

struck him that his language at least apparently doubted the authority of the Vedas. The very utterance of the conditional clause implied irreverence for the Vedas. Overcome by deep repentance, he decided to immolate himself. At this juncture, Śaṅkara who was travelling through the length and breadth of India for vindicating Vedānta, came there and threw down the gauntlet. Kumārila was undergoing self-imposed Tuṣānala punishment which consisted in twisting dry straw round a person's limbs and setting it on fire. Kumārila said that he was on the point of departing and hence there was no time for any argument. He suggested that Śaṅkara should go to Maṇḍana Miśra – Kumārila's disciple – who would represent the Mīmāṃsā stand. How in the argument between Śaṅkara and Mandana the latter was won over, is history. The underlying meaning of the tradition is that Vedānta could consume Mīmāmsā.

Bibliographical Note

A. B. Keith : Karma-Mīmaṃsā, Chapter I is historical containing among other things an account of Prabhākara and Kumārila. Chapter II is epistemological containing an account of स्वतः प्रामाण्य as well as an account of the various Pramāṇas comparatively with those of Nyāya. The account of अर्थापत्ति, अनुपलब्धि may be read; but particularly the account of शब्द or verbal testimony as the Vedas themselves play such an important part in the system. Chapter III contains the very celebrated criticism by Kumārila of Buddhist nihilism and idealism; also an account of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of categories comparatively with those of न्याय-वैशेषिक. Chapter IV contains a very good account of a disproof of God and a proof of the soul. Chapter V deals with ritual interpretation and Chapter VI with Hindu Law (for this see Ganga Nath Jha, Prābhākara School).

Ganga Nath Jha : Translation of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Tantra-vārtika, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1924; 2 Vols. with a fine Introduction "On the Tantravārtika and its author Kumarila" by Pt. Gopinath Kaviraj, Pp. v to xviii. Also a small 4 page Introduction of Dr. Ganga Nath Jha. The brief Introduction of Ganga Nath Jha contains reply to Pasupatinatha Shastri's criticism on the author's work on the Prābhākara School. Gopinath Kaviraj discusses Kumārila and Buddhism; Kumārila's last scene; Kumarila's date etc. in Introduction to Vol. I.

Ganga Nath Jha : Translation of Śloka-vārtika, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1900 with a very fine Introduction by the author, of 45 pages on the "Pūrva Mīmāṃsā System". Ślokavārtika (in verse) I. i of Kumārila's work is the Tarkapāda, given to metaphysics and epistemology. The excellent Introduction of Ganga Nath Jha contains discussions of Dharma (Page iii); the means of knowing Dharma viz., Veda (Page v); The word as

supreme Pramāṇa (Page vi), Six objections urged to the view along with answers thereto (Pp. vii and viii); Constructive arguments of Jaimini for the word (Page viii). Nature of Jñāna and स्वतःप्रामाण्यवाद (Pp. viii ff). The Apūrva (Page xv). The meaning of Vidhi; अपूर्वविधि, नियमविधि, परिसंख्याविधि (Pp. xviii and xix), Subsidiaries (Page xxii), secondary actions and primary actions (Pp. xxiii to xxvi). Three kinds of primary actions नित्य, नैमित्तिक and काम्य (Pp. xxvi and xxvii). Arthavāda of four kinds– निंदा, प्रशंसा, परकृति and पुराकल्प (P. xxxv). Three kinds of results: क्रत्वर्थ, पुरुषार्थ and उभयार्थ (P. xl), and Īśwara, Categories, Mokṣa, Jñāna, Pramāṇas, Sṛṣṭi and Pralaya and Devatā (Pp. 32–34). In Śloka-vārtika Dr. Jha discusses Kumārila more or less, as he discusses Prabhākara in the next work.

Ganga Nath Jha : "Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini" translated by Ganga Nath Jha (Sacred Books of the Hindus Vol. X) with his own English commentary. Only Sūtras in Chapter 1 to 3 i.e. Śloka-vārtika and Tantravārtika, the remaining 9 chapters being Ṭup Ṭīka). The very brief Introduction contains an account in English (P. ii) of the contents of the 12 Adhyāyas. The translation also contains headings to the different Adhikaraṇas of the first three Adhyāyas.

Ganga Nath Jha : Prābhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā (Doctorate Thesis 1911). Very important work on Prabhākara particularly, and Prabhākara and Kumārila generally. Chapter I is historical and discusses the relation of Prabhākara to Kumārila. Pp. 5 to 18. (Read particularly our markings in the Table of Contents in 1820/96 Philosophy Department Allahabad University). Chapter II (Pp. 18 to 101) discusses the nature of cognition and its self-validity (Page 22). The very important discussion of word as the supreme Pramāṇa (Pp. 52–68). Prabhākara's doctrine of the self in relation to that of Kumārila (Pp. 73–82). The nature of Liberation (Pp. 83–85). Arguments

against God's existence (Pp. 85–88) and Categories in Kumārila and Prabhākara (Pp. 88–101). Chap. III discusses Dharma, Word, Arthavāda, Vidhi, different kinds of Apūrva (Pp. 159–168). Motives of actions etc. among other ritualistic matters. Chapter V discusses relation of Mīmāṃsā to Law such as Evidence, Inheritance, Adoption etc.

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If a full exposition of a problem from the pen of a master is delightful, suggestions from him for further study are challenging. Prof. R. D. Ranade's book is a critical survey of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Buddhism, Jainism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. In the present annotated edition, the author's aphorism-like observations are explained for the benefit of readers, especially students of philosophy. Documentation of references in the original text are provided for researchers who want to go to the sources. The work in hand provides ample food for thought to any one who wishes to launch upon a deep study of philosophy and religion.